Raiding with RIVERS...

 

Today marks the 357th birthday of the Royal Marines, founded on 28 October 1664. The Corps has been through many different campaigns and operations in its history, and today finds itself as an amphibious force and specialist light infantry organisation par excellence.

It is perhaps fitting that for an organisation intended to go to sea and support the Royal Navy, the Corps has been rediscovering its maritime roots, after a period of sustained ground operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Today HMS TRENT is operating off the West Coast of Africa, engaged in maritime security patrols, with a detachment of Royal Marines embarked from 42 Commando. Their role is to provide regional training and assistance to help improve the overall levels of security in the region.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright


When we think of the Royal Marines, its perhaps easy to think  back to the days of D-Day or the USMC operations in the Pacific, with vast fleets and large numbers of troops storming ashore across bloody beaches to take and hold land. Or we could think back to the Cold War and the role of the Corps in being ready to reinforce Norway and hold it against Soviet aggression.

This in turn builds an image of a Royal Navy with landing ships and support vessels intended to move large numbers of troops around, and then land them, much as was demonstrated in the Falklands War. Is this really the future though of the Corps, or has it got other plans?

Arguably the challenge in recent years has been to quantify what is it that the Royal Marines can do that others cannot. In a military flush with high quality light infantry units, why does the Royal Navy need them too – does this really add much in the way of tangible capability?

There is a very  compelling case to be made that actually you could disband the Corps in its current form, scrap the amphibious shipping force as constructed and probably not lose much in the way of operational outputs.

This may sound like heresy, but there is a logic to it – the days of large scale beach landings on an opposed scale have gone forever. Why land in front of the enemy when you don’t need to do this? If you don’t need to land in front of the enemy, and if you can carry out your mission in a different way – why are you conducting an amphibious assault at all?

A better question is whether the UK needs amphibious assault capability, or if it needs strategic sealift – which is arguably a subtly different beast altogether. There is definitely a strong case to be made for the ability to move large amounts of military equipment to  another location – and this is admirably carried out by the POINT class RORO force of four vessels.

There is no doubt that the ability to move substantial forces a long way is incredibly potent – for example looking at the Middle East, being able to ship equipment out for Exercise Saif Sareea was invaluable – without the strategic sealift capability, that exercise could not have happened.




But, do you need an amphibious landing force too and all the attached shipping that goes with it? Arguably the circumstances where the UK is going to carry out a major landing from sea is pretty limited, and unlikely to occur very regularly – given this, what is the value gained from having a large amphibious force that is unlikely to be used very often if at all in its intended role?

You could scrap these ships, get rid of the Corps and continue to be able to move major ground units around the world, and support operations through major ports and logistics hubs.

This may sound contentious but it perhaps hints at the existential debate surrounding what the Corps is going to do next. The Royal Navy seems to have made its views fairly clear – the current force of LPD’s and LSD’s (5 ships in total) are used for a variety of low level raiding and other local amphibious work – but there has been a quiet move away from the days of major beach landings.

If you look ahead, the future is much less about how do we put lots of troops on a beach, but far more about how do we use the Corps as a raiding force and specialist organisation. The pattern of employment for the BAY class has changed – one is now permanently in the Middle East supporting MCMV work, another has been regularly based in the West Indies supporting disaster relief efforts. This leaves one nominally available for amphibious work when not in refit.

The plan seems to be (on paper at least) that the RM will convert this ship to become the hub of a raiding platform, embarking smaller groups of troops to provide a presence and capability to conduct specialist operations around the world. This is an exciting vision – its one that is arguably far more likely to be carried out than a big amphibious assault, and one that is easier to sustain for the long haul.

If you look at where the Royal Navy is going, the future seems to be a potentially powerful mix of multi-role support ships to replace the LPD force – moving away from the concept of an LPD as a command platform and assault ship, and into something more flexible.

This reflects the reality of amphibious operations in recent years and how these ships have been used- as parent vessels for smaller detachments, command platforms and the odd landing of smaller forces – but only rarely as a major amphibious assault platform.

At the same time there is a growth in the Corps going back to sea with the Royal Navy – the deployment to West Africa comes at the same time as other units are embarked on the CSG21 deployment, providing a local embarked infantry capability.

This training and mentoring role, working with other nations while providing an ability to carry out a raid or other discrete operation is the sort of work where the future lies. It’s a compelling vision that will likely see the Corps operating far more globally with permanently deployed strike groups, people deployed at sea in training teams and also some specialist maritime security assets.




