Is it time for a 'Custom of Reasonable Silence'? Thoughts on Gen Houghtons comments about defence funding


The former Chief of the Defence Staff, Baron Houghton of Richmond (more widely known to many as General Sir Nick Houghton) has courted controversy in the media today by suggesting that Defence is not properly funded, and was not properly funded in 2015. In comments on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme he said:
We have slightly deluded the public of late that we have a defence programme that frankly we know is unaffordable… We are to an extent living a lie” (LINK)
These comments caused a veritable storm with some praising the General for his intervention, while others saw it as an untimely and potentially hypocritical position to take.

Humphreys strictly personal view is that interventions by retired very senior officers have become a depressingly familiar theme in recent years. There appears to be a well-worn trend of Service Chiefs staying relentlessly ‘on message’ at every opportunity while serving, telling the men & women who look up to them for leadership, that all will be well, that decisions make sense and that there is a plan to make it work. As they come to the end of their time there is usually a slightly risqué interview with a national newspaper where they’ll obliquely hint at concerns over funding and issue a veiled threat that they’ll be watching with interest or concern. There is then a period of silence, followed at some time later by an attack on the Government of the day for failing to fund Defence properly. These interventions have attracted increasing levels of cynicism from many commentators, who note wryly that people only seem to develop an ability to tell the truth once their pension is secure…
While the ‘secure pension’ line is in itself a myth (anyone who has served long enough to be a 4* has already got a secure and generous pension for life waiting for them the moment they retire), there is perhaps more substance in the view that it is inconsistent to say one thing, and then barely two years later say something completely different.
Most people in Defence will probably harbour private concerns at one stage or another about the nature of their organisation, the pace of cuts or structural changes and what they perceive to be lack of investment in their area. This is entirely natural, particularly in large organisations like the Armed Forces that regularly change their focus, structures and roles, and where if you are in a small unit in a remote part of the system, it is easy to feel that you’re not privy to the bigger picture.
The challenge for SNCO’s and Officers is to motivate and lead their people at times like this, when there is relentless negative coverage on the possible outlook for defence funding or reading in the paper that your ship / regiment / squadron will be axed. They must persuade people to keep the faith, that there is a plan and that things do make sense, and not to lose hope. This is a real leadership challenge, taking a disaffected workforce and keeping them engaged, particularly if they feel the system is letting them down.
This leadership challenge is at its hardest after big reviews like the 2015 SDSR, which will often have major changes involving unit moves, disbandment’s, redundancies and other career changing impacts. At times like this it is essential for the chain of command to have faith that Senior Officers have signed up to something that works and makes sense –  uniformity of message from the most senior 4* to the most junior Private is vital to keep people believing.
There are very few people in Defence who actually take decisions, one of the great ironies of the system is that the more network-centric, agile and enabled it becomes, the harder it gets to find people actually empowered to make something happen. Therefore the Service Chiefs carry considerable weight as the individuals who make the really tough decisions on approving the force packages and structures, or looking at where to make cuts to fund enhancements elsewhere. Other more junior personnel may create and staff these proposals, but the buck will stop at 4* level.
Therefore it is disheartening to see a recently retired CDS actively go on the offensive and claim that the most recent review wasn’t fully funded and that we are living a lie. As recently as 2015 in the RUSI Christmas speech, General Houghton said publicly of the SDSR:
I think that the defence review has delivered a remarkably good outcome… So, as I say, the outcome of the review itself was, I believe, a very good one… In capability terms the review has allowed us to lift our level of equipment investment to £178 billion over the next 10 years. This, in turn, will allow us to plug many of the capability gaps that worried us, as well as investing in new capabilities… “
“I want to offer you 5 themes which I think better demonstrate the sophistication of the Review’s outcome and how we envisage the character of the future force and the defence organisation that generates it. They are: utility; agility; strategy; innovation and partnership… Collectively they are at least part of the response that I would make to the consistent and, I fear, sometimes unimaginative criticism of those who can only judge the competence and capability of armed forces through the input metric of platform and manpower numbers” (LINK)
This positivity sits at considerable odds with his intervention today, which is even more surprising when you consider that he is essentially condemning the findings of the Review that he was responsible for leading.
It is one thing to make a carefully timed intervention many years, or decades, after leaving the Service and comment with the benefit of wisdom and distance from serving about your personal concerns about how the Government of the days defence review may impact on the security of the nation. It is unlikely that anyone you served directly with will still be serving, and while your words carry weight, they do not come borne from direct exposure to the specific review.
It is frustrating to see so many retired officers publicly state post retirement that they harboured doubts and concerns about issues. But there comes a point where Humphrey feels like saying to the 4*’s who are doing this – ‘You had the ear of the Prime Minister and the right of access to them. You could have raised these concerns. You could have resigned on principal. You could have used the democratic process appropriately and stepped away with dignity rather than implement something you clearly don’t fully believe in, and then spend time making statements to your people about how good it is, only to openly contradict yourself once you no longer serve – what message do you think this sends?’
Service life is a calling where people can be expected to put their lives in the hands of others, and risk everything for the Service. They take pride in the core values and ethos – for example, the so-called C2DRIL (Courage Commitment Discipline Respect Integrity Loyalty) at the heart of the Royal Navy ethos. How can a junior officer have confidence in their leadership chain of command that they are doing something right and proper when they see very senior officers openly misleading their people. Military personnel are told to demonstrate moral courage, and arguably to say ‘all is well’ and then later on say something different does not set the right example.
The commonly used riposte is that senior officers shouldn’t try to intervene in the democratic process to make their views clear. This is absolutely correct, it is not appropriate for a serving officer to openly step up and engage in political games (although it wasn’t that long ago in the early 20th Century that you could be both a serving regular officer and MP). But there are ways and means to express your concerns privately and if still not redressed, then resignation is always there as an option.
It is frustrating to see someone who wasn’t prepared to resign on principal over his concerns about the SDSR findings to now feel that they can criticise it publicly. To stage a direct attack on the Government of the day, exposing your clear doubts over a defence review findings and funding that was a result of a defence review occurring barely 2 ½ years ago while you were CDS, and when many of your peer group are still serving and worked on it is arguably inappropriate.
To publicly expose private doubts, having spent so long telling the people that looked to you for leadership that ‘all is well’ makes a mockery of the concept of honesty and integrity. It calls into question too the trust that people will have in the currently serving leadership, for they will know that the current Service Chiefs worked directly with Gen Houghton. They will reasonably want to know whether the current Chiefs shared (or still share) his private doubts. Frankly, this intervention undermines the position of the existing Service chiefs for any reasonable journalist will want to ask them (particularly those who served with Gen Houghton) whether they share his views or not.
One of the great strengths of the UK is that the lack of a written constitution has led to the emergence of a great many conventions and practises that have become custom. Perhaps it is time for a new one to emerge, namely ‘the custom of reasonable silence’.
Such a custom would ask that those retiring very senior officers undertake not to publicly pronounce on Defence issues in a political manner until such point as the next Strategic Defence Review has been completed (which should be every 5 years) or until all their 3 & 4* peers serving when they left have retired.  The aim would be to perhaps prevent the next CDS or Service Chief from dealing with broadsides from recently retired peers who made the decisions that they are now attacking the Government over.
It would provide a gentle air gap too, much like public servants are not theoretically permitted to take up employment for a period after leaving government, perhaps too it is appropriate to not let influential retired officers be in a position where they can try to sway the debate on Defence until they are no longer current on, or directly linked to, the issues of the day. A reasonable silence would give the current Service Chiefs the ability to lead and take difficult decisions without concern that their predecessors will publicly stage an intervention that could cause them immense difficulties.
Defence will always remain an emotive subject, but it is vital that people have confidence that very senior officers can deliver difficult decisions in an objective manner. The men and women of our armed forces deserve better than the sight of their former CDS until less than two years ago openly undermine the work he had done and imply that he’d helped perpetuate a lie on the British public, and by extension the people who would go in harms way on his command.  A custom of reasonable silence would be very helpful indeed…



