My my my a JOA... Thoughts on the 1st Sea Lords First TV Interview

In his first television interview since taking up the post of First Sea Lord just over two and a bit years ago, Admiral Jones has confirmed that a ‘Joint Operations Area’ (JOA) has been established in the North Atlantic to counter the growing Russian threat.

This was interpreted by some as meaning that the Royal Navy would be expanding to meet this new commitment, whereas in reality the establishment of a JOA is unlikely to see any short-term tangible growth in the size of the Navy.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

What is a JOA?

In purely doctrinal terms (available in the MOD Joint Doctrine Publication, JDP01 here), the definition of a JOA is very straightforward:

An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific.

In practical terms this move means that the MOD is now treating operations in the North Atlantic like it does in other parts of the world, whereby units assigned to operate within the region will be better able to work together to achieve a specific purpose.

An example of this is the way that the UK exercises commands of military operations in the Middle East. The Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) at PJHQ as a 3* is the Joint Commander, delegating day to day responsibility for the maritime presence to the UK Maritime Component Commander, based in Bahrain. This 1* RN post is responsible through a local battlestaff to exercise command and control over RN forces based across the region to deliver a range of specific outputs and effects. He has the overall control of these forces locally and is responsible for exercising that control to ensure his forces are disposed and available in a manner that ensures they can meet the mission placed on them by the MOD.

The advantage of declaring a JOA is that it helps fuse together a variety of strands of work and ensures that they are woven together for greater effect. For instance, it is much easier to ensure that logistics support is provided and prioritised when linked to a specific operation, or to decide that when bidding for assets to deliver support, to assign them to Operation X rather than nonspecific localised training.

 It also makes it easier to have an understanding of the totality of operations in a region and provide support for them to co-ordinate this work. For instance, under the old model it would theoretically have been possible to see different ships, aircraft and other units all working in the same space, possibly under subtly different chains of command or organisational structures, and not privy to the same operational direction and support. The new structure means that all forces working in the same space will be far more effectively co-ordinated, helping tackle the threat in a more coherent manner.

Very few people say ‘hooray for process’, but this is one of those decisions which should hopefully make the RN a more effective organisation at preparing to tackle inappropriate activity by Russian forces. It will hopefully ensure that the UK is much more effective at mustering its assets in the North Atlantic region in a coherent manner, and in employing them effectively to meet threats as they emerge.

Wider Implications

What it does not mean though, at least in the short term is more ships. The UK has, along with many other nations, taken something of a strategic risk in ASW over the last 15 years or so, with the reduction in ASW frigates, poor SSN availability over many years due delays with ASTUTE and accidents, the loss of the Nimrod MR2, the reduction in numbers of the Merlin force and the general loss of institutional knowledge of how things were done in the Cold War.

The RN is emphatically not alone in taking these decisions, many other navies did likewise when it appeared that the threat from Russia had significantly diminished. The challenge now though is to rebuild the knowledge required to do ASW again, against a first-rate opponent who builds very good platforms and has shown a contemptuous disregard for the rules of international law.

Any fleet expansion will take years to deliver though, with the Type 26 still some years away from entering service, and at present seemingly little spare cash available to deliver additional hulls in the programme (hence the genesis of the Type 31e design). The older Type 23s are now getting elderly and fragile, and some are still the best part of two decades away from paying off. There is not much else that can be done to enhance availability of hulls.

The only other option really open to the RN is to radically shift how it does business, away from the model run since the 1990s of globally deploying frigates to support standing tasks, and instead concentrate the core ASW force in the North Atlantic, remove escorts from doing roles like KIPION and instead refocus the RN as an ASW force with a carrier task force to go on global strike tasks.

Whether the RN is willing to look down this route, keeping the higher end escorts focused on these duties, and make the RFA and Type 31e the flag bearer of choice abroad is not clear. But, it seems likely that the days of seeing ASW T23s doing global tours are probably ending.

It will pose an interesting question for the RN though as it looks to prioritise resources and hulls over the next few years. What is more important – is it supporting a UK ‘global Britain’ tour in Singapore and East Asia, or is it delivering support to ASW operations in the North Atlantic? These require different platforms with different capabilities, and in turn this drives a lot of decision making on what equipment should be purchased and how the fleet should be structured.

More widely the very public statement of a JOA helps draw public attention back to the growing security challenges faced within the NATO area of responsibility. By highlighting that the UK is investing effort and resources in tackling the submarine challenge, it reassures the US (who has likewise reactivated 2^nd Fleet for similar reasons) and sends a message to other NATO nations that they too need to take this seriously.

With the NATO summit looming, and with stakes higher than ever about the long-term credibility of the Alliance, it will be a useful announcement to make to underpin the UK’s continued commitment to ensuring North Atlantic security. Whether other nations see this as a chance to commit their forces to support this work (noting that the JOA’s parameters have not been publicly announced) and start to rebuild coalition ASW operations is not clear. Pledging forces to support this work would be an easy win for European NATO member states keen to demonstrate the value they place on the Alliance.

Engagement with the Media

It is somewhat depressing though that this announcement marks only the first time that Admiral Jones has conducted a television interview during his time in post. There is a lot that the RN can rightly point to over the last two years as an example of ‘good news’, be it the acquisition of world class equipment, the relentless operational tempo across all of the worlds oceans, or the efforts of some exceptional people to support operations, often in very demanding conditions.

The silence emanating from the centre doesn’t help make the case for the Royal Navy or the value of maritime power. In a world where the RN is faced with major challenges, both structural and financial, it is essential that the case is made robustly for maritime power at every opportunity. Being a ‘silent service’ may be a romantic ideal, but it is not the best way to highlight the work of a globally deployed organisation of over 30,000 people.

While there are doubtless some in the defence media world who would dearly love social media to disappear, for reporters to ask friendly questions in the manner of the film ‘Hot Fuzz’ press conference (so Admiral Bloggs, describe your perfect Sunday’) and for all press releases to be reprinted verbatim without being held to account, the reality is the world has moved on. Deferential press treatment is not given as a right. It must be earned – and this is not done by hiding away from the world, pretending that the media doesn’t exist.

Timely engagement with organisations, loudly proclaiming the great work you are doing, robustly defending the organisation you work for and fielding and effectively rebutting difficult questions is essential. The relative invisibility of senior leadership doesn’t build reassurance for juniors – Humphrey has often listened to friends serving feel upset that media coverage inaccurately portrays what is going on in their Service, yet despair that no one senior seems to step up and debunk these myths. Part of leading your people is being willing to publicly stand up to the public and push your case for them at every opportunity, even if that means having people in the media ask you uncomfortable questions.

The nations taxpayers deserve to hear first-hand, on as regular a basis as possible about the case for Defence, and why nearly £40bn of taxpayers money is used to fund it. One must hope that this is not the only TV interview given, that it marks a real change of campaign approach by the Media world and that we will see a lot more of senior military figures talking publicly, but appropriately about the brilliant work done by the men and women of the MOD and Armed Forces. They deserve every opportunity given to praise their courage and commitment, and that can only be done by entering the lions den, not hiding behind the barricades of Main Building.