Fortress Britain? Is it time to rethink how we defend the UK from attack?
Last week there were reports in the media that the UK is
considering using text messages to provide warning of imminent attack by ballistic
missiles. The idea attracted a mixture of scorn and ridicule, with people seeing
it as the new version of the ‘four minute warning’ and wondering what possible
difference it could make. In fact the idea has a lot of quite interesting
potential benefits and is worth considering further.
Theso-called ‘four minute warning’
dates back to the Cold War when as early warning radar systems came on line, the
ability to gain advanced warning of an incoming attack grew. In practical terms
there was never a guarantee about the actual time people would have got, but
the hope was that there would be at least four minutes notice.
While this doesn’t sound a lot, it is worth remembering that
ballistic missiles fired at the UK from the Soviet Union would only be airborne
for a relatively short time due to their speed and flight distance, so the
reality is there would only ever be a short window of warning time.
It is also largely forgotten these days that the Cold War
plans did not assume, for the most part, that there would be a ‘bolt from the
blue’ and that the Soviets would fire out of nowhere an overwhelming attack
with just four minutes notice. Rather the assumption was broadly that any
attack would follow a period of transition, with a deteriorating international situation
combined with mobilisation measures and transition to war beginning.
In this event, the attack would have come at a period when
the population would have been alert to the risks, and probably commencing some
form of preparation at home, so when the alarms sounded, it would have potentially
given a reasonable number of people the chance to take cover. Whether it would
have made any difference though is an entirely different question.
The link between this and the military was that the RAF
would have used a variety of radars situated at Fylingdales, a station which
continues to play a critical role in national defence to this day, combined with
the work of the UK
Warning and Monitoring Organisation, and civilians in the Royal Observer Corps,
volunteers who helped collate warning information, and post attack fallout dispersal
and disseminate it to the appropriate authorities. The result was that there
was a good chance that in the event of an attack, it could have been communicated
quickly to people across the nation, hopefully helping to save life.
The various reporting systems and air raid siren networks
were all switched off in the early 1990s. To this day you can still see remnants
of it, for example in London there are still orphan air raid sirens rotting
quietly away – there is one just outside Waterloo station. At the same time the
BBC stepped away from providing a national warning function via the Wartime
Broadcasting Service, and the general apparatus of warning about Armageddon was
abandoned and left to rot.
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Waterloo Siren - photo from article here |
This matters because today the world is moving to a
significantly more volatile and unstable environment where the threat of ballistic
missile attack has increased. Events in Iraq in early January show that the
Iranians are willing to fire, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, missiles towards
other nations, and as users proliferate and ranges increase, the risk to the UK
and other NATO nations increases.
As the risk increases, so to does the need to consider what to
do about it and perhaps more widely, what should the armed forces do about it?
The adoption of a text based warning system reflects a fairly low cost but
sensible approach to being able to notify as many people as possible of imminent
risk, but potentially at the risk of panic if it goes wrong.
In the Cold War there was a complex network of warning
systems to get a message of attack disseminated quickly involving everything
from air raid sirens to pub landlords firing maroons out on the village green. There
was no guarantee it could have worked, or that it could have reached many
people. By contrast text messages are a particularly good way to reach tens of
millions of users quickly because the mobile phone has become so ubiquitous in
public life.
If you wanted a cast iron way of being able to warn as many
people as possible, then the phone is an ideal way to do it. It is also cheaper
and less manpower intensive than relying on a network of volunteers like the
Royal Observer Corps and can hopefully spread messages quickly.
The other advantage of a text-based system is that it can be
used to scale up or down depending on the situation in a way that the previous
systems could not. As long as the network remains active, it is possible to
send messages warning of floods, disasters and other issues and send updates
and advice. While the nuclear warning is by far the least likely to be used, it
is helpful to have a national reporting system that can proactively advise
people on potential emergencies.
Many commentators have mocked or been cynical about the
idea, citing the mass panic that would likely ensue, or the potential for
things to go wrong. The example in Hawaii a few years ago where there was an inadvertent
release of a message suggesting, wrongly, that a North Korean nuclear attack
was inbound, was a good example of what can go wrong. Others worry that cyber attacks
may disable the networks or cause it to play up.
But this shouldn’t mean that we should automatically write off the technology as pointless. Part of the challenge is investing in good training and education to understand how not to issue a text message by error. Another is to try to reassure on the cyber bogeyman and ask how real the threat is?
