End of Term Announcements - thoughts on the disposal of RAF Scampton

The last day of the Parliamentary ‘summer term’ is traditionally a day to bury announcements that the Government of the day would like to be forgotten, or at the very least, not too closely scrutinised. Last year saw the slipping out of a statement of the terribly minor news that there was to be a National Security Review (which became the MDP which in turn is becoming another SDSR and which is now approaching the age when the MOD 5^th Floor is probably thinking about which school to put the Reviews name down for). 24^th July 2018 saw a similar raft of announcements, ranging from the positive to the eyebrow raising.

Positive news included the announcement of the formation of a joint Qatari/RAF squadron to train up the Qatari airforce on Typhoon ahead of its introduction into service. Less positive announcements included confirmation that the Type 31e programme contract is delayed – a significant piece of news that Humphrey will have to reflect on and write about in due course (likely with his MDP article which is still being drafted).

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The main announcement of the day was the update on the Defence Estate strategy, updating the House on progress in disposing of surplus estate and securing efficiencies in the defence budget. The headline news was the closure of two RAF stations (RAF Scampton and Linton-On-Ouse), which has attracted significant media attention.

One of the great frustrations that Humphrey has with Defence commentators is the slightly confused approach many take to how the MOD should run Defence issues. On the one hand, when asked to identify how to make savings without damaging the front line, the usual answer is ‘efficiency savings, rationalisation, close places we don’t’ need’, but when told that the MOD intends to close places for those reasons, the same commenters usually go on about ‘vital for defence, putting all our eggs in one basket, what are those idiot bean counters doing’…

The Defence Estate is an extremely expensive and maintenance intensive part of the defence budget – at present the MOD owns over 2% of the UK landmass, and while the size of the armed forces has decreased by 36% since 1999, the built estate (e.g. not training land) has decreased by just 9%. There is clearly a significant surplus in capacity which is not being used to best effect. The long-term aim is to draw back landholdings by about 30% by 2040 – an ambitious but achievable target, providing there is a clear sense of drive and coherent plan behind it.

Taken from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/matt-cartoons-july-2018/

At the same time the buildings are often very old, maintenance intensive and in need of a lot of work just to keep safe and HSE compliant, let alone fit for purpose. Every pound spent on building maintenance is a pound less available to spend on modern front-line equipment. Every site disposed of generates revenues that can be offset against wider demands for efficiency savings, and not found via reductions in training, force levels and manpower. In short, the MOD has everything to gain from reducing its built-up estate wherever feasibly possible to do so.

While the closure of RAF Scampton has led to complaints about ‘idiot bean counters throwing away our national heritage’ or other such helpful views online, you have to take an objective view about what is gained from keeping the base open. To support a single flying squadron plus ground support units in isolation generates a large bill for life support services, support staff, airfield services (e.g. ATC and fire/rescue crews) and significant duplication of effort.

There is nothing unique about Scampton from an operational perspective – it is one of many airbases in use by the RAF which has a runway, some support facilities and a proud history. The only real issue that relocating the Red Arrows poses is finding somewhere with enough airspace to permit the team to practise their manoeuvres without disrupting flying operations (e.g. it probably wouldn’t make sense to send them to RAF Valley or Lossiemouth). The land-based elements can easily be moved elsewhere, and collocated, helping provide long term savings.

There is inevitably sadness at losing a site with strong links to 617 Squadron, the Dambusters and ‘that dog’, but equally the site reportedly needs substantial investment, is no longer used by a front-line squadron, and is one of many RAF sites with a strong and proud heritage. This does not mean that it needs to be retained as an active airbase – indeed it is likely that in its new guise, the public are more likely to see the historical parts that really matter than they are now.

But why not sell X?

It is common at times like this to see people go ‘what on earth is the MOD doing’ why doesn’t it sell X instead – those idiots don’t know what they are doing’.  The reality is that estate planning is a really complicated business at the best of times and relies on people with a great deal of understanding on the complexities, not just of the estate, but wider defence planning too.

The MOD has probably the most complicated land estate of any government department, encompassing everything from firing ranges, stately homes, forests, nuclear weapons storage sites, fuel depots, wharves, runways, railways, nuclear bunkers, lots of accommodation blocks, an enormous amount of heritage buildings and a diverse array of Sites of Special Scientific Interest and nature reserves, not just in the UK, but also around the world. (For anyone with an interest in this area, the Sanctuary magazine – available HERE, is a great way to learn about the challenges of the nature and historical parts of the Estate). It is also worth reading the Estate Strategy too, to understand what is trying to be acheived - HERE

These sites were not acquired under one coherent plan, but instead piecemeal over generations, particularly during times of conflict, and often under different means of acquisition, ranging from purchase to requisitioning. There are many complicated covenants and issues to do with land use and disposal that may prohibit some developments or require others to be cleaned up to specific standards (there are many tales of RAF airbases requiring complete refurbishment back into farmland if sold, hence their remaining open).

To manage this estate requires a clear picture of what can be sold, what can be developed, what sites have constraints on them and what has potential for further building. For instance, the Royal Navy has invested heavily for decades now in HMS COLLINGWOOD in Fareham, using the large amounts of space to build ever more training facilities and accommodation on one site, consolidating a range of other smaller wartime site requisitions such as HMS DRYAD and MERCURY for little if any operational impact.

The Defence Estate planners need to consider all of these factors, plus understand evolving training requirements, capability changes and where to put units when deciding what to close. They also need to know about likely land values, the potential for purchasers to get planning permission (which may impact on the value of a land sale) and the potential for contamination or other issues. This is a very complex business, and while it is easy to moan and say ‘they’re closing all the crown jewels down’, it may well be that those are the sites that are the most maintenance intensive and also the most valuable to developers.

There is also the usual argument ‘we’ve run out of bases as they’ve closed them all down now’ which is utter nonsense. Even after the closure of RAF Scampton and Linton-On-Ouse, there will be plenty of airfields across the UK with a defence aviation presence. Some may not be full time RAF airbases, others may be emergency landing grounds (such as the former RAF Leuchars), but they still provide a range of places to operate from. Frankly, given the reduced size of the RAF, and the increased capability of its aircraft meaning fewer diversion airfields and other support facilities like weapons ranges are needed, a strong case can be made for even more consolidation and closures.

This may not sit comfortably with those who want to see as many RAF bases open as possible, but to Humphrey the issue is simple. Every pound spent on running an RAF base is a pound less for running RAF aircraft. It ties up manpower that could be used elsewhere and it adds little to operational capability and enabling the RAF to keep this nation safe through enabling airpower to take to the skies. Ruthless and merciless efficiency is what is needed here, not an overly-emotional idea that because back in 1945 when we were fighting a total war in a battle for national we had hundreds of airbases, we somehow need to keep them all open now.  What matters most is the aircraft, the weapons and most importantly of all, the people.