The Post COVID BBQ Of Sacred Cows - Defence in a post COVID19 world

As the month of May 2020 enters what feels like its fourth decade, it is hard to escape from drawing the conclusion that the world is, frankly, a bit of a mess right now. The combination of global pandemics, rising tensions across borders and a broader decline in international relations points to a decade ahead of turmoil and challenge.

Looking at the world around us though, 2020 seems to have signalled certain key themes emerging which may indicate where future priorities may need to be focused and also highlighting where further risks could potentially have to be accepted.

The most volatile domain this year thus far has probably been the maritime. A quick review of the worlds current trouble spots shows significant spikes in tension in the Gulf and South China Sea. The US Navy is engaging in a struggle to retain its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region, against a Chinese Navy that is emerging as a capable and potent, albeit not operationally experienced, force to contend with.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

A new Cold War seems to be occurring in the Asia-Pacific with US and Chinese warships engaged in tense standoffs, while other nations in the region look to defend their claims against highly assertive Chinese pushes to occupy territory others regard as their own.

Much like Germany was the point of closest danger in the Cold War, with two forces facing off against each other, the seas and airspace in the Asia Pacific region will be the focus of this new cold war, as both sides engage in increasingly assertive games of high stakes ‘chicken’ to prove their military position.

We are seeing a return to ‘carrier diplomacy’ as both the US Navy and Chinese Navy engage in highly visible exercises and deployments of their respective carrier forces, while below the waters, the US Navy submarine force remains a vital tool of sea control.

In the Gulf Iranian forces continue to harass shipping, causing tensions to rise and escalate in a region already on edge. The news that the US Navy will open fire on vessels coming too close to their own in Gulf waters sends a clear signal to Iranian forces, but also poses the risk of escalation of conflict, particularly given the way that Iranian ships will assertively challenge US (and allied) vessels in transit, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile in the Mediterranean, EU maritime operations continue to carry out an embargo off Libya, trying to enforce an arms embargo on the country. This classic use of naval power, acting as a third party to prevent conflict escalation highlights the value of vessels in being able to stop, and if needs be interdict illicit trafficking in the region, hopefully reducing tensions.

In the Atlantic Russian submarine activity remains high, and the classic Cold War challenge posed by an assertive Russian force remains a real challenge, particularly in the Baltic. Finally the Caribbean continues to see activity as embargoes are in force off Venezuela, with the risk of US and Iranian vessels coming into direct contact as they seek to deliver oil to the Venezuelan regime.

While all this is going on, we must not forget the importance of airpower in delivering a continued presence in the Middle East, where the RAF remains committed to supporting OP SHADER, while in North Africa, reports are emerging indicating that Russians are supplying militant groups in Libya with aircraft.

On land tensions continue to remain high, with NATO forces engaged in continual stand off and deterrence against Russian aggression in the Baltic states, while in India the Chinese and Indian armies are engaged in increasingly tense clashes in border regions.

This sense of tension is underpinned by a wider sense of democracy being under threat from increasingly assertive totalitarian regimes. The moves by China to curb democracy in Hong Kong, and threaten Taiwanese independence with threats of forcible reunification show that China is increasingly intolerant of any who threaten its position.

At the same time the descent of Russia into a totalitarian state, while across Europe some nations appear to be adopting measures that call democracy into question are of deep concern.

When added to wider concerns around the volatility in the Gulf, where the combination of elderly monarchs, a land war by proxy in Yemen, a large and angry young population and a collapse in the value of oil threatening long cherished lifestyles, means there is potential for real risk and further conflict.

The British Armed Forces have already been heavily committed this year, albeit in less conventional ways, and seen themselves trying to balance off both delivery of ‘business as usual’ operations, while also supporting significant military operations at home.

The problem, as was eloquently flagged up in the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee on Thu 28 May, is that there are huge draws on a Defence budget that remains overstretched and where tough decisions need to made about what to fund, and what to delete. With the next defence review now kicked into the long grass of 2021, Defence arguably lumbers on with an overcommitted and not fully funded budget, unable to take the decisions needed to focus on its future direction. The question though is what decisions need to be made and where do future priorities lie for the UK?

