"You Say It Best When You Say Nothing At All" - Thoughts on the MDP Review Announcement

The Secretary of State for Defence has provided an update to the House of Commons on progress towards the Modernising Defence Programme review (MDP), setting out its progress to date. To say that this statement has left some commentators underwhelmed is an understatement – the response landed with a resounding ‘is that it?’ on social media.

The MDP is the successor review to the National Security Capability Review (NCSR) that was launched last July, and was intended to function as an update on the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) outside the normal five yearly cycles of defence reviews. Reasons for the review being conducted differ depending on who you listen to – some will claim it was a timely and reasonable update chapter, intended to ensure that UK national security policy was well placed to address the post Brexit referendum security dynamic. Others will suggest it was due to the money running out, and defence procurement writing cheques its ego couldn’t cash.

The challenge with the NCSR was that it seems to have become painfully clear that the appetite by the MOD to deliver effect is not matched up by its financial package, and that major cuts would be needed to keep the Department fiscally solvent. It was last autumn that the first rumours began to emerge of deep cuts to force levels, causing unrest on the back benches. The unexpected resignation of Michael Fallon, and his replacement by Gavin Williamson seems to have led to further concerns as the MOD struggled to pull together a force package that was credible to allies, amenable to the backbenches and affordable to the Treasury.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

A further series of leaks over the spring, particularly on the state of the amphibious force led to the conclusion that the MOD work should be spun off into a separate review – to be known as the Modernising Defence Programme – which the MOD explained was about ensuring the British armed forces were fit to meet the current strategic challenges and threats facing the UK.

Little more has been heard about the review, with the usual dynamic of leaking for effect replaced by a full-frontal public relations assault on the Treasury by a significant number of MPs and Ministers, leading to possibly unimaginable of scenes of a Secretary of State for Defence very publicly standing up for his department and its budget. The sense was that the dynamic had shifted and that given the strong feeling in Parliament over this issue, more money would need to be forthcoming to fund Defence and give it additional resources to meet the challenges placed on it.

The announcement then came as a surprise to many, who had been expecting an insight into the findings of the review at the NATO summit. Instead, after a year of work, the findings were boiled down into a barely 2000-word statement on what the review had concluded to date.

Key Findings

The statement noted that the complexity of the threats had accelerated since 2015, with adversaries deploying new capabilities and engaging in passive aggressive hostilities, often via proxies, in a manner that threatened to undermine the existence of the Rules Based International System:

“Threats and risks to national security have diversified and become more complex since 2015. Although we anticipated many of the threats and risks we now face, we underestimated the pace at which they would intensify and combine to challenge UK national security at home and threaten the rules-based international order that has delivered peace, security and prosperity over many decades. And, we did not fully understand the ways in which they would interact with each other.

Alongside this, the character of warfare has changed since 2015. We are in a period of constant aggressive competition between states, often developing into undeclared confrontation and, in some cases, proxy conflicts. Technology, especially digital technology, is developing at a breath-taking pace, making pervasive many capabilities once only imagined in science fiction.”

This scene setter then goes onto discuss how the potential adversaries are using these opportunities to threaten the UK, using a variety of new environments and operating spaces to pose fresh threats and challenges:

Our adversaries are working to take advantage of this contested environment by systematically identifying and exploiting our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and partners. Peer and near-peer states are investing heavily in both conventional and emerging technologies, and are increasingly adopting hybrid or asymmetric approaches to gain advantage.

This has included attacking our digital networks and those of our allies, and operating in unconventional and legally questionable ways. Broader developments in the world including demographic change, increasing urbanisation, the risk of pandemics, resource and environmental pressures will all contribute to a global strategic context which will become more complex

At the risk of sounding harsh, there is little in any of the above paragraphs that should come as a surprise to anyone who has studied the future nature of conflict – indeed the 2014 publication ‘'Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045’ by the MODs own in house ‘Doctrine & Concepts Development Centre identifies many of these issues as challenges back then.