Comments

  1. Replies
    1. Humph, I responded to fruit man's comment on the Tier One article. Just in case you find a use for me. Apologies.

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  2. Well no one else is prepared to tell us the truth, someone's got to do it.
    Planning a tier 1 structure that you can't afford inevitably ends up unable to do anything properly.
    The carrier programme is an immense folly.

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    Replies
    1. Your evidence for the UK carrier policy being an immense folly is?
      Your evidence for the vast USN carrier policy being an immense folly is?
      Your evidence for the French, Indian and Chinese carrier policies all being immense follies is?
      Your alternative policy proposal with political, strategic, tactical and financial evidence for it being superior to a carrier policy is?

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    2. That would be a very,very long reply. However in the case of the French its very easy, their carrier is currently in middle of a long and expensive refit which will be followed by a work up.Attack now in the unlikely case that all that was stopping you was this complex and vulnerable drain on their resources.Our only carrier is currently no use to us either and according to the rule of three we will have the same problem.I don't think the Indians and Chinese have anything viable at the moment despite massive expenditure.We have nothing like enough escorts to support a carrier battle group and absorb losses or enough manpower for the ships that we have.
      The alternative is not having a large fleet carriers.
      How about you coming up with a viable mission that would be worth risking?

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    3. Grubbie, whilst we live in a democracy with freedom of speech, it seems to come, in this day and age, with freedom of ignorance. Whilst most rational people accept that major military decisions are taken by military and engineering teams with the relevant qualifications and experience. There are those who posses neither who do not. Whilst most rational observers, would give to those who devout there lives to the service of the nation and in service of engineering excellence, the presumption that they carry out their duties with honesty and integrity. Many of those without either do not.
      One assumes that a rational analysis of the carrier force projection package has been carried out by qualified and experienced professionals from many countries and found to be logical and efficient. However, we live in an age of Trump and therefore logic or rationality are not a requirement for decisions or opinions.
      As to the article in question. I would agree with the gist of the thing, either he was lying then or he is lying now. Obviously Humphrey is too polite to put it in these terms. However, if we subject these things to "rational" analysis, compared to other nations of similar "heft" are armed services budget is bigger than most and in line with our peers (or peer i.e. France), so this eternal winging is neither rational or honest. Not even China gets as much bang for the buck with a budget which is 5x bigger.

