OP TOUCAN & CLOVER - How the UK Prepared for War With Colonel Gadaffi...

 

On 15 April 1986 the United States launched air strikes on Libya intended to punish the Gaddafi regime for its support of terrorism. Dozens of F111 bombers, A6 intruders and F18s launched from the UK and US Navy aircraft carriers carried out strikes across the country, damaging the air defence network and targeting regime facilities. The Libyans threatened a response against those deemed responsible for the attack, although nothing meaningful occurred.

What is not realised is that in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the British Government was so concerned about the risk to UK interests in the Mediterranean region, that covert plans were put in place to defend Gibraltar and Cyprus from Libyan attack. This is the untold story of the MOD response, known as OP TOUCAN and OP CLOVER, and how the UK prepared for conflict with Libya in 1986.

The British strategic position in the Med during the 1980s was built around two core locations in Cyprus and Gibraltar. The Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) in Cyprus, territory retained by the UK after independence and which housed several thousand British Army personnel and a major air base (RAF Akrotiri). The RAF base was a key hub for British operations across the Middle East, and also housed  USAF U2 detachments for recce missions across the region. It was (and arguably still is) a major strategic hub for both British and American interests in a region short on friendly partners.

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Gibraltar has been under British control for centuries, being used as a major naval base and unsinkable guardian to stand watch over the entrance to the Med. With significant naval, air and land forces based there, both to protect the territory from Spanish attack (still seen as a remote but credible threat in 1985) and also support wider British operations, ‘The Rock’ was one of the most critical strategic assets available to the UK.

Between the two locations, the UK can exert significant strategic influence across the region, using the naval base, airfields and intelligence apparatus to monitor developments and support a wide range of military operations in support of both British and NATO interests. This makes them prime targets in wartime for any regional opponent.

Uniquely among NATO, only the British government had supported the US mission, while the French and Spanish closed their airspace to the US aircraft operating from British bases which had facilitated the strikes. The UK was particularly concerned then that it would be seen as a legitimate target for response by Libyan forces in the aftermath of the US operation, and that Cyprus and Gibraltar would be the most likely targets for any Libyan response.

On 16 April the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) produced a threat assessment on the potential air threat posed by the Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF) against both territories. It assessed that, on paper at least, the Libyans possessed TU22 BLINDER bombers, Mig 25 FOXBAT and French Mirage V jets that had the theoretical range and ability to carry out an air attack Cyprus, and (in the case of the BLINDER) Gibraltar.

Whether they could achieve this or not was questionable, the DIS noted that while the Soviet Union had previously carried out maintenance on the BLINDER force, this was now being done by Libyans. It stated though: “LAAF crews have, in the past, refused to fly them when serviced by Libyan crews”!

The capabilities of the pilots were not considered up to much either, with the DIS noting that only two crews were capable of firing long range missiles and that: “the BLINDERS have a poor operational record in Chad and Sudan, frequently getting lost and with little or no night attack capability”. At best the LAAF would be able to generate four BLINDER aircraft, supported by four FOXBAT and five MIRAGE to carry out any strikes.

The most likely target was assessed to be RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, on the grounds that It was relatively easy to locate, and a clear British interest. The expectation was that the BLINDERS could deliver up to 9 tonnes of free fall bombs each, or some combination of long-range missiles. The FOXBATs would be able to fly at high altitude, potentially delivering an inaccurate iron bomb, while the MIRAGE would fly a hi-low-hi attack profile using iron bombs and then fly to Syria to refuel.

Gibraltar was assessed to be a less likely target, due to the range, difficulty of finding the site and the challenges of recovery afterwards, with no friendly bases nearby. Only the BLINDER force could carry out the mission. It was assessed that any air attack on Gibraltar would breach Spanish airspace and likely focus on targeting the centre line of the runway at RAF Gibraltar.

On the more positive side, the DIS noted that “though an attack on Cyprus or Gibraltar is possible, it is the DIS and DIA view that whilst such an attack cannot be ruled out, it is very unlikely”.

The challenge for the MOD was being ready to defend against any Libyan response, either in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, or in the weeks that followed. Given the Gaddaffi regimes track record of unpredictable terrorist attacks, and use of military force, it was reasonable to assume that both Gibraltar and Cyprus would be targets for a revenge attack. But, how to protect them?

