Tootle Pip?

 

The Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace MP, has raised some eyebrows with his comment that the British Army is currently only funded to “stay at home and do a bit of tootling around”. These comments, coming as the UK heads into a new Defence Review to determine the size and shape of the armed forces and defence budget provide a timely insight into the challenges facing the MOD right now.

It is worth reminding ourselves why a Defence Review is underway as the Integrated Review, written 1 SofS Defence, 3 Prime Ministers, and 4 Chancellors ago (e.g. last year) is now looking already out of date. The significant changes to the global security environment driven by the invasion of Ukraine, the reinvigoration of NATO against a dangerous Russian threat, the challenges raised by ‘grey zone’ operations as well as the increasingly fraught relationship between the USA and China means that assumptions need to be revisited.

The IR was an attempt to balance off British commitments and interests in Europe, reaffirming the long term UK security role on the continent even after Brexit, and balance that off with wider geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific, where the government was keen to see an increasing British presence. The IR can be seen as an attempt to balance ambition on two very different fronts, and try to support ongoing interest in NATO with a more maritime/air based commitment to the Indo-Pacific. It made relatively few changes to force structures, salami slicing in some areas, and drawing down capability earlier than planned in others, while putting new investment into emerging technology. Its main ‘pain’ was the decision to cut back the size of the Army to 72,000 regular troops.

What has changed since then has been the rapid decline of the global security situation, coupled with the decline in the pound and the rise of inflation means that previous plans are no longer necessarily affordable. The defence budget cannot cope with all the commitments placed on it and is fundamentally unaffordable without significant cuts or changes to equipment plans. Therefore a review is needed to see how to make the books balance and also ensure that the MOD is able to address the ever more complex global security situation.

For the Army this means that hard questions need to be asked about what it is that the UK wants to do with its land power? The headmark of being able to deploy a Division (or at least a Divisional HQ) has been a corner stone of the Army ‘offer’ to Government, in providing (on paper at least) the ability to deploy and command a large formation of troops and supporting assets as part of a coalition operation. Arguably the commitment to the Division is seen as a key test of the Army’s credibility in that if it cannot deploy a Division, is it really able to operate as an Army at all?

This makes sense on one level – it is after all, barely 30 years since the Army operated a full Corps in Germany, with multiple Divisions in existence to stand too and engage the Soviet forces if they’d invaded. For fighting the battle the force was intended to fight (hold the Russians for long enough to let talks begin or the city killer nuclear warheads fly), the British Army was well equipped. With a well established logistics chain, plenty of enablers including air defence and artillery and modern armoured fighting vehicles, the BAOR in 1991 was a potent organisation for the mission it was designed for. As a deployable force though, it was perhaps less capable – sending troops to the desert in 1991 to liberate Kuwait meant the stripping back of much of the force to sustain a much smaller deployed Army engaged in a mission for which it was not designed to do.

The post Cold War decision to retain a deployable Division has driven much of the Army thinking and planning, and the goal of being able to send large formation of troops abroad as part of a coalition force is very much at the heart of the Army DNA. But, does it have the ability to actually sustain and support a credible warfighting Division, or is it a paper HQ? Some would argue that with the reductions post 2010 of logistical enablers, combat support elements and the increasing age and fragility of the offensive forces, coupled with the increasing delays of replacement programmes, that the Division is a capability in name only. Ukraine has highlighted that to fight and survive in a modern contested environment calls for a hugely resilient and capable force, with the most modern equipment and support in place to be able to stand up and engage the enemy, and communicate with friends. Can, hand on heart, the British Army say that this is the situation it is in today with the current force?

The Secretary of State appears to have given a hint in his thinking that the Army right now probably isn’t in the right space to meet the requirements placed on it -which in turn raises bigger questions about what it exists to do. In the context of Ukraine, is it sensible to continue to aspire to field a Division that may, or may not, be able to hold its own against a peer rival? It is practically inconceivable to envisage any credible scenario where the UK would deploy a land component at scale, and in isolation without allied support (Peninsular War 2 ‘Sharpes Zimmer Frame’?). If anything NATO has emerged strengthened from the Ukraine conflict and in far better shape to deter aggression from Russia. In turn the question becomes, what level of commitment should the Army offer to NATO?

