Don't Shoot The Messenger - Why The Armed Forces Are Not The Solution to Every Crisis

It has been announced that General Gordon Messenger, the Royal Marine former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) is to lead a review into the NHS. Apparently he will be tasked with trying to improve the overall quality of leadership, ensure value for money and increase the return on investment that the nation gets from the NHS.

This appointment comes at a time when the nation once again is looking to the military to deliver a variety of MACA tasks to assist civil authorities. In a time of challenge, sending the Army in increasingly seems to be the default answer for many different situations.

There is a view held in some quarters, usually ex-military it must be said, that the Armed Forces provide ‘world class leadership’ and are well placed to deliver and lead reform and change, and fundamentally alter the culture of an organisation for the better.

Humphrey does not fully share that view, and this article has been written in the spirit and intent of reasonable challenge, to ask whether this view is actually correct?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

If you look at what we ask the armed forces to do in generic terms, you could say the roles break down into three broad areas at different stages of a career. Firstly, there are many ‘shop floor experts’ – junior staff with deep technical skills or experience in a fairly niche career trade that they specialise in with some success. This area covers both junior ranks, SNCOs and junior officers, and those posts where people focus on delivery at the military end of the business.

Secondly there is the ‘middle management’ – a combination of leadership and managerial postings (often separate roles) involving some elements of leading people, some elements of management, and a variety of office skills.

These roles are encountered as people step away from their front line postings, usually filled in  the SO2-OF5 level are often arguably ‘civil servants in uniform’, involving work that could often interchangeably be done by civilians with little demonstrable difference. These posts are interspersed with time in front line units (for example command tours), but these get reduced in number the more senior someone becomes.

Finally there are the senior leaders, at 1* and above who take on board level equivalent roles, providing visible senior leadership and direction – owning responsibility to deliver outcomes and provide advice as required. Their leadership span can range from 20-30 people to tens of thousands, depending on the role they fill.

In other words, an argument could be made that military rank hierarchies and career structures are little different from a large industry – just with fancier titles and more gold braid.

We turn as a nation to the military to solve problems because we believe that their training and experience prepares them to do this. We think that because they have a track record of success, this means that it can be replicated across many different models and organisations with equal success.

Humphrey feels instinctively uncomfortable with this assumption. There is no doubt that in some areas, and some situations, the military career model, skills sets and styles of leadership is absolutely fantastic.

If you have a short term crisis, involving bringing together lots of disparate activities into one space to co-ordinate into a single plan of action, and then deliver it under incredibly difficult circumstances then the armed forces model of operations works exceptionally well.

The system trains people from entry to be able to deliver ‘crisis leadership’ – working hard and under tough conditions to think of solutions to problems, then deliver them in order to achieve success. This can involve preparing people to force others to go into battle, to close with, and kill people, and inflict massive destruction or suffering on others to achieve the aim.

For these sorts of missions, military crisis leadership is without doubt a fantastic set of training to draw on. In the real world, its ideal for organisations that want to focus on disaster recovery, business continuity and delivery of operations and events to tight timescales amid challenging circumstances. Is this the right model though for leading reviews into organisations that are fundamentally not military organisations?

We perhaps make the mistake of assuming that the military model of leadership is ideal to fix all our problems. Be it ‘bring back national service for young criminals’, ‘send in the Army to solve petrol’, ‘send the Royal Navy to the Channel’ or various other tried and tested themes guaranteed to excite docile Daily Mail readers, the wider public seem to think that because military leadership works, its going to work elsewhere.

Arguably, it is not.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

There is a strong argument to be made that the military are not the right people to use as role models for reviews into big organisations, nor that senior military officers are particularly qualified to do this.

We assume that because crisis leadership works for one organisation, it will work for another. We also assume that because the military are good at delivering operational success, they are good at fixing organisations more widely – arguably this is not the case at all.

If you took the position of offering reasonable challenge, you could easily construct an argument that says that the armed forces are actually remarkably inefficient and reluctant to truly squeeze out true value from every pound spent by the taxpayer.