What Role for the Armed Forces

The review sets out three key findings for the structure of the Armed Forces that it sees as being how they will operate in the future:

1. Contribute to strengthening global security through our leading role in NATO, and provide the structures and capabilities to defend the UK;

2. Meet the challenges of the wider threats to international security and stability, including through operations and activities alongside our global allies and partners. Defence must be engaged and outward looking, meeting the challenges of our age, from state-based competition and confrontation, violent extremism and terrorism, instability and crises in Africa and Asia, illegal and irregular migration, serious and organised crime, to climate change and environmental disasters.

3. Act independently, when appropriate, to protect UK interests and citizens overseas, leading multi-national operations and developing strong defence relationships with partners around the world.

 Again, this is nothing new or surprising here. Although some of the emphasis may have changed, for instance the increased reference to NATO compared to previous years, there is nothing in this statement that should trouble or cause surprise to anyone with a passing interest in UK defence policy. In many ways this is, so far, a routine statement that could have been written for any of the Defence Reviews conducted since 1991.

There are though several interesting statements which are worthy of further comment. To start, the emphasis in Para two on the role to be played tackling instability and crisis in Africa and Asia – both regions that have traditionally seen a lower commitment of UK forces in recent decades. This focus suggests an increased need for forces capable of both training and educating to enhance stability, but also capable of intervening at speed and distance to stage a decisive role in a possible crisis.

Secondly, the heavy emphasis placed on tackling state-based threats (competition and confrontation) serves as a timely reminder that the armed forces need to be capable of executing conventional deterrence again – ensuring that potential aggressor nations do not see the UK as a soft touch. This is a strong signal that for UK defence policy, focusing resources against a specific national threat will once again become the norm, much like in Cold War days.

The final paragraph focuses on the role of acting independently, to protect UK interests and citizens overseas. This is a very open statement that could lead planners to a range of conclusions. For starters, it doesn’t define what ‘acting independently’ means – is it a Falklands Islands style scenario of a Task Force liberating territory, or is it about permitting discrete hostage rescues or evacuations of nationals from war torn countries?

The reason this is of interest is that many of the assets needed to conduct independent operations, such as amphibious platforms were the ones seen as most likely for being scrapped earlier on in the review. It would be helpful to understand what the planning appetite is here – is it to sustain large scale operations, or scale back and accept that ‘acting independently’ means ‘rescuing the small party of holiday makers from a beach resort in Obscuristanaloinia’?

Similarly, the emphasis on commitment to leading multi-national operations is intriguing and raises questions about what it means in practise. Leadership of multi-national operations calls for a specific set of skills and capabilities, such as Divisional / Brigade HQ’s, or being able to deploy command platforms with battlestaffs capable of managing a coalition of diverse actors. It also requires being able to deploy sufficient weight and capability to justify your claim to a leading role in a coalition (and in turn, this requires a forward leaning interventionary foreign policy that favours taking on the mantle of operational leadership).

How will the MOD respond?

There is a line of interest which notes : “Today, our adversaries disguise their actions by launching attacks that are hard to attribute, or by operating below the conventional threshold for a decisive, collective response. Whilst our Armed Forces already protect us against these challenges every hour of every day, we need to be able to respond to this new character of warfare, both in the traditional land, sea and air domains, as well as in the new domains of space and cyber.”

The clear inference here is that the rules of the game are changing, and that traditional deterrence, both through conventional and nuclear means is no longer sufficient to be certain of preventing malign state activity against the UK. Incidents like cyber attacks and the Skripal poisonings prove that other nations are willing to conduct operations to achieve an effect, and that for the UK, there is a need to both deter, and be able to pick up the pieces afterwards.

This leads to a reasonable conclusion that an already crowded budget will have to find additional room for more spending in cyber defence and CBRN measures, as well as enhancing the role of Space. This  is all important, but not necessarily a ‘traditional’ measure of military capability. Choosing how to prioritise funding, and also explain to a cynical public and backbenches that scrapping ships was essential to fund and preserve a hard to define, and probably highly classified  cyber capability (for example) will be a hard sell. This cuts to the heart of the national security challenge facing the MOD – the sort of the threats it will need to guard against are often difficult to explain or show as they aren’t traditional military hardware.

