Stockpiling Problems...

 

 

There are never enough munitions available to fight the wars we think we may need to fight. This is a statement that is both true and also timeless. Every nation that has fought in conflict has found itself running short on expendable munitions, from arrowheads, cannon balls and bullets to artillery rounds and precision guided missiles.

The war in Ukraine has reminded us again that modern high intensity warfare chews through munition stockpiles at a vast rate, far higher than pre war exercise planners would have assumed. Tens of thousands of rounds are being fired weekly in the war, and supplies it seems are starting to run low on both sides. At some point, without western intervention, Ukrainian supplies will dwindle and run out.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The importance of logistic chains and munitions stockpiles was discussed this week in Parliament by senior officers and Ministers, who focused on the importance of rebuilding stocks and ensuring that there were enough weapons and supplies available for the UK during operations. The gauntlet has been thrown down to industry to deliver, but can it do so in a credible timescale?

Part of the challenge is that we are now reaping the consequences of thirty years of disinvestment in areas like munitions stockpiles, planning for heavy war and assuming that conflict will occur on a discretionary basis at a time and place of our choosing. During the Cold War NATO forces maintained large stockpiles of vehicles, weapons and ammunition that would have been used to stop an invading Soviet force for about 10 days. Despite the widely held assumption that these would have not been enough to last anywhere near long enough, they would have bought time for negotiations or common sense to prevail before the war went nuclear.

In the Falklands in 1982 the UK faced a challenge in trying to get access to advanced munitions such as AIM9L sidewinders, which it owned, but which were assigned to forces in NATO, as it could not draw down the conventional defence of the Alliance to support its own national interest. This required some flexible support from the US to acquire access to equivalent missiles which could be used instead. This highlights the importance with which the commitment to stockpiling ammunition for contingency use was held in by NATO at the time.

After the end of the Cold War the imperative to maintain large stockpiles of munitions and be ready for near instant action went away. The demand reduced, and the associated warehouses, munitions compounds and the chain of defence industry support withered away. Munition levels were vastly reduced, a fact particularly felt in the UK after the introduction of a new budgeting method in the early 2000s, which essentially penalised the UK military for having holdings of too many weapons – it was financially incentivised to draw the stockpile down to the lowest practical level.

The result has been over the last 30 years that with reduced orders and demand for weapons and munitions, the defence industry has reduced in size and capacity to reflect customer demand. There is very little in the way of mothballed plant or workers sitting around waiting for orders to come in, as industry cannot afford this – there is no sentimentality or ability to hold onto things ‘just in case’, when you have to pay for them. The result is that the UK, and NATO have emerged with the munitions industry that they have spent decades creating the conditions for. While it is clear that nations now want to increase their spending on stockpiles, and to increase readiness more widely, it will take time for industry to respond.

You cannot just press a button marked ‘quadruple production’ and then expect to see more weapons and bullets flying off the production line. It takes time to put the supply chain in place and scale production up – realistically a decision now to increase demand will result in a couple of years’ time with increased levels of productivity and stockpile levels – it is a slow process. That is even before you have difficult conversations about costs and where the workforce is coming from to increase production.

The challenge posed by Ukraine is that the UK has to now make difficult decisions on the extent of the support it can offer, and what must be held back for its own needs. There has been very generous assistance provided, including vehicles, artillery and missiles, often drawn from UK stockpiles. But these are finite in nature, and every missile sent is one missile less for British operations. While more weapons can, and will, be built, it will take time for them to arrive on the front line in Ukraine, or with British forces. In the interim, tough calls are needed as to what matters more – should we send every missile, every spare vehicle, every bullet we have to Ukraine to stop the Russians now, or should we hold back as a contingency to deter Russia and ensure we have forces available to help defend the Baltic republics in the event of invasion?

As the NATO summit in Madrid approaches, tough calls need to be made, not just about the support offered to Ukraine, but about how NATO is willing and able to stand up and defend its members. An emboldened Russia may be an economic basket case, but led by a delusional dictator with fantasies of being ‘Putin the Great’, we cannot rule out a further land grab by attacks to reclaim the Baltic states. At present faith has been put in the concept of Article 5 and nuclear deterrence, but is the tripwire really enough, or does NATO need to return to a much more visible and beefed up defensive posture in the region?

Perhaps it is time to focus on building stockpiles up again, calling exercises like ACTIVE EDGE (the BAOR emergency callout) and putting forces into the Baltic in considerable number, much like in Germany in the Cold War, to show Russia a credible force that can, and will, fight to defend the Baltic region if attacked. Such a move though will require significant reallocation of forces, and a major investment in stockpiles of weapons, munitions and infrastructure on a long term basis – it means winding the clock back 30 years and turning NATO back into a highly capable defensive Alliance with agreed warplans and trained to fight and win on the ground it will operate on.

For the UK this poses an interesting dilemma – a move to reinvest in NATO and provide stockpiles there to deter and defend the Baltics will reduce resources available for operations elsewhere. For example, with finite Brimstone missiles in the inventory, do these need to be held and declared to NATO as part of a mission capable force to destroy invading Russian armour, or can they be sent globally to support British expeditionary operations, reducing NATO defences but supporting British national interest?

Having spent decades focusing on global operations and, largely, paying lip service to NATO, the UK now finds itself potentially having to choose what matters more. Is it credible hard power in the Alliance, investing in turning itself back into what it was in 1991 when the Cold War ended – a capable land power with modern equipment, supported by a very potent tactical airforce and arguably the best ASW navy in the world, with some limited power projection capability, or does it continue down the path laid out in the Integrated Review of a ‘Global Britain’ with more emphasis on the Indo-Pacific?

There is not, on current spending plans at least, enough to do both outcomes, and to reinvigorate and retrain the Army in particular will take a great deal more money, time and willingness to shed sacred cows like Ajax in order to save it and reform it into a credible warfighting force fit for operations in Northern Europe. To do this is likely to come at the cost of resources for wider global operations, even if the ambition remains. This change cannot be done without the support of the defence industry, which will need to scale up production on a vast scale to produce what is needed of it. In turn this will call for more money and investment, perhaps more than is available.

The final question to ask though is whether the threat is as real as we think it may be? We assume that Russian attention may turn post Ukraine to the Baltics, or elsewhere, yet their stockpiles too are rapidly depleting. We know that Russian forces are running very short on advanced missiles, and are using older weapons instead. But we don’t (publicly at least) have any idea as to how rapidly Russia is drawing down its own munitions stockpile, or how easily their ammunition can be replaced.

It seems reasonable to assume that given the scale of sanctions imposed on Russia, the economic hardship that will follow and the difficulty in securing western derived parts, they will face great difficulty in rebuilding their advanced weapon stockpiles. They may also struggle to rebuild their forces more generally after the summer fighting season. To that end, how great a threat is Russia likely to pose to the Baltic in the next two to three years as it tries to regenerate its military and stockpiles?  With that in mind, is there more time than we perhaps assume to go about the process of hardening and continuing to reinvigorate the Alliance, and ensure that it can defend its members if required?

The Madrid summit will be a vital point for NATO, helping show the world how it will be ready to respond to deter and defend its members from hostile attack. But no matter what is agreed politically, it is likely that the debate on how best to do this, via proxy supplies, drawing down stockpiles to aid others, or by reinforcing their own defences will continue for many years to come. The UK, like other states now faces tough decisions on the role it wants to play in NATO, and whether its armed forces are the right fit for the new world we face, or if sweeping and significant force structure changes need to be made to adapt to it.