What Is a Tier One Military Power And Does It Matter If The UK Isn't One?

What is a ‘Tier One Armed Forces and why do we need them’? A simple question, reportedly reasonably posed by a Prime Minister and Chancellor seeking to understand why the UK needs to spend nearly £40bn per year on defence. It is a fair question to ask of the MOD – why does the UK in 2018 need this ‘Tier One’ armed force capability (which in itself is a truly dreadful phrase) and what benefits does the taxpayer reap from it?

The argument goes that the UK is, along with other permanent members of the UN Security Council one of the few nations able to deploy armed forces in numbers and capability globally at a time and place of their choosing. In reality Humphrey would argue that when you break the other four nations down, outside of the US (the only truly global superpower), Russia has at best a limited capability to deploy at distance away from its own borders, while China may be more capable, but remains focused on a predominantly naval global approach, not mirrored by wider land and airpower deployments – it remains unlikely in the extreme that the PLA would deploy an armoured division in (for example) Africa on operations. France maintains a global reach, but this is arguably as much to protect French global territories as it is a genuinely capable armed force. The French Armed Forces have reach and prestige, but would they do this if the nation did not have its overseas territory to worry about?

The UK is in the curious position of having high end globally deployable armed forces, theoretically capable of fighting in the most intensive theatres of conflict, but also maintaining these almost by an accident of history, with many capabilities and facilities dating back either to the Empire or the Central Front.  Were someone designing the British Armed Forces today, it is highly unlikely that the current model and structures would be adopted. To the eyes of many in Whitehall, while the individual personnel are superb, and immensely valued, the structures and capabilities represent historical legacy and anachronisms that are chronically wasteful.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The MOD has spent decades with a generous budget settlement compared to most Whitehall departments, and a strongly supportive backbench support network. Yet despite this, there is a regular case of special pleading for more money in order maintain the status quo and not reduce the military. But whenever proposals are made to try and make cuts, the cacophony of leaks explaining how mergers, closures and changes would threaten the status of the armed forces as they stand and the UK’s place in the world means these plans are cancelled or amended.

A strong argument could be made that the MOD has spent decades on the edge of institutional failure, propped up by successive Governments who are unwilling to let it fail, but where the organisations inside it are too reluctant to really ask or change their behaviours to move with the times and make the aspirations fit the budget. Perhaps it is this sense that the MOD is continuing to ask for more, without clearly defining ‘why’ is driving the reasonable questioning from No10 & 11 – what is it that means that the UK should continue to maintain the status quo and not look to do things differently?

A glance at the UK’s global commitments and armed forces would suggest that we continue to as a nation aspire to have the influence to be involved in shaping the outcomes of international crises and play a responsible part in the rules based international system. But the threats we face as a nation are changing, as are the ways in which they are dealt with.

The sort of threats that are emerging are not necessarily dealt with by maintaining a ‘balanced globally deployable military’. Do you need an armoured division to react to cyber attacks and fake news? Is the public willing to support the deployment of troops on the ground in response to the Russians moving little green men into a country somewhere in Central Europe? Do we as a nation need to maintain the ability to send tanks and guns half way around the world for exercises with nations that we are never likely to operate with in actual combat deployments?

A fairly hard cynical look at what the UK needs to ensure our national security as a nation would suggest that what is required moving forward is the ability to deter potential aggressors who threaten our integrity as a nation, the ability to contribute meaningful capability to coalition operations which benefit the national interest of the UK, and the ability to use our armed forces as enablers to support the delivery of wider national security goals.

This translates quickly into sustaining a credible deterrence force, which is both nuclear based and also other capabilities such as cyber and the like, where the threat of use would send a clear deterrence message to potential aggressors. At the same time maintenance of a small sustainable force that benefits our interests would seem to be an argument for carriers (operating well in multi-national task groups), special forces and intelligence assets, niche airpower capabilities like strike (e.g storm shadow and brimstone)  plus ISTAR/airlift enablers to support allies operations, plus a small ground force capable of fitting into the framework of wider allied operations.

This force would ensure continued value to our allies, particularly the US, whereby the UK can offer to put in capabilities that complement and enhance operations and ensure the continued flow of wider benefits under agreements like the 5-EYES treaty. In other words, structure our forces to be nakedly transactional in nature – the UK will provide assets to participate globally to get wider benefits, but will not invest in units that do not enhance our standing or access.

This model is based on the idea that the UK is unlikely to ever operate in isolation again. Other than the ridiculous idea that the Falklands are invaded (which as the years go by requires the smoking of ever more potent psychedelic substances to conjure up an invasion scenario), the reality that UK national integrity is threatened to the point where a purely national deployment on the ground abroad will occur without any allied support outside of our home territory is unthinkable.

If we assume all operations are going to be with our allies then the question quickly becomes – why should the UK be a tier one military? Why not invest in niche areas and offer up a strong package of capabilities that people will want to see used? If you are operating in a coalition then the trick is to be able to secure the best posts in the HQ chain to influence campaign planning and execution – offering up a package of ISTAR, airlift and SF, along with highly permissive Rules of Engagement will see nations keen to see the UK participate and maintain influential posts, without the requirement to send tens of thousands of troops.

