Thoughts on ‘The 45' Rebellion, the Battle of Culloden and its ongoing relevance to the modern Royal Navy

Humphrey was lucky enough to spend the last weekend hiking in the Cairngorm mountains with friends, including the defence blogger known as ‘Fighting Sailor’ his Twitter profile here, one of the UK’s best naval authors and well worth a follow on social media. One of the highlights of the trip was a visit to the battlefield museum at Culloden, scene of the last major battlefield in the British Isles in 1746, and today an excellent museum run by the National Trust for Scotland.

One of the surprising things about the museum was the manner in which many of the lessons and themes from the wars of the 1740s and in particular ‘45’ rebellion continue to be relevant to the modern Royal Navy and MOD. While Humphrey is in no way an expert on this period of history, he was struck by the similarities of operations nearly four centuries apart and wanted to capture his thoughts on this in a short article.

A Global Navy – then & now

It was intriguing to note that in the 1740s the RN was a truly global force, deployed conducting operations across the world during the War of Jenkins Ear, including in the Caribbean, Mediterranean Indian Ocean and Pacific. The locations where battles were fought for control, maritime dominance and strategic basing then are sites where the RN of today remains a regular visitor.

In a period when it is common to think that the RN is in decline and the UK’s global aspirations are reduced, there is something reassuring to think that the RN continues to sail in the same waters, to deliver counter-piracy, sovereignty reassurance and protection, littoral raiding, convoy protection and helping ensure control of strategic sea-lanes. The technology used to conduct these operations may have changed considerably, but the nature of the operations is timeless.

Also during this period, the ability of the Royal Navy to exert a credible deterrence effect on opponents planning was noticeable. The presence of forces in the Channel in 1743 was a constraint on plans to invade the UK by France, and considerable effort went into conducting decoy operations to try and lure away RN forces to keep the Channel open for long enough to invade. The unwillingness of the RN to seek battle by distraction meant that it remained present in sufficient force so as to present a deterrent.

The RN continues to deliver similar deterrence mission today, with the SSBN force now celebrating 50 years of Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) patrols, showing how the RN is central to deterring potential aggression, both for the UK and NATO allies by ensuring that any nuclear attack would be met with overwhelming force in return.

This leads to the first impression–that much of what the Navy does operationally today, and where it does it is fundamentally unchanged from what it did in the 18^th century.

The vital importance of coastal protection

One of the key battles fought at the start of the rebellion was between HMS LION and two French vessels carrying Prince Charles to Scotland. This battle saw HMS LION damaged, but in return the key supply ship ‘Elizabeth’ carrying many of the supplies and volunteers for Charles forces withdrew for repairs, hampering the start of the rebellion.

The lesson for today is that maintaining offshore patrols is a vital part of the means of the RN to defend UK sovereignty. Whilst there are considerably fewer pretender Princes trying to travel by sea to ferment rebellion in the UK these days, there remains a risk of smugglers and terrorists using the maritime domain to enter illicitly.

The Royal Navy can continue to intercept them using a combination of offshore patrol vessels, specialist boarding parties, aviation assets and other capabilities. This is backed up by the work of the Police, HM Coastguard and the Border Force, all of whom bring other maritime capabilities to bear.

The second impression is simple – while the technology has changed, the seaborne threats facing the security of the Kingdom continue to require the Royal Navy and wider government assets to counter it. This requires continued investment in highly capable maritime constabulary platforms and assets to meet the threat.

Blockades Still Work

One of the key roles played by the RN during the 45 Rebellion and in the wider wars was the effective blockading of enemy ports, preventing fleets from sailing, or supplies from reaching rebels. A key reason for the success of the British Government over the Prince was the strength of blockading RN forces preventing French shipments of supplies and money reaching the rebels.

This blockade tactic at sea helped ensure the UK Government was able to shape conditions on the ground, preventing the rebel army from operating as effectively as it could. Maritime power, although perhaps invisible to the soldiers in General Wades army was instrumental to setting the conditions for a precipitous decline of morale and manpower in the rebel force, which in turn created the conditions for victory at Culloden.

Today the Royal Navy continues to maintain the ability to blockade an enemy port or coastline – although this time using the submarine force. The presence of an RN nuclear submarine off the coast will reduce the ability of an enemy force to use the sea for resupply convoys, and divert forces into countering it, in turn reducing their ability to fight on the offensive.

More widely continued investment by the RN in the world beating mine warfare force means that the UK is well placed to prevent itself and allies from being blockaded by mines laid by foes. This means of warfare has been used effectively across the globe over the centuries and is a key reason for the continued presence of the RN MCMV force in Bahrain. Similarly, the ongoing ability of the RN to deliver world leading anti-submarine warfare forces in the form of Type 23 frigates, and air defences in Type 45 destroyers helps ensure that UK forces can counter efforts to blockade the UK by air or sea.

The third impression is that maritime blockades continues to play a major part in the evolution of naval capability and is something that the Royal Navy is well placed to both enact and respond to.

Providing Guns & Ammo

One surprising snippet at the museum was the information that the British Army forces were able to pursue the campaign in part because the RN had command of the sea and could ensure supplies of weapons and ammunitions were lying offshore to let the Army fight another day. Thus the Army could proceed to battle confident in its logistics support and that it could continue to fight thanks to the presence of the Royal Navy.

Today the Naval Service continues to provide this capability through a combination of RN amphibious platforms that can move and sustain troops ashore, Royal Fleet Auxiliary landing platforms and store ships able to carry and hold significant amounts of munitions and other stores afloat until needed, and the four large ‘Point class’ vessels run under private operators providing logistics support. This provides a potent mixture of capability and sustainment that is unmatched by almost any other nation, ensuring that the RN can continue to deliver similar support in future.

The fourth impression is that the maritime domain continues to be vital in ensuring success in land based operations by not only reducing the opponents ability to manoeuvre, but also to hold supplies and stores to feed in as required to influence the outcome of a campaign.

Final Thoughts

This article has been an extremely brief gathering of thoughts about how the Royal Navy of today continues to fulfil almost identical missions to that of its forbears. It has not begun to consider the wider use of naval tactics during this period, particularly the wider wars between the UK and Spain/France during the 1740s, a period that saw the UK undertake global amphibious operations and commerce raiding, and work with allies to use military force as a partial solution to complex diplomatic problems.

It has also not considered the impact of wider concepts like information operations, accurate assessment and analysis of intelligence and the use of UORs to respond to new and emerging threats – all themes central to the outcome of the 1745 rebellion. What should be taken away is that the Royal Navy of today remains well equipped and capable of meeting the threats and conducting the operations familiar to their predecessors from over 350 years ago. Humphrey would highly recommend a visit to Culloden, and to read more on this fascinating period of history – one equally as complex and challenging as the world we find ourselves in today.