For Those In Peril On The Sea

For Those in Peril On the Sea.

The Argentine Navy has reported that one of their submarines (the ARA SAN JUAN) has gone missing. She was on transit to her home base and reportedly experienced technical difficulties of some form, and since then all contact has been lost. A major international SAR operation is underway, including assistance from Brazil, Chile, the UK and the USA.

Everyone hopes that the SAN JUAN will be found as soon as possible with her crew unharmed and that she returns home soon. But this incident highlights several issues of relevance to the UK and the RN that are worth considering.

Firstly, the possibility that SAN JUAN may have been lost highlights the dangers inherent in submarine operations. Almost every major navy has in its history experienced a serious submarine disaster. Operating at depths under the ocean is very challenging and not something where you can cut corners or take risks.

For the RN it is a timely reminder of the importance of investing properly in sea time, training, refits and shore support. The Argentine Navy has had a challenging period in recent years, suffering from a dearth of maintenance funds, and reportedly SSK ‘sea days’ (e.g. funding to keep ships at sea for periods of time) cut to the absolute bone. The core skills required to be an effective submarine operator means you need to invest heavily in time at sea, mastering the basics. Unfortunately, the Argentine Navy had cut back so heavily that at one stage, its time submerged annually was measured in tens of hours.

Keeping a Navy operational at sea needs funds to be found for doing basic trials, training and operations day in, day out. This poses real prioritisation questions for most Naval Staffs facing cuts– do you focus money on a force that will operate unseen, and require extensive support but deliver little visible defence diplomacy or ‘soft power’ outputs, or do you put money into the more visible surface fleet?

 It is perhaps telling that over the last few years many nations have chosen to step quietly away from the submarine game, or not choose to acquire new build construction. It is an expensive and costly business to maintain a submarine force,  and not always easy to sell the benefits of it. Within the next 10-15 years many other nations will also face difficult decisions on whether to extend, replace or delete this capability – some of them key NATO members.

The incident also reinforces the importance of the support chain – keeping submarines operational involves heavy investment in a wide range of very niche and specialist pieces of equipment and being certain that they will work. Cutting logistics and supply budgets is always tempting, particularly when considering whether to cut the front line or the tail. Similarly you need to ensure you have access to effective manufacturers and industry who can supply you the parts needed to keep the force at sea.

In the UK there have been recent stories about the defence industry facing major challenges because of potential defence cuts. Major companies, such as Ultra Electronics are reportedly in challenging circumstances, and put the blame on this down to the MOD. It highlights the importance in Defence of not just funding the front line, but in keeping the domestic defence industrial base active and able to meet the long term needs of the nation.

A key lesson is that a submarine force is not, an isolated beast. It is a complex organism which requires extensive external support from the military, civil service and industry to keep operational. Cutting budgets or skimping on support, training and the ability to keep the force at sea poses potentially enormous risks.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

International Rescue

One of the heartening aspects of this incident has been the way that international navies have come together to work on finding the SAN JUAN. What it has highlighted though is that international co-operation isn’t something you can just do overnight.

Submarine operations are some of the most secretive and sensitive parts of a states arsenal. Nations do not like to admit where their submarines are, what they are doing or why. Even the UK and France, two extremely close allies have had a submarine collision when two of their SSBNs collided at sea – because neither nation was prepared to expose in sufficient detail where their SSBN patrols were occurring.

To admit where your submarine is, is a significant act of trust on behalf of the nation. So, it reflects well on Argentina that they were prepared to so quickly look for help beyond their own resources – this act may well prove to be decisive in saving their sailors lives.

But co-ordinating these operations isn’t easy, and it highlights how a withdrawal from international military exercises can reduce interoperability. For instance, the UK and Argentine militaries have not really worked together in these waters for decades – there have been isolated incidents of co-operation elsewhere, but sadly the political climate has meant that these two forces do not have a honed ability to work together.

