To Build A Navy - Thoughts on the new Shipbuilding Strategy

 

Amid the ongoing nightmare that is the appalling Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the horrendous civilian casualties being inflicted by this barbaric war, there are still wider defence stories going on. With this in mind, this article is focusing not on Ukraine directly, although the heroic struggle by the incredible Ukrainian people should be at the front of all our minds, but instead wider news on the Royal Navy and the British Government shipbuilding programme.

People observing activity in Portsmouth Naval Base will have not missed the departure this week of both HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and HMS PRINCE OF WALES, two of the largest, most advanced and most capable aircraft carriers in the world.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright


It is a good reminder that for all the doom and gloom stories put about around the perceived state of the Royal Navy, right now there are two British carriers at sea taking part in work to help secure the maritime security of the UK and our allies. They are supported by a number of ships, including Type 45 destroyers and ASTUTE class submarines in their work.

A key deployment for PRINCE OF WALES is the major NATO exercise COLD RESPONSE, which is being held in the high North. A good test of the ability to fight and win in challenging conditions against external aggression, she will function as a key NATO afloat HQ capable of commanding forces and coordinating response during the exercise.

The UK remains a leading NATO power and has reinvigorated its commitment to the Alliance in recent years, providing more troops, ships and aircraft in support of combined defence of member states. This exercise is a great way to help show how the UK remains committed, and also to test how to work and remain operational and supported in often challenging conditions – as the Russian Army is discovering to its cost, winter warfare is difficult, particularly when you have an amateur approach to logistics.

This exercise commitment is also supported by wider deployments, for example of HMS DIAMOND and RIVER class OPVs to help provide reassurance for maritime security in the Med, again which help the UK show its leading role in NATO, working across multiple operational areas.

This serious deployment is also not occurring in isolation. The RN continues to operate forces in the South Atlantic, West Indies and the Gulf, sending ships to operate and work across the globe to help support UK interests.

On the other side of the planet the deployment of the two RIVER class to the Pacific continues, with HMS SPEY visiting Pitcairn, the most remote of all British territory, and HMS TAMAR has now arrived in Singapore for the first time for maintenance and use of the RN facility in the country.

This is very much a global operational picture – ships at sea across practically every ocean on the planet, operating in support of British and wider allied interests. It’s a great story of operational success and availability, and is a record that many other navies are envious of.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright


This record though can only be sustained through a constant programme of shipbuilding and regeneration of the force. Ships always have a finite lifecycle, and will always eventually need replacing in some form or another. The British Government has launched its updated shipbuilding strategy, which sets out how the UK intends to sustain domestic shipbuilding for government vessels into the future.

The document makes for a fantastic read to understand the scale of ambition in the building programme. There is without doubt a clear package of work ahead covering not just the Royal Navy, but also wider government departments too for many years to come.

One area of surprise is perhaps just how substantial the requirement for UK Government shipping actually is. Step away from the RN and you’ll see a requirement for no fewer than 18 fishery patrol or border cutter vessels to be built in the next few years (in addition to RN vessels) and a large number of science and research platforms.

There is a substantial requirement for dozens of different ships, from across many different departments to help support and sustain the UK way of life. We often forget just how the sea is in our blood, and as an island nation how critical shipping, and shipbuilding is to this.

This strategy sets out the ships that will be required, and more widely the means by which they will be acquired. It is clear that this will not automatically be easy, and there is no certainty that they will be built in the UK – the case will need to be made for this on a case by case basis.

But it is clear that there is a package of work available well into the 2040s for substantial government shipbuilding that will help generate enormous amounts of work for the UK shipping industry, and hopefully more jobs in the design, build, operation and refit area.