The Royal Navy is starting to make good use of this capability when combining it with the RIVER class patrol ships, which are the most widely deployed class of ship in the fleet. All five are forward deployed around the world, and present the ideal platform for the sort of low level mentoring, training and maritime security role that the Royal Navy is hoping to achieve.

Despite the constant tediously dull and utterly naïve suggestions that these cheap simple and highly capable ships need X missiles or Y mega guns or Z superlasers, ideas that emerge seemingly without the faintest clue of just how much it would cost, how challenging it would be to do and how it makes an intentionally cheap low end ship into an expensive and still low end ship, the RIVER class remain an ideal platform for the 99% of operations that the RN wants to do day in, day out.

There is a serious misunderstanding on the role of these ships – they are not frigates, they are not designed to go and fight in a serious war (like every other OPV on the planet) and they are not intended to be a cutting edge front line escort. The Royal Navy has plenty of those, what it does not need is a force of 5 ships cutting about pretending to be frigates and not being remotely fit for that role.

These ships excel at the maritime constabulary role that generations of RN ships have done over many centuries. They exist to patrol the seven seas, engage with foreign nations, conduct low level port visits and training and fly the flag to remind people of the continued interest of Her Majesty’s Government in far flung parts of the globe.

To that end they are perfect for embarking Royal Marines to carry out maritime security training and building great links with a wide range of nations, and providing help and assistance as required. They are not there to start a war, fight in a war and bluntly if involved in a war they are not going to survive if targeted by heavy weaponry, not matter how many CIWS or anti-ship missiles you fit them with.

When we look ahead to the plans for the RIVER class, it is inconceivable that the Royal Marines do not feature highly in them. Able to embark on these ships and provide a significant boost to the vessels capability and flexibility, the presence of small platoon sized forces will play a key role in helping forge links as part of the Integrated Review goals.




This is going to be critical in regions like the West Indies, West Africa and the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the smaller Pacific Island states, where strong links can be built, capacity improved and the MOD can help forge a new generation of friendships and alliances.

The value of their presence is that they can do the regular drumbeat of port visits and engagement that rarer escort ship visits cannot. A frigate may visit the west coast of Africa once every 5 or 6 years – but a forward deploy OPV can make the same trip every few months, and build a much bigger relationship as a result. There is a difference between an occasional high profile ship visit, and routine working visits that help develop links and take them to the next step.

These ships and those who sail on them are going to be crucial to the narrative of ‘global Britain’ – to use a policing analogy, they are the local ‘beat bobby’ who is based in the neighbourhood, knows it well and wants to develop good relationships with the locals

It is a genuinely exciting time for the Royal Navy and its constituent fighting arms. We’re now starting to see the reality of the Carrier Strike Navy come good – a force of hugely capable strike carriers operating with their groups, providing an exceptionally capable global reach and presence. This is underpinned by the global role of the RIVER class, now forward deployed and helping ensure that the Royal Navy has more ships permanently globally based abroad than any other navy than France or the USA.

The Royal Marines have a hugely positive part to play in this world – they are integral to the success of the fleet, from the troops embarked on the Carrier, to those conducting amphibious operations from LPDs and LSDs, and then to those operating globally training and exercising with friends and allies around the world from a variety of locations. They do this while still defending the strategic nuclear deterrent, providing a major part of the Special Forces and continuing to train and recruit to the highest possible standard.

The future is very bright, and the way ahead brings many opportunities.

Happy Birthday Royal!

Comments

  1. ...worth observing that one key element of our maritime supremacy for a good two hundred years was the our ability to put a mixed force of Royals and Bluejackets ashore from every one of the Queen's Ships, no matter where they were located...or what their tonnage was. All of them capable of delivering extreme violence as and when required, and the bigger ones capable of putting ashore their own heavy weapons if useful. With this Century looking more like the C18th than the C20th, that is a set of lessons worth reflecting on...GNB

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  2. Agree completely with this analysis. Unfortunately some are going to find the fact that the Albions are not going to be replaced with a pair of new F-35B capable LHDs hard to swallow. We are almost certainly going down the route of multi-role support ships and deploying the RM from a range of different platforms. This is however seen as a capability cut pure and simple by those who cannot understand why the modus operandi is changing.

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