More Than A Middling Power...

 

France has announced its new National Security Strategy, which will lay the foundation for French defence planning over the period 2024-30. This document sets out policy direction and guidance on where France sees its primary strategic interests and how it proposes to focus resources. There is, at time of writing, no English language version available (merde!) but there is plenty of coverage on it available.

The UK and France are both nations that occupy very similar positions in the world – they are ‘more than a middling power’, enjoying a global network of interests and alliances, credible armed forces, effective soft power and diplomatic reach and a willingness to use force when necessary. For all the banter and disagreements, both nations have far more in common than differences, and a good strategic partners. It makes it timely for the UK to understand French policy direction, for it could highlight some of the challenges facing planners in Whitehall and the policy concerns they may have.

What is notable from the strategy is firstly the intent to prepare for a new era of state on state conflict. French planners seem in no doubt that what lies ahead is a period where we must be ready to engage in nation state level competition up to, and including, conventional warfighting, and this calls for both nuclear deterrence and investment in conventional forces. President Macron noted too that we’re seeing in Ukraine the lesson that newer capabilities don’t always deliver, while older ones may still have some life left in them – this seems an intriguing counter approach to the British ‘sunset – sunrise’ of capabilities that are being paid off to free up funds and people to jump ahead with technology.

The French military is likely to focus its resources on being a credible force able to project power and influence across parts of the globe, and do so in a way that brings both reach and depth. Much like the UK lessons seem to be have learned about the importance of rebuilding stockpiles, ensuring there is depth in the supply chain and ensuring that the defence industry is able to respond to the needs of the government. Both nations have reached the same conclusion that you need to invest in unglamorous areas to be credible as a power.

It is also notable how the French focus on the importance of cyberspace and investing in credible deterrence and cybersecurity. There was tacit admission that more needed to be done in this field, and while the specifics are unlikely to become public knowledge, it highlights the challenging resource balance that nations must strike between visible and capable military forces and investing in cybersecurity – the latter is less ‘sexy’ and visible but arguably far more important to longer term national security than other assets. Trying to find a balance here to deter digitally and physically while being credible in both spaces at a time of budget constraints will be hard.

In the same vein the French are seeking to better understand how to handle the challenge from the ‘grey zone’ or hybrid war. How do you respond to a problem like this, when the actors we operate against do not necessarily operate in the conventional military manner? There is an argument that this is nothing new – operations in the hybrid space are as old as war itself – supporting through special forces, intelligence operations, working to use psychological tools to influence populations etc. All of this is a longstanding part of the toolbox of statecraft, but now, unlike previous years, it is much easier to use digital means to shape and exploit opinions and outcomes almost instantaneously, rather than over long periods of time.

What this means is that state planners need to be better at working in a more integrated manner, understanding that the effects they’re trying to achieve may occur far more quickly than before – and that they need to be better synchronised. Arguably the challenge of hybrid warfare now is ensuring that everyone involved is coordinated and able to deliver their part of the plan, and understand what others are up to. Perhaps the lesson is that joined up government matters far more now than ever before, because timelines and potential for things to go wrong are so much more accelerated.

One area of note is the French view on alliances, which confirm that it sees multilateralism as the way forward – while it is unlikely that French policy envisages France ever operating in a war in isolation again (the same as British policy) it is interesting to see how France sees NATO as ever more crucial to its national security. Following years of challenging relationships, France has now emerged as the most powerful NATO member in the EU, and is able to leverage its ability to influence in both organisations to enhance its security policy (e.g. it can contribute to both EU and NATO missions and influence across both organisations).  Part of the ongoing national tragedy that is Brexit is the fact that the UK no longer enjoys similar accesses or influence. This in turn has impacted its relationship with France, which recognises that burned bridges need to be rebuilt- it is a sad situation to see that two powers that should so instinctively turn to one another are, at present, further apart than they should be.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright 2023.

The other interesting observation is that France, unlike the UK, lacks the wider support of alliances like 5-EYES or AUKUS. One of the means by which the UK is able to benefit from shared intelligence, information and policy coordination is these well established cooperation channels built on mutual trust. The French lack access to a similar channel and while they enjoy positive relations with many nations, they are not ‘in the club’ nor likely to be considered for admission either. This in turn poses a large challenge for France in funding a global intelligence collection capability that supports French needs across a diverse range of theatres. Again this poses a resource burden on security spending as the cost required to fund investment here is eye wateringly expensive, but what do you deprioritise elsewhere in order to pay for it?

This is perhaps the big challenge facing France – it is a nation long on global ambition, but not flush with funding. To meet the challenges of funding a credible nuclear deterrent, aircraft carrier force, aerospace industry and national intelligence / cyberspace capabilities as well as normal armed forces is incredibly expensive. Lacking the ability to go into partnership in some areas, as well as the need to be seen to be a leading military power may force France into difficult budgetary decisions. If you define your value as an armed power by prestige projects then France will need to make cuts elsewhere to enable the ‘shop window’ kit to remain in service. In previous years it could be argued that the UK followed a different path to the French, focusing on less glamorous but important enablers, rather than prestige projects – there is though a compelling case that could be made that now both nations seem to be focusing more of their budgets on the shop window and not the back office functions.

Looking ahead French policy makers and budgeteers face extremely difficult decisions – do they focus resources on prestige projects to maintain the nuclear deterrent and new carrier and what gives to afford this? There is no sense that much more money will be available, and with skyrocketing inflation and rapidly changing security challenges, working out where to focus effort will be difficult. In short France faces a complex set of problems, almost identical in nature to the UK, and it will be interesting to see how both nations face up to resolving them. Trying to balance off so many challenges and deliver national security in an ever changing world will be difficult and hard choices and prioritisation decisions lie ahead, the impact of which will be felt for years to come.