Should We Worry About The Trident 'Failure'? No

 

 HMS VANGUARD has ‘failed’ to successfully launch a Trident missile as part of her return to service trials in the USA. This marks the second test in a row that has not been successful for the Royal Navy. Is this a cause for alarm and should we worry? In a word, no.

Crown Copyright

What do we know has happened?

The Royal Navy and US Navy share a pool of Trident missiles, which the UK can draw on 58 to load its SSBN force and conduct tests. As part of the shared agreement on Trident operations, the missile compartment on the VANGUARD class is essentially a scaled down US Navy missile compartment and the launch process follows US procedures. The policy in place is that when a UK or US SSBN completes refuelling, which is a multi-year process of refitting a vessel, the final stage before the submarine takes its place in the deterrent patrol cycle is a test firing of a missile to ensure it works as planned. This is known as a DASO (Demonstration and Shakedown Operation) to confirm the submarine is fit for operations.

During the 2024 test, HMS VANGUARD successfully launched the missile as required, but for reasons not being made public, the missile did not ignite as expected and instead sank.

Is this a wider problem?

In a word, no. The UK and US have collaborated together on dozens of tests over the last 56 years – the Royal Navy did 32 Polaris test firings, and this was the 12^th Trident firing.  These are not done in isolation, they are part of a much wider cycle of US testing, which is utterly identical. Some US tests have also failed, although not for systemic reasons.

There is a shared pool of data to draw on based on these tests that will identify if there is a common fault in the missile stockpile, or if this was an isolated incident. All indications from the MOD are that this was isolated. If it was a wider fault then the US would be equally concerned because it could have serious ramifications for their own nuclear deterrence capability.

Why did the last test fail?

The last test (2016) is seen as a failure in the eyes of the public because the missile was destroyed while under way. The very important distinction here is that the missile was launched successfully – the command, control and communication chain held up to deliver an authorised firing message, the submarines systems worked internally to ensure that the boat could fire as intended, and the missile was launched successfully, ensuring that the submarine met the required standards.

After the launch, for reasons that have not been made public, the decision was taken by the range safety team to destroy it while in flight – this was nothing to do with the Royal Navy. It is common for Range Safety Officers to do this if they perceive even the slightest hint of risk – read accounts of astronaut training and they will recount how all US launches, including crewed ones, will have an RSO present who will destroy their spacecraft, killing them all, if the telemetry indicates a risk. There is a zero risk tolerance here, which would not apply in real launches, and which the UK is not in any way at fault over.

Again, if a wider issue had been detected, there would have been ramifications for the whole UK and US SSBN force. This indicates it was an isolated event, not a systemic reason for concern.

Does the UK have a credible nuclear deterrent?

In a word, yes. The test proved that VANGUARD, like VENGEANCE in 2016 has the ability to successfully demonstrate she can fire a nuclear missile if ordered. The test met its goal, and the submarine is now back in the patrol cycle, ensuring that the RN can sustain Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) patrols.

The UK remains able to fire a credible nuclear strike at all times, regardless of this test. Nothing has changed.

Why do tests fail?

Sometimes firing highly complex missiles highlights things don’t work as planned. Sadly missiles do not have a 100% reliability rate – every nation on earth has that experience as the Russians with their 50% failure rate on recent tests can confirm.

Tests are highly controlled and subject to stringent safety measures not in place in peacetime which can impact on operations to a point (e.g. the RSO), and also draw on older missiles approaching life expiry rather than brand new ones. Anyone who has served in HM Forces and done live firings will have experienced things going wrong. This does not mean the missiles will not work when required, as wartime experience indicates over many years.

There is a danger of drawing too much from one situation, but in turn it highlights the value of tests. It is likely that the ‘lessons identified’ washup will find more valuable data from this experience than a successful shoot, which can in turn be used to help increase confidence in the deterrents ability to be used when required.

Why don’t we fire again to prove it works?

There is no need to do so – the system has been proven to work for the goal of the tests. VANGUARD has shown she can fire a missile if needed. To fire again would cause significant disruption to her patrol cycle, potentially risking longer term CASD capability and would send the message to the wider world that the UK and US had doubts about the credibility of Trident and needed to conduct further reassurance trials. Paradoxically, more tests would call the sense of our confidence in the deterrence into question in a way not testing does not.

Things go wrong, it does not mean that there is a systemic problem.

Time for the RAF to take over?

There is no requirement for the RAF to pick up the nuclear mission. There are no nuclear capable jets in the front line force, or nuclear air launched bombs in our inventory and nuclear strike missions require significant amounts of people, aircraft and support to be credible. It would require expensive integration of the US tactical nuclear weapons onto either Typhoon or F35, disrupting the front line force, reducing available aircraft and not really adding much in terms of day to day capability that cannot already be done by Trident.

Why was it kept secret?

The MOD chose not to publicise this event, in keeping with its long history of silence on nuclear matters. The USN is significantly more open about DASO tests, while the MOD does not, as a rule comment. Sadly the rise of open source intelligence makes it hard to keep anything secret – AIS transponders and imagery before and after the test, and publication of the test range closure dates meant that it was obvious it had occurred. The author spotted images of RN participating vessels on their way home some time after it had happened and was beginning to wonder if the silence meant things had gone wrong. The lesson here is that everything will leak – trying to cover it up rarely works.

The bottom line though is that this is not the drama, let alone crisis some want it to be. Tests happen, the desired result was achieved and operations continue without impact. The deterrence remains assured and there is not an issue to worry about – that the RN and USN remain publicly relaxed on the issue and are not recalling their SSBN for urgent refits tells us that this is not a wider problem. It is also worth remembering that this could equally have been a US SSBN firing the same missile, and this is not a uniquely British problem.

Overall, remember the words of the Hitchhikers Guide To The Galaxy – Don’t Panic!