VE Day 75 & The Choices The UK Faces Ahead of VE Day 100
It is now 75 years since the war in Europe ended, heralding
the closing of one significant era in history and opening the door to another. Looking
back at images of that time it is hard to imagine that the world then, which
appears so different, is still within living memory, or that participants from
it are still with us.
It is easy to imagine a French or German veteran of the war
of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 still being alive in 1945 and wondering what
manner of madness has befallen the world, and questioning how quickly it had
seemingly changed, and asking what future either nation would have in the future.
It is also strikingly similar that so many in the UK
perceive 1945 as an epoch shift, marking the end of one world view, and setting
the stage for what many perceive to be an era of decline and fall from influence.
But is this true, and to what extent does the impact of the world of 1945
continue to be felt in how the UK sees the world?
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A superb shot from HMS LEDBURY |
While the traditional narrative seems to be ‘we won the war,
we failed as a nation and now we no longer matter’ it is perhaps worth asking
if this is true. In many ways the world of 2020 continues to closely mirror
that of the world of 1945.
The UK and US continue to maintain close relationships in
the world of defence and security, while Canada, Australia and New Zealand
remain close allies. The core of the war winning alliance of ‘old commonwealth’
nations remains exceptionally close, even if it is subject to the occasional up
and down over the years.
British thinking continues to be global in context, unlike
other nations we have not had a post imperial withdrawal in aspiration. The
ending of the empire has not seen a corresponding withdrawal in interest – the
UK remains a globally focused nation, involved in regional security issues
across the planet, and playing a leading role in a variety of organisations.
We perhaps like to feel sorry for ourselves, feeling like
some kind of decline has set in. Yet when you look at the range of UK reach and
influence, from participating in international peacekeeping operations to
taking part in multi-lateral organisations, if anything the reach and interest
is expanding. New embassies and High Commissions are opening year on year, with
UK also opening new missions to organisations like ASEAN too.
There is a strong argument to be made that the UK has retained
a significant and influential voice throughout the last 75 years, remaining a
valued partner of choice and able to be seen as a credible participant in many organisations
– to this day it retains one of the largest overseas networks of embassies and
diplomatic missions of any country.
Coupled to this is the realisation that the UK’s core
strategic interests really haven’t changed all that much since the end of WW2 –
a period when control of the Atlantic, security in Europe, the defence of wider
choke points critical to shipping and operating to protect UK and allied interests
and uphold global security on a wider basis led to a truly global military
presence.
The intervening period has seen this policy continue
unabated. From maintaining strong naval forces to protect the Atlantic from firstly
German, then latterly Soviet / Russian submarines and surface naval forces, to
keeping heavily involved as a leading power in NATO, the UK has continued to
engage in the northern hemisphere as a leading military power.
Defence policy has focused on the delivery of effective ways
to ensure regional stability, and provide a credible deterrent against external
aggression. The modern British Army and RAF based in the Baltic States is a direct
descendant of the forces sent in to liberate Europe, while the Royal Navy
continues to invest heavily in protecting the North Atlantic as required.
More widely the UK focuses significant interest and effort
in ensuring that choke points remain accessible and that commercial shipping,
the lifeblood of our ancient island nation continues to flow.
Over the last 75
years the RN has deployed, supported by the RAF and Army to help protect shipping
from interference on countless occasions. Sites of importance in WW2 remain of
key interest today, for example the Royal Navy continues a long term presence in
Gibraltar and Diego Garcia, while keeping ships permanently deployed or based
in the Gulf too for the last 40 years to ensure regional stability.
At the same time there remains a commitment and interest in taking
a leading part in wider global security and stability. The UK has not turned its
back on any part of the world, nor stepped away. While force levels may have
changed, there remains consistence presence – Singapore remains a key part of British
defence interests in the Asia Pacific region, and the former HMS TERROR is
still part of the UK defence estate to this day.
Across the globe the UK continues to work as a leading coalition
partner providing military experience, coupled with highly effective civilian support,
from FCO, DfID and other departments to help work to bring stability to
conflict zones.
You only need look at the work done in Africa in the last 20
years by the UK to see how British personnel have helped save lives from Ebola,
restored democracy and order to Sierra Leone and invested heavily in training
military personnel from across the continent in everything from support to
democratic governments to protecting wildlife from poachers.
The point here is that for all the talk of us being a nation
in decline since the war, we continue to do an awful lot of good around the
world and remain one of the most influential and significant powers out there.
How often do you read articles about the UK being in decline?
Regularly, yet for the last 75 years people have been predicting the end of the
UK as a credible power, but despite this, it still seems to be carrying on as a
key nation in the global order.
There are significant challenges ahead though – much needs to be
done to balance the budgetary challenges currently faced by the MOD to try and
solve a huge shortfall in funding. Similarly, people remain both the greatest
asset and biggest challenge. Arguably the biggest failure of the armed forces
since WW2 is getting their people management right – one only has to delve into
archive files to realise that getting sufficient trained people is a perennial
challenge and one that the military have singularly failed to do well.
