Is it time to scrap HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH? Why the RN should consider scrapping the Carrier force.

In an interview with the Sunday Times today, the Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace MP raised concerns about the future ability of the British Armed Forces to operate alongside American allies, noting that this cannot be taken for granted and that it would be essential to look at improving British sovereign capabilities. This would include better ISTAR and other capabilities that the UK benefits from when working as a partner alongside the US.

In the first article on this subject today, Humphrey explored what this could mean particularly for the British Army. The key challenge in this debate is that while developing national sovereign capabilities may sound appealing, it comes at a significant price and could require scaling back of ambitions.

For instance, if the assumption is that the UK is going to operate alone, or without direct US support, does this mean that it continues to make political and policy sense to want to have the ability to deploy a ground-based division globally? What are the benefits and gains of doing so relative to the potential costs? Similarly, when Defence is potentially looking at a £15bn shortfall, what is sacrificed to pay for this capability?

The purpose of this article is to even the balance a little, play devils advocate and hopefully fend off the views of some that the original article was a pro navy piece intended to attack the Army, and other such nonsense. Instead it wants to focus on what could an approach mean for the Royal Navy?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The starting point for this is the debate around how the UK engages with the world. The original article noted that the UK is a maritime economy dependent on global trade for prosperity. For years the view has been that the best way for the Royal Navy to protect this is around a forward presence, global reach and trying to ensure that UK national interests can be protected.

But there is an alternative perspective that could be credibly considered. The UK could easily consider that in the light of its withdrawal from the EU, and wider concerns about the stability of NATO that the SDSR offers an opportunity to strengthen European security credentials and reassure NATO partners of its ongoing steadfast commitment to the Alliance – particularly in the Baltic states where there is real concern around the potential for Russian mischief.

In those circumstances an equally strong case could be made for the British Army to become the key defence priority, and for investment to flow into ensuring that the ability to deploy and sustain forces in Eastern Europe, operating as a truly sovereign force and able to work as part of NATO makes a lot of sense. In these circumstances there is a clear argument to be made for bolstering the Army, enhancing its logistical and strike capability and making it able to serve as a clear sign of British commitment to European security.

This shift would not be the first time this decision has been taken – arguably the 1981 Defence Review took a very similar posture, choosing to focus resources on the ability of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) to fight and survive, and enhance the forces assigned to it. At the same time, the roles of the Royal Navy and RAF were more clearly intended to be as both supporting organisations to ensure the Army had air support and sea control of the Atlantic against submarines to permit reinforcements from North America. This could perhaps be summed up as a ‘NATO / Fortress Britain’ approach.

The 1981 Defence Review still causes shudders of involuntary horror to emit from many Naval Officers who remember it for the loss of the LPDs and the Carrier force, downgrading of the Royal Marines as well as cuts to the front line fleet (to a force of some 50 ships) and the loss of the ENDURANCE.

Yet despite this, it remains a strikingly well-argued paper in terms of prioritising resources against the threat, and is perhaps remarkably prescient for the threats and challenges we face today.

In identifying that the role of the Royal Navy was to provide ASW and focusing resources away from the highly expensive Type 22 and into the more austere Type 23, we see a repeat of the Type 26 vs Type 31 arguments that remain valid now. But, more widely we see a sense of Government not being afraid to ruthlessly concentrate resource on the core missions at hand – ASW and not global deployments to protect wider interests.

In the likely highly resource constrained SDSR that the UK is about to do, very similar arguments could be made – especially in light of SofS’s comments. It is easy to look at the modern Royal Navy and ask whether if the decision is taken to refocus resources to NATO and European security, the Carriers, the LPDs and the Escort fleet continue to be relevant to the key threats we face.

You could make a strong argument that of the significant or existential threats to the UK where warfighting assets are needed, either to deter or be ready for use, then these are built around the need to protect Europe from external aggression.

