OP WILMOT - The Secret SBS Mission to Protect the QE2

 

In April 1973 the iconic Cunard cruise liner ‘Queen Elizabeth 2’ (QE2) steamed out of Southampton docks on a private chartered cruise. Her voyage would take her through the Mediterranean Sea to Israel to mark the 25^th anniversary of the founding of the Israeli state. The risks were high though, with an increase in terrorism around the world, particularly targeting Israelis, and there was considerable hostility from other regional states. There was a clear concern about the security of passengers onboard, which is why when the QE2 sailed, she was carry 29 heavily armed Royal Marine members of the Special Boat Section (SBS) as both overt and covert passengers onboard to deal with any threat. This is the story of that operation, known as OP WILMOT.

UK MOD © Crown copyright

The QE2 was chartered to sail on 15 April from Southampton with around 700 passengers onboard, many of whom were believed to be American. The plan for the cruise involve calls at Lisbon, call at the ports of Ashod and Haifa between 21 April and 7 May and then return to the UK via Majorca arriving home on the 13 of May.

The risk to security of the passengers was credible, given the rise of international terrorism at this time. It was barely months since the horrific events of the Munich Olympics had resulted in the massacre of members of the Israeli team, and separate attacks at airports killed Tel Aviv killed dozens. The growing increase in hijacking of aircraft too led to concerns that a competent group of terrorists could potentially board the QE2, seize control of the ship and take hostages or conduct a massacre. The potential for a terrorist incident was high, and the means by Cunard to repel it using their own resources was very low.  Therefore in January 1973 the Cunard line contacted the British Government to set out its concerns around the security of the planned charter and to see what could be done about this and formally requested the assistance of the Royal Marines to advise and assist with security.

Initial analysis by the Security Service (MI5) and the MOD indicated that a range of highly credible threats existed. An analysis drawing on both a  March 1973 JIC paper and internal MOD reports concluded that:

“It has been assessed that the ship and her 700 or so, Jewish passengers, mostly American will present an attractive target to Arab terrorists. It has further been assessed that even with a protection force of about 1000 military personnel, it would be possible only to minimise the likelihood of terrorist action; the prevention of terrorist actions could never be guaranteed”

The paper then noted that in working with the governments of the host nations and others, that the Cunard company was ‘taking all precautions which a commercial company could reasonably be expected to take to safeguard the ship and those aboard”. But it was also recognised by the MOD that “in spite of these precautions the possibility remains that a small determined group of terrorists could evade the security checks and get on board”. To mitigate this risk further, the MOD concluded that the most appropriate course of action was to deploy a team of personnel from the Special Boat Section (later renamed Service) to provide a last resort capability to protect the ship and her passengers.

UK MOD © Crown copyright

As a result it was agreed to provide a small team, known as a ‘military armed response force’ to embark on the QE2. This force would be 26 strong, and split into two distinct groups. The first team was a more overt presence, and would be 8 strong and was known as the ‘Command Cell / Bridge protection team”. Its role was to operate in plain clothes, but the MOD and Cunard agreed that if challenged, they would admit to being members of “MOD security”. The purpose of this team was to conduct liaison with the Bridge team and ensure that in the event of a crisis the ships bridge (very much the nerve centre of the vessel from an operational perspective) could be defended for as long as possible.

It was agreed in a secret MOU between the Government and Cunard that the command and control chain for the operation would, unusually, see the Royal Marines working under the direction of the vessels Master. Under the C2 arrangements section, it was confirmed that:

“The Force Commander will come under the direct operational command of the Chief of the Defence Staff and under the authority and direction of the Master.”

It was also intriguingly noted that “There is a similarity between the employment of the Special Air Service (SAS) under the terms of Operation SNOWDROP and the employment of the Onboard military Armed Response Force  Operation WILMOT”  Notably no reference can be found to what Operation SNOWDROP was in 1973, or why it involved SAS personnel operating under the command of others in this way.

The Force Commander had a significant responsibility then, in charge of 25 other special forces personnel, their role onboard was made clear to be:

“It will be the responsibility of the Force Commander to act on the request of the Master to deal with any incident threatening life or the safety of the vessel that may occur aboard the QE2.

It will be the responsibility of the Force Commander to advise the Master on the best way of dealing with such incidents.

Except under the most urgent circumstances, such as the discovery of an armed terrorist by a member of the response force, the Force Commander will not commit his men to action unless requested by the Master”.

The MOD agreed a lengthy series of rules of engagement with Cunard about the circumstances in which force could be employed – every single paragraph of which remains redacted to this day. It is clear though that significant thought was given to how to manage the relationship and ensure that in a crisis the SBS had enough leeway to carry out the mission in whatever fashion was deemed appropriate to protect life.