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    4. So,you are unable to explain what the carrier's are meant to do ,although apparently there might be a handful of experts with huge brains somewhere who know,but it's far too complicated for them to explain to everyone else?
      The "vast USN carrier policy"is bankrupting the US,but at least achieves the nessicary critical mass to make it viable.

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    5. Not an 'immense folly' at all. SDR1998 emphasised the global role of UK forces and that requires aircraft carriers. Ditto any navy that needs to be able to project force out of area, e.g. the U.S., Russia and France. If someone had suggested abandoning the carriers and just building frigates and attack submarines they would have been laughed out of the room given that the Cold War was over and we had spent the previous decade scrapping them.

      The RN has been hobbled for decades by mini-carriers that were far too small to be effective and offered poor value for money. It made far more sense to build full-size ones than go round in circles reinventing the square wheel. Even a STOVL light fleet carrier would need to be 30-40,000 tons to be credible today, 50-60,000 tons for a mid-size carrier. Put simply, big carriers are far more useful and represent much better value.

      No, the QE class are not perfect but they are the best design the RN could get without spending significantly more. Just over £6 billion for 2 ships represents something of a bargain by today's standards and the final bill would have been less had Labour not foolishly slowed down the build to make short-term savings. We would have bought the F35 in some form anyway with or without the carriers so all-in-all a successful project.

      The carriers are clearly an easy target for 'bee in the bonnet' detractors who have no understanding of the Navy's requirements and what the carriers offer across the full spectrum of operations, whether working alone or with allies. Typically, they appear to be blissfully unaware of far more wasteful projects in defence and indeed elsewhere in government - presumably because they have not been hyped-up ad nausem by the tabloid press and/or do not agitate the bee for some inexplicable reason.

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    6. What are you actually going to use them for?6 billion is just the bare shell.We don't have enough escorts, crows nest isn't really adequate and we can't keep them in continuous service because 2 is not enough and we don't have the manpower.Its just not viable.

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    7. Lots of logical refutation above, with which I agree. I note that Grubbie has not yet explained a policy to achieve what carriers achieve without using carriers but has demanded to know what carriers are for. There are endless possible scenarios not to mention dozens of examples of carrier power from history. But what about this scenario:
      It is 2025 and the NHS has made huge advances using diagnostic artificial intelligence but it can only operate on open architectures and all firewalls have weaknesses. A rogue Middle East state is harbouring terrorist groups that are carrying out cyber attacks on the NHS and people are being killed. As fast as one loophole is plugged the cyber attackers find another and the deaths go on.
      The locations of the cyber attackers are identified by GCHQ and strikes are launched from Cyprus and the UK which temporarily slow down the attacks. However, the cyber attackers move into a heavily populated city and set up operations from hospitals and schools so air strikes cannot be used without causing massive collateral damage.
      HMS Prince of Wales is configured in the helicopter platform role and Special Forces and Royal Marines embarked to raid and destroy the cyber attackers locations without causing collateral damage. The raiding force is lightly equipped and would be overwhelmed by the rogue state's army. Providing protective air cover from Cyprus and the UK is difficult - the required sortie rate and time on task simply cannot be achieved at that distance. HMS Queen Elizabeth operating in the carrier strike role embarks 30 F35B stealth fighters. Operating off the coast, F35Bs provide the necessary air support and the raid is successful.
      Is this a fanciful scenario? We know there are rogue states that hate us. We know there are terrorist groups who wish our people harm. We know cyber warfare is a burgeoning threat. We know the NHS has already been subjected to cyber attacks. We know there are terrorist groups that will deliberately site their weapons close to schools and hospitals. So the scenario could come to pass if sufficient malice and ingenuity is brought to bear. So how are you going to deal with this scenario. Remember that the majority of the world's population live close to the sea so can be impacted by sea power. Remember that the key to success will be aircraft sortie rate and time over target. How will you achieve this without an aircraft carrier close to the area of operations?

      Or you could just let the deaths go on in the NHS, after all this is only an artificial scenario. For now.

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    8. First law of the 21st Century; don't feed the troll.

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  3. Junior staff have been let down by their peers too often in the recent past. Trust has been lost. The MOD 'gagging order' on all MOD workers prevents criticism/ telling truth when in uniform. The MOD remains the only department of state whose professional workforce are prevented from contact with the public unlike police, doctors,teachers and local government. The true material state of the Armed Forces is a disgrace. At present the public are only given the politicians interpretation of capacity & capability. Spare a thought for those who serve without the resources needed to perform.

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  4. I find his comments reasonable.

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  5. Humph, I responded to fruit man's comment on the Tier One article. Just in case you find a use for me. Apologies.

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  6. Often ignored in this debate is the enormous flock of chickens coming home to roost in the form of the very high interest PFI credit card repayments that have been allowed to build up.Wonga is next.

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