A Global Navy for A Global Britain - CSG21 in the Pacific

 The Royal Navy has continued to demonstrate its impressive global reach and presence in the Pacific Ocean. The Carrier Strike Group deployment has been operating across the region, with ships calling in various ports, and jointly operating with friends and allies in a range of exercises.

Perhaps the defining point of the deployment thus far has been the stunning images released showing HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH steaming alongside a pair of US carriers, and a Japanese helicopter carrier, along with escorts and support ships. This image of a coalition of willing allies working together at sea sends a powerful signal to a variety of nations.

For the Royal Navy the CSG21 deployment has marked a welcome return to operating strike carriers globally for the first time in many years. It has been an extremely useful deployment that has helped not only visibly demonstrate the renewed British interest in the Indo-Pacific, but also begin to rekindle defence links that had become somewhat atrophied in previous years.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

For example, there have been a wide range of visits into different ports, admittedly curtailed in excitement for the crew by the challenges of managing COVID restrictions, but which have been a good chance for the Royal Navy to carry out its timeless function of defence diplomacy. This has been a good chance for the ships and crew to represent the UK abroad, and serve as the backdrop to a variety of talks, engagements and opportunities to help further enhance diplomatic interests and links in the region.

The presence of the ships has permitted a thickening of defence relationships that have perhaps not played centre stage for some time. For example, joint exercises with Five Power Defence Arrangement partners, marking the 50^th anniversary of this organisation which provides a valuable security framework for partners to work together in SE Asia.

More widely there have been other chances for wider training, for example there will shortly be joint exercises in the Middle East fusing together regional British Army training with the exercise to help practise and develop closer working links and future operating concepts. This helps remind us that the CSG21 deployment is more than just about ships and is about a truly joint way of operating that is central to how the British armed forces will deliver the outcome of the Integrated Review.

Although less prominent, or high profile, one of the most important parts of this deployment has been the ability to test and prove the logistics chain that underpins support to the military. All too often attention is focused on the ‘headline capabilities’ – the tanks, ships and aircraft that look impressive right up until you try to work out whether they can be deployed.

Logistics networks, supply chains and the ability to operate from allied bases is not glamorous, but it’s the difference between having an impressive military parade at home, and being able to actually deploy and operate. In this case the ability to come alongside and support from locations like Guam, Singapore and Japan, for refuelling and storing, maintenance and other essentials, and then return to sea is extremely important.

Not all countries with aircraft carriers have this sort of access globally. Being able to have a trusted relationship with another nation to the point where you can enter their ports, support your warships and then stay deployed is invaluable. It also speaks to the existence of effective working relationships at all levels, and testing processes and procedures to make sure they are fit for purpose – CSG21 has helped act as a good test to make sure things work as planned.

There is a wider message here about the other enablers – for example the RAF strategic airlift force that will have been supplying the ships, and the UK’s ability to deploy and support airpower to underpin the maritime. We take logistical support like this for granted, but that’s unfair – the logistics teams underpinning the deployment are vital and often forgotten.

The final key point that needs to be remembered here, and is often lost amid the understandable national pride about the CSG21 deployment is that this is intentionally an international by design force. Not only is the USMC embarked on the QUEEN ELIZABETH, but the Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen and the US destroyer ‘The Sullivans’ are also integrated into the force.

The UK has realised that international operations are the way forward, and that future deployments will be done in coalition, not isolation. Working together on deployments like this is critical to build the links and trust required to operate together in wartime. We should not underestimate the considerable value likely to be accrued from this sort of joint deployment.

Of course one area where this is of considerable importance is looking beyond the photo opportunities. While task group photos are all well and good for the media imagery, what really matters is building the operational links that can be used to work together properly on operations.

For the UK this deployment is a gentle reintroduction to a theatre that it has been absent from now in a meaningful way for many years. This is about re-establishing links, beginning joint exercises and starting to work up meaningful work that helps build strong and mutually beneficial working relationships in the future.

The challenge is how to build on these links though and prevent this being a one off occurrence. The deployment alone in isolation is probably not going to do much in longer term benefits unless it is followed by more meaningful engagement in the not too distant future. International operations work best when there is regular co-operation and meaningful exercising, not just occasional PHOTEX opportunities.

