To Build A Navy - Thoughts on the new Shipbuilding Strategy
Amid the ongoing nightmare that is the appalling Russian
invasion of Ukraine, and the horrendous civilian casualties being inflicted by
this barbaric war, there are still wider defence stories going on. With this in
mind, this article is focusing not on Ukraine directly, although the heroic
struggle by the incredible Ukrainian people should be at the front of all our
minds, but instead wider news on the Royal Navy and the British Government
shipbuilding programme.
People observing activity in Portsmouth Naval Base will have
not missed the departure this week of both HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and HMS PRINCE
OF WALES, two of the largest, most advanced and most capable aircraft carriers
in the world.
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
It is a good reminder that for all the doom and gloom stories
put about around the perceived state of the Royal Navy, right now there are two
British carriers at sea taking part in work to help secure the maritime
security of the UK and our allies. They are supported by a number of ships,
including Type 45 destroyers and ASTUTE class submarines in their work.
A key deployment for PRINCE OF WALES is the major NATO
exercise COLD RESPONSE, which is being held in the high North. A good test of
the ability to fight and win in challenging conditions against external aggression,
she will function as a key NATO afloat HQ capable of commanding forces and
coordinating response during the exercise.
The UK remains a leading NATO power and has reinvigorated
its commitment to the Alliance in recent years, providing more troops, ships
and aircraft in support of combined defence of member states. This exercise is
a great way to help show how the UK remains committed, and also to test how to
work and remain operational and supported in often challenging conditions – as the
Russian Army is discovering to its cost, winter warfare is difficult,
particularly when you have an amateur approach to logistics.
This exercise commitment is also supported by wider
deployments, for example of HMS DIAMOND and RIVER class OPVs to help provide
reassurance for maritime security in the Med, again which help the UK show its
leading role in NATO, working across multiple operational areas.
This serious deployment is also not occurring in isolation.
The RN continues to operate forces in the South Atlantic, West Indies and the
Gulf, sending ships to operate and work across the globe to help support UK
interests.
On the other side of the planet the deployment of the two
RIVER class to the Pacific continues, with HMS SPEY visiting Pitcairn, the most
remote of all British territory, and HMS TAMAR has now arrived in Singapore for
the first time for maintenance and use of the RN facility in the country.
This is very much a global operational picture – ships at
sea across practically every ocean on the planet, operating in support of
British and wider allied interests. It’s a great story of operational success
and availability, and is a record that many other navies are envious of.
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
This record though can only be sustained through a constant
programme of shipbuilding and regeneration of the force. Ships always have a finite
lifecycle, and will always eventually need replacing in some form or another.
The British Government has launched its updated shipbuilding strategy, which
sets out how the UK intends to sustain domestic shipbuilding for government vessels
into the future.
The document makes for a fantastic read to understand the
scale of ambition in the building programme. There is without doubt a clear
package of work ahead covering not just the Royal Navy, but also wider
government departments too for many years to come.
One area of surprise is perhaps just how substantial the
requirement for UK Government shipping actually is. Step away from the RN and
you’ll see a requirement for no fewer than 18 fishery patrol or border cutter
vessels to be built in the next few years (in addition to RN vessels) and a
large number of science and research platforms.
There is a substantial requirement for dozens of different
ships, from across many different departments to help support and sustain the
UK way of life. We often forget just how the sea is in our blood, and as an
island nation how critical shipping, and shipbuilding is to this.
This strategy sets out the ships that will be required, and
more widely the means by which they will be acquired. It is clear that this will
not automatically be easy, and there is no certainty that they will be built in
the UK – the case will need to be made for this on a case by case basis.
But it is clear that there is a package of work available well
into the 2040s for substantial government shipbuilding that will help generate enormous
amounts of work for the UK shipping industry, and hopefully more jobs in the
design, build, operation and refit area.
Mention is also made of the growing importance of international
collaboration -an area where the UK seems to be having increasing success with
its export offering – for example the Type 26 and 31 frigates are doing well on
the international stage. There is likely to be opportunities for further collaboration
to shape how ships are built which may make both their ordering, and longer
term support costs cheaper.
