Global Bases for a Global Britain?

The Secretary of State for Defence has used an interview with the Daily Telegraph to announce a substantial change in the UK’s defence posture which may lead to the opening of new permanent bases in the West Indies and the Far East. While it is perhaps a little unusual to see such a major policy shift trailed via a national newspaper interview, and not through the medium of a major defence policy document such as the MDP, it is potentially an intriguing development.

Few subjects appeal more to the online defence debating community that follows UK military matters than the subject of overseas bases. There is a strong emotional attachment to the idea that the UK should reopen and possess overseas forces in ‘proper’ bases, which will permanently house garrisons and ships to do a myriad of jobs. Attempting to provide scrutiny into what the role of these bases would be usually falls by the wayside though…

Strategic Airlift - vital to delivery of effective basing - Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

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The UK has a long history of deploying its armed forces overseas on a permanent basis. The Empire saw the acquisition of sites linked to critical strategic choke points, or coaling stations-  for instance Gibraltar, Singapore and the Falkland Islands. During Imperial times bases were used to house garrisons, often for many years at a time. Even in the post war years as decolonisation gathered speed, the UK retained facilities across the world. For example the RAF maintained bases in Pakistan and the Middle East into the 1950s to permit access to the Far East for air force units.

Until the late 1960s the UK maintained a large presence in Singapore and Malaysia designed to protect wider national interests, support residual colonial interests and protect newly independent nations. The so-called ‘confrontation’ with the Soviet supported Indonesian forces remains a widely forgotten but often extremely violent legacy of this time.

The decision to withdraw forces from across the globe and instead focus on NATO defence in the late 1960s and early 70s saw the closure of a range of facilities, many of which went on to live second lives with other nations. By the end of the 1970s the UK had largely completed its post-colonial withdrawal, with the departure from Malta in 1979 perhaps representing the end of this era.

The recall of the legions though did not mean the end of the overseas presence, and since 1979 the UK’s overseas footprint has, if anything, increased. Today the UK maintains permanent basing facilities of one form or another across the globe to help support operations.

The model that emerged over time was of a curiously British combination where some facilities (Cyprus, Gibraltar and Brunei) remained permanent ‘garrison’ facilities housing troops on accompanied postings with a long-term commitment to that location. Other locations such as the Falkland Islands are regarded for most personnel as an unaccompanied deployment for about 6 months. There are a small number of isolated outposts, for instance Diego Garcia and Singapore, housing facilities and a small number of staff, but not permanently assigned units.

What characterises these locations is that they are all regarded as long-term facilities and funded as such. They have long term investment plans, accommodation and personnel assigned to go to them fill roles that the MOD has determined need manpower to cover them (e.g there is a list of jobs for each service to help determine headcount requirements, and the posts at these sites usually feature on this list).

By contrast many of the deployments undertaken overseas, many of which became enduring for many years, do not have the same level of permanency. For instance, even though the RN was deploying multiple escorts into the Gulf from 1980 onwards, it did not feature as a standing military task, and no permanent facilities were created to support this work. This led to a variety of temporary solutions, for both support and maintenance – such as the creation of Forward Logistics Sites (FLS) in places like Bahrain and Mombassa.

Similarly, the RAF found itself making use of many interesting and varied airfields around the world – particularly in the Middle East. Despite operating detachments out of these locations, they were never made or intended to be permanent operating bases.

The British way of expeditionary warfare then seems to be characterised as a combination of long term ‘post imperial presence’ in areas where it either retains sovereignty of a facility, or a very low key and benign relationship with the host nation. Or it is operating out of an often austere and short-term facility borne at risk on top of existing manpower and operational requirements to meet a specific operational goal. The UK has for many years shied away from establishing wider ‘bases’ globally, preferring instead to rely on host nation support.

Bases overseas offer both benefits and constraints. While it is easy to look and suggest that it makes sense to have forces and equipment to hand in one location, when you look up to the wider perspective, this may not always be the right outcome for the UK.

In opening a base facility overseas, a number of issues need to be considered. Firstly, who owns the land you plan to work from, and what impact will this have on your ability to operate effectively? In practical terms, can you do what you want with your armed forces based there, or does the host nation have constraints and powers of veto on their use?

Developing an effective agreement to permit the basing and operating of military personnel in another country is not easy. You have to solve many difficult legal issues, ranging from the mundane to the very serious. If the UK were to open a base facility in a country that was not UK sovereign territory, would it be able to reach agreement on the best way to use this facility? Will the host nation allow unrestricted access to its port and airspace for shipping & aircraft movements or does the UK need permission each time it wants to sail?

The expectations of the host nation need to be considered too – if they allow you to build a military facility, what do they want in return? Are they seeking assurance and protection, or do they expect you to support them in all they do? In the event of civil disorder, or an uprising, will they expect British personnel on the streets to protect the Government?

