Raiding with RIVERS...
Today marks the 357th birthday of the Royal
Marines, founded on 28 October 1664. The Corps has been through many different campaigns
and operations in its history, and today finds itself as an amphibious force
and specialist light infantry organisation par excellence.
It is perhaps fitting that for an organisation intended to
go to sea and support the Royal Navy, the Corps has been rediscovering its
maritime roots, after a period of sustained ground operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Today HMS TRENT is operating off the West Coast of Africa, engaged in maritime security patrols, with a detachment of Royal Marines embarked from 42 Commando. Their role is to provide regional training and assistance to help improve the overall levels of security in the region.
![]() |
Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
When we think of the Royal Marines, its perhaps easy to think back to the days of D-Day or the USMC operations in the Pacific, with vast fleets and large numbers of troops storming ashore across bloody beaches to take and hold land. Or we could think back to the Cold War and the role of the Corps in being ready to reinforce Norway and hold it against Soviet aggression.
This in turn builds an image of a Royal Navy with landing ships
and support vessels intended to move large numbers of troops around, and then
land them, much as was demonstrated in the Falklands War. Is this really the
future though of the Corps, or has it got other plans?
Arguably the challenge in recent years has been to quantify
what is it that the Royal Marines can do that others cannot. In a military
flush with high quality light infantry units, why does the Royal Navy need them
too – does this really add much in the way of tangible capability?
There is a very
compelling case to be made that actually you could disband the Corps in
its current form, scrap the amphibious shipping force as constructed and probably
not lose much in the way of operational outputs.
This may sound like heresy, but there is a logic to it – the
days of large scale beach landings on an opposed scale have gone forever. Why land
in front of the enemy when you don’t need to do this? If you don’t need to land
in front of the enemy, and if you can carry out your mission in a different way
– why are you conducting an amphibious assault at all?
A better question is whether the UK needs amphibious assault
capability, or if it needs strategic sealift – which is arguably a subtly different
beast altogether. There is definitely a strong case to be made for the ability to
move large amounts of military equipment to
another location – and this is admirably carried out by the POINT class
RORO force of four vessels.
There is no doubt that the ability to move substantial
forces a long way is incredibly potent – for example looking at the Middle
East, being able to ship equipment out for Exercise Saif Sareea was invaluable –
without the strategic sealift capability, that exercise could not have
happened.
But, do you need an amphibious landing force too and all the
attached shipping that goes with it? Arguably the circumstances where the UK is
going to carry out a major landing from sea is pretty limited, and unlikely to
occur very regularly – given this, what is the value gained from having a large
amphibious force that is unlikely to be used very often if at all in its
intended role?
You could scrap these ships, get rid of the Corps and
continue to be able to move major ground units around the world, and support
operations through major ports and logistics hubs.
This may sound contentious but it perhaps hints at the existential
debate surrounding what the Corps is going to do next. The Royal Navy seems to
have made its views fairly clear – the current force of LPD’s and LSD’s (5 ships
in total) are used for a variety of low level raiding and other local amphibious
work – but there has been a quiet move away from the days of major beach
landings.
If you look ahead, the future is much less about how do we
put lots of troops on a beach, but far more about how do we use the Corps as a
raiding force and specialist organisation. The pattern of employment for the
BAY class has changed – one is now permanently in the Middle East supporting
MCMV work, another has been regularly based in the West Indies supporting disaster
relief efforts. This leaves one nominally available for amphibious work when not
in refit.
The plan seems to be (on paper at least) that the RM will
convert this ship to become the hub of a raiding platform, embarking smaller
groups of troops to provide a presence and capability to conduct specialist operations
around the world. This is an exciting vision – its one that is arguably far
more likely to be carried out than a big amphibious assault, and one that is
easier to sustain for the long haul.
If you look at where the Royal Navy is going, the future
seems to be a potentially powerful mix of multi-role support ships to replace
the LPD force – moving away from the concept of an LPD as a command platform
and assault ship, and into something more flexible.
This reflects the reality of amphibious operations in recent
years and how these ships have been used- as parent vessels for smaller
detachments, command platforms and the odd landing of smaller forces – but only
rarely as a major amphibious assault platform.
At the same time there is a growth in the Corps going back
to sea with the Royal Navy – the deployment to West Africa comes at the same time
as other units are embarked on the CSG21 deployment, providing a local embarked
infantry capability.