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
For the Royal Navy the strategy sets out essentially the same details as seen in the Integrated Review – The big challenge seems to be that there is, on paper an incredibly exciting programme of work ahead – new ships, new classes and new capabilities all brought together to show that there is a coherent plan for the regeneration of the RN over the next 30 years. This ranges from the Type 32 escort ship to additional RFAs to replace the LPD and LSD(A) force, and also replacement of the Mine Warfare vessels with new shore-based capability.
There is no doubt that on paper, this looks a credible and
impressive plan. Translating this into action though is where it gets more
challenging. It remains unclear what the state of defence funding is here, and
whether there is a budget in place that is ringfenced for these capabilities
now, or if over time they will be slowly chipped away at and not ordered.
The challenge is going to be proving that the money exists
and that ships will be ordered as a result of this work. Many of the projects
listed have existed in one form or another for many years without ever being
ordered – the future solid support ship project is well over 10 years old and has
never progressed beyond a series of PowerPoint slides, and never been ordered.
Where this has the potential to be challenging is if the
aspiration to do good things is broken by the reality of the financial position,
which in turn prevents much of this good paper capability from turning into real
world shipping.
It remains of extreme concern that we are approaching the
middle of 2022, yet no orders have been placed for the first FSS, and yet RFA
FORT VICTORIA goes out of service in 2028 – there is a looming capability gap
that will mean the Royal Navy is unable to deploy Carrier Strike Groups from
the late 2020s, and yet nothing seems to be being done about this to progress
things. There is a risk that real world pain will be felt due to a failure to
take a decision and place an order for new ships.
This illustrates the problems that the MOD has – it remains
in a challenging financial position, and while its shipbuilding aspirations are high, whether these
can be properly funded, or are traded away in the MOD ‘game of thrones’ that is
a spending and planning round remains to be seen. Many of these projects will need
funding at a point when the threat is changing, and may call for increased
investment in the land and air domain to counter the challenge of an increasingly
assertive Russian military (perhaps one option is to invest in a large number
of tractors to steal Russian tanks if required?).
There is a really complicated set of decisions ahead that will require Ministers to make choices that will force prioritisation on all three services. The key questions will be whether the UK wants to retain its focus as a global outward looking nation, or if the changed security situation in Europe means that different prioritisation is required now. What was once a ‘no brainer’ (e.g. more escort ships, amphibious shipping etc) may now not fit our emerging defence needs.
There is a sense that ‘events dear boy, events’ have
intruded upon the planning laid out in last years Integrated Review and
rendered it increasingly obsolete. The question now is whether to start again,
conducting a new Defence Review to assess whether new choices need to be made,
or if it makes more sense to stick with what we know, and continue on course as
planned.
Allied to this is, of course, a discussion on finance – the general
issue of inflation and rising fuel and commodity prices will be felt in Defence
as it will elsewhere. This will in turn reduce cash available as budgets are
more stretched and difficult prioritisation exercises occur over what to invest
in or step back from – does it make sense to do exercises abroad given the increased
fuel cost, or is it better to do them at home (for example), even if the impact
is reduced ability to work with international partners?
There will doubtless be debates and suggestions about whether
there is an uplift in the MOD budget. It is unlikely that anything further will
be known about this for some time, and while it is tempting to speculate what
shopping list ‘fantasy fleet’ may be bought, the reality is that any uplift is likely
to be about plugging gaps and fixing holes, not lots of ‘new and shiny’ things.
What is clear is that we live in incredibly complex and
challenging times – tough decisions lie ahead, and balancing them all off while
trying to protect the nations interests will be increasingly difficult. It will
be interesting to see in 10 years time when the most updated version of this
strategy is published whether the intervening years have been cruel or kind to
naval aspirations. Only time will tell…
Interested in what the delta is between this and the last NSS. Is that ambitions plan on track, and if not why not? I'd suggest the delta between ambition and reality over the last 5 years is good LFI for the next plan.
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