There are a great many legal questions that need to be considered when looking to open a permanent base. There is also the challenge of maintaining relationships – if you put a certain level of capability into a facility (say a warship and squadron of jets), then this becomes the ‘new normal’. E.g. the hosting nation will regard this as the default setting for the state of the Defence relationship. It makes it harder to dispatch troops or units on other tasks without implying the commitment is being reduced to the host nation.

Similarly, permanently basing units in another country means it is harder to cut them without damaging bilateral relationships. They very much become a hostage to fortune – for the French, it is now impossible for them to withdraw their Rafale squadron from the UAE without sending a clear message that they do not value their bilateral relationship as much anymore. This may work for the UAE, but is it in the long-term strategic interest of France to be tied up in this manner?

The advantage of the UK approach to date has been flexibility in not being too proscriptive about force levels, allowing it to ebb and flow units across the world – by contrast France has found that in deploying certain units and capabilities permanently, particularly to the Middle East, they have become something of an tethered goat – offering less value and influence than may expected because the host nation expects them to be there regardless.

There are wider logistical, and personnel challenges associated with establishing new bases too. In the 50s and 60s the model of basing a family overseas made sense – usually soldiers were the sole earners in the family and the wives would be expected to raise the children. Today the notion that the Forces member is the sole earner in the family, or that their partner can, or wants, to move overseas for two - three years and put their career on hold is a much harder sell.

Finding volunteers for overseas service in the right rank brackets may be a bit of a challenge – its one thing if you are an older officer approaching retirement and with the kids in university to want a defence attaché posting. If you have a partner with a career and young children, three years abroad may be a bad move – and potentially career ending.

The alternative of relying on people for isolated tours, such as seen in Diego Garcia, may work for a short while, but places pressure on the system to find the manpower. These facilities will be opened on top of existing manpower pressures, so finding people to staff them means either securing a very long-term manpower uplift, stopping doing something else entirely, or gapping a post. This potentially places a lot of pressure on an already taut career model.

People may well not want to regularly go overseas for 6-8 months to a foreign base for a deployment. What starts as a positive one-off tour quickly pales into frustration and boredom if they keep returning to the same location and are separated from their family. A major challenge for posts in the Gulf has been the pressure felt by the MCMV community, many of whom are on their 5^th or 6^th tour of Bahrain now. Opening additional bases will only increase this pressure.

There is a wider issue too with the nature of what the bases will exist to do. By their very nature they will likely need stores facilities, access to airports and munitions stowage and all the other elements required to support a military force. Ensuring that this setup does not interfere with existing military missions, nor reduce availability of stores in a crisis because they are held in the wrong place will be important. As critical as access to the base will be the assurance that the existing defence logistics supply chain can get people and material in and out of the facility without challenges – which in turn reminds us of the need to resolve the complex legal issues around basing in a foreign country.

Finally it needs to be worked out where the money is coming from the pay for this, and what gives as a result. Building military bases and ensuring they meet UK defence standards are not cheap. Given the wider financial pressures on the defence budget, either more money is required to open entirely new facilities, or major cuts will be required elsewhere to pay for it.

Regardless of the challenges and constraints of establishing and operating the base, the bigger question is simply – what will they do and why do we need them? It was suggested that two facilities will be opened, one in the West Indies and one in the Far East.

In the West Indies the most likely roles to support are recovery from hurricanes and supporting wider counter narcotic efforts. There is already a substantial facility in Belize which hosts training courses for the Army. The RN and RFA have focused on a model of using vessels such as an RFA BAY Class to forward deploy into the region, doing refits locally supported by occasional deployments of River Class or Type 23 frigates.

The biggest opportunity a base would offer would be to provide some kind of refit and stores facility, combined with access to training, and an airfield for flying in humanitarian aid for loading as required. Such a facility would need to be outside the traditional hurricane landing points to prevent it being wiped out, and also not too far outside of the area to make it difficult to sail quickly to provide help.

Therefore any structure would need to offer stores, access for RAF aircraft and an ability to house a rapidly expanded force. It would probably want to house DFID supplies and also provide accommodation and communications facilities for an HQ element too.

There is a long tradition of training the local coastguards and forces in the region – for instance the RN used to provide a Lt Cdr to a senior role in the Turks & Caicos islands to head up their maritime force. A well designed facility could function as a hub for a small training team to help improve capacity in the local regions security forces.

The RN used to have a facility that had the space to do much of this – it was called HMS MALABAR and was based in Bermuda. It closed in 1993 (but even then still had 30 RN staff based there). The real estate has long since been sold off though and no UK facilities exist on the remaining overseas territories in the region.