There is a clear threat to the security of both the Baltic states and Scandinavian nations from an aggressive and resurgent Russia. This calls for strong land-based forces able to reinforce rapidly the continent, coupled with effective airpower assets able to support both air defence and strike operations. It also requires the ability to work as part of a residual NATO alliance, able to lead and command multi-national operations and bring together military land and air forces from multiple nations in an effective manner.

To deliver this as a sovereign capability would be expensive – it requires both investment in new national capabilities such as imagery and C2 functions, coupled with the recapitalisation of significant swathes of the British Army armoured and artillery force – long deferred decisions on replacements or refits need to be taken soon, particularly for the AS90 and Challenger 2 force, and these come at a price.

For the Royal Navy the question would be if the emphasis is to support national operations in Europe, and to reduce spending internally to free up funds then what has to give and what could change?  The 1981 Defence White Paper is a good starting point to help shape this argument as the threats are so similar – a resurgent Russian threat coupled with the need to replace Trident.

In operational terms the RN could credibly look to step away from the ‘high end’ focus on expeditionary warfare and instead refocus its efforts on the littoral and operations far closer to home to develop a force that works to support the Army.

To that end you again could make a very compelling case to dispose of both of the LPDs – these complex ships are intended to command amphibious assaults, yet are manpower intensive and are perhaps anachronisms at a time when the Royal Marines are moving away from the direct amphibious assault role. The removal of the LPD capability would free up a lot of naval manpower and remove the need to refit BULWARK soon ahead of a planned return to service.

If the Royal Marines were to retain some focus on providing a discrete ‘strike’ capability via the Littoral Strike Ship, then this would probably suffice for the sort of small raids that would occur  e.g. limited and highly discrete operations involving small numbers of troops, and not large-scale beach landings.

In a similar vein, there is a strong case to be made to step away from carrier aviation completely. The Carrier project has now delivered both vessels into service, and at its most brutally cynical, one could argue that they have fulfilled their role of keeping the British shipbuilding industry intact and alive.

With both ships now in service but without the full airwings in place, this is the most effective time to scrap them and reap significant return on their sales to a third party. With the concept proven, but very few ‘miles on the clock’ there would be a wealth of countries keen to bring both ships into their navies – which when coupled with the onwards work for refitting the ships for foreign service, this could be a real boon for the UK shipbuilding and repair industry.

The Royal Navy could well step away from both ships and actually reap huge operational and structural benefits. There is no doubt that while they are magnificent vessels, they are also a manpower drain on the Naval Service as a whole, requiring well over 1500 people (or some 10% of the general service headcount) to crew.

Scrapping both carriers would free up wider changes by significantly reducing the requirements for escort ships, as there would not be a need to generate the associated escort carrier strike groups (potentially reducing by 4-8 ships the numbers of escorts needed in the RN force).

In terms of wider programming, now would represent the best time to scrap them, before Croswnest is fully in service, or the F35 force is built up, as well as before the FSS contract (intended to provide two-three large supply ships for stores to support carrier operations) is placed. The longer term savings would be enormous and potentially significant enough to buy out a potentially large amount of the short term funding ‘black hole’ and potentially offer space to fund the new capabilities needed to support the Army.

This may sound revolutionary, but again there is precedent here. The RN moved to sell HMS INVINCIBLE, then brand new as part of the 1981 Defence Review, to Australia. If we are moving to an assumption that the UK may need to act in isolation, then it is also entirely reasonable to ask if carrier groups are still relevant in that vision?

The role of the Carrier Strike Group is as much to project power in a wider coalition force, so operating with partners like the USN or other allies, and embarking foreign aircraft too. If we are now in a space where US partnership cannot be taken for granted, then there is a case that the carriers represent a capability we may not actually require for future operations.

Intended as the centre piece of coalition work, the change to the planning assumptions to ensure that enough credible escorts and aircraft that can work as part of the force in a crisis are available may make them practically unaffordable. At the moment the RN is intending to deploy two CSG’s, but is assuming that foreign allies will contribute in some way. If it had to go it alone, the cost of doing so could be eye-watering, and potentially make the force unaffordable for the long term.

