The Christmas ghosts of Foreign Policy past, present and yet to come...

Richard Hass, a former US diplomat and President of the Council for Foreign Relations issued a blistering tweet on Friday, setting out the state of Europe as he saw it today:

“In an instant Europe has gone from being the most stable region in the world to anything but. Paris is burning, the Merkel era is ending, Italy is playing a dangerous game of chicken with the EU, Russia is carving up Ukraine, and the UK is consumed by Brexit. History is resuming”.

While there is an argument that this could be seen as slightly hyperbolic, and that the situation in France reflects normal business (aka ‘if in doubt protest’), that Italian governments are often short lived so it is unlikely to last long enough to be serious, and that the German Chancellor succession represents the end of an era, not likely to cause unrest, it still should give us pause for thought about the world we live in today.

Since 1990 the public assumption seems to have been that Europe was somehow ‘safe’, that it was stable and that the multitude of problems in its past had been overcome. More widely, there was a sense that in a difficult world, Europe was the ‘sorted’ placed that could go and help others. Today we live in a world where arguably we have returned to business as usual in Europe, as old fault lines emerge and tensions increase.

At the same time as Europe is faltering, the world more widely is going through a period of transition, with three parallel periods of power competing for influence. To misquote Charles Dickens, we are currently witnessing three ghosts showing us the world that was, that is, and that will be.

Russia is the ghost of Christmas past, a declining power which generates strong memories and emotions, yet one still replete with enough power to cause challenges. The United States is the ghost of Christmas present, a powerful nation in the now, but with questions raised to about its long-term future. China represents the ghost of Christmas yet to come, with a variety of options abounding as to how it chooses to engage with the international system.

The curious challenge posed by all three of these powers is that they may be individual nations, but the most effective means of tackling them, or working with them effectively is probably via multilateral co-operation.  For the United Kingdom, the question is how does it engage with these three ghosts, and what does its future position on the global stage require, and how does it deliver this? More widely, how does it balance the relationships between them, and the inherent tensions that may be raised?

Russia presents a curious paradox of a nation. Militarily powerful, it remains an economic basket case, with a declining population and major structural challenges. Although it continues to hold a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its actions and foreign policy are more akin to a deeply uncultured rogue state, not a civilised one.

The threat posed in handling Russia is its unpredictability and risk to other nations. A long-term proven willingness to utterly ignore and hold the basic values of the international system in contempt, and to willingly invade other nations shows that Russia is a threat to the West. The challenge for the international system is how to deter Russia in a manner that their leadership understand the risk of acting is too great to warrant the potential gains.

But the West must engage with Russia in order to progress different foreign and security policy issues. It is not enough to cut Russia off and treat them with the contempt that their appalling behaviour so utterly warrants. Instead engagement is vital on issues such as progress in Syria, prevention of vetoes of wider UN Security Council business and in helping make the global order progress.

While their armed forces may be potent in places (particularly their submarine force), Russia is a power whose long-term prospects are bleak. It is impossible to see Russia as anything other than a power in precipitous decline. The dropping birth rate, faltering economy and deep underlying structural and economic challenges facing the country means its future as a global power is reliant on winning arms export orders to keep the heavily militarized economy afloat and the size of their nuclear arsenal.  

There are some who may argue that the United State is also a power in decline, reliant more on its military power than pure economic muscle. While the death of the American empire has been declared many times by writers, we are probably not yet at the end of its life. The United States is struggling to adapt to a world where in living memory it has gone from possessing power and influence unrivalled in human history, to now being in direct competition with other nations for influence.

As the US adapts to a new world order, its ability to influence and determine the shape of world events will change. It is not a power that will disappear, but equally the ability of Washington to speak and nations to act in response is quickly changing, with capitals across the world instead focusing on what both Washington and Beijing think on issues.

The challenge at the heart of US policy is the equally strong tugs of both engaging internationally to solve problems and magnificent isolationism. The US economy cannot cope with being cut off from the worlds markets, but this in turn places a requirement to take a deeper interest in the worlds problems. Whether a retreat behind walls and tariffs will increase the strength of the US economy, or whether it will merely accelerate the decline of the US as a global hegemon is not yet clear.

