There Will Be No Fighting In the War Book!

 

According to reports on Sky News, the UK  has no current plans for national defence mobilisation. Despite the enormous changes to the geopolitical situation since 1991, no plans exist for the activation of a ‘whole of state’ effort to prepare the nation for conflict, or mobilise the entire machinery of government in an effort to prepare for war. There are suggestions that the Cabinet Office and MOD are now rethinking this and are beginning to look again at what may be needed to bring this about.  The irony is that until 1991 the UK was actually very well prepared (on paper at least) for the contingency planning required to commence mobilisation through the multi-volume series known as ‘The Government War Book’. This lengthy suite of manuals can best be described as the Microsoft Office paperclip of contingency planning – in the event of a crisis it would ask “It looks like you’re planning to fight global thermonuclear war – do you want my help”?

The War Book, as it was known is a fascinating series of publications. It covers in astonishing detail every step that Government would take on the journey to war, usually assumed at occurring with somewhere between 7 – 28 days notice, and all the steps that would be taken. Across multiple volumes it sets out how the Government would call up reservists, the steps that would be taken to inform people of the recall to the colours, the plans to introduce food stockpiles and rationing, round up known dissidents, while releasing prisoners on licences, put key point protection in to defend critical areas from sabotage. Eventually it covers the draft legislation that Parliament would vote on to essentially abolish itself, replacing a central democratic government with a series of ‘Regional Commissioners’ (Ministers) who would have absolute control over one of the now devolved regions of the UK, including the power of approving death sentences. Central Government would disperse to a variety of sites  and locations including nuclear bunkers, and an entirely new system of local, regional and central government would be put in place. Ultimately the war book covers the procedures by which the Prime Minister or their successor (one of several appointees to the role) could assume command of British nuclear forces and order nuclear retaliation. The one thing that the war book does not cover is advice or guidance on what to do after a nuclear strike.

It is a read of terrifying blandness. Each volume covers a range of measures that are to be carried out, with a series of step-by-step actions to be taken. The plan assumes every part of the State will work in perfect unison, carrying out plans never exercised for real, with people doing the job for the first time, and everything proceeding according to a strict timetable and plan. No account is taken of anything going wrong, or assuming that the plans would not be disrupted in some way. What makes the War Book so grim is that to read it is to read the plan made by the British State to destroy itself, while still hoping against hope that some facet of governance would survive, somewhere, to somehow resume control over the survivors of a nuclear strike on the UK.

The problem was that the State knew that the plans for the civilian population would not work. In a remarkable series of files available in the National Archives, it is possible to read correspondence and briefings between Margaret Thatcher and members of her Cabinet about the reality of the situation. In a note from her Principal Private Secretary (Charles Powell) dated 30 Dec 1987, ahead of a Cabinet Meeting on civil defence, he noted:

“You should be aware of the annual report on the Civil Preparedness Plan… The essence is that we are not able to guarantee the basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, medical care to the survivors of a widespread nuclear attack… Their conclusion is that without a very large increase in resources, it will be many years, if ever, before the country reaches an acceptable level of civil preparedness”.

PM Thatcher memo

To read the volumes of the War Book released to the Archives in Kew is to wander through a land of planning that boggles the mind. There are extensive files covering how to close motorways, how to draw up stockpiles of food, how to put in place wartime broadcasting arrangements and so on. The Police, NHS and Fire Service all had extensive war plans in place to cover dispersal of their assets (in the 1960s it was planned to issue the police with cadet force .303 rifles and Webley revolvers, while the Fire Service was to have sent tenders out to remote areas to survive the blast and be used as a source of getting drinking waters – the cities being left to burn). There are extensive files on feeding arrangements and the necessity of maintaining large stockpiles of basic foods, and of guidance to farmers on how to protect their herds from radiation.

Underpinning this planning was the maintenance of extensive supplies, stockpiles and facilities to support the transition to war. This included emergency feeding equipment to cover survivors in local authorities areas and associated very basic foodstuffs held nationwide in 65 ‘buffer’ depots. Most utility companies maintained war stocks – BT for instance had emergency depots containing stockpiles of cables and poles that could be used to reestablish comms. The Home Office maintained a huge fleet of emergency ‘Green Goddess’ fire engines and other supplies for fire fighting while the Metropolitan Police maintained two nuclear bunkers just outside London to act as emergency war HQs. The MOD meanwhile had huge stockpiles of equipment in warehouses that would be used to equip reservists ranging from rifles to old blankets.

There was an extensive and highly resilient comms infrastructure put in place across the UK including hardened facilities, underground bunkers, microwave towers and emergency networks designed to bypass nuclear devastated cities. Many local BT exchanges had on site stores and food, as well as emergency bricks to build a temporary fall out shelter to keep the comms going a little longer, while the military had a vast network of crisis communications – for example the UNITER network built in dozens of blast proof bunkers throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Likely Soviet targets for conventional attack

Underpinning this was a clear sense of planning against a clearly understood threat. Reviewing the documentation from the time and its clear that the UK had a good understanding of the likely Soviet threat – assessed as being around 500 Spetznatz type saboteurs and a series of conventional air attacks on air defence and nuclear C2 facilities. The general assumption was that cities and civilian targets would not be hit, with Russian efforts focusing on the facilities that could enable a nuclear attack instead. To defend against this an extensive series of Key Points was formed with varying levels of protection depending on their status.

