Responsibility Without Power? - Thoughts on the CDS Position

 

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, Royal Navy, has been confirmed as the next Chief of the Defence Staff. The first RN incumbent of the role in 20 years. This choice, made personally by the Prime Minister, will generate significant speculation among many, who will read a great deal into it and what this may mean for the future of the armed forces during their tenure. The reality though is that it probably means less than many may think.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The role of CDS is in effect a simple one – the postholder acts as the senior advisor to the Prime Minister on matters of defence and is the most senior military officer. The post holder is essentially the Permanent Secretary for the Armed Forces, in that they represent and are accountable for the armed forces to Ministers.

They provide advice to the PM, offering insight and guidance as to the merits of different courses of action. Behind the scenes their role is to provide counsel on the art of the possible, and discrete advice on where the possible quickly becomes the improbable. They must speak truth unto power privately, while displaying loyalty publicly and ensuring the armed forces deliver what is asked of them.

Internally the role is one of leadership and vision setting – what is the broader strategic journey Defence is embarking on, why does it matter to the military and how is it delivered? The postholder needs to walk a difficult tightrope between matters of politics, of inter-service politics and continue to exert leadership while not overstepping their boundaries or authority.

In many ways it is one of the most challenging jobs in Defence – the postholder must step back from direct command, usually but not always of their Service, ditching this single service loyalty and move forward to being a purple officer in all facets. They will discover their authority is absolute, but their span of control and power is limited.

They must learn to step back from meddling in their Service – it is easy to want to do what is right by the organisation that has shaped you, but it is no longer your Service to shape. In some ways this always seems something of a bitter-sweet appointment, as the individual must effectively leave their Service, and instead for their final appointment serve in a purple and political role that sits outside any one Service.

The CDS role is one of trying to steer Defence through the wider and vastly complex world of Whitehall and international political shenanigans and ensuring that Defences overall interests are protected.  This requires an ability to understand the various strands of Defence effort, and identify where equities need protection or can be offered to support wider outcomes, and in turn the impact that this could have on Defence delivering its prime outputs.

It is also not necessarily as powerful as some believe it is. CDS commands no troops, has no warships at his direct disposal and cannot wage war directly. These powers are significantly delegated, predominantly to the world of PJHQ and the Service Chiefs who generate these forces for CJO to employ. That said though, operations are carried out under the so-called 'CDS Directives' which direct operations to occur.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The CDS post is at heart one of acting as chief peacemaker between warring tribes, trying to broker compromise when there is Service disagreement that cannot be resolved at a lower level. In turn this calls for the postholder to shed their prior Service identity and become utterly impartial as a purple decision maker, doing what is right for the interests of Defence as a whole, and not surreptitiously looking after their former Service.

Any CDS who constantly wore their former cloth openly would fail quickly, and it is perhaps testament to the holders of the post over the years that they have managed to avoid falling into this trap. To do so would fatally undermine their position and authority.

As a naval appointment, it will be seen as both ‘good news’ for the Royal Navy and ‘bad news’ for the Army. This is perhaps both inaccurate and an oversimplification of the situation.

CDS does not have the casting vote to determine what the money does or does not get spent on, nor can he direct changes in strategy or investment. That is, and rightly remains, a role for Ministers to decide. It is the role of the Service Chiefs to work collaboratively together to put forward options for Ministers, but it is not for CDS to decide on their behalf.

What this means is that whatever the outcome, the next three – five years will not see a sudden flurry of initiatives like “scrapping all Army tanks and engaging in a transformation programme to give them blue uniforms (hopefully ones that fit properly)” or “putting black buttons on RN uniforms and renaming all Royal Navy warships with “(RIFLES) after their name”. Instead CDS will need to lead the work to develop balanced objective advice on what to be done in a way that looks after the interests of Defence, and all three Services, in the round.

If there is a naval appointment some will read it as punishment for the Army for failings in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Others will see it as an endorsement for a maritime strategy at the cost of the Army and one that heralds bad news for future Army investment. This is utter nonsense and should be ignored as the garbage it rightly is.