This training and mentoring role, working with other nations
while providing an ability to carry out a raid or other discrete operation is
the sort of work where the future lies. It’s a compelling vision that will
likely see the Corps operating far more globally with permanently deployed
strike groups, people deployed at sea in training teams and also some
specialist maritime security assets.
The Royal Navy is starting to make good use of this capability when combining it with the RIVER class patrol ships, which are the most widely deployed class of ship in the fleet. All five are forward deployed around the world, and present the ideal platform for the sort of low level mentoring, training and maritime security role that the Royal Navy is hoping to achieve.
Despite the constant tediously dull and utterly naïve suggestions
that these cheap simple and highly capable ships need X missiles or Y mega guns
or Z superlasers, ideas that emerge seemingly without the faintest clue of just
how much it would cost, how challenging it would be to do and how it makes an
intentionally cheap low end ship into an expensive and still low end ship, the
RIVER class remain an ideal platform for the 99% of operations that the RN
wants to do day in, day out.
There is a serious misunderstanding on the role of these
ships – they are not frigates, they are not designed to go and fight in a
serious war (like every other OPV on the planet) and they are not intended to
be a cutting edge front line escort. The Royal Navy has plenty of those, what it
does not need is a force of 5 ships cutting about pretending to be frigates and
not being remotely fit for that role.
These ships excel at the maritime constabulary role that
generations of RN ships have done over many centuries. They exist to patrol the
seven seas, engage with foreign nations, conduct low level port visits and training
and fly the flag to remind people of the continued interest of Her Majesty’s Government
in far flung parts of the globe.
To that end they are perfect for embarking Royal Marines to
carry out maritime security training and building great links with a wide range
of nations, and providing help and assistance as required. They are not there
to start a war, fight in a war and bluntly if involved in a war they are not
going to survive if targeted by heavy weaponry, not matter how many CIWS or
anti-ship missiles you fit them with.
When we look ahead to the plans for the RIVER class, it is
inconceivable that the Royal Marines do not feature highly in them. Able to
embark on these ships and provide a significant boost to the vessels capability
and flexibility, the presence of small platoon sized forces will play a key
role in helping forge links as part of the Integrated Review goals.
This is going to be critical in regions like the West Indies,
West Africa and the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the smaller Pacific
Island states, where strong links can be built, capacity improved and the MOD
can help forge a new generation of friendships and alliances.
The value of their presence is that they can do the regular drumbeat
of port visits and engagement that rarer escort ship visits cannot. A frigate
may visit the west coast of Africa once every 5 or 6 years – but a forward
deploy OPV can make the same trip every few months, and build a much bigger
relationship as a result. There is a difference between an occasional high
profile ship visit, and routine working visits that help develop links and take
them to the next step.
These ships and those who sail on them are going to be crucial
to the narrative of ‘global Britain’ – to use a policing analogy, they are the
local ‘beat bobby’ who is based in the neighbourhood, knows it well and wants to
develop good relationships with the locals
It is a genuinely exciting time for the Royal Navy and its
constituent fighting arms. We’re now starting to see the reality of the Carrier
Strike Navy come good – a force of hugely capable strike carriers operating
with their groups, providing an exceptionally capable global reach and presence.
This is underpinned by the global role of the RIVER class, now forward deployed
and helping ensure that the Royal Navy has more ships permanently globally
based abroad than any other navy than France or the USA.
The Royal Marines have a hugely positive part to play in this
world – they are integral to the success of the fleet, from the troops embarked
on the Carrier, to those conducting amphibious operations from LPDs and LSDs, and
then to those operating globally training and exercising with friends and
allies around the world from a variety of locations. They do this while still defending
the strategic nuclear deterrent, providing a major part of the Special Forces
and continuing to train and recruit to the highest possible standard.
The future is very bright, and the way ahead brings many
opportunities.
Happy Birthday Royal!
...worth observing that one key element of our maritime supremacy for a good two hundred years was the our ability to put a mixed force of Royals and Bluejackets ashore from every one of the Queen's Ships, no matter where they were located...or what their tonnage was. All of them capable of delivering extreme violence as and when required, and the bigger ones capable of putting ashore their own heavy weapons if useful. With this Century looking more like the C18th than the C20th, that is a set of lessons worth reflecting on...GNB
ReplyDeleteAgree completely with this analysis. Unfortunately some are going to find the fact that the Albions are not going to be replaced with a pair of new F-35B capable LHDs hard to swallow. We are almost certainly going down the route of multi-role support ships and deploying the RM from a range of different platforms. This is however seen as a capability cut pure and simple by those who cannot understand why the modus operandi is changing.
ReplyDelete