Eating Your Own - Cannibalisation in the Royal Navy

The National Audit Office issued a report today into cannibalisation in the Royal Navy. This practise, is not as one might think in light of recent headlines, something indulged in by submariners. Instead it refers to the process of taking equipment from one ship, and swiftly moving it onto another. The headline figure that the media are focusing on is that these incidents are up nearly 50% in the last few years, at a considerable cost to the taxpayer.

Firstly it is important to realise that the process of cannibalisation (or STOROB as referred to in the Service) is not unique to the RN. All navies do it to some degree or another. It is also not a new process, and dates back many years. For instance the old HMS EAGLE after paying off was used for years to provide a source of spare parts for HMS ARK ROYAL. Many other ships in reserve or lower readiness states have been donors of spare parts to other ships. This is not a new thing, nor is it surprising that it is done.

Why does this happen?

 Ships are very complex beasts, full of machinery and parts that will break down or which have a finite life. Much of the equipment fitted to a ship relies on sub components to function properly, but ships are living embodiments of the principle of Murphy’s Law.

The RN keeps a substantial number of its ships at sea 365 days per year on operational tasking, while other ships are either alongside at lower readiness or in refit. The deployed ships are at the end of a long logistics chain, and it can take time for parts to arrive. Similarly, ships need to sail on time to meet fixed dates, such as getting to the start of an exercise, or supporting a major event. Finally other ships are held at high readiness for operations and may need to sail at short notice.

Normally the RN logistics chain is exceptionally effective at getting kit, particularly routine or low priority kit to ships when it is needed. This makes use of the wider UK strategic air transport network run by the RAF, and the highly effective contractors support solutions elsewhere. One of the reasons the RN is so effective is because of the investment in logistics to get parts out to ships quickly.

Sometimes though it is simply not possible to provide the right piece of equipment in time to meet the ships need. Reading the NAO report shows clearly the flow chart of decision making to highlight that cannibalisation only occurs when the operational imperative is there, and the support chain cannot provide it in time.

What sort of time are we talking about though? As an example, in the Gulf the UK maintains a small force of MCMVs. These are required to support a range of operations and exercises, often at very short notice. As part of the regular programming of the ships activities, one hull might be alongside for a weeks maintenance, while another is at very high readiness to sail within 4-6 hours.

If a part breaks (say refrigeration systems to keep vital machinery chilled in the heat) on the high readiness vessel, then there is not always going to be a spare part immediately available. The reality of a globally deployed navy is that the spare parts you need are usually at the other end of the supply chain.

In this instance, what can be done is to take a part from the ship alongside, who is not going to sea anyway as she is in planned maintenance, and fit it to the other ship in a hurry. This ensures the first vessel remains ready for operational tasking, and the other one is not impacted as she is not in a sea going state. Meanwhile the UK based logistics chain can get a replacement part out on the next inbound RAF flight. The capability is maintained, but it is recorded as a cannibalisation event.

Another example is where older equipment is beginning to fail and there may not be many spare stocks left as the Original Equipment Manufacturer is no longer in business. The Type 23s were designed in the early 1980s, the Hunt class MCMV in the 1970s. No matter how progressive the updates are, these are old ships with older bits of equipment on them. Similarly, as the Merlin fleet ages, one wonders whether the reported incidents reflect more the reduced number of older airframes as the upgrade programme went on, rather than any deeper issues?

At times like this, it may be necessary to take a part from one ship to another deploying or at very high readiness, because there are no spares available. The MOD purchases plenty of spare parts, but if usage rates vary and are higher than planned or historical data indicates is likely, it may take time to find a manufacturer to make bespoke parts to backfill  the requirement. Alternatively it could be that the new contract has been placed, existing stocks have run down and there is a pause while new parts arrive.

TImage by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

While it is easy to say ‘why not do a Just In Time’ logistics system, military use of equipment means this isn’t feasible. We are talking tiny pieces of equipment here, such as circuit boards or electronic equipment. Predicting failure rates is not always easy when the way the equipment is used changes over time.

Another option is to take parts of a ship in build or refit, knowing that further parts can be ordered to replace them. This is a riskier option as it can lead to delay on the ship in build, but if you need to get a ship into service quickly, or back into readiness then it makes sense. In the case of the Submarine Service, completion of an ASTUTE class was delayed by 6 weeks, and extra costs incurred by putting parts intended for one boat onto another in service hull. This may have been for emergency repairs, or it may have been because the RN needed SSNs at sea, and decided it was better to risk completion to one hull, than not have another at sea doing its mission.

The Fleet Planners daily have to balance the short term risk of not having a ship available for critical missions, or delaying the arrival of replacements further, knowing this causes knock on consequences. These decisions are not taken lightly for this reason.

Like all navies the RN has to balance the need to deliver on the front line against the need to generate follow on forces. Robbing ships of spare parts is not the optimal solution, but sometimes time and need means there is no other option. If you need a ship to sail in 2hrs, and the part cannot be there for 24hrs, then you face a tough choice. If you know you have a ship next to you that has just returned from deployment, is about to refit and will not be sailing for weeks, then its better to send a working party to acquire the spare part than wait an extra day and risk the programme.

What is the risk?

The big challenges facing the RN from this report seems to be twofold. Firstly the ongoing pressure to save money – lots of money. The risk is that if you have to make in year savings, then the contracts you need to place to get the smaller items may slip into the next quarter or following financial year. It is easy to think about deferring a spare parts buy 12 months if you need to save £92m and know that there are sufficient spares in the fleet to last that long with a bit of juggling.

Secondly, the report highlights the desperate shortage of MOD civil servants who purchase the spare parts. There are overall 21% shortage of staff, with over 40% gapped vacancies in some areas, and critical shortages of qualified staff to lead on the contract management. It is easy to demand that the MOD downsize civil servants instead of the front line, but this is the very real outcome of that process.

If the MOD continues to come under pressure to further shrink its workforce, then this problem will only be exacerbated. The collapse in morale at DE&S, where a civilian workforce that has spent years being abused by politicians and media alike has started leaving in droves without adequate replacement means that the people you need now to staff the contracts no longer exist. Buying spare parts is not sexy, high profile and does not win votes. It does though keep ships at sea without having to necessarily consider cannibalisation.

Final Thoughts

This story is yet another self-inflicted PR disaster for the Royal Navy. Speaking to naval friends this morning, there was enormous frustration at the inability of the Service to go on the media offensive, to expose that yes there is cannibalisation but it needs a sense of perspective. 1.4% of spare parts provided were cannibalised – that is 3,230 incidents in 5 years, and 71% of those were for components valued at under £5000. That means there have been almost 300,000 incidents were the right kit was provided new in the same time frame (e.g. 98.6% of the time).

The RN, rather than pointing out that the need to keep ships at sea ready to fight tonight means sometimes taking risk, instead seems to have meekly rolled over. Once again, a chance to secure an easy PR win by showing how busy the RN is, what good work it is doing for the public around the globe 24/7/365, and noting that yes, sometimes things break or need replacing, but isn’t the RN doing a bloody good job, has been lost.

It is depressing to think that this blog article is likely to be the only robust counter offensive mounted to try and press the RN’s case. When a part time blogger without any involvement with Defence can marshal a strong argument as to why this is being overblown in under an hour, one has to wonder what on earth Navy media are playing at? This was a story which a forward leaning PR team could, and should, have defused easily. Instead once again the RN is the victim of self inflicted damaging stories, building an image that will not be easily shaken off that it is a shambolic shrinking scrapheap, not a world class global force for good.