If you look at the balance of investment and strategy decisions over the last 20 years, you can see that in this time, when the RN has only had one CDS appointment, there has been enormous investment in the Royal Navy and its capabilities. The idea that somehow the identity of CDS shapes investment decisions is foolish because it bears no resemblance to reality.

The problem though will be if the Army finds itself in a position where it requires Ministers to take difficult decisions that may result in cancelling major projects. This could be seen in some quarters not as an Army generated decision to bring the budget into balance, but as a Machiavellian RN plot. If difficult decisions lie ahead for the Army, then expect to see some ill-informed elements incorrectly briefing that these are the result of it being a ‘dark blue plot’.

The new CDS faces a challenging inbox that requires difficult decisions no matter the colour of their cloth. The budget remains under very significant pressure, which will call for decisions on what to do about it – decisions that are likely to be painful. They will need to steer the armed forces through the delivery of the Integrated Review now and set the shape of thinking for the next iteration of Strategic Defence Review, likely in 3-4 years time.

Their ability to shape short term change will be limited, three years isn’t a huge amount of time to deliver meaningful change in the short term. It is time enough though to put the groundwork in place for future change, slowly turning the defence super tanker onto a new course and direction.

That’s not to say that the postholder doesn’t have a vision or idea of success that they wish to deliver – all of the candidates publicly known to have been interviewed have reportedly got well-deserved reputations for driving change and transformation within their areas of responsibility.

This direction is not going to be one at odds with the Integrated Review, which will remain the policy document that sets out how Defence will deliver as part of wider government. It will not see plans to suddenly shift to entirely new ways of thinking or activity, but rather it will be about ensuring that Defence continues to remain relevant.

This isn’t to undersell the role of CDS, which is a critically important position, but it is important to understand the limits of its power. It is perhaps better to think of CDS as a conductor who keeps the orchestra running, while simultaneously advising the owners of the concert hall and the local town council on all aspects of musical performance than as someone who will singlehandly change everything at once.

It is also a timely appointment in many ways as it realistically marks the last CDS to have served, albeit in a very junior role, during the Cold War. All the main candidates joined during the last stages of the Cold War, and are some of the last of this era still serving in the military.

This means that the next CDS and Service Chiefs are likely to be drawn from an entirely different generation of experience, one not shaped by BAOR and the GIUK gap. It is sometimes helpful to consider the ‘span of lived experience’ that the military can draw on at any time.

The current crop of Service Chiefs joined about the time that the very last WW2 veterans retired from active duty. They too will now form some of the last of the cadre of ‘Cold Warriors’ on active duty into the mid 20202s. Within the next few years there will be no one serving with any professional ‘lived experience’ of the Cold War. An entire generation of service personnel will only have known the post Cold War world, with all that this entails for Defence.

One final observation is that the demographics of the candidates is not particularly diverse. This is perhaps a reality of the personnel management practises in place when they joined the system 30-40 years ago, and a career structure that was significantly less diverse and inclusive than it is now. It is though a shame that given the wealth of talent in defence, not a single woman was shortlisted as a possible contender for the role – this is hardly the sign of a modern diverse employer.

Hopefully the next time this competition comes up, the talent pool will be widened slightly to make it more representative of modern Britain. While the playing fields of Eton may have traditionally been a breeding ground for future Prime Ministers and Chiefs of the General Staff, that is not necessarily the country we should aspire to be today.

It would be an interesting exercise to speculate what would happen if the UK followed the Danish model and opened up the role of CDS to open competition, enabling anyone in the armed forces to apply for it. Some years ago the Danes ran a competitive recruitment competition that resulted in a Lt Colonel being appointed to the role (presumably as a local acting 4*).

How different would Defence be in the UK if it opened up this role to anyone in the system to apply for it? There is a wealth of highly experienced, capable and genuinely revolutionary thinkers across Defence, who could bring a fresh eye to this role. Perhaps next time the role should be advertised for open competition to see what changes this could bring.