Ground Hog Day - The Royal Navy And the Falkland Islands

 

February 2^nd is sometimes referred to as ‘groundhog day’ referring to both a curious tradition in the US around an animal selecting a weather prediction scroll, or the movie involving Bill Murray. It has come to mean, in popular consciousness, living the same thing on endless repeat. Frankly, ground hog day was the phrase that came to mind reading the latest ‘the sky is falling’ article from the Daily Telegraph, published on 2^nd Feb 2024 about the Royal Navy and the Falkland Islands.

Unusually written by their US Editor, rather than their excellent Defence team, the article focused on the fact that the Royal Navy hasn’t sent a major escort ship to the Falkland Islands since 2017 and this is apparently a bad thing. Cue complaints about defence cuts, the threat from Argentina, the obligatory visit from everyone’s favourite rent-a-quote Admiral Lord Alan ‘I Used To Be First Sea Lord Doncha Know’ West and you have the makings of a classic defence ground hog day story – long on hyperbole, short on factual analysis or context. So lets try and set some context shall we?

UK MOD © Crown copyright - RAF A400M at South Georgia

Firstly, what is the Royal Navy presence in the South Atlantic? After the 1982 war, the RN deployed forces of varying size in the region for many years, ranging from local inshore patrol ships (such as HMS SENTINEL) to occasional visits by nuclear submarines. By the early 1990s the permanent naval presence had stabilised on a permanently deployed ‘CASTLE’ class OPV, a ROVER class tanker, rotating visits from an escort ship, usually but not exclusively a Type 42 to provide air defence if needed, and the semi-permanent presence of the Antarctic patrol ship, HMS ENDURANCE. This was supported through the military port facilities at the Mount Pleasant complex, designed to ensure a credible maritime presence. In more recent years this presence has evolved, with fewer visits by deploying escorts (Type 23 and 42) and the withdrawal of the ROVER class tanker. In its place has come a new permanent presence of the RIVER class, of which one is permanently based in the islands to conduct sovereignty patrols and provide support to the garrison as needed.

How much of an impact has this really had on the islands security? Firstly, the RIVER class is a significant step up from the CASTLE class in terms of range, capability and habitability – they make for an excellent platform to monitor the islands and conduct the 99.9% of maritime operations that are not throwing missiles at each other. Their long legs (over 5,000 miles range at normal steaming) means they do not require an RFA tanker for ‘top ups’, removing the need for an RFA presence in the region. They are the ideal ships to handle the sovereignty protection role and patrol challenging waters where the biggest threat is the treacherous high seas and bad weather.

The move to no longer routinely deploy an escort to the islands has its roots in the significant changes to operational deployment patterns by the RN in recent years. Historically escorts were sent on singleton deployments for 6-9 months out to various locations – for example the Gulf, West Indies and South Atlantic, usually relieving another vessel in the region. Their purpose was to ‘fly the flag’, provide a measure of military capability if needed and conduct sovereignty protection where required. The missions varied depending on the location, but it was normal for a ship going to the South Atlantic to visit ports in both South America and southern Africa, and roam across the region more widely. While in theatre the ship provided additional defence capabilities – usually a helicopter and heavier 4.5” gun for gunfire support and anti-ship missions, and potentially some limited ASW capability too depending on the platform. This would make them a useful capability to deter a surface attack or air attack – for example a Type 42 could sit west of the Islands and identify/intercept incoming aerial attacks as part of the wider air defence network on the islands.

UK MOD © Crown copyright  = Grenadier Guards exercise

What has changed is that the RN has moved away from this operational model. It is now exceedingly rare for a major escort to conduct a singleton deployment like this on a 6 – 9 month basis. If you look at the last 18 months the only one that springs to mind is HMS DAUNTLESS on her deployment to the West Indies to act as guardship during the hurricane season. Instead the RN escort force is now focused on providing support to NATO operations (e.g. HMS DUNCAN spent about 9 months in the Med last year with  various NATO forces) or in support of ASW operations – for example HMS NORTHUMBERLAND has spent much of the last 12 months in remote seas listening for ‘interesting’ acoustic noises. In the Gulf HMS LANCASTER is permanently based in Bahrain conducting similar operations with allies in the Middle East region and will be there for several years.