The Key Points list covers off all the sites that were deemed crucial for wartime purposes, ranging from 10 Downing Street, to nuclear command and control sites, through to sites that may be of longer term economic value. The lists began to be drawn up in the 1950s, although at times there was confusion around why some sites were considered Key Points. In a wonderfully British note, dated Jun 1962, a bemused MAFF official working at the ‘Low Temperature Research Station’ wrote asking:

“It seems strange to me that the Privy Council and MAFF should be concerned with security at our institutes, and I should be grateful if you could explain to me how the Low Temperature Research station comes to be on the Key Points list of the MAFF”.

In 1982 the MOD and Cabinet Office agreed that Key Points would be defined as follows:

Super Priority Type 1: Installations which are of outstanding significance to UK’s ability to carry out a nuclear counter strike at any time.

Type 1: Installations which have a vital role in enabling the UK to receive timely warning of an imminent nuclear attack, or to carry out a nuclear counter strike at any time.

Type 2: Installations both Civil and Military which during the reinforcement period have a vital role in the reinforcement period or are required continuously for NATO operations.

Type 3: Economic installations which are essential to sustain the population or the economy of the UK in a prolonged period of tension or conventional war.

Type 4: Installations the major disruption of which would at any time seriously impact the maintenance and credibility of the government of the UK centrally or regionally.

The files indicate that over the years different Key Points enjoyed different levels of protection during the transition to war, with some getting an enhanced police interest, while others benefitted from a permanent military guard force of regular troops, well armed for the job at hand. Sometimes this could cause concern for planners – the Royal Navy files for home defence indicate worries that there were not enough sailors to meet the demands of both KP protection and mobilisation, while there was also concern about where time would be found to train sailors in using rifles. At least one officer raised concerns in writing about whether sailors needed to be trained in counter ambush drills and use of the GPMG – an attitude many who have seen matelots with guns may share…

Sailors and guns memo

One of the key challenges in planning for the War Book was balancing off the ‘need to know’ with the need to maintain secrecy. The more people involved in the planning of any aspect of wartime operations would increase the chances of having trained credible people available during transition to war, but it would also increase the chances of the secrets being compromised, enabling the Soviet Union to put effective countermeasures in place. For example, knowing the likely locations of where central government PYTHON groups (small teams of ministers and specialists) would be deploying to would in turn increase the chances of their being targeted. One of the constant tensions in documents from this period is balancing off this challenge, with planners constantly trying to determine whether it was better to involve people or not.

The upshot of all of this detailed planning was that by 1991 the UK had, despite public perceptions to the contrary got a significant and capable set of war plans in place that could probably have been activated to positive effect. The scale of planning across multiple organisations and bodies, the breadth of stockpiling and the depth of experience at all levels, particularly given the residual number of WW2 veterans still working meant that had the British government gone to war, there would have been a credible plan in place. Whether it would have made any difference though is debateable, given that internal HMG documents assessed that tens of millions would die regardless during even a small nuclear attack. At best it would have ensured that some parts of the nation may have had some residual capacity to limp on, although to what end remains unclear.

In part 2 of this article, we will examine the decisions to close down the War Book and in turn the challenges facing the Government as it looks to re-establish some kind of planning capability relevant for the 21^st century. Before we depart though, it is worth reading the 1961 memo in full from a Major Brook Johnson (an original SAS veteran who served with Stirling in Africa, escaped from captivity in Italy and served in Malaya) and who wrote in response to a question about the structure of UK regions and government during wartime:

“Dear Mrs Grimble,

Reference my letter dated 27 Dec… the regions have been nominated by the Home Office both by number and geographical designation. They are:

Number	Region
1	Northern
2	North Eastern
3	North Midland
4	Eastern
5	London
6	Southern
7	South Western
8	Wales
9	Midland
10	North Western
12	South Eastern

The designation of these regions has evolved over some years with the consequence that certain anomalies have occurred. They are:

a)     When the precautionary period starts, London region breaks up into two halves, that part north of the Thames joins No4 region, and south of the Thames joins 12 region.

b)     Number 8 Wales Region is never referred to as Number 8 or as a region because it refers to a whole country. In conversation it is referred to as Wales Civil Defence control, but for ease of reference in documents the number is used. 

c)      South Eastern region is not referred to by number in conversation. We do not know the reason why, but for ease of reference we continue to refer to it in documents as Number 12.

d)     There is no Region 11. We do not know why.

Scotland does not have a regional system but divides itself into 3 zones (North, East and West). Northern Ireland is an entity on its own and is referred to as Northern Ireland civil defence control.

I am afraid that this must appear muddling, but no doubt it is in accord with normal English tradition. I enclose a copy of the map showing the Regions which may be of some help to you. I should add that there are some mistakes in the boundaries as these are constantly being altered, but in broad detail this is correct.

Yours etc…