"A Fine Tribute to One of Our Few" - OPERATION BACTON

 

In September 1991British hostage and WW2 RAF veteran Jackie Mann was released by his captors in Beirut and taken to Damascus. There he was reunited with his wife, before being flown by RAF VC10 to Lyneham to return to civilian life. With this flight, one of the final missions of OPERATION BACTON was completed. This short blog covers this relatively unknown RAF contribution to British history.

Throughout the 1980s a number of hostages were taken by militia organisations in Lebanon. The hugely complex international politics of the time meant that westerners were seen as attractive targets for kidnapping, ransom and being held to achieve political goals by their captors. Some escaped, others were murdered, while more were kept in hideous conditions pending eventual release.

The British government accepted that when released, it was vital to return these individuals as quickly as possible to safety in the UK. It also knew they would be vulnerable, potentially extremely unwell and in urgent need of assistance. It also knew that release would often come at short notice, potentially in a range of locations and require a delicate diplomatic dance to be delivered – potentially in countries where the UK did not have a consistent diplomatic presence.

To resolve this, in 1988 Operation BACTON was created – a cross government effort led by the RAF to provide a short notice airlift to retrieve a hostage and return them to the UK as quickly and safely as possible and with the appropriate support required.

Crown Copyright

The plan called for 4 different options to recover the hostages depending on where they were released. The most dramatic option was for the recovery of hostages at no notice from Beirut, where they may have been released unexpectedly. In those circumstances, the risk to their safety was high, and it was vital that they were recovered as quickly as possible.

The ’worst case’ scenario for BACTON called for the urgent dispatch of Wessex helicopters from 84 Sqn based at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, where they would fly as quickly as possible to Beirut to find and recover the hostage and return them to Cyprus. This party would probably be 5 strong, and potentially armed, and would allow the urgent recovery of the hostage.  

A second scenario called for a more sedate option whereby the release was pre-agreed, and the time known. In those circumstances, 84 Sqn was dedicated to flying to Beirut to collect the former hostage, but it would be a less urgent response.

In either case, the challenge was getting the hostage back from Cyprus to the UK. There was huge interest in these events, with a significant media presence expected. One of the big challenges facing planners was how to get the hostage home while still providing the much-needed photoshoot for the press?

The MOD felt two scenarios were likely – either the hostage would move at pace from the helicopter to the aircraft and then depart Cyprus, or they would need to spend time at the British military hospital on the island. In those circumstances departure would be delayed until they were fit to travel.

Both would call for a press photoshoot, which in turn would be challenging to manage – dozens of media organisations wanted to be present, and had high hopes of getting a shot of the hostages, and ideally a statement. The MOD found one of the hardest parts of planning the operation was getting the arrangements for the press right – to give them the news they craved while also not hurting a very disorientated hostage.

Returning from Cyprus would be straightforward, as a route regularly flown by RAF crews and where the VC10 and C130 had enough range to make the flight in under 6 hours. But the other two release options were more challenging.

The MOD was concerned that given the complexity of the Middle East, a planned release could occur from either Damascus in Syria, or Tehran in Iran. In either case this was not a good outcome for the UK, which had non-existent diplomatic and defence relationships with the UK.

In both cases it was agreed that the RAF would dispatch a VC10 to the respective nations, equipped with stretchers, carrying a spare crew, family members and diplomats and flying an unfamiliar route to each nation. The complexity of the operation was high, and given the risks, it was decided that an RAF Wing Commander would act as force commander to prevent the medics and others being overwhelmed by the challenges they faced, which could include logistic, diplomatic and other hurdles.

The potential for risk was high – if the VC10 arrived in Tehran, it would have been probably the first RAF flight since the Iranian Revolution to enter Iran. There was real concern that the media interest in the flight and the reputational risk was high – RAF Strike Command noted when planning the operation:

“As those options requiring the use of VC10 aircraft for recovery involve the use of airports not normally visited by the VC10 and we have no idea of what, if any, engineering facilities they have, we suggest that some ground engineering personnel and a modicum of spares be carried. I would not like to explain to the world press why we couldn't fly the hostages home if the aircraft became unserviceable, when with a little foresight we could have carried some spares just in case! Two ground engineers, a towbar and a full ranger pack would fit the bill.”

The idea of a VC10 ‘going tech’ on the runway at Tehran airport in front of the worlds media would be, at best, a PR disaster for the RAF!

Crown Copyright

Thankfully the Tehran options were not required, although BACTON was updated throughout the 1980s and into 1991. There the lessons of the managing of the release of POWs from the Gulf War was taken onboard, which included refinement of the plans handling to make it better reflect the challenges of looking after people released from Captivity.

The final reference to OP BACTON came when it was triggered for the release of Jackie Mann, who was released in 1991 and taken to Damascus, from where he was flown to RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire. There were some unique challenges with this flight for the RAF including the fact that his wife wanted to bring their poodle along for the flight – which caused the MOD to issue a rather remarkable signal to RAF units:

“We have been asked to provide airborne canine carrying facilities for Mrs Manns Poodle (exclam) (!) in the event of Op BACTON being executed. Stations are requested to identify such facilities and earmark them for short-notice use should they required”.

The Op Order was amended in handwriting to note that this would require an RAF Police dog kennel to be included in the cargo for the aircraft for the “return of the mutt”!

The operation stood down when the last hostages were released – today it remains a nearly forgotten part of RAF history. But its lessons are critical – it reminds us of the importance of strategic airlift, and the ability to move airframes at pace to respond to events. Media management and getting the balance right between looking after people and getting the right shot is also crucial, while having the right balance of medics, spares and managers to handle the potential for a plane to break down in Tehran is vital. Perhaps most importantly, it illustrates the importance of RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, as an invaluable unsinkable aircraft carrier for British national interests in the Middle East.

On 26 Sep 1991 Jackie Mann returned to the UK at RAF Lyneham as a Spitfire, similar to that which he flew in the war, flew overhead, and prompting a congratulatory signal from the Chief of the Air Staff to those involved noting as a sign off “It was a fine tribute to one of our Few”…