Good enough for Nelson? The CDS RUSI speech, risk and medical entry standards.
The Chief of
the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter has given his annual speech to the
RUSI about the challenges facing the UK today. In a speech that covered the
wide range of highly successful deployments met by the British Armed Forces this
year, and which rightly praised their successes, he also commented about the relationship
between the armed forces and society.
In the speech
he said:
People must be encouraged to lead, to build inclusive teams, and to take
sensible intellectual risk in the pursuit of opportunity and delivery – we do
this brilliantly on operations with our philosophy of mission command, but the
moment we return home the system freezes up…
This discussion of risk was followed by wider reflection
on the role of the Armed Forces in Society and how they are increasingly not
understood by the public. He reflected that the armed forces need to improve
their engagement with the public and be better at recruiting from the full
spectrum of the UK and its cultures.
This discussion
is particularly pertinent given his prior comments about recruitment and how
people seemed reluctant to serve in the armed forces. It also ties into wider
discussions about how difficult it seems to be to actually get into the armed
forces these days. For all the debate about people not wanting to join, there
seems to be a significant disparity between expressions of interest and people
actually joining up.
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Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
A huge challenge seems to be the medical standards used to recruit people. The armed forces have
set stringent standards on peoples height, weight, medical conditions and
medicine taken to ensure that when applying to join, only physically fit people
can get in. That's fine if you have high recruiting levels, but when you are 8000 undermanned, is it time to think again? (data here)
The argument
seems to be that the moment you make exceptions, then what happens if someone
with Condition X or medicine Y is in the field or on operations and their
condition flares up and they cannot possibly do their job? Is it the thin end
of the wedge that may end up getting someone killed?
There is a strong logic that if you are applying to be an infanteer, you want to recruit someone able to withstand a punishing physical fitness training programme and be in excellent physical condition. But if you are recruiting an engineer, or an intelligence analyst, then do they need to meet the same standards?
The challenge
seems to be that the system seems to be extremely well designed to reject
people on highly spurious grounds. There was a case mentioned on social media
last week of someone who has been deemed permanently unfit for service because
he was prescribed an inhaler once – that individual is now a fell runner.
CDS is right
that the system prefers to rely on its intellectual comfort zone of not taking
risk at home and relying on the old defence of ‘standards dear boy’ when people
ask why not take a risk and let someone with a minor condition join.
This would be
fine if every single person in the military was an athlete in perfect physical
condition, but when you consider the sheer range of medical maladies that serving
military personnel have, and are allowed to continue to serve with, you have to
wonder whether the system is completely fit for purpose.
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Admiral Nelson |
The challenge
facing the military is that it is trying to draw from a pool of individuals of
varying ages and varying health conditions. Todays youth is often less fit, and
possibly more prone to being diagnosed with various conditions than previous
generations. This is arguably due to advances in medicine, or a wider risk averseness
in doctors to avoid the worst case scenario and prescribe something ‘just in
case’ (e.g. Humphreys old family village doctor was well known locally for
prescribing inhalers to village children at the slightest hint of wheeziness,
whether they had asthma or not).
The challenge
is that the military is not moving with the times, and is instead insisting on
everyone joining meeting a pretty comprehensive list of medical standards –
which is ruling out thousands of potential recruits every year – many of whom
are likely fit, healthy young people who just happened to have one minor issue
that is easily mitigatable.
A sensible pragmatic
approach perhaps also needs to be taken to rejoiners who have already accrued long
medical history in the forces. At present people who leave and try to rejoin
after 3 years are subject to taking the New Entry Medical again which involves
a telephone triage call with a contract nurse. Unsurprisingly it is remarkably
easy to fail this medical, particularly if you’ve served in HM Forces in the
past and been injured or prescribed medication.
As an
example, Humphrey was very keen to rejoin the Reserves after a few years away.
Having gone through the long process of trying to rejoin, he has now been
declared Permanently Medically Unfit to join the armed forces on the grounds
that he is too short sighted and was once prescribed a very commonly taken medicine by
doctors to treat a common very minor issue. This rejection is despite his having served for many
years in the Services, and been considered medically fit enough to deploy to
HERRICK with fundamentally the same eyesight prescription as he has today, and
despite his taking the medication while serving in the military, and when military serving today are being regularly prescribed
said medication without the slightest impact on their employment ability.
It feels odd
to discover that having served for years across the globe with very minor issues that the system
considers risks that it tolerated and treated, the system is no longer prepared
to treat the identical issue the same way once you are outside. While
theoretically appeals are available, spending 12-18 months of precious spare
time trying to persuade someone that yes you are able to sit at a desk with
perfect corrected vision and type at a PC or work in an office without being at risk, and still
running the likelihood of people saying ‘no’ is just not worth it.
For all the
talk of ‘risk taking’ and attempts to blame Capita, it feels like the lack of
willingness to take risk lies in the hands of those who set the medical
standards. Do recruits to the modern armed forces really need good uncorrected eyesight,
or is it enough to treat the risk by ensuring they always have glasses on, and
a spare pair to hand if required?