In Cyprus the RAF fortuitously had a squadron of 9 F4 Phantom aircraft, used for air-defence of the UK conducting armament training camps. On 16 April the decision was taken to disperse the force around the airbase, with two aircraft fuelled and armed on QRA duties and held at ‘RS10’ (essentially short notice readiness to launch) in the event of any air defence concerns.

By chance a Nimrod R SIGINT platform was on the island, but remained committed to wider missions, while the Red Arrows and Army Falcon Parachute display team, both on detachment, were unceremoniously dispatched home!

Meanwhile in Gibraltar there was no RAF fighter presence, but a not insignificant naval presence happened to be visiting. The Type 42 destroyer HMS EXETER, and the Leander class frigate HMS ARGONAUT were both visiting the port and at an hours’ notice for sea. Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, of Falklands Task Force fame and now Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) noted that while having a Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile capable vessel was useful, in reality: “this is likely to cover response to hostile action only. Hostile intent is not practicable since there is no means of identifying potential hostile aircraft”. Having a Type 42 able to shoot down BLINDER bombers though, even after the attack was better than nothing at all.

RAF Akrotiri - Crown Copyright

In the same memo the Admiral also noted that the threat to Gibraltar wasn’t just from the air. There was a real concern that the Libyans would attempt to carry out terrorist attacks using sympathisers for the Libyan cause. Woodward noted that: “there are various terrorist organisations in Spain which have explosives and are linked to Libya. Gibraltar also has a large North African Arab population and regular ferry links to Morrocco. The latest assessment (today) considers the threat to UK bases overseas higher than that to the UK, where it is higher than it has ever been”.

To address this, the Governor of Gibraltar chose to increase the security alert state, and put in place increased surveillance of ports and the airport. They chose not, at this point to recall the Army garrison infantry company that was on Adventure Training in Portugal or make use of the TA infantry company that was covering them.

By the end of 16^th April then it was clear that the UK had some short-term capability in place to meet any immediate Libyan response. But it was clear that this wasn’t sustainable in the medium term – if the Libyans were going to strike back, the UK had to be ready for any eventuality. This meant urgent reinforcements would be needed – but what would they be?

The MOD makes all sorts of plans to counter just about any contingency from covering industrial strikes to launching nuclear strikes. In 1986 plans existed to dispatch reinforcements to both Gibraltar and Cyprus to meet a range of different scenarios. In Cyprus, the decision was taken on the 16^th to advance the ‘notice to move’ (e.g. time to commence the operation) to 12 hours for OP JUVENILE, the planned reinforcement operation for Strike Command to dispatch up to 8 Rapier SAM battery units to the island to provide effective short range air defence. The Rapier had proved its worth during the 1982 Falklands War as a highly effective anti-aircraft platform, and the deployment of 8 fire units would be likely to overwhelm any incoming Libyan attack on Akrotiri.

Meanwhile in Gibraltar the MOD started to look for ways to improve the air defences in this highly complex space. It recognised that EXETER provided some good capability but ideally wanted to see more of the 42/22 combination that had proven so effective in the Falklands, whereby a Type 42 and 22 with Sea Dart and Sea Wolf respectively would operate closely, providing a mutually beneficial air defence operation.

HMS SOUTHAMPTON and HMS BRAZEN were working up for deployment to the Gulf and were 48hrs sailing away, while HMS MANCHESTER and HMS BEAVER were en route for Venezuela, but could be back in Gibraltar within 48hrs too. This would mean that within 2 days of the attacks occurring, no less than 6 Royal Navy escort ships, including 3 destroyers would be providing air defence for Gibraltar.  More widely the MOD sought to deploy four fighter jets (ideally Phantom) and bring forward the readiness of four more Rapier batteries to enhance air defences in the area.

The most controversial proposal was that at a time when bilateral relations with Spain over the issue of Gibraltar (the border had only recently reopened following years of Spanish closure), perhaps this was the time to talk to Spain about sharing responsibility for air defence. The MOD noted that:

“Any reinforcement of Gibraltar to meet the AD threat would have to be explained to the Spanish. As NATO partners, and since their airspace is equally at risk they should be understanding. They also may consider an attack on Gibraltar as an attack on Spain. Having a common interest in defending the Rock they may wish to use their  HAWK/NIKE missiles in defence of Gibraltar; in this case coordination with UK forces would be essential. FCO has been invited to approach the Spanish government to establish their view on use of their AD missiles in the common defence of Gibraltar, however initial FCO reaction is that this would cause difficulties…”

It is quite an incredible thing to contemplate that the MOD seriously considered asking Spain to share in the joint air defence of Gibraltar against Libyan bombers in 1986. The chances of Spain agreeing to this request would seem minimal. It also highlights the difficulty the UK faced, any reinforcement of Gibraltar, no matter how legitimate, would cause tensions to increase with the Spanish Government, keenly alert to any perceived rise in British military presence.

