We Must Prevent a Minehunter Gap!

The Sunday Times reports today (PAYWALL LINK) that the Royal Navy is thinking of removing two of the four MCMV vessels that it has permanently based in the Gulf. This is seen as inevitable following the removal of a pair of Hunt class from service as an in year savings measure. The worry is that there will be significant damage to bilateral relations with the US over this issue.

The RN has maintained a reasonable presence in the Gulf for many years, which is built around three core roles –

a.        the ability to provide a surface escort (either AAW or ASW) that can operate in a high end war fighting environment, and integrate into US CVBGs.

b.       An MCMV squadron and support ship to provide an integrated ability with the USN to ensure an effective mine clearance capability in the region.

c.       Support ships such as tankers, stores ships and a repair capability (now on the LSD) to support wider coalition operations.

This force is also augmented on a regular basis by other deploying units which over recent years have included submarines, helicopter carriers and LPDs, hydrographic vessels and so on. It is commanded from Bahrain through the 1* UK Maritime Component Commander, a ‘dual hatted’ individual who not only exercises control over UK ships in region, but acts as a deputy for the Commander US 5^th Fleet, primarily on matters linked to the 31 nation Combined Maritime Forces HQ.

In his national role, Cdre UKMCC is supported by a small HQ designed to provide local support including HQ functions and a support facility to ensure the MCMV force and visiting warships are able to access stores and spares. These functions are being consolidated in a major new development that will be known as ‘HMS JUFAIR’ that will provide the RN with a major new shore base in region.

Why does the MCMV fleet matter?

For the RN, the MCMV commitment to the Gulf is second only to the MCMV forces commitment to support the nuclear deterrent. It is a critical mission and one that they have invested heavily in for years.Many of the RN crew in this world have rotated multiple times through the Gulf region, with some more senior ratings now on their sixth or seventh four-month tour of the region in the last few years. 

It is a demanding pace of life, matched by equally basic life support facilities onboard. Anyone who has seen the forward accommodation space of a Hunt class MCMV, where over 25 men coexist in a tiny space not much bigger than a suburban garage for months at a time in up to 50 degrees heat, cannot help but be filled with admiration for the work of the MCMV crews. The case for an OP KIPION medal in recognition of their efforts is compelling and long overdue.

The RN MCMV force is one of the jewels in the crown of RN influence and access for the USN. Undoubted global leaders in this area, the force has proven time and again that it possesses capabilities and skills not held by other navies, including the USN. It is fair to say that the USN has invested far less than the RN in this area, and the two forces are very closely integrated and aligned.

Mine warfare is a difficult and dangerous business. In the Gulf it is even more so – the underwater conditions are not usually benign and tropical. Divers are required to operate in almost zero visibility in a relatively shallow area filled with detritus and wrecks. Finding and removing potential mines is a slow business, and one that needs a lot of skill and support to do effectively.

The MCMV is by nature a slow ship, with limited endurance to stay at sea for more than a few days before getting very uncomfortable. To be certain you can deploy and sustain operations for the long haul, you need to have quite a few of them available to manage the complex rhythm of repairs, refits and crew rest.

More widely the RN/USN work exceptionally closely in the region to the extent that the MCMV force is essentially a single force. They work together and sail together, and when alongside will usually be seen berthed in close proximity to one another. The BAY class landing ship has become a critical centre piece for support to the USN too, providing a level of capability and value that the USN openly covets. Simply put, of all the things the UK does with the US, the MCMV world is very much at the cutting edge of why the UK gets taken seriously as a credible ‘peer partner’ and not a token ally.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

What does this mean?

In simple terms the potential loss of the MCMV fleet matters because it is a significant ‘force enabler’ in getting the UK taken seriously by the US. The RN ability to deploy and sustain a force at distance capable of operating in very challenging waters to find mines is something that very very few navies are capable of.

The very fact that the RN is seriously considering deleting half its MCMV force in region highlights how utterly desperate the financial situation is for the Navy right now. This is not a minor secondary duty. This is by a significant margin one of the most critical defence commitments the UK has internationally right now, and the RN feels it cannot resource it.