There are several comments in the statement about the importance of the international aspect of Defence, both by presence and training value – for instance:

“The Armed Forces have a unique network of alliances and friendships spanning every corner of every continent. We have made significant progress in making Defence more ‘international by design’, and we will look at how we could do more… We will consider our global defence network, to make sure we have the right military and civilian staff deployed around the world… And we will continue to lead multinational forces and deepen our relationships across the globe”

It is right to point out that the UK occupies a strategically unique position, benefitting from overlap across a  range of alliances, partnerships and relationships that are of mutual benefit. These often only work by the presence of low level liaison or exchange officers, prestige postings that are often the first to be chopped when budgets get tight and protecting core capability is deemed more important.

It is reassuring to see a commitment to review the Defence Network, particularly as the UK has one of the largest and most global Defence Attache and Advisor networks in the world. It must be hoped that the outcome of this review is to expand it, to deepen relationships and not draw it in on itself again. The short term savings accrued from deleting an exchange post often pale into insignificance from the long term damage such a move can do to bilateral relationships.

It must also be hoped that this review reinforces the message that Defence Diplomacy is a critical force enabler for the UK, and enhances our standing around the world. But, it relies on high quality individuals going on defence attaché tours, not final tour SO1s being given a ‘thank you and goodbye’ posting. While progress has been made in this area in recent years, it is vital that the message is sent clearly – Defence Attaches are a force multiplier, not a holiday posting for duffers.

It was also intriguing to note the comment:

“Most importantly, we need to make sure we can respond rapidly to future crises on our terms. Our elite and high-readiness forces are critical in this regard, enabled by collective training and our high-end exercise programme. We will consider how we can rebalance our training and equipment to mainland Europe, the Far East and the Middle East and review our overseas basing to improve our interoperability with allies and partners.”

There are two key issues in this statement. Firstly, there remains an affirmation to the continued value of high readiness forces, which remain of critical importance to the UK, and the importance of the international exercise programme. This again is often an easy cut to make during times of financial shortages, but if you want a globally deployable capability, then you need to be able to fight in whatever climate you’re likely to encounter. Its hard to simulate jungle or desert warfare training in the UK – you either need to train, or get out of the business altogether. It must be hoped that this is a code for confirming the ongoing work to train with allies abroad.

The phrase ‘rebalance’ is one that often sounds like a code for ‘how do we do less and spend less without looking like that’s the case’!  The second part of the statement reads like a list of where the UK currently has personnel and assets has based, and how it can do better with them.

It is perhaps ironic that the decision to withdraw from Germany in 2010 is coming to fruition now, just as the need for British forces in Continental Europe is greater than at any point since the end of the Cold War. It already seems likely that the UK will commit to keeping a training presence in Germany, probably not dissimilar to the BATUS setup in Canada, using the Sennelager training area.

More widely, the Middle and Far East have in recent years seen a significant increase in UK presence and operational tempo. The recent opening of the Jufair support facility in Bahrain, coupled with the commitment to enhance both maritime and land presence in Oman also points to an ongoing UK commitment in the Gulf region. The imminent Exercise Saif Sarrea 3 in Oman is also a good example of testing the readiness of globally deployable forces to exercise across a range of environmental terrain.

The UK has one of the largest global footprints of any nation when it comes to overseas basing facilities and real estate, some it quite elderly (for instance the wharves and fuel depot in Singapore). It is likely that this review will consider issues like whether the current estate is fit for purpose, whether it could be more effectively served by lodging with other nations (for instance, could the UK ‘piggyback’ off a third nations infrastructure in places like Africa or the Gulf).

It may also examine issues like whether you need a permanent presence in a region, or merely stores and a warehouse to issue kit when required. There is also a lot of issues over permissions, and whether basing in another nation reduces our own national ability to conduct operations (e.g. what veto / approval is given to the UK to conduct operations out of a friendly country).Sometimes overseas basing can be restrictive – for instance, are the Gurkhas in Nepal the right place to keep a regional reserve of acclimatised infantry for the UK, given they are funded mostly by the Sultan of Brunei?

There is also a question over how the global network of Permanent Joint Operating Bases could be used – are they in the right place to support operations where we are likely to work? Do we need to invest in more facilities in places like Africa or nearer to the West Indies (recommission HMS MALABAR?), or do we close them down? Playing devils advocate, does the UK need anywhere near the level of force presence currently in the Falkland Islands, or could it safely reduce considerably the local forces?