In addition to the air threat, the UK also began planning for additional ground troops to be sent to Gibraltar to support the ‘Internal Security’ situation, in the event of terrorist attacks occurring on the ground. This included plans to deploy the resident infantry Battalion, dispatch reinforcements from the UK and potentially deploy the SAS on counter terrorism duties.

Although perceived as a slow-moving ponderous organisation, in a genuine crisis the MOD can move very fast indeed. By the evening of 16 April Minister of State for the Armed Forces (MINAF) John Stanley MPs office wrote to the FCO informing them that four Phantoms and 8 rapier fire units were to be deployed to Gibraltar, while a further four Rapiers were to be sent to Cyprus. Of note, the speed of deployment was so fast that these assets were being sent before the Rules of Engagement were ready for them.

While ROE may sound a dry legalistic task, they are perhaps the most critical part of any operation. They define the scenarios and escalation measures necessary, and in turn the circumstances when lethal force can be employed legally by the military. The decision was taken that the ROE for Gibraltar and Cyprus (CLOVER and TOUCAN) would be identical.

In broad terms it was agreed that Libyan aircraft approaching Gibraltar would be positively identified, then shadowed, in an attempt to get them to change course – just because it looked dodgy doesn’t mean you can start a war and shoot them down. This would be followed by a burst of fire intended to signal intentions and get them to change course.

The aircraft could only be attacked if they demonstrated hostile intent towards Gibraltar or Cyprus. This was taken to mean:

An engagement can be conducted in the following circumstances:

a. in individual self-defence.

b. if a hostile act has been committed by the Libyan combat aircraft. a hostile act is defined as an attack on UK forces or Gibraltar.

c. if hostile intent is clearly demonstrated by a Libyan aircraft opening its bomb bay while on a direct track for Gibraltar and within 15 nautical miles of Gibraltar territorial airspace.

Similar rules applied to fighters, Rapier and surface ships, and applied to all military units within 50 miles of Gibraltar and Cyprus. The ROE profile was agreed at the very highest levels of the Government with the PM, Attorney General and Ministers all signing off on them, although MIN(AF) did seek clarification on the ROE around Sea Dart, noting:

“it is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which there could be a conflict, in Gibraltar in particular, between a risk to a civilian aircraft and the use of Sea Dart in self defence. He assumes that we would put an RN ship at risk rather than risking the loss of a civil aircraft but would be grateful for confirmation of this.”

On 17 April the Foreign Secretary identified a potential problem with these ROE – while they made sense to tackle the Libyan threat, there was a real problem around Gibraltar where the Spanish military often refused to engage with British aircraft. In a scenario where jets that couldn’t be identified could be potentially shot down, this was a recipe for disaster. What made things even more complex was that that week after, the King of Spain was due to pay his first official State Visit to the UK, the first by a Spanish monarch since 1905. Clearly things wouldn’t get off to a good start if the UK was busy shooting down recalcitrant Spanish fighter jets.

In theory the solution would have been to coordinate with the Spanish, but the policy dilemma here was that this opened the door to Spain claiming that it would expect to be consulted on future Gibraltar security issues – it would mark a dangerous precedent for future scenarios. In true diplomatic fashion the Foreign Secretary asked that:

“in order to reduce the risk of accidents, it would be desirable if the military authorities in Gibraltar could exchange information at a working level with their Spanish opposite numbers on aircraft sorties. In doing this, it would be important to avoid any impressions that we were seeking Spanish agreement to our defensive measures or asking them to contribute to the defence of Gibraltar.”!

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With the reinforcements in place, the next challenge was to work out what to say to reassure the public. There was concern in MOD and FCO when the Governor of Gibraltar pushed heavily for strong public statements explaining what was going on, and the question arose of the media handling for the whole event.