The first team therefore had a clearly defined mission and role and were reasonably visible as a security deterrent. Enough to provide visibility, without compromising the fact that they were Special Forces. What though to do with the remaining 18 men? The MOD noted that conversations with the ships Master highlighted a real concern:

“The voyage is a pleasure cruise for which passengers are paying up to £1000 (approx £10,500 today). Should it become known that a military response force was to be deployed aboard, it is likely, in the opinion of the Master, to be unacceptable to passengers and it could result in the cancellation of bookings. Therefore, it is considered essential that the bulk of the Military Armed Response Force operates covertly”.

There was some deliberation in the MOD about how best to conceal in plain sight the presence of 18 extremely fit and active young men, who were clearly in some form of military employment. In the end it was agreed to deploy a cover story that was about as plausible as a certain former Navy SEAL working as a chef onboard the USS Missouri… The paper noted:

“The presence of the command cell / Bridge protection party, however will become known and they should therefore be ready to admit, if challenged, that they are MOD security personnel engaged to strengthen Cunards existing security organisation…

As to the rest of the force there are arguments both for and against a cover story. However both the Force Commander and the Master of the QE2 are much in favour of operating covertly if possible. They propose that this reaction force of 18 men should act as a group of travel agents on a sponsored tour. Such groups are commonplace on cruises and their presence onboard should not attract any particular attention. The men are all of an age and experience which should enable them to play this part well.

Although, some at least using the cover story will probably be recognised before long to have security duties of some kind, the use of the response force will make the size and function of the response force difficult to identify… to minimise the force aboard being compromised, no military uniforms should be taken aboard”.

One must wonder the response from the SBS team given the task of spending a month onboard a luxury ocean liner, travelling in plain clothes and pretending to be a travel agent on an all expenses paid cruise. It’s the sort of luxury lifestyle that is usually only encountered by the rich and famous, or members of the RAF…

UK MOD © Crown copyright

Given all these precautions to get the force onboard, what would it do when it was embarked and at sea, and what role would it play?  This was harder to be certain of and caused a few headaches – how do you ensure that in the days before the internet you can keep your most elite troops up to date with information and intelligence and help them stay ready for the challenges ahead? Thankfully the MOD spent a lot of time working with Cunard to solve this problem.

For starters the MOD installed direct radio phones, equipped with scramblers, to enable direct contact between the ship and the MOD if required. It was also agreed to ensure that in a crisis the ship could transmit back to London if needed – although it was noted that it was highly unusual for merchant ships in port to do this, so the MOD had to formally request diplomatic clearance (something usually done for warships visiting a port) to permit this to happen.

As was the case for the 1970s finance and union relations also raised concerns, as it was noted that while Cunard could establish a permanent link open to the MOD in London, it would come at a high cost and may involve “problems concerning the hours of work for radio officers”!

It was also recognised by the Joint Intelligence Committee that there may need to be pass highly sensitive intelligence support to the party to warn them of concerns or threats. Concerns were raised though that: “the telephone scrambler is not secure and there is no protection for the radio telegraph, it will be necessary to provide the Force Commander with a one-time pad to provide a secure cypher channel with the MOD. This is a very slow cypher system, but anything better would involve installation of equipment on board the ship and involve considerable security problems”.

There is something wonderfully ‘James Bond’ like to think of a dashing Special Forces officer operating under cover onboard the QE2 to keep her safe from terrorists, dressed in his finest evening dress and tuxedo and sneaking off to use covert one-time-pads to send secret missions to and from the intelligence services in Whitehall. It could be that OP WILMOT was the closest we’ve ever gotten to life emulating art in this way.

Another intelligence plan was to try to gather worst case covert intelligence. As such the plan called (with the support of MI5) for the RM to “embark an Arabic speaking Royal Marines officer to be available immediately not only to interpret in any incident, but to understand any private statements which might be made by terrorists”.

The final policy part of the consideration was the legality of the mission at hand – what would happen if the QE2 were to be attacked by terrorists while in a foreign port. On this subject the MOD admitted that technically there was a legal risk if they engaged in armed actions while in a foreign port or territorial waters, but it was hoped that the impacted nation would accept that the SBS had acted in ‘good faith in the performance of duty”. It was noted that from a legal perspective:

“If the Commander or individual serviceman acts within the law, in good faith and the action which he takes is necessary to achieve his immediate aim, or there are reasonable grounds for believing it to be necessary to achieve that aim, he need not fear the result of any inquiry into his conduct”.

With the legal and policy implications sorted and the indemnities signed by Cunard, it was time to nominate the force, get the participants ready for their arduous duties and embark the military equipment necessary to defend the ship. In terms of getting ready, several key things had to be done. Firstly they had to ensure that the selected participants looked the part. The MOD noted that:

“The average age of the 26 Royal Marines is about 30 years and each is a mature experienced individual. To ensure that they would be able to achieve credibility as civilians, each member of the Force has been instructed to grow his hair to a length which would conform to the current civilian standards”.