For China the world is replete with opportunity and a chance to secure leadership and influence. The explosion in the Chinese economy over the last 40 years, and the ongoing ability of the country to steer a course between capitalist progress and the characteristics of a one-party state is intriguing. The increase in Chinese resources to buy influence globally through economic power, soft power and an increasingly numerically potent armed forces points to a future where Beijing and not Washington dictates the global agenda.

The challenge facing China is whether its growth is sustainable, and if the economy can keep up with the demands of a billion increasingly wealthy and savvy individuals who aspire to a middle-class lifestyle. As China modernises and its population seek the comforts of the West, where will the cheap labour go? Does China have the ability as a nation to transition from a low income industrial economy to a higher income service-based economy in the same way as Western nations have done, or do they have to stifle personal aspirations and dreams of wealth to keep the country’s economy going?

What does this all mean for the UK?

When considering all of this, the question is – what does this mean for the UK and how does it take an appropriate role in playing a part in the changing global order? For all the talk of national decline, the UK remains an extremely significant player on the global stage, with a large economy, globally capable armed forces and a widely respected suite of soft power capabilities ranging from the Diplomatic Service through to the BBC. With a truly global outlook, the UK has both an opportunity and a responsibility to shape how the world changes over the next few years.

Russia poses the most traditional challenge, and one that requires a response most clearly rooted in deterrence. From a diplomatic perspective the UK in isolation cannot force Russia to change its pattern of behaviour – realistically no nation can. The Russian mindset is one that thrives in being challenged and subjected to difficult times and problems. The Skripal incident showed that bilaterally, our ability as a nation to shape Russian behaviour was limited.

What hurts Russia and forces them to moderate and assess risks is a multi-national response that pushes a co-ordinated diplomatic process. The mass expulsions of intelligence personnel and diplomats across the Western world in response to the outrageous Russian use of Novichok in Salisbury was not only hugely effective in punishing Russia but was also a triumph of British diplomacy.

The first lesson for Russia is that the UK needs to maintain a strong global diplomatic network that can build effective relationships that can be called on when required. The way that the UK co-ordinated a widespread international response demonstrates the potency of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in lobbying effectively. A large part of the UK’s global influence is because of the ability of the men & women of the Diplomatic Service to persuade nations to work with the UK.

Using multi-lateral instruments like NATO, the UN, the EU and so on to call out Russian behaviour not only supports the UK but helps allies too. In setting out clear red lines of unacceptable behaviour, and in getting the West to stand up to Moscow, the Russian regime know that their ability to conduct future such attacks is more challenging.

The second area that the UK must invest in is continued support for NATO and other multi-lateral institutions that can help stand up to Russian intransigence. The UK is safer in part because its membership of NATO helps send a message that a kinetic attack on one is an attack on all. But the Russians are determined to push this interpretation to its breaking point, putting enormous pressure on the Baltic states and countries in South East Europe. The growing resurgence of UK commitments to the Black Sea by the Royal Navy and RAF, and deployments by the RAF and British Army to the Baltic is a key part of sending a message to Russia.

While the days of the British Army maintaining a large corps sized formation in Germany to protect against a Russian invasion are long gone, the value of deterrence via international organisations cannot be underestimated. The small token presence in Estonia and other nations may not be a large military force, but it sends a message to Russian planners that the UK and NATO allies are present and committed. The ultimate question Moscow must contend with is whether the UK and allies are prepared to trigger Article 5 in response to an attack on a NATO member like the three Baltic states.

For the MOD the requirement to tackle an emerging Russia places an emphasis on requiring equipment that can be used on the traditional and long neglected European and North Atlantic theatres. The return to increased ASW patrols, investing in practising for high intensity fighting and airpower requires the MOD to prioritise its money in some very niche roles. This is often at odds with the ‘globally deployable military’ that defence reviews have invested in for the last 30 years.

To shift priorities now back towards focusing on the threat to NATO allies not only requires significant new investments, but it also may cause a challenge in how the UK continues to operate with the US.

The ongoing challenge for the UK with America is how to influence it and ensure that our national interests continue to align and that we see eye to eye on most issues. For nearly 75 years the UK and US have been closely aligned in international security matters, developing a bond that is arguably closer than any other two nations. The ability for two of the P5 members of the UN Security Council to work so closely together has made a substantial difference to the maintenance of peace and security.

