The Saga of Norway and the Type 26

 

Media reports suggest that the Royal Norwegian Navy may purchase some Type 26 frigates from the UK as part of a wider increase in defence spending. Norway has decided to grow their defence budget and firmly committed sufficient spending to double it in coming years. This will enable the acquisition of additional frigates in the late 2020s and early 2030s to tackle the potential submarine threat from Russia. This is both good news and also poses an interesting challenge as the Royal Navy may be asked to sell one of the hulls under construction direct to Norway to ensure a vessel is in service by 2029. How big of an issue is this?

Norway is one of the UK’s most long standing and valued defence partners. There is a trusted relationship stretching back decades and a firm commitment by the UK to the defence of Norway. During the Cold War British personnel regularly trained in the arctic circle, building an ability to survive, operate and fight in the most challenging of cold weather environments. This was seen as a potential scenario given the Norwegians share a land border with Russia, and it was likely that in the event of war, Soviet forces would try to occupy the country to deny the coastline to NATO. By making it harder for NATO air forces and naval assets to monitor and operate near the Greenland Iceland UK gap, and monitor the passage of Russian military forces into the Atlantic, or head towards Murmansk and Soviet submarine operating areas, it would have put NATO defensively on the back foot in wartime.

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In the post-cold war era Norway continued to work closely with the UK and today not only do the Arctic warfare exercises continue, but both nations operated together in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Norway is a joint operator of the P8 Poseidon , as is the RAF and will operate the F35 too. The UK and Norway continue to have strong joint security interests in the so-called ‘High North’ and cooperate closely on a wide range of security matters as like minded partners.

The Royal Norwegian Navy currently operates four frigates and has identified a need to replace them as part of a wider recapitalisation of their fleet. The current strategy is to buy essentially ‘off the shelf’ taking an existing design in use with another navy with minimal modifications and bringing into service as quickly as possible. This mirrors the strategy for the submarine service, with at least four, and potentially up to six, new U212CD submarines being built that will also enter service with the German Navy. The challenge now is to find a similar partner for the ASW frigate programme. Initially it was expected that the US Navy CONSTELLATION class may prove to be a suitable platform, although the ongoing delays to its construction (currently at least three years) is likely to rule this out as too risky. Instead, the Norwegians may be looking to other nations, including the Royal Navy and the Type 26.

The Type 26 will be an outstanding ASW frigate when it enters service, delivering a truly world beating capability intended to go up against the most capable submarines our opponents may possess and come out on top. Designed from the keel up to reflect decades of ASW expertise and knowledge learned in the deep waters of the north Atlantic, these ships will be the cornerstone of at least three ‘Royal’ Navies (UK, Australia and Canada) for decades to come. The RN currently has eight on order or under construction, alongside a further five Type 31 frigates, with the programmes due to deliver all thirteen ships over the next decade. If the rumours are true, the Norwegian request to have a hull under construction provided to them would deny the Royal Navy a much-needed frigate and in turn raise concerns that ‘hull nine’ may not be ordered. Is this something to be concerned about?

It is not uncommon for ships under construction to be sold or ‘acquired’ while under construction, for example, the Royal Navy ROTHESAY class frigate HMS HASTINGS was sold while under construction to the Royal New Zealand Navy. The Egyptian Navy acquired several escorts under construction for the French and Italian navies, while the US Navy acquired the ‘KIDD’ class after the Iranian revolution. In this case the question is whether the temporary loss of a Type 26 in the programme for the RN would have a significant operational impact on the wider fleet?

There are several reasons why it may have less of an impact than perhaps feared. For starters the RN is suffering from an enduring and seemingly unsolvable headcount crisis as it struggles to generate sufficient crews for its ships. The fact that over 30%of the RFA fleet is laid up in reserve, unlikely to ever go to sea again, while the RN is considering decommissioning Type 23 frigates shows that the lack of people is biting hard. At the same time it faces a real challenge in introducing several new ship types concurrently – the Type 26, 31 and wider autonomous capabilities in the mine warfare world will come into service nearly simultaneously, which will put pressure on the fleet that also has to operate the existing force.