There is no doubt the political desire exists for much more to be done in the Indo-Pacific, but while we can laud the success of this deployment, the more difficult question is about the longer term goals of it – what is the desired outcome here? Is it long term security co-operation that evolves into bilateral and multilateral security relationships with leading players (e.g. Japan or Australia), or is it to develop defence export opportunities that could benefit the UK defence industry?

Also, the deeper challenge will come when a security crisis breaks out in the region at a time when there are significant UK forces present. At some point it seems inevitable that difficult decisions will need to be made about the extent to which UK forces will move from being a presence, to being operationally committed, and what this may mean for longer term relationships.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

Part of the challenge is that given the fanfare of the CSG deployment, the bar has been set reasonably high for UK engagement in the region. Future deployments will be calibrated against the commitment shown for this one, and if in future smaller forces, or no carrier could be read as a reducing interest and commitment to the region.

One is perhaps mindful here of previous efforts by the UK to establish a drumbeat of global deployments after the withdrawal of forces from the Far East – for example the global deployments of the 70s, or the task group deployments of the 80s. These looked high profile, but were often not followed by further visits for many years, allowing the good engagement done to whither on the vine.

If the commitment to the region is serious and long term, then this means that the UK will need to consider carefully how to build on the CSG21 deployment for future trips. A drumbeat of regular engagement, e.g. CSG23/25/27 would be a chance to thicken some of the links built here, and develop it into a more meaningful security relationship with the region.

CSG21 is an operational success, but it is too early to say if it becomes a policy failure. If properly supported, and further enabled by near identical deployments on a routine basis for the next 10-15 years, then it will be bedded in as a key tool in British defence and security policy delivery. But if it is abandoned, toned down or pared back (e.g. to singleton deployer or only going as far as the Gulf), then all the warm words and vision will be lost with nothing to show for it.

It doesn’t perhaps seem to be clear if this is about a serious long-term renaissance of the British maritime presence in the Pacific, or about exploiting a short-term opportunity which may, or may not, be squandered.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

On the positive side though, there does seem to be a very clear shift in RN thinking. The CSG21 deployment is just part of the commitment to the region, and the presence of the RIVER class patrol ships TAMAR and SPEY, who will be forward deployed into the region, will help provide a permanent RN presence locally to keep links at a working level.

These ships will be crucial to filling the gap between the bigger deployments and in showing the UK is serious about its commitment to the region. They will be hard worked and although small, will be a vital regional presence to help show the UKs enduring commitment to the region.

There is much to be very positive about here – even 10 years ago the prospects of a British carrier strike group operating in the region would seem slim. That an extremely capable force is now doing this, not as part of a one-off, but instead as part of what seems, on initial planning, to be a coherent and regular programme of deployments speaks volumes about the hugely positive aspirations that the Royal Navy has for its future.

One final thought is that, for the Royal Navy, this deployment has been done not as a ‘main effort’ to the detriment of all other fleet activity, but instead as part of the wider fleets routine deployments. If you consider that at the same time as the CSG21 deployment was underway, the RN has deployed ships in the West Indies for hurricane support and wider counter narcotics operations, maritime security patrols off the coast of West Africa and the Falklands, ongoing Mine Warfare work and maritime security patrols in the Gulf as well as routine deployments and operations from home waters to the Med and elsewhere, you realise just how busy the fleet is – and how global its focus is.

The icing on the cake perhaps is that in September the RN managed to get both carriers at sea, conducting fixed wing operations with the F35, helping build the tempo and availability of the carrier force. After years of vision, planning, construction and trials, we’re now at the stage where the UK has got two operational and deployable fixed wing strike carriers, and appears to be entering a ‘drumbeat’ of working up for global deployments with them. Its an incredibly exciting time for the RN.

For the Royal Navy CSG21 has been a good test of its ability to deploy some of the most advanced warships and aircraft in existence to the other side of the planet and operate them there for a sustained period. It appears to have passed this test with flying colours.

There are very, very, few navies capable of doing what the Royal Navy is doing right now – deploying, sustaining and recovering a carrier strike group and its component parts helps mark out the RN as one of the worlds leading naval powers.