It also highlights the continued challenge of organisational structures between the Front Line Commands (FLC) and Joint Forces Command. In very simple terms under the current structure in Defence, the FLC’s are responsible for generating, training and providing a fully worked up capability to JFC, which through PJHQ exercises control over the units/assets whilst they are in the Joint Operational Area. PJHQ is responsible through CJO for running the operation and the assets declared to it – the RN is not. In simple terms the UKMCC and its Cdre work for PJHQ, not Navy Command HQ.

What is not clear from the Sunday Times report is whether the RN or JFC was considering the scrapping of the presence – it highlights the disparity at the heart of defence planning. On the one hand you have a clear defence plan, with operational goals to meet and outcomes to deliver – JFC will have clearly set out what they need to deliver this requirement. If the RN feels it can no longer afford to sustain this capability, then JFC is going to have a major problem delivering its operational commitments.

It highlights that there is a mismatch between the service provider and the service deliverer. It also shows a lack of joined up planning, when one budget area is making decisions that will have a long term and deeply damaging impact on the ability of another budgetary area to deliver outputs.

For the UK, the potential reputational damage is huge. The RN has already shrunk its presence considerably in region over the last few years, with the loss of RFA DILIGENCE (albeit done differently via the LSD), reduction in the KIPION escort task line from two escorts down to one permanently in theatre and a wider loss of other assets too. There is arguably already a perception in some areas that the UK is not pulling as much weight as it used to.

At the same time the French, Australians and others are looking at the highly influential position held by the UKMCC Cdre, who with his CMF hat on sits adjacent to and with direct access into Commander 5^th Fleets office, ensuring the UK enjoys very privileged access indeed. Making this billet a permanent UK fill made sense when the UK had more ships and more commitment in the region. If there is a further substantial reduction in ships, at a time when both the French and Australians are ramping up their regional presence, then there is likely to be a real push by them and other nations to make the deputy slot rotational and not fixed as a UK appointment. This ‘flags to posts’ may sound slightly like officialdom gone mad, but in the world of multi-national operations it is significant and makes a real difference.

The UK got the best job going because it was prepared to put resources and hulls into the region and commit seriously to it. A 50% reduction in the MCMV force will quickly call the UK post into question, potentially doing serious damage to UK influence with the US and beyond.

More widely, the current UK government has spent several years trying to convince Gulf allies that the UK is serious about its presence in the Gulf and is trying to reverse the ‘withdrawal’ policy of 1973. There has been a steady increase in visitors and in MOD presence in the region. The MCMV role is one that very few nations in the Gulf can do, and they openly recognise that the UK adds enormous value by providing these ships to help. A major reduction in the force level will have wider diplomatic repercussions and be seen by other nations as a sign of reduced British commitment to the Gulf.

What does the future hold?

The RN is looking more widely to replace its MCMV fleet, and for several years has had a concept in place to replace the existing hulls with a variety of different technology and systems, including unmanned vessels and autonomous technology. The common denominator in all these programmes is that they involve buying more technology and less ships.

However the RN wants to spin it, there will be a lot fewer MCMV style vessels in the next 10-15 years as their replacements eventually come on line. Taking the man, and the ship out of the minefield is an inherently sensible idea, particularly if you can do the mine clearance from shore in the back of a lorry.

At some stage soon the UK will need to have difficult conversations with a number of allies and partners about how they are changing their naval presence anyway to focus less on ships and more on capability. The reduction in hulls is not good news, but in the medium to long term is a conversation that was going to have to happen anyway.

The challenge though is getting the future programmes funded. The buzzword seems to be ‘cutting edge’ and ‘transformational’. At a time of reduced funding, there is a tendency by fleet programmers to assume that if you defer funding another four – five years, then not only do you save money in the short term, but there is likely to be some really cutting edge and transformational technology available to buy.

As we look to the future, the RN of 20 years time is going to be very different in size and capability from the one of today. But, it is important that decisions on force structures are made coherently with an equivalent level of capability replacing ships as they leave the region. A failure to do this properly, and instead do poorly co-ordinated defence planning whereby the UK deletes ships from service in one budget, while another budget struggles to deliver defence outputs is not the sign of a Ministry in a good financial place. The worry must be that the current short term financial woes are doing very serious and very long term damage to the UKs standing with our allies, which will take years to undo.

Perhaps instead of ‘we want eight and we won’t wait’, the new mantra for supporters of the RN should be ‘We must prevent a Minehunter gap’?