OPERATION SHARPSHOOTER - A very public secret mission.

In February 1996 a Russian VICTOR III nuclear submarine entered the Norwegian Sea on an unknown mission. The Cold War may have ended, but NATO remained alert to any potentially hostile submarine in its waters. Tracked by the Norwegians, the VICTOR began moving towards UK waters, and as a result the decision was taken to commence OPERATION SHARPSHOOTER.

The goal of the operation was to allow the UK to monitor and covertly track the submarine to understand its presence and mission and gather invaluable intelligence on the vessel without giving away the British presence. Yet in a most remarkable turn of events, this was a mission that ended with the Royal Navy embarking personnel onboard the VICTOR at sea…

Crown Copyright

OP SHARPSHOOTER was like previous operations carried out over many years to monitor and track the Russians. In 1995 alone, Operations SYDNEY, PORRINGER and PADBURY were mounted for similar reasons – to find, track and monitor the submarine and understand its mission.

The mission began in February when the Integrated Underwater Surveillance System (IUSS) identified the target – this was the successor to SOSUS and provided NATO with the ability to identify and track naval vessels of interest. The Royal Navy identified that the submarine was an “elusive target” but IUSS was able to hold “intermittent contact” throughout the operation.

As the VICTOR moved closer to UK waters, the decision was taken to deploy Nimrod patrol aircraft to monitor and track its deployment – working closely with the IUSS data, the RAF played a key role in tracking the submarine. This was a classic task for Nimrod, which spent many decades operating across the Atlantic finding and detecting Soviet SSNs.

The decision was also taken to deploy a Royal Navy SSN to covertly monitor the situation – in this case HMS TRENCHANT was taken off her planned programme to covertly deploy into a position where working with IUSS and the RAF, she could monitor the situation. By all accounts the Russian boat was competently operated, making it hard to identify and track – despite this, TRENCHANT reported that she had been able to covertly track the Russian vessel on at least two occasions.

Due to wider programme challenges, the decision was taken to pull her off task and replace her with her sister ship HMS TALENT, as well as the Type 22C and Type 23 frigates HMS CAMPBELTOWN and MONMOUTH deployed. These escorts had Towed Array sonar, and were the pinnacle of British cold war ASW platforms – highly capable and designed to find and kill Soviet submarines in the third Battle of the Atlantic. Again the VICTOR was hard to find, and only MONMOUTH reported tracking her, holding a “brief contact”.

HMS TRENCHANT Crown Copyright

The mission continued throughout February, with the Royal Navy and RAF working hard to covertly track the VICTOR, without compromising their own position. It was a classic throwback to cold war era ‘cat and mouse’ games between the hunter and the hunted. Normally the VICTOR would have departed the area, or completed its mission, enabling the British units to come off task, but without either side ever setting an eye on each other. A secret mission conducted far from land and without a word exchanged between the two sides.

All this changed on 29 February when the Russian Embassy urgently contacted the MOD to ask for help. A crewman onboard the VICTOR was seriously ill and urgently required medical assistance – could the Royal Navy help? There is an ancient and time honoured tradition that ensures sailors render aid to sailors, regardless of nation or politics. It was agreed that yes, the UK would come to the help of the Russian sailor.

An RAF Nimrod from 201Sqn was dispatched to the location given by the Embassy, encountering the submarine some 90 miles northwest of Cape Wrath. At the same time the Type 42 destroyer HMS GLASGOW, participating in a Joint Maritime Course (JMC), which was a major UK led naval exercise off the west coast of Scotland was tasked with conducting a Search & Rescue operation.

GLASGOW was sent with all due haste to an agreed rendezvous point, arriving at 1520 in the afternoon of the 29^th. There was some confusion  at this stage, with the GLASGOW arriving at coordinates given by the Russians, yet the VICTOR was nowhere to be seen. The RAF Nimrod began a surface search, perhaps the most unusual search that the Nimrod ever had to carry out for a Russian submarine, and in turn found the vessel surfaced some 12 miles from the agreed location.  This was a remarkable turn of events – for weeks the RN had been spending long hours trying to find and then covertly stalking this submarine, taking every effort not to hint at their presence. Suddenly she was on the surface and waiting to receive help from the Royal Navy.

With the location confirmed, GLASGOW deployed her Lynx helicopter, which closed with the VICTOR and transferred a winchman and the PO Medical Assistant onto the deck. This was probably the first time that Royal Navy crew had ever joined a Russian nuclear submarine at sea. The intent was to offer medical assistance and if needs be evacuate the patient for more medical help ashore.

It was discovered that the Russian sailor was suffering from serious complications with his appendix – although the POMA was surprised to note that “the Russian medical officer had operated on the patient 24 hours earlier, but had not removed the appendix”. The decision was taken to evacuate the sailor, who was then transferred to the Lynx and from there via Sea King to the Western Isles, where an operation was carried out to treat an abscess on his appendix.

The patient made a swift recovery, supported by an RAF linguist who spoke Russian, and who provided translation services until the Russian embassy could dispatch a member of staff to support the sailor.

The sense from the Royal Navy was that this was a genuinely successful operation: “The regular and cordial communications between GLASGOW, the Nimrod and the submarine gave the impression that the Russians were very grateful for our assistance.”

During this period OP SHARPSHOOTER was suspended, however once the mercy mission was complete, the operation resumed. The challenge for the British was what was the purpose of the Russian deployment? In a note to Ministers, the MOD stated:

“The VICTOR III’s intentions are not known but possibilities include waiting to join up with the KUZNETZOV group returning from the Mediterranean (due out in the first week of March); conducting an ASW patrol to the west of the UK; returning north to conduct surveillance of Exercise BATTLE GRIFFIN off the Norwegian Coast; or, conducting surveillance of JMC 961. Operation SHARPSHOOTER recommenced shortly after the VICTOR III dived.”

