For Those In Peril On The Sea
For Those in Peril On the Sea.
The Argentine Navy has reported that one of their
submarines (the ARA SAN JUAN) has gone missing. She was on transit to her home
base and reportedly experienced technical difficulties of some form, and since
then all contact has been lost. A major international SAR operation is
underway, including assistance from Brazil, Chile, the UK and the USA.
Everyone hopes that the SAN JUAN will be found as soon as
possible with her crew unharmed and that she returns home soon. But this incident
highlights several issues of relevance to the UK and the RN that are worth
considering.
Firstly, the possibility that SAN JUAN may have been lost
highlights the dangers inherent in submarine operations. Almost every major
navy has in its history experienced a serious submarine disaster. Operating at
depths under the ocean is very challenging and not something where you can cut
corners or take risks.
For the RN it is a timely reminder of the importance of
investing properly in sea time, training, refits and shore support. The Argentine
Navy has had a challenging period in recent years, suffering from a dearth of
maintenance funds, and reportedly SSK ‘sea days’ (e.g. funding to keep ships at
sea for periods of time) cut to the absolute bone. The core skills required to
be an effective submarine operator means you need to invest heavily in time at
sea, mastering the basics. Unfortunately, the Argentine Navy had cut back so
heavily that at one stage, its time submerged annually was measured in tens of
hours.
Keeping a Navy operational at sea needs funds to be found
for doing basic trials, training and operations day in, day out. This poses
real prioritisation questions for most Naval Staffs facing cuts– do you focus money
on a force that will operate unseen, and require extensive support but deliver
little visible defence diplomacy or ‘soft power’ outputs, or do you put money
into the more visible surface fleet?
It is perhaps
telling that over the last few years many nations have chosen to step quietly
away from the submarine game, or not choose to acquire new build construction. It
is an expensive and costly business to maintain a submarine force, and not always easy to sell the benefits of
it. Within the next 10-15 years many other nations will also face difficult
decisions on whether to extend, replace or delete this capability – some of
them key NATO members.
The incident also reinforces the importance of the
support chain – keeping submarines operational involves heavy investment in a
wide range of very niche and specialist pieces of equipment and being certain that
they will work. Cutting logistics and supply budgets is always tempting, particularly
when considering whether to cut the front line or the tail. Similarly you need
to ensure you have access to effective manufacturers and industry who can supply
you the parts needed to keep the force at sea.
In the UK there have been recent stories about the
defence industry facing major challenges because of potential defence cuts.
Major companies, such as Ultra Electronics are reportedly in challenging circumstances,
and put the blame on this down to the MOD. It highlights the importance in
Defence of not just funding the front line, but in keeping the domestic defence
industrial base active and able to meet the long term needs of the nation.
A key lesson is that a submarine force is not, an isolated
beast. It is a complex organism which requires extensive external support from
the military, civil service and industry to keep operational. Cutting budgets
or skimping on support, training and the ability to keep the force at sea poses
potentially enormous risks.
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Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
International Rescue
One of the heartening aspects of this incident has been
the way that international navies have come together to work on finding the SAN
JUAN. What it has highlighted though is that international co-operation isn’t
something you can just do overnight.
Submarine operations are some of the most secretive and sensitive
parts of a states arsenal. Nations do not like to admit where their submarines
are, what they are doing or why. Even the UK and France, two extremely close
allies have had a submarine collision when two of their SSBNs collided at sea –
because neither nation was prepared to expose in sufficient detail where their
SSBN patrols were occurring.
To admit where your submarine is, is a significant act of
trust on behalf of the nation. So, it reflects well on Argentina that they were
prepared to so quickly look for help beyond their own resources – this act may
well prove to be decisive in saving their sailors lives.
But co-ordinating these operations isn’t easy, and it
highlights how a withdrawal from international military exercises can reduce interoperability.
For instance, the UK and Argentine militaries have not really worked together
in these waters for decades – there have been isolated incidents of co-operation
elsewhere, but sadly the political climate has meant that these two forces do
not have a honed ability to work together.
In an emergency much can be overcome, but even basics
like ensuring people know who to talk to, what email address to use and how-to
co-ordinate work is being improvised on the go. This isn’t optimal. It also
shows what happens when you reduce your exercising with other nations – you just
can’t work as effectively with them from the off. This again is a timely reminder
of the importance of not cutting exercise budgets too heavily – deployments overseas
may well be a ‘jolly’ but they also serve an important purpose in building good
links and working relationships.
The wider picture is one of reminding the world how much
investment is needed in rescue capability when you operate a submarine force.