Given the 1970s were a decade that taste forgot when it came to fashion, one can only imagine the horrified reactions of various SNCO’s when they saw these marines sporting hairstyles that probably appeared to be a crime against haircutting.  It was also confirmed that the RM would carry fake but convincing ID on them that would confirm their identity “either as MOD security personnel or as a travel agent” to stand up to scrutiny if inspected by others.

The arsenal

All of these preparations though were irrelevant unless the SBS had weapons to use in the event of an incident occurring. It decreed that every member of the group would carry a personal .38 revolver which was to be carried in a shoulder holster. Additionally the Bridge party were to be equipped with 8 x Ingram sub machine pistols, a rapid firing weapon that was the precursor in Special Forces service to the much vaunted Heckler & Koch MP5 that was used a few years later during the Iranian Embassy siege. Finally at least four 7.62mm sniper rifles were embarked, along with appropriate amounts of ammunition.

To help conduct some limited crowd control, two shotguns and CS gas were embarked, presumably to conduct operations were it would be necessary to incapacitate terrorists, while a wide range of grenades were embarked including frag grenades, white phosphorous grenades and smoke grenades, presumably to cover off all manner of tactical situations.

Perhaps the most impressive (if mildly overpowered) weapon embarked was six x 66m LAW (lightweight anti-tank weapon) which was a disposable one shot missile used by the UK. The purpose of embarking these missiles was twofold – it was stated that:

“This weapon will assist the Response Force to gain entry to locked areas of the ship, and to react to terrorist action involving launches or helicopters”.

In other words, were a terrorist group to try to board QE2 by fast motor launch or try to land on with a helicopter, the SBS had a sufficient capability on hand to destroy them. The Royal Marines had a strong pedigree with the 66mm – during the defence of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia during the Argentine invasion in 1982, the 66mm was used to enormous effect to tackle both infantry, armour and even an Argentine Navy corvette!

It was agreed that this arsenal was to be stored in a secure armoury near the bridge, under the direct control of an NCO. It was confirmed that access to the weapons would only be permitted only on the instructions of the Force Commander when responding to an incident, although it was noted that there were no operational restrictions on their use…

Brought together then the force embarking for OP WILMOT represented a very effective discrete capability that would, if required, have posed a very credible defence to the QE2 in the event of  an attack on the ship during the cruise. This came at a price though, and Cunard agreed that it would pay the full cost of some £15,000 to refund the MOD for all expenses incurred.

UK MOD © Crown copyright

After all of the build up though, ironically the cruise passed off without incident. There are some reports which suggest that the QE2 was discretely shadowed by a Nimrod MPA at times during her trip. This would be plausible given its presence in the region at Malta and beyond, although there seems to be no credence in the claims that a Royal Navy submarine also shadowed the vessel. Reports that the Libyan Navy attempted to sink the vessel with a torpedo also seem wide of the mark, although there are suggestions that at times she was advised to exercise zig-zag manoeuvring while in the eastern Med.

As far as is known in the material that is publicly available very little seems to have happened on the cruise. A report from the Jewish Chronicle about memories from one of the participants refers to the security presence, and the fact that at least one individual had an Arabic newspaper clipping in his pocket and when challenged simply said ‘we’ve got to be equipped for everything’. Its possible this may have been the RM officer intended to act as a covert translator, although no one seems to have linked the security presence directly to the SBS. About the only incident of note seems to have been, if internet forum rumours are to be believed, that one of the Royal Marine ‘travel agents’ ended up meeting a woman on the cruise and in due course ended up marrying her – hopefully their cruise went off with a bang!

Although the cruise passed without incident, this was not to be the last time that the QE2 enjoyed close links to the armed forces. In 1976 another cruise occurred onboard to Israel, where the SBS was again reportedly deployed, again without incident. In 1982 she had her finest moment when she sailed as part of the Task Force to recapture the Falkland Islands, acting as a troopship and vital member of the force to enormous success. Thus continued a long line of Cunard liners carrying out their service to both passengers and the nation as a whole.

To this day the UK remains involved in maritime counter terrorism work, with the SBS and 43 Fleet Protection Group RM involved in deploying a discrete and highly effective range of capabilities to deter terrorism and provide reassurance and support where required. While full details of this capability remain closely guarded secrets, one would hope that the modern day ‘Royal’ is both able to enjoy time at sea on a cruise, but is hopefully not forced to rely on sending secret messages on a ‘one-time-pad’ while wearing a tuxedo, or pretending to be a travel agent on a jolly!