Why Exercise COLD RESPONSE Matters.

 

The major NATO exercise ‘COLD RESPONSE 22’ is underway in Norway. This gathering of over 35,000 troops, ships and aircraft is a long planned means of testing the ability of allies to work closely together.

There is perhaps more attention than usual to the exercise, in part due to timing, which coincides with the horrific and blatantly illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia. It is important to be clear that this is not a direct response to that act, but instead a long planned exercise.

The UK commitment has been significant, deploying HMS PRINCE OF WALES, ALBION, two escorts (a Type 23 and 45), a Bay class LSD(A) and an ASTUTE class nuclear submarine, as well as aircraft, helicopters and 900 Royal Marines and supporting units.

This is a significant presence, helping demonstrate the ability of the Royal Navy to send a carrier strike group style force to sea, able to play a leading part in any coalition operation. Of particular note is both that the POW is a key NATO command platform, embarking planners from multiple nations to exercise command and control over the exercise, as well as testing her secondary role as an LPH.

For the Royal Navy this deployment is a good chance to demonstrate a large scale and overt presence in northern waters, an area which is becoming of increasing strategic importance again. Operating in the ‘high north’ helps reaffirm wider UK political and strategic interest in the region, and sends a clear message of deterrence to Russia that this is not an uncontested space open for land grabs.

The exercise more widely sends a strong message of presence, capability and deterrence. By showing the ability of NATO forces to come together and operate as a tightly integrated force, able to carry out complex military operations across land, sea and air domains, this reminds others that NATO is an increasingly revitalised body.

Events in Ukraine have shown the importance of working together to deter Russia, and to make clear that NATO will stand firm in any invasion of member states terrain. By showing an ability to work in Norway, which shares a land border with Russia, the message is simple – the will is there, as is the technical capability to work in the country in the most demanding climatic conditions going, and be able to go to war in these circumstances.

This is a powerful message to send, namely that NATO forces are capable of operating in incredibly difficult situations and holding their own. To a Russian Army, bruised from heavy losses in Ukraine, the prospect of fighting in Norway, a country which for nearly 80 years has prepared to defend itself against external attack, and to do so facing the full might of NATO, will be a daunting one.

The wider message is that if NATO can operate in Norway, it is equally comfortable operating in other arctic areas too. Finland and Sweden may not (yet) be part of NATO, but they have an exceptionally close working relationship with the Alliance, and the Putin regime may have provided a catalyst to seek even further close links.

To know that NATO is comfortable working with both nations means that in the event of NATO coming to their assistance in the event of Russian attack, there would already be effective working links. To that end, COLD RESPONSE is a good example of NATO practising both deterrence while being able to shift into a ‘defence’ mindset if required to support friends and partners.

To the UK this exercise is a good chance to reiterate the leading role played by the British in NATO. As one of the two largest participating contingents, this deployment is occurring at the same time as British forces are operating across Europe, including in the Baltic and Med in support of wider NATO operations. This is another visible sign that Britain is prepared to invest time, money and troops to NATO to help maintain its credibility as a serious defensive alliance.

At a more tactical level it is a good reminder of the ability of the Royal Navy to send balanced task groups to sea to conduct naval operations. Despite the usual naysayers on social media moaning about ships not being at sea (particularly the Type 45 force), as usual this has proven to be little more than hyperbole. With a pair of 45s deployed, one in the exercise and one in the Med, and others working up in home waters, once again the Type 45 fleet shows that it is both highly deployable and extremely capable – even if it doesn’t deploy in line with unrealistic internet admiral expectations.

The deployed force showcases the continued UK ability to deploy amphibious forces, which will be capable of moving ashore when needed and operating in challenging conditions. The level of training required to operate in the Arctic in winter is significant, requiring specialist training from how to survive if you fall into the ice, through to being able to maintain aircraft to fly in these conditions.

