Values, Standards and Leadership in the Internet Age.

 

It has been a busy and challenging first week for the new Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Sir Patrick Sanders. Having taken on the mantle of leadership of the British Army at a time when it faces challenges on many fronts, he has quickly made his mark by stopping 3 Para from deploying to Kosovo as a result of the Battalions recent activity.

His letter, crisp, punchy and written with a RIFLES like elan landed as a message clearly intended to be seen by a much wider audience. By very publicly pulling the unit from a high profile operational tour, and in particular one which would have been a medal earning opportunity, he has laid down the marker for his line on values & standards in the British Army.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright


The reports of recent incidents in Colchester, involving alleged orgies (albeit consensual) and wider disciplinary failings while in Macedonia highlight a real challenge for the Army – how do you keep a highly aggressive and motivated unit ready for operations, while ensuring that behaviour doesn’t cross the line?

Part of the mythos surrounding the Parachute Regiment is its near legendary ‘bad behaviour’ – it is not seen as a gentlemanly and affable club, it is, arguably, the Millwall of the British Army infantry units. Their role is simple – to leap from the air, and land in the most difficult and demanding of circumstances, probably at night, probably amid confusion, disarray and destruction, and then fight until relieved. It calls for a uniquely aggressive and determined mindset, and a willingness to go on long after others would have stopped.

The Regimental history is littered with gallantry awards and tales of valour that are both inspirational and humbling to read. There is no doubt that within their world, the airborne infantryman can, when deployed on operations, be a ferocious foe, who few would wish to tangle with.  The problem is that this aggression and drive is not something that is commonly needed outside of military operations, and the chances of these occurring are in ever shorter supply.

After a period when there were opportunities for deployments and kinetic action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the call for missions for Paratroopers is, currently, slim. Designed as a force intended to be ready to go when called, their leadership have to balance off maintaining an aggressive ‘ready for anything’ mentality, coupled with trying to keep the behaviour of their people under manageable control.

This is the era of the ‘Strategic Tom’ – What must have started off as a raucous party has quickly resulted in the actions of a small group of soldier leading to the direct intervention of the head of the British Army, and seen a major short notice change to deployment plans, disrupted other units plans and made headlines across the country. Even the tiniest of incidents can have a very large effect.

It poses a series of really difficult questions and challenges about how the British Army balances off leadership values and standards, and remains fit for duty. There will be lots of people looking to pin the blame on someone – was it the CO, was it the Company Commander, was it the RSM or the NCO’s – did someones Corporal fail to say ‘this needs to stop’ – the fact is that wherever you want to pin blame, something went wrong. It matters less what happened, but far more on how you fix it, and how others perceive the recovery. The challenge is to step into the culture and change what isn’t working as well, without disturbing the ethos that draws the unit together.

Leadership isn’t easy, and leading motivated troops who have had ‘a good idea’ and then feel that their actions are in keeping with the traditions of the Regiment, or what went on before can be a challenge. Having the ability to say NO, and ensure at all levels that behaviour doesn’t cross the line can be, at times, a hard thing to do.

You only need look at the accounts that pop up in books and online of what went on in the past, of massive parties, huge fights, very stupid things happening to realise that this was what always went on in some quarters. If this is the done thing, then stopping it can be hard – particularly if you yourself did it earlier in your career.  The problem is that what may have been low key and under the radar years ago can now easily become front page news, and this is not a good place to be.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright



The modern Army has a very different set of values and standards that are far less tolerant (and rightly so) of behaviours that even a few years ago would have been seen as ‘hijinks’ or letting off steam. There is very little appetite or tolerance for inappropriate conduct at any level – in a world where a Private doing something silly can be a major news story, there is little room for manoeuvre. The question is what do you do about units like the Parachute Regiment, who are troops ready to fight, yet who lack a fight to deploy to?

This high-profile intervention will send a clear message on values and standards, that will need to be reinforced at every level of the command chain. But it has to be carefully handled – those who were planning to be deployed this summer, and who had no part in the shenanigans will potentially be very unhappy at what could be seen as ‘collective punishment’, while others may see it as being unfairly punished for not (in their eyes) doing anything particularly wrong, certainly not compared to the past.

Underpinning this is a sense of giving troops direction and purpose. The Parachute Regiment, formed 80 years ago, has not operationally jumped into action for over 65 years. With the loss of the C130 looming and the A400M not cleared for parachuting yet, the near future as a parachutists looks bleak at best. With the days of HERRICK long behind the unit, and without meaningful opportunities to deploy likely, how do you keep a group of fit, motivated and very aggressive men occupied without things going wrong, or losing the ethos that binds them together?

To so publicly lose the trust of the CGS and lose out on a high-profile deployment will be uncomfortable, and there is no doubt that this letter will hurt many in the Regiment and many more will be embarrassed or ashamed of it. It is not a good place to be, and the road to recovery will be challenging. There will be a huge leadership challenge ahead to prevent the emergence of a ‘Millwall culture’ (‘no one likes us we don’t care), which needs to be stopped in its tracks before it becomes incredibly damaging.

The wider message that has been sent is that standards are changing, values are changing, and the nature of the Army is changing. There is no doubt that activities that would in previous years have been seen as acceptable is now totally unacceptable.  It is clear that the Army will no longer tolerate behaviour that brings it into disrepute, and that the actions of even the most junior soldier can, and will, be judged at the highest levels.

The British Army is rightly proud of its history, heritage and traditions drawn from hundreds of years of battlefield experience. But it has to ensure that it reflects the society it defends and does not become isolated from it, by choice or behaviour. The challenge for leaders is to ensure that the Army at all levels does not become separated from society, or that their actions create conditions where it is seen as an awkward embarrassment, not a source of pride.

Hopefully this is an isolated one-off incident, never to be repeated. But the message is clear, if you fail to live up to the values and standards of your organisation, then the organisation has no place for you in it.

Comments

  1. This is clearly a collective punishment. I find those problematic in an organisation which claims to be against bullying, because the operative aspect of collective punishment is, ultimately, bullying. It is a tacit admission by the chain of command that it lacks the interest or means to pursue adequate and visible punishment of the individuals involved through disciplinary or administrative action, and is instead content for justice to be served through informal means, such as the time-honoured Code Red, or more likely in this case, a good old fashioned kicking. Many will shrug and say "so what, they deserve it", but let's at least recognise that collective punishment belongs in the past alongside other behaviours the Army wishes to eliminate.

    ReplyDelete

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

OP WILMOT - The Secret SBS Mission to Protect the QE2

Is It Time To Close BRNC Dartmouth?

"Hands to Action Stations" Royal Navy 1983 Covert Submarine Operations Off Argentina...