The wider picture for the RN is that scrapping the LPD and Carrier forces as they currently exist also actively calls into question the justification for the retention of a large surface force of 19 high capability escort ships.

Already the RN has struggled with manpower for years and only 17 of the 19 hulls are actually active at any one time, with two held in nominal reserve. The Type 23s are also materially fragile in some cases, often having significantly exceeded their hulls intended to design life.

One of the reasons for the size of the escort force is to be able to provide enough ships to meet various contingent scenarios and ensure that the RN can meet the requirements placed on it in wartime. But, if you remove some of the prime reasons for those scenarios to be generated, you equally reduce the requirement to need as many ships.

While discussing specific ship hull numbers is a dangerous slippery slope into the world of fantasy fleets, it is reasonable to say that if the RN took the decision to delete the Carrier and LPD forces, then it could also accrue significant savings by paying off a not inconsiderable number of escort ships as surplus to requirements.

This would save money in the short term and also generate longer term savings by not needing to build like for like replacements. It would also free up a considerable amount of people to be redeployed elsewhere to close gapped billets and ease the burden on a very overstretched workforce.

There is a good argument to be made that it would be better for the RN to have 8-10 escort ships, fully crewed and with a ‘third watch’ system in play that would significantly increase their ability to be at sea and operationally available if needed, compared to the current force.

While these moves would herald the end of the Royal Navy as it is currently known, they also represent a very good opportunity to reconfigure it for the sort of local maritime constabulary tasks that it excels at. For example, some of the savings used could be reinvested in building additional simple offshore patrol vessels for both the military and wider maritime tapestry like Home Office and fishery protection agencies to increase the ability to monitor offshore. Other funds could be diverted into better investment in surveillance drones or aircraft to monitor UK waters and ensure their security if required.

From an operational perspective, the Royal Navy could refocus itself as a predominantly small ship navy intended to provide the ability to close and hold the Channel, support operations in the Baltic and perhaps retain a small number of ships to support wider international deployments.

The holding of the Channel would require forces intended to protect the area from mining, heralding renewed investment in the next generation of MCMV capability (most likely a land based force using alternative systems to find and destroy mines). The MCMV force would continue to be a credible bargaining tool for use in coalition scenarios, particularly in the Gulf where the UK is already de facto lead nation among coalition forces.

The wider challenge of the Baltic would call for a similar force to that seen during the 2019 Baltic Protector deployment, smaller ships able to visit local ports coupled with perhaps a slightly larger Type 31 style vessel able to operate against potential hostile forces. There may be a requirement too for an LSD to operate as both mother ship and residual mover of littoral forces around the coastline if needed.

One area to consider is what happens to the Submarine force and its role? It is to be assumed that regardless of what else happens in the SDSR, the decision to renew Trident will be taken as it is, at heart, an overwhelmingly political one. This in turn will drive the decision to retain some wider capability – for instance the P8 force, some ASW frigates and some form of SSN capability to protect this.

There is no credible or more cost effective way to remain a nuclear power without renewing Trident – there is no warhead and missile delivery system in service today that the UK could use, and as exhaustive studies have proven, both ground and air launched alternatives are too vulnerable to be credible as a ‘second strike’ capability. This therefore drives us to assume that Trident remains in service – and even if the relationship with the US is reconfigured, the USN is likely to push for a continued close relationship because they too are dependent on the UK support for much of the next generation of SSBN work to help safeguard their own Trident force.

This means that the UK is in the same place as it was in 1981, investing in new SSBNs and deciding what to do with the SSN force. The key medium-term question is whether the UK decides to call time on a Royal Navy SSN force and instead move to an AIP or other system instead and reconfigured itself as an SSK focused navy.

The key challenge here is whether as part of a defence policy optimised to support NATO, the UK see’s its role in wartime as that of conducting operations ‘up north’ or if it would prefer to invest in submarine operations in the Baltic to protect the flanks of UK forces based in the region. In those circumstances a return to conventional submarine operations may well be more credible option than nuclear, primarily due to the characteristics of the Baltic.

