The MOD & The High North

 

The Ministry of Defence has published its long awaited document on the role of the British armed forces will operate in the so-called ‘High North’. This document is a valuable insight into both goals for the region, and also has wider implications beyond the cold waters of the Arctic. It is well worth a read.

While it may sound like a barren frozen wasteland, of little interest or Defence value, the UK is concerned about this region for a variety of reasons. The impact of climate change is opening up commercially viable routes, with an impact on trade in the region. There is a wealth of natural resources, while the UK retains a strong interest in undersea cables and other critical national infrastructure in the region.

This is a region which is contested militarily by Russia, which has increasingly boosted its armed forces presence in the region. Even with their lamentable performance in Ukraine, we should be wary of writing off the Russian military too quickly, and their Northern Fleet and associated forces contains some extremely capable platforms that could pose a threat to vital UK national interests.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

China too is increasingly interested in the region, opening trade links and it is now pursuing a so-called ‘Polar Silk Road’ which will increase Chinese presence in the area. This may include icebreakers and other military style assets, and may yet herald the presence of Chinese submarines conducting under ice operations, similar to British, US and Russian vessels.

Given this the UK has a clear political and strategic interest in the region, and in trying to keep it low of tensions and high in cooperation. To that end British policy is based around trying to ensure that the UK remains a constructive player, helping to maintain the freedom of navigation, uphold the international rules base system and help tackle malign behaviour by hostile states.

In practical terms this means that Defence has found itself playing an increasingly visible and high profile role in this region. In the last few years there has been a substantial increase in UK military footprint, including a return to occasional SSN operations in the arctic, the deployment of RN escort ships and support vessels well above the Arctic Circle to maintain a watching presence and monitor activity, and an increase in RAF and Army activity – both in terms of surveillance flights (such as from the P8 and the Typhoon in Iceland), and also joint exercise programmes – particularly in Norway.

By providing a major military presence, allied to a formidable diplomatic reach, the UK is able to take on a key leadership role in the high north – bringing a range of military assets to operate that few others possess.

When combined with the powerful and effective global reach of UK diplomatic efforts, and wider ‘soft power’, there is no doubt that the UK is playing a not insignificant leadership role in this space, brought about in part by the fact that it is one of the most militarily capable nations that borders the high north region (remember that if you head north from the northern Scottish coast, there is no landmass further north) - the UK is without doubt a key stakeholder in this space.

This contribution matters in several ways – firstly, it enables the UK to take on the mantle of leadership in a region where it can make a real difference. The deployment of a significant British contribution to EX COLD RESPONSE reminds us that Britain is able to operate military equipment in some of the toughest climatic conditions imaginable – this provides reassurance to friends and allies in the region who have unfriendly neighbours that threaten their integrity.

It also matters because it helps the UK work with peers more widely to help expand and enhance defence cooperation. Reading the document it notes that the UK sees potential to work more closely with other partners including France, the Netherlands and Japan in this space – a potent reminder that the High North is not an exclusively northern European issue.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

By working more closely with partners like the Netherlands, this helps drive future cooperation in areas like joint units and training. The UK has been lucky to benefit from a fantastically close working relationship with the Netherlands Armed Forces, in particular the Netherlands Marine Corps over many decades. This relationship has been honed in the Arctic, and the two nations enjoy an extremely close set of links.

The exercises and operations in the High North provide a great chance to reconfirm these links for many years to come and help provide a focus for further plans and procurement. For example, the amphibious world has very close links, with strong synergy between both nations LPD forces and joint amphibious exercises – it is likely that this reaffirmation of the need to protect the High North will drive future procurement decisions around replacement ships able to operate together in future.

This is the wider piece as to why this strategy matters – it is not just about the here and now of joint military operations with friends and allies in the short term. While vitally important to show ongoing commitment, it also has a wider impact too on the decisions and prioritisation of how the MOD choses to invest and operate its armed forces.