While cyber is an extremely challenging and potentially game
changing domain for operations in wartime, it has to be asked if the peacetime
threat of meddling is credible. We are still in the early stages of defining
the ‘rules of the game’ when it comes to cyber operations, but it is clear that
if cyber-attacks have occurred, then if detected and attributed they carry a high
political cost – for example the calling out and public attribution of China
for its use of various cyber campaigns against the UK and other nations.
The question a potential adversary must consider is whether
it has the accesses needed to disrupt this sort of technology, and if it does,
is it worth exposing both its access to the system and the potential tricks it
could deploy? The risk of discovery is high, and the wider question is why blow
your cover and expose your capabilities in peacetime without very good reason?
To that end, the risk of cyber meddling is probably lower than some may think.
What this issue does illustrate though is the way that slowly
and subconsciously the UK mainland is quietly becoming a potential target for
military operations again. After decades of adopting an expeditionary approach,
and the attitude that ‘wars happen in other places’ this sort of thinking helps
highlight the risks to the homeland itself.
While war is hopefully unlikely, it is good to be reminded
that many of our potential foes do possess and have the willingness to employ
long range ballistic missiles. Similarly, the debate about the vulnerability of
warning systems to cyber attack equally highlights that the UK is potentially vulnerable
to some forms of electronic attack as well which could cause significant
impact.
What this means is we need to ask for the first time in 30
years, what is the role of the armed forces in homeland defence, and does the
threat require a military response? The big capability gap would seem to be some
kind of ballistic missile defence capability, but is this something that is
feasible or affordable?
The RAF has continued to maintain its defence of UK airspace
since WW2 and through RAF
Fylingdales, maintained a watchful eye on ballistic missile threats as
well. Similarly the Royal Navy has shown that its Type 45 destroyers can use
their impressive Sampson radars to provide some form of detection capability
against missiles too. The question is perhaps whether more investment is needed
in the defence of the homebase to harden against these sorts of risks?
The UK population have spent many decades assuming that wars
happen elsewhere, so the impact of a ballistic missile hitting a UK target
would be enormous. There would rightly be questions and demands to know why the
Government hadn’t invested in appropriate ways of stopping the threat. But to
fund the ability to counter the threat would be considerable and raises serious
questions about whether the armed forces exist for expeditionary warfare or to
provide a ‘fortress Britain’ safe from harm.
To defend against the threat of attack probably requires the
ability to find and effectively strike launch sites in the nation that is threatening
us. This requires the ability to invest in, or have access to good intelligence
and timely information about where the sites are. In turn this requires the
ability to either strike from the air, or the ground, using appropriate assets
to do so.
This is a very expensive set of capabilities, as it would
require investment in airpower, such as F35 or Typhoon and supporting enablers
like the Voyager and air transport fleet, as well as ISTAR platforms to be certain
of successfully entering the airspace and destroying the sites. It would also require
investment in helicopter platforms and expensive special forces equipment if a ground-based
option was preferred.
Perhaps most importantly it requires the maintenance of diplomatic
relations and engagement globally to ensure that the UK can create the
circumstances where the international community tacitly support any strikes,
and that it can find a host nation prepared to provide the basing facilities to
enable it to occur (the constant challenge being finding a third party country
happy to let you launch combat operations against a neighbour from).
This requires the maintenance of global presence and
capabilities that are expensive and perhaps raise the question about whether by
involving ourselves in some regions, we in turn make the problem worse?
By contrast the adoption of a more ‘fortress Britain’
approach would probably require bigger investment in good ballistic missile
countermeasures, so more warning radars and probably some form of interceptor
capability. The challenge here is that this sort of capability is expensive and
may reduce the ability of the military to do other jobs.
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Missile Away!- Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
The most likely platform to host a BMD capability, at least
in the short term, would be the Type 45 destroyer. The class is ideally suited
to this sort of role and could probably be upgraded with relative ease – for example
HMS DARING participated in BMD trials in the Pacific a few years ago and other
trials have occurred since (see
this article by ‘Save The Royal Navy’ for a good update).
The bigger question though is less about the specific package
of weapons and radars you want to fit to the ship and more one of asking about
what impact such a move would have on the Royal Navy.
The six strong Type 45 class can get 2-3 ships to sea on a routine
basis, and those that are available are increasingly intended to operate as
part of the Carrier Strike Group. If the decision were taken to move to a BMD role
for the class, this would necessitate some very difficult decisions on how best
to deploy them and how you could maintain a credible BMD capability.