If you expect people to go into the dark deep waters, you need them to know
that if all else fails, you will try and get them out again. The UK and USN
have invested heavily in rescue submarines, air portable at very short notice
to conduct rescues around the world as required. Other nations, with more
localised ambitions have invested in rescue ships – such as the Brazilian Navy.
Either way, this incident highlights the scale of investment
needed to keep a submarine force operating. You need rescue facilities, shore
support, good medical support too (such as the RN’s Submarine rescue group) and
a heavy investment in hydrographic capability to ensure you know as much as possible
about the waters you plan to operate in – humanity knows more about the dark
side of the moon than it does about the depths of our own oceans. All of this capability
comes with a large price tag, and isn’t always an easy sell to treasuries around
the world seeking to make defence cuts.
Whatever else happens, this incident is a timely reminder
of the importance in investing properly in the underpinning rescue and other
logistics to keep submarines at sea, and in sustaining international relationships
to ensure that when a crisis hits, others help.
It is also perhaps a timely reminder of just how
difficult ASW is, and just how big the oceans really are – trying to find a submarine that wants to be
found in a known box of water without success indicates how hard it can be when
the submarine doesn’t want to be found. The ocean is a very big, very empty
place and submarines can easily disappear.
British Forces ‘Down
South’
The final issue identified is perhaps the more politically
vexed question of UK forces in the Falkland Islands. The fact is that the UK
has an overwhelming level of military capability in the region, much of which
is deployable in short timeframes highlights that it is perhaps a force without
a current mission. The UK has proven itself able to offer a patrol ship, an Antarctic
patrol ship and a plethora of aircraft capability all held locally to support
this issue.
The garrison has been sustained at a constant level now
for decades, despite there being no credible military threat for a very long
time now. This incident has highlighted that the UK retains a suite of very advanced
and capable military equipment in the region, which perhaps doesn’t have that
much to do. While it may be heresy to say it out loud, has the time come to
look again at the size and scale of the Falklands garrison?
The UK armed forces hold the Argentine armed forces in
the highest professional regard – there is a respect and admiration for the
courage displayed in 1982 and the bravery with which near suicidal attacks were
pressed home. But this is now 35 years ago, and Argentina long ago ceased to be
a credible threat.
Perhaps the time has come to ask if defence cuts are
needed, whether it is time to draw down the garrison in the Falklands to a
significantly reduced force? Nearly 1500 British personnel 8000 miles from home
waiting for an enemy who will never come – it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the Falklands have become the BAOR of the 21st Century.
Already the reduction of the resident guard ship (either
T23 or 45) to an occasional presence has had little discernible impact on
security. Would anyone really notice if the UK quietly ceased to send escorts
to the South Atlantic at all? Such a move would relieve pressure on the hard-stretched
RN, which has to nominate an APT(S) platform at all times, even if not in
theatre, and also provide a tanker to support the UK presence in the region.
One of the four Tide class tankers will probably spend most of their life steaming
in these waters, supporting an occasional visitor or small OPV – is this really
the best use of a brand new nearly 37,000 tonne tanker?
If one good thing comes from this incident, then it is
perhaps that the door has been opened slightly to working more closely with the
Argentine armed forces. Working together in diplomatic and international
security forums, and on the ground globally with the UN, there is huge potential
for more to be done which benefits everyone.
There is always going to be a bilateral irritant in the
form of Falklands sovereignty, but hopefully the time is approaching when this
can be viewed as almost a form of ritual and not something that should disrupt
the otherwise strong links between the UK and Argentina. No one expects an easy
solution here, but one does hope that we can try to move forward in some small
way.
Conclusions
These are difficult days, and our thoughts should be with
the crew of the SAN JUAN and also their families. It is right to hope that
there is a happy ending to this situation, to consider anything else too soon
is not right or proper.
1 further point
ReplyDeleteHalf a dozen nations throwing significant assets at the problem are unable to locate a submarine THAT DESPERATELY WANTS TO BE FOUND.
Its hard to think of a more compelling case for the military utility of submarines.
Fingers crossed for the lost
I'm not sure the decision to delete the BAOR stands up post-Ukraine, post Russian revitalisation of their armour, post their development of their drone, artillery and cyber capabilities and given the attention of the US being elsewhere.
ReplyDeleteIf drawing down the garrison at the Falklands is as well-timed or as well-thought through as the BAOR decision then we should absolutely NOT do it, particularly as we seem to be about to lose much of our amphibious shipping and large parts of the RM. John Nott anyone?
It is a sea adventure that is very scary. ไพ่ป๊อกเด้ง
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