In an emergency much can be overcome, but even basics like ensuring people know who to talk to, what email address to use and how-to co-ordinate work is being improvised on the go. This isn’t optimal. It also shows what happens when you reduce your exercising with other nations – you just can’t work as effectively with them from the off. This again is a timely reminder of the importance of not cutting exercise budgets too heavily – deployments overseas may well be a ‘jolly’ but they also serve an important purpose in building good links and working relationships.

The wider picture is one of reminding the world how much investment is needed in rescue capability when you operate a submarine force. If you expect people to go into the dark deep waters, you need them to know that if all else fails, you will try and get them out again. The UK and USN have invested heavily in rescue submarines, air portable at very short notice to conduct rescues around the world as required. Other nations, with more localised ambitions have invested in rescue ships – such as the Brazilian Navy.

Either way, this incident highlights the scale of investment needed to keep a submarine force operating. You need rescue facilities, shore support, good medical support too (such as the RN’s Submarine rescue group) and a heavy investment in hydrographic capability to ensure you know as much as possible about the waters you plan to operate in – humanity knows more about the dark side of the moon than it does about the depths of our own oceans. All of this capability comes with a large price tag, and isn’t always an easy sell to treasuries around the world seeking to make defence cuts.

Whatever else happens, this incident is a timely reminder of the importance in investing properly in the underpinning rescue and other logistics to keep submarines at sea, and in sustaining international relationships to ensure that when a crisis hits, others help.

It is also perhaps a timely reminder of just how difficult ASW is, and just how big the oceans really are  – trying to find a submarine that wants to be found in a known box of water without success indicates how hard it can be when the submarine doesn’t want to be found. The ocean is a very big, very empty place and submarines can easily disappear.

British Forces ‘Down South’

The final issue identified is perhaps the more politically vexed question of UK forces in the Falkland Islands. The fact is that the UK has an overwhelming level of military capability in the region, much of which is deployable in short timeframes highlights that it is perhaps a force without a current mission. The UK has proven itself able to offer a patrol ship, an Antarctic patrol ship and a plethora of aircraft capability all held locally to support this issue.

The garrison has been sustained at a constant level now for decades, despite there being no credible military threat for a very long time now. This incident has highlighted that the UK retains a suite of very advanced and capable military equipment in the region, which perhaps doesn’t have that much to do. While it may be heresy to say it out loud, has the time come to look again at the size and scale of the Falklands garrison?

The UK armed forces hold the Argentine armed forces in the highest professional regard – there is a respect and admiration for the courage displayed in 1982 and the bravery with which near suicidal attacks were pressed home. But this is now 35 years ago, and Argentina long ago ceased to be a credible threat.

Perhaps the time has come to ask if defence cuts are needed, whether it is time to draw down the garrison in the Falklands to a significantly reduced force? Nearly 1500 British personnel 8000 miles from home waiting for an enemy who will never come – it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Falklands have become the BAOR of the 21^st Century.

Already the reduction of the resident guard ship (either T23 or 45) to an occasional presence has had little discernible impact on security. Would anyone really notice if the UK quietly ceased to send escorts to the South Atlantic at all? Such a move would relieve pressure on the hard-stretched RN, which has to nominate an APT(S) platform at all times, even if not in theatre, and also provide a tanker to support the UK presence in the region. One of the four Tide class tankers will probably spend most of their life steaming in these waters, supporting an occasional visitor or small OPV – is this really the best use of a brand new nearly 37,000 tonne tanker?

If one good thing comes from this incident, then it is perhaps that the door has been opened slightly to working more closely with the Argentine armed forces. Working together in diplomatic and international security forums, and on the ground globally with the UN, there is huge potential for more to be done which benefits everyone.

There is always going to be a bilateral irritant in the form of Falklands sovereignty, but hopefully the time is approaching when this can be viewed as almost a form of ritual and not something that should disrupt the otherwise strong links between the UK and Argentina. No one expects an easy solution here, but one does hope that we can try to move forward in some small way.

Conclusions

These are difficult days, and our thoughts should be with the crew of the SAN JUAN and also their families. It is right to hope that there is a happy ending to this situation, to consider anything else too soon is not right or proper.