Much like the 1981 review brought the UPHOLDER class into existence, the 2020 review too could herald a path back towards conventional submarines. Such a move would in some ways help the UK return to the ability to operate in isolation, removing the dependency on other nations for nuclear co-operation, and also expand shipbuilding export opportunities as well.

The final role on global trade protection would call for retention of a small force of reasonable capability ships to fly the flag for soft power and work to promote UK exports and protect shipping.

In a totally ruthless world though it needs to be asked the extent to which the UK would want to be involved in protecting shipping in the Middle East or Far East? Given other European and Aisan economies are reliant on shipping too from this region, and given the way nations tend to respond when their interests are threatened – particularly with piracy in the Horn of Africa, perhaps the time has come to ask others to carry the burden more?

The UK could perhaps look to offer on an occasional basis an East of Suez deployer if required, but instead take the conscious decision that the role of the Royal Navy is primarily protection of the home base and not its more global interests.

While there may be tangible goodwill generated by a British carrier in the Asia Pacific region, a strong argument could be made that if the Royal Navy is no longer planning to operate or fight in the region, why does it need to visit it? In this case and scenario, the argument would be that UK soft power in the Asia Pacific region can just as easily be delivered by a combination of the FCO, DfID, Trade and the odd deployment than it can by a Carrier Strike Group visiting on an occasional group deployment.

From a soft power perspective too, there is a lot to be asked about the value of whether a flag waving deployment actually generates benefits in a world where the UK has reconfigured itself to be a predominantly European land power. The reality of making decisions to ‘go it alone’ as a planning assumption is that it cuts your horizons and aspirations to what is credible and survivable, unless you choose to have very deep pockets and a benevolent Treasury on your side.

The benefits to the Royal Navy and Defence of adopting these widespread changes would be considerable. At a pinch you could reduce headcount considerably while still solving gapping, thus saving huge amounts of money and freeing up headcount to be assigned to the RAF and Army.

It would help reduce risk in the shipbuilding programme by reducing the reliance on expensive and complicated designs with significant potential to go wrong, and instead focus on cheaper and simpler vessels aimed at lower intensity roles. Paraodoxically it could actually lead to real terms growth in the number of ships as sufficient funds may be available (and people too) to grow the force of OPVs to the point where the Royal Navy could be larger in hull terms than it is now.

Humphrey has no doubt that this piece, intended as a ‘devils advocate’ article is likely to generate enormous debate in some quarters by those who will see it as an attack on the Royal Navy. But, at its heart is a key point – namely that at its heart defence policy is about making difficult decisions and trade offs to try and balance out multiple different interests and equities.

In this case the view that the UK should be prepared to ‘go it alone’ represents a very different policy perspective to decades of previous planning assumptions. This in turn means having to take some real and very difficult decisions about what should be prioritised and how it should be funded.

In the case of the military, it is highly unlikely that enough money will be available to support both a global forward deployed, and a continental Europe approach. Nor will all three services benefit equally from funding, and they will have to cut their cloth accordingly.

The reality is that the British Government are on the cusp of having to make and take some extraordinarily difficult decisions that will have an impact that could last for years, if not decades. The move to assume that the UK must be ready to fight alone will probably force the MOD to scale back its aspirations for how and when it can deploy the armed forces, and the scenarios where they can be employed.

Alternatively, the MOD could consider genuinely radical suggestions, like the ones raised here, about an alternative approach that would turn on its head the established missions and structures that have existed for over 30 years and instead accept a considerable shrinking of horizons and ambitions to meet the goals placed on them.

There are no easy answers and the next few months are likely to see all manner of equally unpalatable views being looked at and considered. There is no certainty beyond the fact that every Service is likely to leak, and be the target of leaks, intended to influence and inform opinion makers views. The hope must be though that the outcome is a coherent defence and national security policy document, and not an uncomfortable mixture intended to try to appease everyone and not actually take the hard decisions that must be taken to ensure the Armed Forces remain relevant for the next 10 years.