In the event of any land war in central or eastern Europe, it is unlikely that there will be much time for the UK to move large forces en masse to the front line. Smaller prepositioned forces will almost certainly need to suffice to deter and defend against Russian hostility. In this scenario, is there a credible role for a Divisional HQ and forces, or would it be better to focus on deploying a properly equipped Brigade, possibly with enhanced C2 and support to ‘plug into’ a NATO led formation? What matters more to our allies – is it the theoretical offer of a Division a few months after a war begins, or the practical offer of troops that fit into an existing force now?

Understanding what it is that the Army offer to NATO is, and where it adds most value seems critical here. Is it time to abandon the emotional attachment to a formation HQ, or does doing so reduce the ability of the UK to exercise influence and control over a large part of a land campaign? Additionally, is the UK likely to ever need to field large scale land forces again, or is it better to focus on a smaller well-armed and equipped force, coupled with support to foreign troops through training, munitions and logistics (in many ways the UK seems to be adopting the same strategic approach to continental security that it adopted in the 18^th, 19^th and 20^th centuries of enabling others to fight on our behalf).  If the UK can offer ships, aircraft, and other strategic enablers to support coalition operations, then does it need large scale but hugely expensive land formations too, or can it step back and let others do this job for it?

What is not clear is the extent to which politicians in the 21^st century want, or see a need for, a force capable of taking and holding ground abroad. There is little interest in fighting wars of conquest, and any major land war is likely to be fought under Article 5, and involve NATO partners and allies. Given this, can we define what exactly it is that the UK needs to provide in terms of troops and equipment and where it can take risk to reduce them?  There is no right answer to this question, and it comes down to whether politicians feel that they want to invest in keeping the UK as a credible ‘heavy’ power, or if they feel that their strategic goals can be delivered through other means.

In simple terms the decision they face is whether to invest more money in the Army to keep it able to fight in the most complex and intense threat environments, reducing resources for other areas given the likely cost of bringing large scale forces up to standard, or alternatively to step back from it. There may be an argument for a token brigade to deploy if needed on a short term mission, but what is the gain to the UK of being able to deploy and sustain a large ground force at distance from home for months at a time, compared to say peacekeeping operations?

This is not an argument against global deployments – for example the Army has enjoyed great success in Mali and elsewhere, and its ability to send smaller detachments for training and exercises has been invaluable. It remains a globally focused organisation, and is one of the very few army’s out there able to deploy acclimatised reserves of troops with jungle, desert and arctic experience at pretty much the same time. It has global mobility and the ability to deploy on smaller raiding expeditions, training and working alongside peers, but the question has to be asked – what is the scale at which the Army needs to operate in future?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright 2023.

Similar questions will likely be asked of the RN and RAF too – for example, in a world where there is very limited appetite for interventions, and where being able to put a force ashore is complex and time consuming, is there really still a need for amphibious shipping? While it looks impressive, and can be occasionally helpful, does the UK really benefit or need a significant amphibious force, supported by the Royal Marines, given that it is highly unlikely that the UK will ever launch an amphibious operation at scale again? Has the time come to ask really difficult questions of sacred cows that perhaps need to be turned into BBQ?

It feels increasingly like the UK is facing a rerun of the 1980 ‘Nott Review’ and has a similar policy challenge. A resurgent and aggressive Russia, coupled with an unstable wider world, aspirations for global operations but a need to credibly support NATO on land, sea and air and an expensive and unaffordable equipment programme (as well as the affordability of Trident) means that tough choices are unavoidable. In 1980 the RN focused on the ASW ‘deep battle’ at the cost of intending to get out of the amphibious game – will history repeat itself?

In 1980 the Army was arguably the big winner of the review, with more investment in BAOR to make it a credible force to deter the Russians. Is the cost though of making a modern British Army able to deliver a similar level of threat and capability too great to bear at a time when funding is overstretched, and replacements are both delayed and overbudget?  There are extremely difficult decisions ahead, and it will be vital that the MOD gets them right-  changes and decisions taken now will take years to unpick and change course on. Can the MOD get it right?