The Governor wanted to talk about the ‘reinforcement of Gibraltars air defences’, the FCO wanted to provide some generic talking points to the Spanish Government (which it noted had already complained about the deployment) and the MOD wanted to say as little as possible. The end response was a masterpiece of not saying very much at all:

“As part of our general precautions in the light of the continuing tension in the Mediterranean, it has been decided to strengthen the air defences of Gibraltar. This is purely a sensible defensive measure in the face of the threat to British interests worldwide. There is no reason to think that Gibraltar is especially at risk. Actions to guard against possible terrorist acts have already been taken.”

Things settled into an operational routine, as the initial rush of deployments abated and the practicalities of day to day ops got underway. By the 22^nd there were 4 Phantoms and 8 Rapier launching stations operational in Gibraltar, while HMS EXETER was providing maritime air defence cover. Meanwhile in Cyprus to cover a radar gap, the RAF had dispatched a Shackleton to provide additional AEW cover, supporting the by then 9 Phantoms and multiple Rapier units deployed across the airfield.

These forces proved invaluable when the Royal Yacht HMY BRITANNIA entered the Med on her return home after completing a Suez transit. Although the risks were considered low, the RAF provided Shackleton and Phantom air cover during her daylight transit (the night risk being non-existent), while the LEANDER class frigate HMS AURORA provided a close in escort from west of Crete to the Messina Straits, before HMS SOUTHAMPTON and BRAZEN escorted her through the Med to Gibraltar.

This probably represents the only time that BRITANNIA was escorted by RAF fighters and Royal Navy warships ready for action, and with ROE in place to permit the use of lethal force to protect against Libyan air attack. This marks an unexpected end to a memorable deployment in which BRITANNIA had already participated in evacuations from Yemen, making this one of her most notable deployments.

By the end of April it was becoming apparent that the chances of a revenge attack were dropping daily. There was minor concern that the Libyans would use a merchant ship to use mines near Gibraltar, based on prior intelligence that a Libyan flagged RORO ferry had done this in the Red Sea in 1984, and her sister ship was operating in the Med. This was sufficient to warrant the issue of revised ROE permitting HMS EXETER to carry out aggressive acts against any Merchant vessel that looked to be conducting minelaying.

On 30 April the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) wrote to Ministers advising that the threat was seen as sufficiently reduced so as to permit withdrawing the reinforcements. He highlighted the impact the continued deployment would have, for example reducing Rapier coverage in Belize, the Falklands and USAF bases in the UK. The use of EXETER to provide AAW cover would impact on wider fleet trials programmes, while the longer the forces remained deployed, the harder the impact on long term operational programmes.

The big difficulty was sequencing the return correctly – there was real concern that the RAF airlift wasn’t sufficient to do it all in one go, and it meant a complex sequencing of activity across the Med with C130s and other aircraft to move people home. It served as a reminder that recovery is as important as deployment, and planning to get people back takes a lot of careful sequencing and work to prevent breaking the force. In this case, CDS sought, and obtained Prime Ministerial approval to return the forces over May, with the Rapiers being first to go, then EXETER and finally the Phantoms from Gibraltar, while the Cyprus units remained deployed for the summer training season.

By mid-May the withdrawal was well underway, and although ROE remained in place in the unlikely event of being required, the crisis wound down. A final assessment by the DIS summed up the situation:

“The DIS assess that Qadhafi's threats are primarily rhetoric for internal consumption. The capability of the Libyan Arab Air Force has not been enhanced, and it would find the task of attacking Cyprus very difficult. Gibraltar represents an even more difficult target. Phantoms will be operating from Cyprus throughout the Summer, and those in Gibraltar will be there until the end of the month. The capability of the Libyan Navy to attack either base remains negligible. The DIS view continues to be that the major threat to the bases in Cyprus and Gibraltar comes from terrorism.”

The story of OP CLOVER and TOUCAN represents a forgotten chapter of Cold War history, testament to the ability of the UK to mount, at no-notice, a tri-service operation involving air defence fighters, SAM batteries and multiple naval vessels to provide air defence to British sovereign territory.

It was a complicated task to deliver, made more difficult by the complexities of allied operations, the presence of 6^th Fleet and the inability to talk easily to it, the challenges of Spanish policy towards Gibraltar and trying not to shoot down a Spanish jet before a State visit, and of course, preventing the Royal Yacht from being sunk by the Libyans.

While it is all but forgotten today, these operations deserve more attention as an example of the sort of global capability that the UK once possessed, and a reminder that when they need to, the armed forces can move very quickly indeed.