The challenge is how to work with America as it pushes on a path towards an increasingly transactional relationship with nations where long-term interests are set aside in the name of short-term ideology. The priority for the UK must be to keep the US engaged and be able to put across an ‘offer’ that demonstrates the continued value of working with the UK and wider Western community of matters of security interest.

This realistically manifests itself by showing to America that the UK can add more than the sum of its parts to the relationship. This can be done by using existing membership of organisations that the US doesn’t belong to (for instance the EU & Commonwealth) as a tool of extended diplomatic lobbying. It can be done through providing highly valued science and technology projects to help develop new military capability (such as the F35 fighter) and it can be done through providing military capabilities that complement or enhance a US deployment.

For the UK this can be done through providing globally deployable armed forces able to support US missions and burden share too. The ongoing reluctance of some NATO nations to fund their way is clearly placing huge strain on the Alliance – by meeting the 2% requirement the UK is helping show it takes security seriously.

The ability of the UK to offer an armed force capable of deploying around the world to support US missions is critical. For instance, the ongoing large commitments in the Gulf help show a willingness to share the responsibility to keep this region safe, whilst the arrival of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class provides additional platforms to deploy USMC aircraft from.

The sort of operations that the US want support for though are often the most highly intensive and complex ones. They are looking for partner nations to turn up able to operate, sustain themselves and fully integrate in to the US way of working on operations. This requires a subtly different military capability from a NATO deterrence force, and instead calls for investment in capabilities like F35, ASTUTE class SSNs and the provision of intelligence, cyber and Special Forces personnel able to collectively fit into a US commanders plan.

The sort of investment needed to maintain this ‘day one’ capability (e.g. there at the start of the campaign as an integral player) is eyewatering. The gains though are considerable – if UK personnel are on the line at the same time as American ones, then it buys the UK a decision-making seat at the table, and a chance to influence how the operation and plans evolve. The price of admission to the ‘day one’ club is huge, but it gives the UK real ability to shape how the US approach a campaign.

The cost though is that it requires cuts in other areas to fund. Planners and policy makers need to decide what they want to prioritise – is it pulling together a balanced military that meets UK needs, or is it a more structurally unbalanced force that would support niche parts of the US, but require its own support from allies to deploy?

The question is whether the UK wants to continue to persuade the US to operate globally with allies, or whether it is better to go it alone? Arguably there is a strong case for international co-operation, but when dealing with a country used to being the predominant power, making the case for allies can be tricky at times. Managing the relationship with the US is about being able to make the case for action and persuade allies to do likewise in order to show why it is in the best interests of the US to commit to resolving an issue.

The UK also needs to reconcile the shifting nature of American strategic focus. With the acceptance that Russia is in the long term a declining power, and the general decline of Europe as a region, American attention is increasingly focused on the Asia Pacific region. There are two options open to the UK here – it could choose to focus on being a European NATO leader, taking responsibility for acting as a bridge to keep European powers focused on defence, while acting as a bridge to the US.

Alternatively, the UK could look to leverage its existing relationships with the 5-EYES community (UK, US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand) and the wider desire to engage more widely as part of the ‘global Britain’ narrative and look to channel increased resources and attention into the Asia Pacific region.

The arrival of China on the global stage as an economic superpower poses a real challenge to how the UK will have to approach its foreign and security policy. While both UK and Chinese officials talk of a golden era of bilateral relations, and the notion of a direct military conflict between the two nations is practically non-existent, there are still challenges. The rise of China as an influencer prepared to use ‘soft power’ such as loans, grants and easy access to military hardware with no questions asked is a good way to build diplomatic support.

The rise of Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific region, from Africa to the tiny Pacific island nations is a story of Chinese affluence and largesse, coupled with genuine attention being lavished on remote nations that have long been ignored by the US and UK. Even as late as the 2000s, the UK was closing High Commissions and Embassies in the region. Today the struggle for influence in the Asia Pacific, with the recognition that these tiny islands hold influential votes on international organisations suggests that there is growing recognition that Chinese engagement is paying dividends. The marked increase in UK diplomatic and economic engagement trips into the region, coupled with the growth of military presence from a low base (there have been four RN warship in the region this year alone – the latest being HMS MONTROSE) suggest that this lesson is being heeded.