Would it, for example, mean keeping the force on patrol at
sea able to fire if required, essentially maintaining a conventional deterrent
that would require 100% uptime, or would it be an occasional role that ships could
slip in and out of as required. Also, where would the patrol areas be, and what
impact would this have on generating ships to escort the Carrier?
The potential challenges are significant because policy makers
will need to make a deliberate decision between providing ships to do a credible
ballistic missile defence, or providing ships to escort the carrier – there is
little point in having one do both if your BMD platform is needed at home, but
is deployed in the far East.
More widely, what impact would assigning Type 45 hulls to
BMD patrol have – to do it effectively requires being on patrol in specific areas
to be able to intercept missiles. The US Navy already does this and essentially
has a force of ships that do nothing but steam in circles around a patrol area.
It is a retention killer and the wider people impact could be very harmful.
This is the sort of question that has to be looked at
because if people are serious about mounting a credible form of BMD capability then
it needs to be adopted with the same mentality and resource support as mounting
the deterrent, and not just as an additional rather nice to have capability.
It would come at the cost of taking ships away from wider
naval presence, and probably forcing difficult decisions on what else to invest
in as a result. The balance that needs to be struck is between that of mounting
a credible defence at home, and abroad as required – and this is not easy.
Another question which must be considered is what role does
the armed forces play versus civilians in the future defence of the homeland?
As noted much of the likely threat in a conflict to the UK could come from some
form of cyber-attack which could cause disruption to infrastructure and the
economy. Is the military the right place to invest in to house the sort of
skill sets needed to defend against this threat, or is it better to look more
at investing in civilians via GCHQ and other organisations?
While the Armed Forces talk about wanting to gain more people
skilled in cyber areas, and able to take on the digital threats we face, do
these people actually want to join the armed forces? The sort of person who is
instinctively a ‘cyber ninja’ is not necessarily the sort of person who wants
to join the military, or who fits with the lifestyle and requirements asked of
them.
A big challenge that the armed forces need to adapt to is reconfiguring
their recruiting processes to make it easier to bring in highly skilled coders and
other cyber warriors and give them the rank and reward to be credible. Many would
not pass the standard commissioning interviews, or would fail on medical grounds,
so is it better to adapt the standards and admit them – or to step back from
cyber and let the civilian agencies, who are not hamstrung by the tradition of
only employing people who can prove a leadership ability to use some ropes and
barrels to get across a water obstacle, to take the lead here?
This sort of debate is going to be central to how the SDSR
is likely to be carried out – a much bigger and much more extensive focus on
not just defence, but also how defence is done and who is best placed to do
this. As the threats evolve and change, the answer may not necessarily always
be ‘send for the military’.
Already we are seeing the military evolve and talk about
future operating environments – the move by the RAF this week to appoint a 2*
to lead space capability highlight
the way that the Air Force is already looking to evolve into an air and space
force. Similarly it is likely that the RN and Army will also look to wider evolution
too, trying to focus on investing in future and emerging technology areas and
how they can be involved in it.
What this means though is SDSR is likely to be as much about
looking at questions like ‘fortress Britain’ versus overseas engagement as it
is about where the best place to put capabilities is. As the UK homeland itself
looks to be increasingly a target, this SDSR will be critical in trying to set
up the necessary measures required to tackle this and help keep the UK
population safe. The challenge for the military may well be though that the answers
the review arrives at do not involve the armed forces at all…
Can I assume this article refers to missiles with non-thermonuclear warheads?
ReplyDeleteThe problem with leaving cyber warfare to 'civilian agencies' is that the 'cyber warriors' could still be considered to be combatants in International Law. Being formally 'serving' military may be the only way to give them the necessary legal and practical protection that the role necessitates. The rest of the military may not like the prospect of having a 'cyber force' comprising fat guys in T-shirts who potentially outrank them- but if that's what's required then so be it. I believe there was some precedent during WWII for simply handing commissions to people with no military training because they had essential tech-skills.
ReplyDeleteThere is an easier option of using the T45 for BMD around the UK. That is to use the PAAMS system from land i.e the SAMP/T. The system has already proven itself in taking out a ballistic missile fired into low earth orbit. We also already have half the system in place already, so why not install the other 50%. The system that is already in place is the PAAMS mission training system in Portsmouth. It has the control systems as well as actual Sampson and S1850M radars. The only thing missing are the Aster missiles. MBDA are developing the Aster 30 Block 2 BMD which has a range over 3000km. This would allow it to intercept exo-atmospheric threats. This would give an anti ballistic missile defence for the UK. It would need more systems throughout the UK to give the whole country a means of defence.
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