This philosophy could arguably be seen in the recent strikes on Syria where the UK offered up a transactional bargain – access to UK bases, tanking and ISTAR abilities and niche assets in order to provide an additional participating nation in the coalition and a say in the aims of the strikes.

When you look to this model then it is clear that the RN and the RAF have a fairly positive future ahead of them. The RN likely to move to a model built around the deployment of airpower via the sea, and offering its carrier to support the USN (thus buying influence for wider support), nuclear submarines to support wider missions and a escort force to support UK interests globally. An even more focused military approach would perhaps also choose to put resources into ASW (such as seen in the 1981 defence review) to combat the very real threat of Russian submarines at the expense of a globally deployable escort force. The RAF too offers a range of flexible assets able to support coalition operations and secure top table access. The combination of basing, highly capable aircraft, sensors and weapons makes it a truly valuable player.

The problem question is ‘what do you do with the army’? The public appetite for deployments that involve long drawn out conflicts is simply not there. HERRICK demonstrated that an Army of 100,000 people was very good at creating an inordinately large number of process based staff officer jobs in Bastion which added almost nothing to combat effectiveness outside the wire, and tied up the air transport fleet and huge chunks of defence resources to sustain an operating base that seemingly existed to sustain the operating base.

The challenge with the deployable division idea is that while the Army want it badly as a measure of capability, it is hard to see what benefits it brings the UK beyond putting troops on the ground for 6 months and breaking the Army arms plot in the process.  Once it has deployed, it cannot quickly be redeployed, hence it is more of a deterrent one must hope is never tested for use as to do so would leave the army exposed.

The question ‘why tier one’ perhaps cuts to the bone of the existential question about the role of the British Army, and whether it is needed in the numbers that it is, or  the range of capabilities that it has. One must ask whether if we lost the sacred cow that is the deployable division, and instead invested in an ability to deploy a small but well equipped brigade at best, if the UK operational effectiveness and influence would actually be harmed, or if it would make no real difference?

In a world where the concept either seems to be ‘deployable division’ or ‘strategic raiding’ one senses that the public would not tolerate either outcome. A deployable division represents troops on the ground, and potential casualties against a peer nation likely to quickly exceed TELIC or HERRICK in the name of a multi-national entanglement that would see the British Army committed to hold ground and be prepared to die valiantly for a corner of Eastern Europe. Strategic raiding seems to represent a concept that the UK would be willing to put small parties ashore in random nations to inflict damage and withdraw, apparently then sailing on without then ending up at war with said nation.

In a world where Parliament is now seemingly consulted at every opportunity for the use of UK troops, it is hard to see where strategic raiding could occur without the element of surprise being reduced, and it is also hard to see public acceptance of the likely causalties that such an operation would bring about (if you are sending a small raiding party, you are not by definition going to be deploying with the wider protective top cover bubble that other operations had). Is there really public appetite for this sort of commando raid or parachute attack, knowing that it would essentially start a war and possibly inflict huge UK casualties?

The challenge for the UK is to define what it is to be a ‘Tier One’ military power – because at present in isolation the UK seems to be paying a large bill for a capability that won’t necessarily meet the requirements of the 21^st century. But to make the changes necessary to modernise and adapt is likely to cause political problems and be unsustainable – leaving the armed forces in the worst of both worlds – over budget for a force structure that doesn’t make sense, while unable to coherently restructure to face future threats.

A better question is ‘is the UK a tier one power’ – which if you look at the range of levers of power including influence, diplomatic reach, engagement opportunities, security agreements, aid budgets and soft power, coupled with military capability, is a very different question indeed. Arguably the most effective UK military deployment in the last couple of years was the response to Hurricane Irma - and if this is the biggest threat likely to face UK national interests, then is this road we need to go down - investment in plant, engineering and logistics capability and not high end weapon systems?

UK interests in the world often do not require the deployment of a carrier battle group to be protected – the investment of a small embassy reopening, an additional bit of bilateral aid funding and support for a nations campaign to lead a multi-national organisation may be enough to secure the sort of influence and support to see policy changes that give the UK the outcomes it desires.

The aid budget, much maligned by fans of defence, is an example where the investment of resources provides a suite of tools to influence and shape how other nations work with the UK – it is perhaps fair to suggest that more governments are directly influenced by UK aid being available as a carrot than they are by the theoretical existence of a UK carrier battle group which is on the other side of the world as a stick.

The question that needs to be asked of the UK is whether we as a nation want to continue to pay the unaffordable price of being a ‘Tier One military power’ without its capabilities necessarily being of value or if we want to be a highly effective military power that matters because of its valuable capabilities. One only has to look at nations like Denmark, whose investment in niche assets and specialist areas has ensured that the Danes are keenly sought after international partners who punch above their theoretical weight as a result. This debate may hurt the pride of those who desire a military that is vast and mighty, but it needs to be had to ensure that we have a military which is right for the world we live in.

It will be interesting to see how the UK MOD responds to the question of ‘why do we need to be a tier one power’ and whether they can justify their answer or not…