The simple fact was that the UK wasn’t clear on what the VICTOR was up to, or where she would go next. Much like the Royal Navy and other NATO nations monitored Soviet exercises during the Cold War, it was likely that the Russians were doing the same thing, attempting to gain intelligence collection opportunities while remaining undetected.

One of the notable points of concern for the MOD was the media coverage of the event – it turns out that a journalist had been covertly monitoring RAF emergency channels including the conversations between the Nimrod and UK stations and had “drawn unhelpful conclusions”. The story of concern is likely to have been in the Herald, and it can still be viewed online.

“But even in the circumstances of the medical emergency, the Russians tried to hide the fact that they were on an intelligence-gathering mission. The submarine gave co-ordinates for a rendezvous 90 miles north of the Isle of Lewis.

It then slipped away from the exercise it had been shadowing undetected for several days and headed out of the area at high speed, taking the patient almost 70 miles away from his rescuers before surfacing.

However, its 30-knot burst of speed allowed it to be picked up and tracked by sonar dropped from an RAF Nimrod maritime surveillance aircraft scrambled from RAF Kinloss. Before that, it had evaded helicopter and other sonar sweeps.”

HMS MONMOUTH & TRENCHANT Crown Copyright

The end results of OP SHARPSHOOTER are not known, although it doubtless provided valuable information. What was notable though is the response from the Russians to the Royal Navy, who seemed to be genuinely grateful for their support.

On the 4^th of March 1996, the Russian CINC Admiral Gromov chaired a meeting in Moscow, at an event to mark the 300^th anniversary of the Russian Navy. It was attended by foreign attaches, senior Russian officers and TV crews. Before it began, Gromov departed from the planned script to brief all present about the rescue, and to make a very public declaration of thanks to the Royal Navy for its help.

In a note from the Naval Attache to London, it was stated that:

“This was a very high profile gesture at a very public gathering. after the briefing NA gave a short tv interview giving a bulletin on the patient’s condition received from the hospital orally before. during discussion with RNS personnel after the meeting it became apparent that it had been an agonising decision and the patient which accounts for the frustrations experienced by all those trying to help. clearly Gromov decision to make the best of it, remarking after handing over the letter that he was “not sure that we would continue to work together to preserve safety and security on the seas unquote”.

In other words, the decision to save the young sailors life was taken at the highest levels, but also reflected the operational concerns of the Russian Navy. Should they save a sailor, or preserve the operational security of their mission. This may reflect why the VICTOR appeared where she shouldn’t have been and there was confusion about the actual rendezvous location – it would have been akin to the RN surfacing an SSN off Murmansk and asking for Russian assistance.

The NA went on to note that:

“The RN is already held in the highest esteem by the Russians. events like this, handled in such an altruistic and capable manner, can only reinforce this regard. bravo zulu to all concerned”.

In the days that followed the Russians sent a formal note to the 1^st Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jock Slater from Admiral Gromov thanking the UK for its help. Given that only a few years previously the Russian and Royal Navy were mutually prepared to go to war against each other, it marks a remarkable change of tone:

“Dear Admiral

On behalf of the Navy and myself I would like to express sincere gratitude for the help given by the Royal Navy when saving the life of the Russian sailor-submariner.

The rescue operation conducted by the British military sailors proves once again the truth that the sea does not separate, but unites our sailors and our Navies.

I would like to take this opportunity to send our gratitude to the Commanders and crews of the destroyer “GLASGOW” and the helicopter “Sea Hawk” for the rescue operation.

I would like to express hope that we will always find mutual understanding in the future.

Admiral, I would like to wish you success in your important work, good health and prosperity.”

What makes this letter and wider situation even more extraordinary is that in the weeks prior, the Russians had been making formal complaints to the UK about how the RAF Nimrods had been harassing the ADMIRAL KUZNETZOV as she transited the Channel. Despite this, the Russians were willing to risk it all for one of their sailors, which speaks to how much better the Anglo-Russian relations were in the mid 1990s than they are today.

The sailor is known to have made a full recovery, while the VICTOR 3, known as the ‘TAMBOV’ remains in service to this day. The Russian account of the story is rather different to the British version – with one website stating:

“During NATO naval exercises, after a successful simulation of enemy detection, an undetected Russian submarine contacted NATO ships, asking for help. Soon, in the middle of the NATO formation, a submarine surfaced, identified by British sailors as a Project 971 Shchuka-B. One of the crew members needed indeed urgent medical care due to peritonitis, after an appendectomy. The submariner was taken to the British destroyer HMS Glasgow, and from there, flown to the nearest hospital by a Westland Lynx. The British press covered this, the Times noted that it was a demonstration of the VICTOR III stealth as none of the NATO ship was able to detect her prior to surfacing, but it was mis-identified as a Shchuka-B.”

Finally, one of the most remarkable parts of the story is that the rescue attempt was filmed by the Russians. There is a 3 minute film available on the internet, which was taken by Russian crew showing the approach of HMS GLASGOWs Lynx, the discussions with the medics and the evacuation of the crewman. Of note is later footage which seems to show potentially a Type 22C, through what could be the VICTORs periscope. While this cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the footage does appear to be genuine and is a remarkable visual record of a most unusual encounter between the two navies during OPERATION SHARPSHOOTER.