The main bulk of the force now deploys as part of the ‘Carrier Strike Group’ concept, sending out larger task groups with the Carrier or other major platforms as a formed group to conduct operations and tasks. For example in 2023 the QUEEN ELIZABETH group operated in the Baltic, before detaching HMS DIAMOND to the Red Sea in late 2023 to support British shipping. The plan now is that the RN will only very rarely deploy surface ships out in isolation, instead using them collectively as part of national or allied task groups.

In place of the isolated deployments, the Royal Navy has forward deployed five Batch 2 RIVER class OPVS to Gibraltar, West Indies, Pacific Ocean and the Falkland Islands. These ships undertake the defence diplomacy work and routine patrolling previously done by isolated deployers, and ‘fly the flag’ on a year round basis across these regions. The result is that there is now a permanent Royal Navy presence in regions which for decades had not seen one, and the size of the ships means they can visit ports and nations which had rarely previously seen an RN platform (for example repeated visits have now been made to Pitcairn, the most isolated British Overseas Territory in the world in the Pacific Ocean) – this followed years of no visits at all. The presence of these ships eases the burden on the main escort fleet, enabling it to prepare for higher end warfighting operations, while enabling a continuous defence engagement presence around the world at very low cost.

The other thing that has changed is the threat posed by Argentina to the Islands. In 1982 the Argentine forces consisted of a reasonably modern and balanced military force capable of posing a credible threat to British forces, including dozens of fast jets, modern warships, submarines and an aircraft carrier. This threat remained reasonably high in the years after the war, but over time has diminished significantly. Today the Argentine military is a fraction of the size that it was in 1982. It does not possess any fast jets, it does not have a credible operational submarine force and its escort ship force is decades old and has undergone no meaningful modernisation in this time. The defence budget has been slashed and very little money is available for basic day to day operations, let alone planning an amphibious attack on the islands.

The Argentine Air Force has been trying and failing to acquire supersonic fighter jets since the 1990s, while the Navy has made clear its procurement plans focus on OPVs and Antarctic operations, not amphibious assault. There are technical studies underway to provide a replacement submarine, but this is likely to be years, if not decades away before it can provide a meaningful seagoing capability – assuming it is ever ordered. No matter how you look at it, the Argentine Armed Forces are a shadow of their former self, and do not pose a meaningful threat to the Falkland Islands. Any change to this situation would take many years to evolve, given the time needed to buy, build, deliver, train and operate new equipment. One would hope that the UK would notice such developments and react accordingly.

More widely the political landscape is changing, with the new President Milei adopting a more policy based approach to the ongoing sovereignty dispute with the UK, with both sides agreeing to disagree. Hopefully this is where such a debate will stay, polite disagreement and no ungentlemanly acts.

UK MOD © Crown copyright  =RAF Typhoons in Falkland Islands

Meanwhile the Falkland Islands remain well defended, with a large operating base designed for rapid reinforcement if required. Huge barrack facilities, extensive airfield operating facilities and significant defensive preparations are in place for the ever less likely day that Argentina attempts to return. The fact is that they are operating on a timescale of decades, while the UK can respond and reinforce the islands in days, if not hours if really needed. Short of the penguin population revolting against their colonial oppressors, it is hard to see any credible situation where there is a military risk to the Falklands directly.

Given all this, it is hard to see what the Telegraph is upset about precisely. The Royal Navy still maintains a credible permanent presence with both a RIVER class and the semi-permanent deployment of the Antarctic patrol ship HMS PROTECTOR. The lower level tasks carried out by the old South Atlantic Guardship are still carried out by the new one, while there is no military threat requiring a high end anti-air/surface/submarine escort for thousands of miles in any direction. Sending a hugely capable Type 45 to the Falkland Islands for a routine deployment would be a complete waste of both a scarce asset and public money to defend against a problem that doesn’t exist.  This isn’t about lack of ships, because the RN escort force is still roughly the same size as it was in 2017 or 2012. It has more modern ships like the Type 31 due to enter service soon too, which in turn could (but in reality are highly unlikely to) deploy to the region.

Once again it feels like media ground hog day – complaints that the RN isn’t doing something it doesn’t need to do in an article which doesn’t make any effort to understand why things are done the way they are. There just isn’t the military need for escort ships in the South Atlantic at the moment, and frankly, that’s a good thing. The world is in enough of a security mess as it is at the moment – we don’t need to add ‘proactively defending the Falklands from new credible invasion threat’ to the lengthy MOD to do list.