The decision to commit forces to the High North will have a series of wider ramifications for planners. It commits the UK to ensuring that forces are available and trained to deploy to the region in support  of exercises and operations in an enduring sense – for example, the decision to commit the RN escort force there, both now and with the Type 26 frigate means planners have to balance off meeting this commitment with others, reducing RN presence elsewhere in the world.

Another example is the commitment of SSN’s to the region for arctic operations – a hugely powerful (and as seen in PR imagery, very photogenic asset) to have available for operations, but it comes at the cost of locking assets into one area, with reduced focus on visits or deployments elsewhere. Fine if you have a large surface or SSN force, but as numbers reduce, it means difficult choices must be made.

In turn the need to be trained to operate in the region drives training programmes and readiness cycles- you cannot easily go from working in the desert to deploying into an arctic region. Extensive preparation and training is needed, and specialist equipment required – this in turn fixes units to programmes that make it harder to extract them to go to other tasks -the commitment to the High North will fix a lot of British units, particularly high value ones, and reduce their wider global employment on a routine basis.

What does this mean? Firstly, it means that you’re going to see units committed to NATO and the region in a way that perhaps has been reduced in recent years. This in turn means less units available to operate outside the traditional NATO space as a matter of routine – for example the news in the strategy that the Littoral Response Group (North) will focus on the region indicates that a lot of RN and RFA assets will be operating in the area, poised to offer a response if required to an exercise or operation.

It also forces choices about where to send single unit or small fleet assets. For example HMS PROTECTOR, the Antarctic patrol ship will be operating in the Arctic later this year and also visiting Canada – while welcome, it also puts pressure on a singleton hull to be both in the High North, and the Antarctic regions in the same year and also do routine maintenance – does this drive a requirement for a second hull, and if so, where is if funded from (and if not, what risks does this entail?)

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

Similarly, there is a lot of focus on the forward deployment of the P8 and Wedgetail forces into this space, both of which are or will be small fleets. A deployment of one or two airframes into Norway or elsewhere will reduce the ability to deploy more globally while still meeting UK operational needs and requirements. By focusing on the High North, a conscious decision seems to have been taken to reduce presence in other regions, with all the consequences that this may entail.

At the same time, it also drives procurement decisions – equipment intended for use in these regions comes with a bill – its not cheap to ensure advanced military technology can operate in this sort of climatic environment, and this drives the price up. What does this mean for future procurement – will the UK still be able to afford globally focused armed forces, able to deploy kit that can work in both the freezing Arctic and the heat of the desert, or is it something where scaling back is needed – again does this desire to focus on one region have medium term consequences for equipment and capability?

It is this sort of decision that in turn will drive the decisions on what is or is not affordable. What will need to be sacrificed to pay for ensuring an arctic capable force, and how do you reconcile this with the wider and highly ambitious defence policy goals that the UK has, which calls for a globally deployable force?

There is a real risk that difficult decisions need to be struck on where to prioritise resource. For example, if the wider security situation calls for assets capable of operating in the Arctic, and also supporting the wider deployment of troops in locations like Estonia, does this reduce funding for other projects and missions – if so do we run the risk of reducing global commitments to meet NATO goals?

It is realistically too soon to make any concrete predictions here, but it is a good reminder that for longer term planners, they need to strike a hard balance between funding credible forces and capability that can operate and fight in climatic extremes, and also be global enough to meet government policy goals. This isn’t going to be easy, particularly trying to balance off ‘global Britain’ and presence around the world with ‘revival of NATO’ and producing credible forces able to fight high end warfare as policy drivers.

Documents like the High North plan are hugely valuable insight into how the MOD is looking to make a meaningful contribution to Government security policy. They point the way to the value that the MOD can offer in meeting these objectives, but they also highlight too the challenges faced by Defence in trying to find the right balance between support and resource prioritisation. If anything this is a reminder of the importance of a well trained staff officer, and a centre willing, and able, to make tough prioritisation decisions to deliver as required.