The final observation worth making is that having access to globally deployable bases and possessing rapid reaction forces is very different to having amphibious lift. It must be asked whether there is a subtle hint in the statement that the likely future interventionary capabilities do not necessarily require an LPD force to deliver them, relying instead on local bases and allied forces or assets.

This ties into another line in the statement – “We intend to modernise our force structure so that it is better able to meet the increasing threats we face. The key design principles of Joint Force 2025 are right; we want Armed Forces able to operate with agility and pace in the information age. Our Armed Forces need to be able to meet a full range of missions now and into the future. This includes, if necessary, warfighting operations under NATO Article 5 and further afield”.

There is a forum on the internet discussing British Airways, where it is noted that the phrase ‘British Airways Enhancements’ usually means cuts. A similar line could be applied to the phrase ‘modernise our force structure’!  In an era of resource neutral budgets, where defence equipment costs increase year on year, modernisation can only happen if you buy less of the new equipment, or make headroom elsewhere by removing capabilities from service. A cynic would suggest that this statement is setting out the argument why major force structure cuts seem likely.

But, what is also important here is the statement that the ambition set out in the 2015 SDSR to field Joint Force 2025 seems right is important, as this sets the likely headmark of aspiration for what the MOD will be intending to field in the future.  As a reminder, Joint Force 2025 sets out the aspiration to ensure the UK can deploy a force of up to 50,000 personnel for a short period of time, or sustain a smaller force for an indefinite period of time.

In broad terms this equates to a deployable division for the Army, a maritime task group for the Royal Navy and an Expeditionary Air Wing for the RAF. It is reassuring to see that this remains the key aspiration, and that the UK is not reducing its ability to project substantial amounts of force into the field.

There will be questions about what falls into this force though, noting the 2015 SDSR was light on information, and it will again raise questions about the structure of the armed forces. There is no commitment within the Joint Force 2025 model to specifically deploy an LPD or amphibious force (merely 10-25 ships). Similarly, there is no specific commitment to aircraft or vehicle types, making it harder to read what the force will actually be equipped with. While the UK may be able to deploy 50,000 people, its not at all clear what the units or capabilities will be.

One guide is the continued aspiration to be able to conduct warfighting operations under NATO Article 5, a strong statement of the UK’s continued commitment to NATO and its willingness to field forces capable of taking on an external aggressor prepared to attack a NATO member state. It is reasonable to assume this means Russia, which in turn reads across into the UK being prepared to provide capabilities that can be credible against the Russian threat – one would expect this to focus particularly on ISTAR, tackling the cyber and other unconventional threats like ‘little green men’ and also being able to deliver credible ASW and MCMV protection to ensure the ongoing credibility of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent force.

The other commitment is to ‘wider afield’, not defined in any more detail. This implies an ongoing commitment to providing a force capable of operating beyond the traditional NATO area of responsibility. What is particularly interesting is the subtle way NATO has taken primacy again in these statements, with Article 5 defence coming first, and out of area operations second – after decades of focusing on global operational presence, the UK is once again signalling that its prime operational area of focus and war fighting preparation seems to be NATO. There is an extremely strong message in that statement, both to NATO members and potential aggressors.

Another key phrase is ‘agility and pace in the information age’ – some may suggest that this means an emphasis on lighter systems (e.g not tanks or heavier capability) and being far more network centric in focus. This may sound the death knell for some units, while opportunity for investment in others. This is also hinted at in another part of the statement where it says:

“We may need to accelerate elements of the programme to meet the most acute threats sooner. Equally, we might want to introduce new capabilities or equipment that provide significant advantage in the immediate term. We intend, in each case, to look to the right balance of conventional and novel capabilities to meet the threats we face.”

There is an entire blog article to be written on what the likely accelerated elements of the programme could be, and what these threats are. What is clear is that the MOD appears to be considering a substantial change to its equipment programme, rescoping a number of programmes to bring them into service sooner, and potentially introducing some kind of ‘UOR’ programme to gain ‘significant advantage’.