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Bringing a ship into service is a long business and starts with crew joining her well ahead of launch, for example the first crew joined HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH in 2012, even though she did not even go to sea until 2016 on her initial trials. Similarly the first crew for HMS VENTURER (lead Type 31) joined in mid 2023, while HMS GLASGOW had her first crew join in 2021. These ships will still need some years of work before they go to sea, but will require naval personnel, particularly with specialist skills and experience to help get them out of build, into trials and then onto generating for operational service. Doing this over the next few years as the ‘frigate factory’ in the Clyde gets fully up to speed will place a lot of pressure as new ships companies are formed up and help bring their ship to readiness. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the RN may struggle to do this without either incurring gaps elsewhere, or even struggling to crew them at all.  Passing one hull on at a critical time may be a good way of easing the pressure of finding a fully fledged crew, while also helping satisfy the needs of a potential new export customer.

Additionally, if you were to delay the ship, you would be able to save some money in the medium term as the payments due to be made at key stages in the process would not now be made. Ships are not paid for upfront, rather funds are released as time goes by and key milestones are met. In this case, not having to pay for a Type 26 hull now would ease financial pressures for several years to come for MOD planners, who would now not need to find this money in their budgets, freeing up cash for other investments. At the other end, when ‘Hull 9’ is ordered and under construction, she is likely in real terms to be cheaper than the vessel she replaces as when serial production of warships hits its stride, economies of scale usually make things cheaper (e.g. the Type 23s progressively got cheaper in real terms as they were built). There is a good financial argument in favour of this move too – it saves money in the short and medium term.

Finally, there are benefits from the economies of scale- the more Type 26s get built, the cheaper spare parts will become and the more economic benefits from shared upgrades and refit work. If you are creating a single global frigate class of potentially nearly 30 ships across four navies, you’ll find it far more cost effective to support them than having four different ship types in service at the same time. The long-term potential for economic savings and sustaining a supply chain with skilled jobs, both for refit and upgrade work is enormous.

In addition to this, there are considerable operational benefits of having Norway as a Type 26 operator. As noted the Norwegians are a very close ally and superbly professional warrior nation. With strong links established between the P8 communities, the combination of having both the UK and Norway operating both P8 and Type 26 in the GIUK or northern Atlantic as close allies would bring massive operational benefits to both countries. This would be a genuine force multiplier for UK security interests, as it would essentially add another five Type 26s to the forces being used to protect shared waters of critical national importance to both nations. Think of it as giving up one hull in the short term to gain five hulls in the medium term – the benefits will be huge.

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The question for the Royal Navy will be whether it can bear the ASW gap as any delay to a hull would mean potentially running on a fragile Type 23 for longer than already planned or accepting an additional cut in fleet strength if the pay off dates remain unchanged. Given the importance of ASW to defending vital UK interests, it seems likely that the RN would run these vessels on, although they will be well into their fourth decade before they retire. This will place pressure on keeping these venerable machine spirits ready for action, but hopefully it can be done. At worst the risk is that for a short period of time, there will be one fewer Type 23/26 than planned – if managed appropriately the impact on operations and force generation will be small.

The other big question is whether having given a hull up, the RN would see an additional one ordered? This is well into the domain of ‘handwavium’ as its far too hard to identify what pressures there would be on the defence budget at the time when a decision was needed (likely 3-4 years from now), or whether the need is for additional Type 26, or if the funds could be better spent elsewhere (e.g. reallocated into more autonomous vessels or the Type 32/83 concepts). There will doubtless be endless online debate about the ‘right’ force level needed here, but such a decision will be based on careful operational analysis at the time and a good understanding of the needs of the Service and its budget challenges.

Overall, if this does go ahead then this does seem like a win win for both Norway and the UK. It expands the force of Type 26 frigates, it provides additional work for British shipbuilding in Scotland (as long as it remains in the UK), and it helps generate long term savings for the taxpayers in four different countries for support costs. Set against this, the temporary loss of an RN hull to help an ally out seems a very sensible price to pay to ensure that the Viking longships sail on our side…