Mention is also made of the growing importance of international collaboration -an area where the UK seems to be having increasing success with its export offering – for example the Type 26 and 31 frigates are doing well on the international stage. There is likely to be opportunities for further collaboration to shape how ships are built which may make both their ordering, and longer term support costs cheaper.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright



For the Royal Navy the strategy sets out essentially the same details as seen in the Integrated Review – The big challenge seems to be that there is, on paper an incredibly exciting programme of work ahead – new ships, new classes and new capabilities all brought together to show that there is a coherent plan for the regeneration of the RN over the next 30 years. This ranges from the Type 32 escort ship to additional RFAs to replace the LPD and LSD(A) force, and also replacement of the Mine Warfare vessels with new shore-based capability.

There is no doubt that on paper, this looks a credible and impressive plan. Translating this into action though is where it gets more challenging. It remains unclear what the state of defence funding is here, and whether there is a budget in place that is ringfenced for these capabilities now, or if over time they will be slowly chipped away at and not ordered.

The challenge is going to be proving that the money exists and that ships will be ordered as a result of this work. Many of the projects listed have existed in one form or another for many years without ever being ordered – the future solid support ship project is well over 10 years old and has never progressed beyond a series of PowerPoint slides, and never been ordered.

Where this has the potential to be challenging is if the aspiration to do good things is broken by the reality of the financial position, which in turn prevents much of this good paper capability from turning into real world shipping.

It remains of extreme concern that we are approaching the middle of 2022, yet no orders have been placed for the first FSS, and yet RFA FORT VICTORIA goes out of service in 2028 – there is a looming capability gap that will mean the Royal Navy is unable to deploy Carrier Strike Groups from the late 2020s, and yet nothing seems to be being done about this to progress things. There is a risk that real world pain will be felt due to a failure to take a decision and place an order for new ships.

This illustrates the problems that the MOD has – it remains in a challenging financial position, and while its  shipbuilding aspirations are high, whether these can be properly funded, or are traded away in the MOD ‘game of thrones’ that is a spending and planning round remains to be seen. Many of these projects will need funding at a point when the threat is changing, and may call for increased investment in the land and air domain to counter the challenge of an increasingly assertive Russian military (perhaps one option is to invest in a large number of tractors to steal Russian tanks if required?).



There is a really complicated set of decisions ahead that will require Ministers to make choices that will force prioritisation on all three services. The key questions will be whether the UK wants to retain its focus as a global outward looking nation, or if the changed security situation in Europe means that different prioritisation is required now. What was once a ‘no brainer’ (e.g. more escort ships, amphibious shipping etc) may now not fit our emerging defence needs.

There is a sense that ‘events dear boy, events’ have intruded upon the planning laid out in last years Integrated Review and rendered it increasingly obsolete. The question now is whether to start again, conducting a new Defence Review to assess whether new choices need to be made, or if it makes more sense to stick with what we know, and continue on course as planned.

Allied to this is, of course, a discussion on finance – the general issue of inflation and rising fuel and commodity prices will be felt in Defence as it will elsewhere. This will in turn reduce cash available as budgets are more stretched and difficult prioritisation exercises occur over what to invest in or step back from – does it make sense to do exercises abroad given the increased fuel cost, or is it better to do them at home (for example), even if the impact is reduced ability to work with international partners?

There will doubtless be debates and suggestions about whether there is an uplift in the MOD budget. It is unlikely that anything further will be known about this for some time, and while it is tempting to speculate what shopping list ‘fantasy fleet’ may be bought, the reality is that any uplift is likely to be about plugging gaps and fixing holes, not lots of ‘new and shiny’ things.

What is clear is that we live in incredibly complex and challenging times – tough decisions lie ahead, and balancing them all off while trying to protect the nations interests will be increasingly difficult. It will be interesting to see in 10 years time when the most updated version of this strategy is published whether the intervening years have been cruel or kind to naval aspirations. Only time will tell…

Comments

  1. Interested in what the delta is between this and the last NSS. Is that ambitions plan on track, and if not why not? I'd suggest the delta between ambition and reality over the last 5 years is good LFI for the next plan.

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