The question for the West Indies though is ‘what does having a base give us that doesn’t already exist’? The UK enjoys access to a variety of ports in region, particularly in the US, and can in a crisis stage through many of the airfields as required. While a national facility may be a ‘nice to have’ it is difficult to understand what it would provide in terms of capability that cannot already be done with existing resources and capabilities present in the region.

This is not to say that creating a coherent central location to bring this all together is not a bad idea. It provides opportunities to create better defence relationships, improve links to local defence forces and helps send a clear signal to the region that the UK continues to play a visible and active part in regional security. The West Indies is instinctively pro British, and HM The Queen remains the Head of State for many islands in the region. Committing forces locally in the manner of the Dutch and French militaries may be a useful and timely reminder of the links the UK has to the region.

The location will be key though – while the SofS suggested Montserrat, given the large and rather active volcano present on the island, this may not be a good location long term (unless of course SofS aspires to having his own hollowed out evil volcanic lair…). The UK has done an increasing amount with Guyana in recent years (and the former HMS ORWELL still serves in their navy as its sole vessel).

In the Far East the UK already enjoys defence facilities in both Singapore and Brunei. In the former the UK has a small wharf complex with the second largest naval fuel depot in the Asia Pacific region (after Pearl Harbour), inherited when the RN withdrew in 1971. This facility has proven its value many times over the years, both from functioning as a revenue generating petrol station (the fuel available is often provided at cost to allies, helping turn a profit for the Treasury), and in providing a good location for stores.

During OP PATWIN HMS ILLUSTRIOUS was able to use the facility to restore and take on the disaster relief mission prior to heading to provide aid to the Philippines. Similarly, as the RN has returned to the Asia Pacific region, there have been an increasing number of RN visits to the facility, which also provides berthing for FPDA vessels too.  HMS ARGYLL has recently used the facility to conduct a mid deployment stand down, allowing several weeks alongside for repairs – as seen in this Royal Navy news story.

In Brunei the UK provides a garrison force, graciously paid for by His Majesty the Sultan of Brunei, to help provide security. Built around a Gurkha infantry battalion, supported by a helicopter flight and supporting arms, the small garrison of around 1000 personnel provides a useful acclimatised ‘theatre reserve’ for the Asia Pacific rim, and can be used to send troops locally in a variety of roles.

The UK has expressed considerable interest in increasing its commitment and presence to the Asia Pacific region, and it is likely that any new facility would be adding to the capabilities already held locally.  In practical terms it would seem realistic to expect an enhancement of facilities in both countries rather than an entirely new facility, although it is not clear whether this would be supported by extra units. For instance, would the RAF look to conduct more deployments out to the Asia Pacific region using Singapore as a hub?

Perhaps the best way to look at both facilities is in the context of the adoption of a so-called ‘lily pad’ model. The MOD appears to have settled on a structure built around a number of permanent base facilities around the globe, able to provide access, support, stores and other essential requirements to enable the wider deployment and operation of UK armed forces units.

An example of this is the Naval Support Facility in Jufair, Bahrain, where the base is built around accommodation, wharves, warehouses and workshops – all designed to support and enable the onward operation of units for other missions.

The proposed structure that is emerging will ensure that the UK has access to a permanent facility in each of the major regions of the world, able to host and support operations as necessary. In many ways this is not really a change from current arrangements, albeit slightly more formalized and possibly enhanced in nature.

If you look forward a few years then it is possible to see a coherent British operational approach built around three mutually supporting pillars – home defence, forward bases and operational deployments.

Home defence would cover the units based in the UK for routine duties from shooing away drones to providing EOD or Counter Terrorism capability. Units deployed in forward bases would be on duties ranging from deterring the Russians in Eastern Europe, to supporting operations in the Gulf or Far East. Finally operational deployments covers units deployed away from home as part of a specific operation name (e.g. TELIC).

This move would be supported particularly by the Royal Navy who are moving to a model of making better use of forward deployed facilities to ensure that the Type 31e will spend much of its life away from home in locations like Singapore. Speeches by the First Sea Lord have highlighted the considerable ambition that exists to do more with these units, while at the same time generating a Carrier Strike Group to conduct high end operations.

It is early days though, and policy ideas proposed through the medium of a newspaper interview  will probably take a long time and a lot of refinement to pass through the Whitehall machinery. It will take time to work out where to open the facilities, to build them and to ensure that they are able to not only support MOD goals, but also across Whitehall as well.

It is realistically going to be several years until anything concrete emerges, but in the interim this statement of aspiration is a helpful way of signalling to these regions that the UK remains a global player, that it wishes to take a renewed interest in their regions, and that it wishes to stay permanently. Whether all the nations in these regions will welcome this though remains to be seen.