The problem
the modern military has is that if it continues to set itself up as an
organisation that is intentionally highly self-selective at the point of entry,
then it will struggle to generate enough people to join and stay. The fact that
there is significant undermanning and constant struggles to recruit suggests
that more needs to be done. While amending medical standards for new entrants
will not solve these problems overnight, it will help get more people into the training
pipeline and then in the Services as a whole.
Has the time
perhaps come to ask whether the standards are too stringent, and that instead a
two tier medical is required. A basic one confirming you have a pulse, and that
you are not going to undergo any long term or major operations or have
substantial physical challenges that would prevent you from doing training.
Then develop a role specific medical for applicants who meet the basic standard
to work out what they can do in the armed forces.
Much like the
recruiting aptitude tests are designed to test your suitability for different
branches, could new medicals be designed that measure your suitability for
roles in the military – ensuring that branches with significantly higher
fitness needs – for instance pilot or infanteer remain exclusively for those
with the right medical history, but not ruling out those with minor issues?
It is also
worth asking whether given many of the niche shortage areas are in specialist
skills like engineers and other highly trained roles, is it worth reducing fitness
requirements to these roles to bring in otherwise suitably trained and
qualified personnel?
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Group Captain Douglas Bader RAF |
There are plenty of people who may argue that creating a two tier military is a dangerous precedent and that it would be divisive. But the reality is we already have a two tier military when it comes to health matters. There are always personnel out there on long term downgrades due to illness or fitness issues, and others need to mobilise to cover them. Likewise there are plenty of serving personnel equipped with prosthetic limbs who have remained in the Services after receiving life changing injures. The attitude appears to be that those injured or ill once inside are fine, but somehow if you have the same problems before joining, then you are permanently unfit to serve your country.
Frankly why
not let people in who are in wheelchairs or have mobility or visual acuity
problems? There are doubtless serving personnel missing eyes, or with restricted
mobility – this is tolerated and managed. The chances of many people wanting to
join is probably slim, but why not look at how it could be done sensibly if
they have particular niche skills that would make them of real value to the
Armed Forces?
The cyber
reserve seems to offer a sensible model of what could be possible to address this. Here individuals
who often reportedly present substantial physical fitness challenges are given
waivers in order to put them in uniform to carry out very niche work. The need
for their wearing uniform is important to ensure that they comply with the Law
of Armed Conflict when carrying out certain tasks – this is not something that
legally can be handed off to a civil servant.
Ultimately
you could move to create a wider ‘General Service Corps’ that captures many
people who are a bit older, or who perhaps have minor ailments that do not
prevent them doing the job at hand, but which the regulations have decided rule
them out of the situation. This could be used to fill some of the wider gapped posts
prevalent in the system that require someone with military training, who is not
going to be in the frontline as a combat arms soldier, but who could bring
their wider skills to bear for the good of the country.
When the idea
of lowering or changing standards comes up, the usual response is the flood of
comments about how it’s a bad thing and what happens if someone gets captured /
killed etc? Entirely reasonable questions to ask, but equally what happens if
someone serving with the same condition that is a bar to entry now gets
captured? If the Service deems a condition that requires medicine to be proscribed
for it sufficiently serious so as to be a bar to entry, why does it permit people
serving who then acquire the same condition to stay in service?
Challenging
the ‘but we’ve always done it this way’ brigade is arguably the big challenge
facing CDS and the new Service Chiefs. In a system when risk is something that
many think is a boardgame, not something that is encouraged to be taken without
fear of career fouling consequences, getting people into the mindset of ‘lets
take a risk and admit someone’ is going to be hard.
There needs
to be a move to a mentality that says ‘lets see what people with X can do, not
lets assume people with X cannot do anything’ and then intelligently recruit
and train them appropriately. If we were in a world of 100% manning, then you
can afford to be selective about who joins, but when you are consistently
undermanned, perhaps taking a risk is the right thing to do to sort your
manning challenges out?
The biggest
irony perhaps is that some of the most revered and decorated personnel of all
three Services would fail the medical entry test. Admiral Nelson, Lt General Adrian
Carton De Wiat VC, and Group Captain Douglas Bader all had challenging physical
disabilities that would preclude them from joining. Today they are all
remembered for their courage, skills and ability, not their disability. Surely the time has come to take a risk, and
let people serve and see what they can do, not rule them out without giving
them a chance?
"Into the lost valley of the Dinosaurs - the response to Women on the Front Line."
ReplyDeleteStandards will not be lowered
....
"Good enough for Nelson? The CDS RUSI speech, risk and medical entry standards."
We're lowering standards...
Raising standards. Right now, it is considered acceptable to be seriously understaffed; we know it is, because nothing is being done about it. That has become standard.
DeleteTime to raise that bar. Time to improve recruitment.
