Don't Panic! Reasons For Royal Navy Carrier Optimism
If you believe some of the more hysterical defence reports
recently, HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH has returned to port with propellor issues for
emergency repairs, prompting the Royal Navy to send ‘plastic warships’ (P2000s)
to sea in her place to take part in Exercise Cold Response, alongside the
carrier HMS PRINCE OF WALES. By any reasonable measure the RN has plummeted to
yet another nadir after years of relentless cuts. But is this a reasonable
assessment of the situation?
What has happened is far less dramatic, despite Daily Mail reporting
suggesting that the ship returned to port, which was an outright lie, as she
had never left port in the first place, engineers have reportedly identified
issues with the propellor shaft on the QE. A decision was taken late in the day
to delay sailing and have the potential fault looked at and fixed rather than
let the ship sail and potentially experience issues while deployed. This is not
an easy call to make – to cancel the sailing of your fleet flagship after
announcing her departure is always going to make for uncomfortable coverage. This
is magnified in the social media age when every departure and arrival get huge
attention online and news spreads globally in seconds.
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UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021 |
It is a truth not universally acknowledged that warships are
phenomenally complex and rely on advanced technology and equipment to work properly.
This equipment can, and does, go wrong on a surprisingly regular basis for many
different reasons. It could be due a repair, or a refit for new parts to be
fitted. It could be that a fitting has come loose that needs to be fixed, or that
something totally unforeseen has happened that requires attention. Every navy
in the world has experienced these problems, with ships developing problems
that require attention before sailing. If you look back through history there
will be hundreds, if not thousands of incidents that have occurred in the Royal
Navy alone, just since WW2, when sailing was delayed due to the discovery of a fault
that needed fixing. The inevitable reality of being a sea going navy is that things
break down if you use them, and the easiest way to avoid this is not to go to
sea. As noted, every navy on the planet has been in this position. This is not
unique to the Royal Navy.
The people that made this decision will have done so based
on balancing off risk, noting what could go wrong if the ship was at sea and
the impact on the wider programme if things went wrong, versus the short-term
cost of doing local repair work and fixing the problem. This isn’t an easy call
to make because it could be entirely possible that the risk would never manifest
while deployed, but equally if it went wrong at a crucial stage (for example
during flying ops), then the impact could be disastrous. The people making this
judgement call have had to look at a tactical issue and make a decision that has
both operational and strategic ramifications (e.g. replacement on the exercise and
the reduced likelihood that a UK CV will be able to relieve USS EISENHOWER in
the Red Sea). This is a genuinely tough call to make. On balance it was almost
certainly the right one. Can you imagine the impact if the decision was taken
to accept the risk, sail on and then it went wrong in the middle of the Red
Sea, while under attack from Houthi missiles? That would be a less than optimal
time for the MEO to discuss the risk register with the CO…
In terms of the impact on the exercise, its limited. There will
be a short delay while HMS PRINCE OF WALES prepares for sea, and then it will
continue as before. There will, of course, be an impact on the programme for PWLS,
which hasn’t been publicly shared yet, but it will not impact on the UK
involvement in the exercise. This serves as a reminder of several things –
firstly the value of having more than one carrier in service at a time – as the
French have often found out, crises seem to happen when their carrier is in dry
dock. Its also questionable if a similar
situation had occurred 20 years ago whether the RN would have been able to
cope, as with the different maintenance routines and use of the three INVINCIBLE
class, it’s entirely possible that there would not have been a carrier
available for sea in the same time frame.
Secondly, the value of having two carriers able to go to sea
in the fixed wing role, and swap at short notice. The real positive news story
here is the testament to the training and flexibility of Royal Navy and RAF
personnel who will quickly be able to adapt to a new plan and find themselves
operating the most advanced fast jet in the world, at sea and without prior
notice, and do so seamlessly. This is a good news story in demonstrating the
flexibility of both the carrier force and the people who support it.