Other challenges ahead include modernising an estate still
linked heavily to WW2. There are large swathes of the Defence Estate that date
back to this period and are in desperate need of either disposal or
modernisation.
The RAF still has plenty of airfields that date back to WW2,
if not before, and which need either significant funding to modernise, or
closure. The RAF Astra programme reportedly aspires to find the funding to
ensure some bases have hot water by closing at least half of the remaining
flying stations in the UK (dropping from some 50 airfields today to around 25
over the next 30 years if you believe PPRUNE), but closure may be difficult.
As was seen during the move to try to close RAF Scampton,
even the hint of shutting somewhere that may have links to the past causes an outcry
and protests, even if it makes absolute sense to shut down a hardly utilised
airfield. The challenge the MOD faces as it tries to slim its estate down is
getting rid of the legacy of WW2 sites that are of practically not ongoing operational
value in the face of localised protests, bad press and the worry that a
Minister tired of constant challenge in the House will step in and say ‘are we
sure we can’t look again at this again’…
More widely the MOD needs to think carefully as the next
Defence Review looms about what the UK wants its defence posture to look like.
The challenges have not changed and global aspiration remains undiminished, but
given the likely scale of austerity and cuts required to cope with the COVID-19
pandemic and its impact on the economy, there may need to be long and difficult
chats about what to prioritise.
The real challenge is whether the UK can continue to afford
to operate in a post COVID world as it has done before, or if the potential
limitations highlighted by depending on contractor support and just in time
logistics needs to be replaced by a return to keeping support in house – and identifying
what needs to be cut to pay for this.
Can the UK continue to play a relevant future in the next 25
years as we move towards the 100th anniversary of WW2 ending? Yes,
it probably can, but it will require continued effort and engagement. As the last
links toWW2 and the memories of Empire and presence pass away, the next
generation will need to work hard to facilitate access for the UK and ensure it
remains a valued and sought-after ally of choice.
This will require investment in the Diplomatic Service, Aid
and other services as well as ensuring that there is a credible offer of military
support that meets the needs of the partner nations. This will also require
difficult decisions about what sort of military capability matters – is the
goal to continue to operate as peer partners to the US and NATO, or be more
focused on local defence and mentoring to nations in Africa and elsewhere?
The next 25 years is likely to see the final change of the
post war power structures, with China rising in their ascendancy of power,
while the US UK and France relatively speaking become smaller economic partners
by contrast. Being able to work with this, while working out how to maintain
effective links to China, but without damaging our long term relationship with
the US will be a difficult challenge for UK policy makers – particularly when
UK and Chinese interests clash in areas like Africa.
The UK will need to think carefully about this not only from
a security perspective, but in considering how to further develop the defence
industrial base, and work with industry to deliver capabilities and also
embrace future challenges like space and cyber – which will also be a draw on scarce
resources too.
So, overall it is fair to say that the UK remains more
influential than we give it credit for, and it retains much of the legacy of
WW2 structures, thinking and relationships in its current defence and security
policy. But it is also now faced with real choices that mean it cannot
necessarily take the old order for granted much longer. As our relationships
evolve, powers change and new powers ascend, it will take continued serious investment
of people and resources to ensure the UK remains relevant for the next 25 years.
Perhaps now, more than at any point in the last 75 years is
when the UK is faced with real strategic choices that it cannot easily fudge.
Torn between a global presence, or investment to support NATO, and trying to
balance off a security relationship with an economically declining America,
while working out how to counter, balance and work with a growing and assertive
China that does not demonstrate any sense of sharing our values of democracy or
liberty, the UK may find itself forced into having to decide what it wants to
be for the next 75 years quickly, without any clear sense of what this outcome
may actually be.
Interesting.
ReplyDeleteWould it help to provide tips on how fantasy fleeter can stop being fantasy fleeters? Is it possible for such people to contribute to defence commentary if they do enough research?
The UK is now more isolated than at any time in living memory. We are not that important to the US any more, particularly as it pivots towards Asia, and have alienated ourselves from European allies. Well and truly stuck in no man's land and I doubt others view us through rose-tinted spectacles these days. If the next SDSR is managed in the same cack-handed way that the COVID-19 crisis has been then we are in serious trouble. I suspect it will be more about muddling through the next 4 years than thinking through a long-term strategic position that is in any way meaningful. Hate to be negative but the pile of dust under the carpet is becoming noticeable.
ReplyDeleteThe decline of the US economy and the growth of China are not certainties. Extrapolating existing trends to predict future developments is notoriously unreliable, and assuming otherwise risks getting over-committed to a bad strategy. The challenge is to invest in policies and capabilities that work to our advantage in any plausible future scenario, including the ones that aren't deemed very likely until they happen.
ReplyDeleteIs it really that clear that the UK's wide-but-shallow overseas military footprint has achieved anything for the UK that has eluded Germany or Japan?
ReplyDelete