For example look at the sheer size of the defence estate, which is far bigger than it needs to be and unable to be shut down. Look at the preponderance of uniforms across all three services, rather than moving to one or two designs that could be worn by everyone.

Look at the duplication of administration and effort, and the hanging onto ‘tradition’ as a justification to incur extra costs (e.g. the Regimental System and all its associated costs with uniforms and admin).

Take long look at how there is, no matter what level you sit at in the system, always a ‘frozen middle’ of individuals who seem to block change or add process rather than progress. The system is not one that rewards initiative, speedy change or doing things differently – it is process bound, slow and one designed for slow evolution, not speedy revolution.

The career system develops those who are left into roles that they are not remotely qualified for, and then fails to do proper career planning to get the best of its talent. Look at the way that the constant merry go round of officers plot moves leads to constant changes, reinvention of direction, and new unqualified individuals keen to make a mark force delay to gain OJAR glory.

This is done against the backdrop of a career management system that is arguably utterly unfit for purpose, and which has been abandoned by all major government departments and big organisations. If it didn’t exist, it would not be invented, and yet this is relied on to govern the careers of tens of thousands of people, often by amateurs who are not HR professionals – and done so under the frankly laughable statement of ‘world class career management’.

Underpinning all of this is the uncomfortable reminder too that for all the statements on how ‘people are our greatest asset’, there exists a very toxic culture that is neither welcoming nor accepting of individuals who don’t meet pre-existing stereotypes.

A quick read of the reports into the experience of female service members, or the reports of racism in the system and its clear that significant parts of the Armed Forces are not inclusive, feel uncomfortable with a diverse workforce and an environment exists where failure to be white and male means you are seen as not worthy of belonging.

More widely, this is a system which actively regards those as not being in uniform as being second class and not worthy of the same respect or attention. You only have to trawl through various online postings to realise that in the hierarchy battle, civil servants, outsiders or others with actual experience or knowledge are seen as ‘REMF’s’ and not experts there to offer assistance.

That’s not to say the entire system is like this, but an uncomfortable and harsh reality is that the armed forces are not the perfect organisation at talent, leadership and culture building that some fondly imagine them to be.

Given all of this, why do we persist in a belief that senior officers in the armed forces are the right people to lead reviews into other systems? For example, looking at the NHS, this is a deeply complex organisation made up of all manner of cultures, relationships, stakeholders, and people.  

Yes it is clunky, yes it is inefficient but so are most large organisations. Its easy to make a small organisation that does one or two nice things very well hyper-efficient, but this doesn’t translate easily to vast organisations working across so many diverse areas of responsibility. Why would former senior military people, who have spent their lives in an identically bloated and inefficient organisation be any better at fixing it than anyone else?

The desire to bring in the military perhaps stems from a few deeper drivers. Firstly, military people are not management consultants – they are not delivering products intended to create a long term sales relationship with an organisation. They turn up, do the job and move on.

Their presence is usually associated with problem fixing – the military get called in to support when things go wrong, and people remember their assistance with gratitude. They are without doubt a fantastic sticky plaster to solve a short term problem – and in the heat of the crisis that they are called to fix, they bring a niche set of skills and expertise that is genuinely invaluable at solving problems.

There is also a sense of reassurance that comes from people whose role is to ooze self-confidence, discipline and control, no matter how bad the situation looks. If all those around you are losing their heads, while your military liaison officer is very much of the ‘no dramas lets fix this’ school, you will be grateful for their help.

But this fantastic crisis leadership response isn’t always the right one for long term organisational change. As noted, there are huge issues with much of the military culture and process, and while it may be very good at some areas of leadership, its also pretty bad at others.

Given the enormous challenges in the defence budget, huge cost overruns on various equipment projects and so on, is it really ideal to ask for the military to review an organisation and find ways to improve how it gets value for money and cuts down on process?

Anyone who has ever tried to do anything administrative related via the armed forces knows that the military is the ideal place to invent process – not cut it. Outside of very exceptional crises, it is a repository of papers, procedures and doing business slowly and inefficiently – for example this is an organisation that insists on paperwork being printed off and submitted with a signature, rather than submitted electronically on a regular basis.