If you look at the wider plan for the carriers this year,
its unlikely to have a major operational impact. QE was due to hand over at some
point to PWLS as the fleet flagship and prepare for planned maintenance. In
this case, she may be at sea less, but there is unlikely to be a significant
disruption to her medium-term programme. Its likely that for some time the QE
will be less active anyway – this situation merely brings that forward by a few
weeks, so there is no major impact on operations.
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UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021 |
This case is interesting as it highlights the growing void between routine naval operations and social media expectations. Speak to anyone in the RN and the general sense is ‘meh, ships break’ – this is very much a business-as-usual situation where something has gone wrong, it will be fixed, and the RN has successfully come up with a Plan B. It is very much a ‘nothing burger’. But in the eyes of the social media commentary, you’d think the RN had been humiliated in the eyes of the world, that this is a legacy of a lack of defence spending and also that no other navy has ever had any technical problems, ever. In their eyes this is a very British debacle. It poses an interesting question about how to manage expectations – the RN and MOD are rightly proud of talking up a ships capability and do a good job of communicating how and when she will sail. When things go wrong, the public, who do not necessarily understand the complexities of ensuring that an aircraft carrier is safe to go to sea, and who don’t understand why an issue has (in their eyes) only just been spotted after months alongside, feel that this isn’t good enough.
There is a challenge too in the public perception of how these ships operate. People wrongly assume they have spent long periods alongside doing nothing, when in reality both vessels have been engaged in busy deployments and exercises – last year for instance both ships globally deployed on trials and operations in the Baltic and USA. Just because they do not go to sea in an operational way that previous carriers did doesn’t make them ‘harbour queens’. In fact, an analysis of time alongside versus at sea of previous carriers would probably show similar levels of operational activity. That perception is hard to challenge though because the constant stream of social media imagery of the ships alongside and tracking of every harbour entry/exit makes it hard to see the bigger picture of their operational programme. Perhaps the challenge is to work out how to communicate to the public that things do break, that this is normal, but that the RN isn’t failing when this happens. Trying to get the MOD to agree to a social media campaign about the armed forces which doesn’t sound like it contains nothing but the lyrics to the song ‘Everything Is Awesome’ may be hard to do. This incident perhaps proves the need to communicate both uplifting messages, but also candid honesty about the state of the armed forces too.
More widely its also interesting to see how twisted the
reporting has become of the exercise. As noted, the Mail implied that the ship
had gone to sea and returned – putting out an article which was factually wrong
and utterly misleading to the public. If you look at the Mail
and Sky
News, they’re reporting that the RN is sending a ‘plastic warship’ to the
exercise as the P2000 force sorties north to Norway. Its being implicitly tied
to the carrier situation, implying that this is somehow linked – but in reality,
it is not. In fact the RN put out a press
release on 11 January talking about this planned deployment, which got very
little news coverage. Its only chance that the ships sailed today, giving the
perfect chance to fuse verbatim the words of a near month old press release
with the suggestion that these ships are the replacement. The P2000 deployment to Norway is a key part
of the work being done by the Coastal Forces squadron to practise littoral
operations and carry out missions done by their predecessors in WW2. Its an
exciting opportunity for the ships and crews to take a vessel into the Arctic Circle
– from the authors perspective, having fond memories of time onboard one of the
participating ships from his URNU days, the idea of sailing into an arctic
winter on one is a very ‘brave and courageous’ decision in Whitehall parlance!
Overall, this is a situation which has become newsworthy for
all the wrong reasons. There are many things to be concerned about with the
state of the modern British military, as the recent House
of Commons Defence Committee report in to resilience highlighted. This
small technical issue is not one of them. People see this as evidence of the
woes of the Royal Navy, not an advert for its strengths. Yet in being able to
reassign participation from QUEEN ELIZABETH to PRINCE OF WALES, the RN is reminding
the world that it is one of a tiny number of nations that operates multiple
carriers, that it has people with the training and flexibility to shift focus
at short notice and that resilience and redundancy means the show can, and
will, go on.
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