What is clear is that the next phase of the MDP is likely to see significant and major changes to the equipment programme. This in turn comes at a price, either through reducing funding for capability, total unit buys or outright cancellation of projects. When coupled with the mantra of faster, lighter and able to fight in an Article 5 conflict, there does appear to be major change likely to happen soon to the equipment programme.

The final part of the statement focused on wider issues, such as people and the relationship with the defence industry:

“we should also ensure that we use the combined talents of our Whole Force of Regulars, Reserves, civil servants and industry partners more effectively. The character of conflict and the world of work more generally are changing, so Defence will need to up-skill our people, harness the advantages offered by Reserves, and reflect the expectations of the modern workforce… To help create financial headroom for the additional modernisation, we will consider how to deliver greater efficiency by adopting ambitious, digitally-enabled business modernisation. In parallel, we will consider removing existing areas of overlap and duplication within our force structure and burden-sharing more effectively with allies and partners.”

These statements suggest two things. Firstly, despite many years of public statements and view that the MOD and armed forces need to modernise, this still hasn’t been done. The phrase ‘harness the advantages offered by the Reserves’ suggests that the Armed Forces are finally going to try and match individual skills to experience, and make best use of their reservist workforce, or more worryingly they will look covetously to the Regular Reserve and see it as a pool of manpower to be tapped to solve short term manning crises.

The ongoing commitment to making efficiency savings and modernisation again reads like a standard line from many prior statements. Whether the MOD can deliver this though remains a moot point – one of the reasons for the MPD occurring was the financial crisis caused in part by the Department failing to meet a substantial sum of efficiency savings. It is not clear why the MOD now feels it can reap further savings from the budget, given its ongoing failure to identify and deliver several billion in savings as it is.

The final line is perhaps the most important, as it hints at substantial structural changes internally (e.g. does the RAF Regiment still need to exist or could the Army do it), and discussions with allies about how the operational burden is better shared. This is likely to lead to some difficult conversations as the MOD tries to identify where duplication exists, how it can be fixed and what cost it comes at – noting that even very minor changes that could save money will cause controversy (e.g. closing sites ,amalgamating units etc).

The phrase burden sharing also implies that the MOD can expect allies to provide some of the required capability, reducing or removing the need for the UK to retain it in such large numbers. This could range from cutting a deal with the Netherlands to provide the LPD if the UK provides the Strategic RORO capability for the UK/NL landing force, or looking to France to share air tanker assets. These sorts of discussions are complicated and never easy to deliver, balancing national aspirations with the difficulty of working out the circumstances when one country can call on anothers assets, and the incredibly complex legal and policy framework that underpins this.

Burden sharing though if successful does offer the UK an opportunity to take risk on force levels if it knows that it can call on specific assets when needed to support operations. Given the renewed focus on NATO, and the desire to enhance relationships with partners like France, this is a credible way of trying to balance resources and capability.

Overall Thoughts

This statement was not particularly long, but it contained a lot of oblique hints and subtle references that with a bit of thought seem to suggest how UK military thinking is evolving and where the likely outcome of the MDP Part Two goes next.

Baring a substantial injection of cash in the spending review, the likely outcome would seem to be structural cuts in a manner intended to preserve the headline capabilities of interest and relevance to our allies, and a wide range of efficiency savings and further base closures designed to help close the funding gap.

The MOD does find itself in a bind though, having proven itself unable to predict how the world was likely to change so quickly (raising reasonable questions about the ability of its strategic assessment organisations to predict and assess future trends), it now faces the challenge of trying to reorientate itself to meet the increasingly important NATO commitment, while also maintaining a global focus and supporting the ‘Global Britain’ narrative. It is doing this under significant resource pressure, coupled with strong opposition to structural cuts, even when doing so would free up resources for enhancements elsewhere.

It is too early to make a judgement on the MDP process – there is a lot of intriguing and interesting lines within it, that hint at a continued UK global presence and capability, but which remains worryingly light on details. The challenge will be over the next few months as the single Services begin to leak options to fight their corner, and the future force structure emerges – this is when the lobbying campaign is likely to get vicious.

Given how much of this depends on last minute deals and changes of heart by Ministers, it would be wise to assume nothing is done and dusted with the MDP until it is announced in the House of Commons in due course. A better question may be ‘when on earth will that be’?