We run the risk of potentially putting the armed forces on a pedestal that they don’t deserve to be on. Yes, the military is very good at doing somethings very well – but we should not assume that the military way of working is particularly good, or the right answer to every problem.  It is one tool, but not the only one in the workshop.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

It is also deeply ironic to hear the constant expectation that military or former military should be recruited into roles to deliver their military leadership and skills to organisations, as if this is some kind of magic panacea, given the complete refusal to do the same in reverse.

The armed forces remain an entirely closed system, unwilling to entertain the idea of direct entry except as a junior, and unwilling to accept the presence of outsiders in their world, or to listen to them. Every time this blog has argued in favour of direct entry at other ranks, there is a long litany of ‘reasons to say no’ which essentially boil down to ‘what could an outsider possibly know about our world’?

The fact is that outside of the direct ‘close and kill the enemy’ part of the armed forces, which should remain something that you need to grow and learn, there are huge opportunities to bring in outside experience at all levels, and get fresh thinking into the system.

The military career structure does not reward people doing things differently or better where risk is involved. Its career management and reporting penalises changes, for fear of failure, and sees those who question not as diverse problem solvers but ‘troublemakers’. If you look at the senior ranks, you rarely see people with a reputation as genuinely different, or genuinely prepared to challenge, take tough decisions and do things differently.

It’s a system that rewards those prepared to take limited risks and not rock the boat – those who do want this are usually career limited and leave in frustration early. This means a cadre is left of people who have spent decades in one organisation, with the same peer network and the same groupthink way of doing business- why bring radical change to an organisation if that doesn’t help you get ahead?

The bitter irony is that all the values that those leaving the military tout on their CV as reasons to be hired seem to be absent in those left in the system. When was the last time meaningful real change happened, or waste was cut down on or processes scrapped and efficiency improved? Perhaps one reason people leave the military is to go and work with organisations who could give them the space, freedom and empowerment to put into practise all the things they thought they could do in the armed forces, but never ended up being able to do?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

It is tempting to imagine the reaction if a former senior NHS official was hired to come a do a similar study into the armed forces – looking at ways to make it more efficient, less wasteful and deliver more effectively. There would be utter outrage by many who would not welcome the idea of an outsider telling them what to do – ‘what does some stupid manager know about our world’ is likely to be a common thread?

Yet perhaps the time is right to do just that – bring in some experts from outside and see how things could be done better? There are huge reasons to change the armed forces – to do procurement better, to manage careers more effectively, to cut down on pointless admin (for starters scrap the FMT600) and to take a long hard look at what is in reality dozens of private tiny empires working together in increasingly inefficient ways.

Perhaps the time has come for us to ask ‘why are we world-class’ and get the answer benchmarked by outsiders. We’ve used the phrase so often that we’ve forgotten what it means – its become a mantra and article of faith, used without question or assessment of its validity.

The answers if outsiders did it may be uncomfortable reading – we’re probably not world-class in a lot of what we do and a lot of what is done is nowhere near as good as it could be if the will was there to change it. But is the will there to change it?

The British Armed Forces are a one way valve – they send people out into the world with good ideas, a good hardwork ethos and willingness to deliver positive change, but they are also not prepared to accept the same in return.

It would be interesting to consider what changes an NHS equivalent of the Messenger Review would state, and whether the will is there to truly change for the better – or if the reaction would be one of ‘well you don’t understand our culture, and what do you know about the armed forces anyway’?

One suspects that for all the talk of ‘send in the Army to solve the problem’, the Army (and wider armed forces) would take great exception to someone sending in outsiders to assess and take a long hard look at their own problems.

Given all this, perhaps we should ask the most difficult question of all – knowing what we know about the skills, capabilities, challenges and problems facing the armed forces, why do we continue to assume that they can solve the complex problems facing the UK when they are unprepared to accept similar advice themselves to solve their own problems?