At its heart lies an age old dilemma for UK planners – do they retain a vision of a global Britain able to operate as a pocket superpower, able to reach globally and carry out a range of engagements and be able to provide a credible presence in military operations, or do they want to focus more heavily on shoring up NATO and European defence to enhance UK security as a whole?

As currently configured the UK’s approach to global security favours the ability to deploy forces at distance, and be able to fight as part of a coalition globally. The success of this force though is reliant on a combination of effective diplomatic presence, good contractor support and the ability to ‘plug in and play’ with allies globally.

One lesson COVID has taught is that access cannot be guaranteed, nor can relying on third party nations be taken for granted as staging posts. If you need to deploy via a series of airfields (for example, much as the UK used certain nations to deploy into Afghanistan), then can you assume the access and support will always be there, and what happens if new requirements to quarantine for 14 days on arrival enter force?

At the same time it is increasingly clear that contractor support cannot be taken for granted in a ‘just in time’ economy that it is clear is not always as durable as had been hoped. If your ability to deploy and sustain operations relies on contracts for food supplies, life support and engineering or comms support (as many longer term UK operations have), then is it still safe to assume the UK is capable of global operations if its underlying contract support isn’t available?

This challenge raises questions about a number of key assumptions for UK defence planning – is it still credible to assume that the UK can deploy a global force built around an armoured division, or are the enablers long assumed to be essential no longer able to be taken for granted?

If the UK is reliant on host nation support for basing warships abroad – particularly in the Gulf, West Indies and Singapore, can this effectively be delivered on an enduring basis or is this soon going to be seen as ‘all too difficult’ on current operating models?

This raises the question then around whether the UK can afford to continue to operate a global expeditionary force in the post COVID world – if more support has to be brought ‘in house’ and more needs to be done by uniformed personnel due to the difficulty in securing contractor support, then is the cost worth paying for the effects gained – or can British strategic goals be met in different ways?

For example, is it worth retaining the ability to deploy forces into the Asia Pacific region to periodically exercise with allies if we can no longer assume that it is possible to send support if needed? Would a better step be to focus on enhancing co-operation via other channels, for example more diplomatic presence, more aid and development support or seeking co-operation in other areas – for example investing to work together on cyber issues?

The question needs to be asked and robustly tested about ‘what is the value we get from overseas military deployments that cannot be gained via other means’? Too often debate focuses on where ships, aircraft and tanks should be based, not what it is that we actually want to do with them and how their presence contributes to our wider national security goals.

For the armed forces this also leads to questions about what roles are worth keeping and what perhaps needs to be re-examined in the context of what is both operationally credible, and affordable, in the future.

If there is a move away from using global force projection, then does this raise questions about the value of rapid intervention forces – if the UK feels it is not necessary or possible to operate in some areas, is there still an enduring requirement for both the Royal Marines amphibious warfare capability, and the Parachute Regiment and associated air assault capabilities?

This isn’t intended to sound like a ‘scrap the Paras’ diatribe (although doubtless this will be interpreted as such). What it is intended to ask is the simple question – if the UK cannot in the post COVID world identify a way to safely and effectively operate globally, is it still possible to identify a credible operational role for these units in the armed forces beyond ‘but we’ve always had it’?

A similar set of challenges can be asked too though about the value of moving to a more continental strategy. If the UK were, faced with a defence review that identified that the best way to assure defence capability was to bring it in house, and cancel much of the contractorization work that has been done before, what has to be stopped or changed in order to fund this move?

If, for example, the outcome of the Review were to adopt a broadly ‘1981 Nott Review’ approach of replacing Trident, focusing on Eastern Europe and ASW in the North Atlantic, then what has to be brought in house – for example, could the Army credibly deploy heavy armour except via reliance on outsourced solutions at present?

The worry may be that to fund the changes needed (for example expanding the RLC to do more work to support operations) that the actual scope of what can be done reduces – e.g. if you can only afford to fund two armoured brigades worth of in house logistical support, then that becomes your new funded front line force, whether you like it or not. Focusing on an ‘heavy Army based Eastern European defence will not necessarily result in either more soldiers, or more capability – if anything, the costs incurred may well mean fewer of both in pure numbers terms.