It is a testament to the long-standing close relationship that the UK has with Norway, both a NATO partner and close bilateral ally, that British forces are incredibly well supported by the host nation. This means that there is a significant reservoir of arctic knowledge in the military and close and highly effective working relationships in place. In times of war, this would be a significant asset.

Perhaps the biggest thing to take from this exercise is the wider point about the reinvigoration of NATO in a very short time. For many years after 1991 it was regularly argued that the Alliance was all but defunct, and indeed it often seemed to be a curious legacy – a political talking shop with some military cooperation involved.

Today, in direct response to the horrific actions of the Putin regime, NATO seems to have been restored to a key role as an extremely effective military defensive alliance. The invasion  of Ukraine has spurred nations into upping defence spending, and focusing more resources on their defences than has been the case for decades.

The challenge for NATO collectively is to work out how best to act in a manner that defends its members and deters Russia. COLD RESPONSE works well as an exercise in the high north because it tests the ability to operate in a climatically challenging environment, while also working in a space where Russia could potentially pose a threat on land, sea and air. It is about sending a message that this space is both defendable, and will be defended.

But is COLD RESPONSE the right response more widely for the alliance? If you look elsewhere there will be different requirements – the Baltic states for example will seek to be defended- is the NATO presence there, which is at presence a ‘nuclear tripwire’ the right one, or has the time come to upgrade it?

Currently the NATO presence in places like Estonia is to provide a presence that if attacked will help trigger Article 5, drawing NATO into any conflict. But the lesson from Ukraine is that properly trained, supported and motivated troops can hold off an attacker, and if well supplied can inflict significant damage.

Has the time come to say that based on Russian performance in Ukraine that a properly resourced defensive effort could hope to hold the Baltic states against attack – not just function as a tripwire for a wider conflict? The initial indications are that yes, a well supported force could hold its own, so does NATO want to move from a policy of deterrence to more substantial physical defence?

While deterrence works in the north, perhaps the time is right for a return to proper defence planning in the Baltic – putting in place measures to ensure that any invader will pay a high and bloody price should they try to take the sovereignty of these nations away.

Similarly, how does the Southern flank respond to the new strategic situation? Arguably the member states on the Black Sea (e.g. Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania among others) also need to consider whether deterrence or defence is the answer here. If Russian forces end up establishing a land bridge to Moldova, denying Ukraine its coastline, then Russian troops are within easy striking distance of other NATO members.

This poses a range of strategic challenges that NATO has not had to consider before- how to defend independent nations that were once forced to be in the Warsaw Pact from attack. Unlike the high north, where Norway, Sweden and Finland are both easily densible and very well funded, these states are harder to defend and lack large defence budgets.

The challenge here is to identify how to defend them from attack, and to work out the best means to deter Russian aggression. Is it more exercises like COLD RESPONSE but in the Black Sea, or would this be too provocative? If not, is there a need for a similar set of forward deployed forces in this region to guard against Russian attack?

The specific challenge facing the UK amid all of this, and which will not be answered quickly, is the level to which it wishes to play a part. Historically a leading NATO member, any ramping up of commitment to NATO will come with a corresponding cost, for example reduced troop levels available elsewhere.

Over the coming months and years planners in London will need to balance off the challenge of supporting NATO and ensuring it remains a credible defensive alliance, while also meeting the political aspiration that the UK remains a global player in military terms, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. This is likely to prove a significant challenge and will require either messy compromise or unpalatable changes for some. It remains to be seen what outcome will emerge, and at what price.

The reality is that the UK and NATO now faces difficult and complex planning questions about how best to maintain its defences. Under Putin, Russia has become a nation determined both to tear up the international rulebook and keep pushing to break rules in the hope of ‘getting away with it’.

There needs to be a robust message that NATO territory is inviolable, and that an attack on one is an attack on all – while NATO remains a defensive alliance, it needs to be clear that any attack would be met with overwhelming force.  COLD RESPONSE therefore is a vital part of ensuring that NATO sends a message to Russia (and others) that any stepping over the line would result in a very hot response indeed.