The challenge for the UK is to work out how to balance off the long-term relationship it seeks with China built around mutual prosperity and opportunities to work together, with the increasing suspicion and security concerns that many more traditional allies are showing. Recent news reports focusing on issues like Chinese influence and the rejection of Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei and ZTE demonstrate that it will be a difficult relationship to balance.

The lesson for the UK in dealing with China is that it will not, in isolation, be able to achieve a significant amount of impact. The sheer scale of the Chinese population and economy dwarfs that of the UK. The only way to land an effective message is to build a coherent alliance of like-minded partners to send messages effectively. Long term the UK will need to think strategically about how it intends to position itself with China – is it to serve as a gateway between the US and China, being able to speak with candour and trust to both parties, or will it be forced to choose in its relationship? What is more important overall – supporting an increasingly hard-line and unpredictable Washington that expects loyalty but may not always repay in kind, or support (or at least remain neutral) with Beijing in order to maintain UK jobs and export orders?

As we look at the world of three powers, two final thoughts emerge. The first is that the Great Game is afoot again, and that the UK needs to consider its posture accordingly. The rise in Russian military power in the Middle East and increasingly in Africa highlights the way that Russia is seeking to confront and cause destabilising actions that can impact directly on UK security. Provision of military equipment to prolong a civil war in Africa may lead to a direct humanitarian crisis that requires UK intervention, or causes mass migration of people across the region that in turn has lasting impacts on wider nations.

A good example of this is the complex pattern of activity in Sudan and the Horn of Africa where people migration linked to Climate change and famine is causing the rise of new towns, increases in piracy in the surrounding maritime environment and people migration to Yemen to flee conflict and famine elsewhere. This incredibly complex picture has enormous potential to suck in UK interests and cause long term strategic challenges.

The UK must be prepared to mobilise all the assets at its disposal, be they military, diplomatic, commercial or soft power related in order to challenge the nefarious impact of Russian influence. It also needs to consider carefully how to address and engage with the growing presence of Chinese military power in new regions. While China is not a military threat or competitor with the UK, their actions in supporting some states may have long term consequences to allies of the UK that in turn threaten our own interests.

The UK needs to determine where its critical interests lie across the globe and the extent to which it is prepared to fight to protect or regain influence. The departure from the EU heralds a more outward facing Britain, and it is at this point that the UK needs to look again at the institutions and relationships it has perhaps neglected for too long to see how to regenerate relationships put in abeyance.

The departure from the EU though does not mean that the UK is able to absolve itself of international entanglements. It is strikingly clear that in dealing with all three of the main global powers, the only way to do so effectively is by multi-lateral engagement. Regardless of your view on Brexit and the risks or opportunities that this may provide, working with partners is the only way to maximise the chances of influencing certain nations view and behaviours.

The risk for Europe and the UK is that a divorce on poor terms means splitting up a successful relationship and weakening the UK’s ability to help shape the debate and formulate the diplomatic approach. Many who have worked in Brussels would comment that the UK was responsible for co-ordinating and driving the EU foreign policy response to crisis situations, and in ensuring that the approach taken met not only EU but also British interests too. The imminent withdrawal from the EU will end this ability and runs the risk that the UK and EU will drift apart on foreign and security policy co-ordination, making it harder to present a united front, or to influence Russia, China and the US.

While Europe may not be collapsing on itself, the world is in an unstable place. As we see powers fall, falter and rise the challenge for the planners and policy makers of Whitehall is how to strike a balance of delivering the right outcome for the UK and her allies, while respecting that it will be increasingly difficult to do so. Determining the right balance of investment in military capability, where to focus diplomatic attention and efforts and how to balance off the interests of old partnerships while building new ones poses a possibly unprecedented set of problems and interests. 

The challenge ahead is enormous, and the answer will not be found by relying on glorious isolation and hoping that previous performance is an indicator of future success, but instead strong positive engagement and compromise in the name of the national interest. These are ‘interesting times’.