Attached to these questions are more difficult ones about how both sea and airpower operate in the future. Can the UK assume that it will be able to operate in the same way, with the same guaranteed support in future from foreign airbases – for example, can it operate QRA to protect NATO states abroad, or deploy into a third party? How will logistics work for exercises – is the potential hassle of having to put troops and assets in quarantine simply too much of a challenge for the foreseeable future and will the focus instead move to national exercises or other solutions?

For seapower the challenge is around ensuring the tail continues to support the teeth. While much is made of the RFA’s ability to keep Royal Navy warships supplied with fuel and spare parts, this is only as good as the ship has fuel and stores to issue. It is often forgotten that RFA’s also need to pull in to port too reasonably regularly to restock their cavernous holds drained from RASing.

If this is no longer as easy to do, or if states impose quarantine on visiting ships, or the challenges around even simple things like munitions transfers, how does this impact on the ability of the RN to carry out ‘carrier strike’? For example, if a plane carrying a shipment of bombs for HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH lands at a local airbase, how easy will it be to move these munitions from the airbase, via the local area and into a port where it can be loaded onboard with new quarantine regulations in force?

The unanticipated second and third order effects of quarantine may well be to significantly reduce the reach and endurance of RN vessels which may have to factor in the difficulties of resupplying the RFA before they can RAS. The longer term impact on both requirements for seaborne logistics demands, and whether this means a need for more stores ships than currently exist is potentially intriguing.

All of these decisions have to be taken against the context of a world where the MOD will not have enough money to do everything it wants to do. The PUS was adamant that there are programmes that the MOD wants to cancel, although it is not clear what these are, or what impact this has on UK aspirations globally.

Planners though need to look to a future where they must balance off a series of really difficult decisions. What matters more – global reach or assurance of supply? Do they need and can we afford to maintain wide chunks of our capabilities – has COVID shown that things like ‘heavy armour’ is possibly an unattainable and unrealistic dream to deliver in a world where the requirement from Government seems more for cheap pools of manpower to support the civil power in a crisis?

There is a sense that multiple tectonic plates are shifting and Defence is caught in the middle of this. The global order is moving, and the UK needs to make difficult decisions on the extent to which it sees China as a partner or a threat, and the level to which it thinks it can engage globally on other issues.

As multi-lateral institutions become increasingly weakened via a combination of American isolationism and emboldened totalitarian regimes seeking to change the way these institutions work and are accountable, the future looks increasingly challenging for medium sized but capable powers like the UK.

Working out how to define what our national security interests are, versus what can be afforded and what is credible in a post pandemic world where so much has changed will be extremely difficult. Armed forces continue to be seen as a key tool of national security, but are they going to be more difficult to use in coalition operations, and will the deployment of troops be credible in a world of restricted movement and flaky supply chains?

Perhaps the most difficult to answer question is, regardless of the risk to global security, is Defence still a priority for funding? Facing a significant recession and difficult public spending decisions, is maintaining large and capable armed forces still a priority at a time when so many other decisions need to be taken?

Or, are we approaching the point when perhaps the unthinkable is possible. If the size of the recession and change means that large parts of the UK defence industrial supply chain may be at risk of collapse anyway, have we reached a potential tipping point when large scale changes and cuts to defence spending is possible in a way not previously deemed possible?

If you no longer have an industrial base to protect in the same way, and the willpower and need to deploy large armed forces is diminished, then why not use this as an opportunity to slash defence spending, freeing up money for other more politically high priority projects?

COVID-19 has shown that the international system is changing, and this is one of those moments when it may be possible to forsee changes and decisions being taken on a scale that would never previously have been looked at. The biggest challenge facing the UK armed forces right now may be a sense that they are, for all the popular support for the concept of the armed forces, deemed far easier to cut in significant amounts now than at any time in the last 75 years.

It is not clear what the next 12-18 months hold, and it is far too early to predict what the next defence review will conclude. But it is clear that significant change is ahead, and so is turbulent times. Realistically nothing Defence does is sacred anymore, and no matter how much the armed forces will wish to protect their sacred cows from major cuts, there is no certainty that they will survive the post COVID BBQ party.

Without doubt, we live in interesting times.