Sir Humphrey,
ReplyDeleteIt is a sound argument, but does not go far enough in addressing the whys and wherefores. Who is the "we" in "we should accept more risk". This has always been the sticking point between the wider military/MoD and the Medical Services when it comes to adjusting entry standards. The first time a recruit in training drops dead from a "minor" ailment, do you seriously expect a Mea Culpa from SoS Def? In terms of health care, we are in a risk adverse world. Clinicians taking professional decisions like that cannot abrogate their responsibility, even if they wear a uniform and plead that they were "only following orders".
I think one solution is to tie the recruit closer to the unit, at the moment unless you are known to them through some other mechanism, they have no way of fighting your corner through the bureaucracy. If the Colonel wants to take you with him to war, that should count more than a tick box.
ReplyDeleteI sure the command staff of operational units would welcome the chance to hand-hold a bunch of no-hopers, time wasters, Call of Duty fantasists and unstable psychopaths for several months at a time. It's not as if they have anything better to do, is it?
DeleteIt's what they used to do/still do for many of the officer candidates.
DeleteHaving a chance to see the recruits in person allows you to decide who is worth putting in the effort to get in your team and who is, as you describe the 'bunch of no-hopers, time wasters, Call of Duty fantasists and unstable psychopaths'. At the moment the control of recruitment is too far removed from the operational area. As to the time element, if you're not thinking about your staff as an officer, and recruitment is a part of that, you aren't doing all of your job.
I was talking about the officer candidates. The OR's tend to be worse. It's a simple resource issue. Given the current Crapita contract and it's potential fallout, there's going to be no new recruiting money until the early to mid 2020's at least (and looking at the current political situation, I wouldn't bet on that either). Units are not scaled in terms of available man hours and warm bodies hanging around doing very little (who need to be the right people in recruitment i.e. highly employable operationally and therefore useful elsewhere) for this sort of activity. Add the complication that most units are under strength and nowhere near their recruitment footprint in the UK, let alone those in Germany and Cyprus. Big regiments e.g. the Rifles, do still generate recruiting teams, but these are focused on raising awareness rather than actual recruitment. I am personally aware that people are looking hard at this sort of activity presently, given its perceived lack of success (I know, I know. They're only going to make it worse by scrapping these sort of initiatives but we didn't get to where we are with senior people making good decisions, did we?) Don't get me wrong, it's a great idea. It's just not feasible on current resourcing.
Delete"I think one solution is to tie the recruit closer to the unit, at the moment unless you are known to them through some other mechanism, they have no way of fighting your corner through the bureaucracy. If the Colonel wants to take you with him to war, that should count more than a tick box."
DeleteIts all fun and games until someone cries discrimination.
Col Jones cant bend the rules for candidates As asthma but not candidates bs, because he likes candidate A and thinks candidate B is a psycho, because Col Jones is not an asthma doctor or a psychiatrist.
Domo: I wasn't suggesting Col. Jones bends the rules, but unless you understand the rules, and the exceptions, and who to speak to, and when to speak to them about it, you end up with viable candidates getting lost to the system because they didn't have a friendly face to guide them. At the moment there is discrimination, if you know someone who will champion you, your chances dramatically improve.
DeleteAs the post says, there are multiple inconsistencies in medical standards, so it's not about the medical advice says X and Col. Jones overrules it. Medical advice says X in these situations, Y in those situations and nothing about other situations because the medics never considered that. It's in these cases that a carefully considered nudge by someone close to the recruit can turn around a situation.
More generally, we employ good people in senior positions, let's trust their judgement and allow them to make decisions, rather than pursue an arse covering approach, something that Gen. Nick Carter was saying (more eloquently than me) in his speech.
Anonymous 15 December 2018 at 11:57: I get what you are saying, but it's a prioritisation issue not a resource issue. The cycle of 'we can't recruit because we're short staffed and we're short staffed because there aren't any recruits coming through' won't be resolved until someone prioritises recruitment.
DeleteI'm not pretending that the consequence of that decision will be painless but we're all adults and we have to face up to difficult choices.
Normal management practice would be to allocate resources on the basis of priorities. They are not mutually exclusive. What would you drop from the unit's current commitments, assuming (I think correctly) no extra resource is provided? MS work? Career courses? PT? Pre-Op training? Leave? Again, I agree it is a good idea but it is simply not feasible without extra resources being made available to support all the other vital effect functions expected of units. And that isn't happening any time soon.
DeleteMy answer would be all of the above, but also more generally look at the way the military goes about delivery of its activities, both from a cost perspective and time freed up for other priorities.
DeletePerhaps its time to re-examine the Canadian Army's development of PULHEMS during the Second World War -- see https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1827961/pdf/canmedaj01708-0081.pdf
ReplyDeleteAs originally devised, the minimum rating for infantry service was 1111221, but in 1944 this was downgraded to 2212221. Service as an infantry signaller required a 1111111 rating to the end of the war. On the other hand, one could serve as a base wallah with a score of 4444414 and as a base wallah's batman with a score 4444444.