Being Open About Intelligence.

As the world waits to see whether President Putin will commit to an all out, and utterly illegal invasion of Ukraine, a wider battle is being fought using open source intelligence material.

In what has been a challenging period, it has been fascinating to watch the way that open source material, downgraded intelligence products and an aggressive information operations campaign has been effectively deployed by the West to hold Russia to account.

What is notable during this period has been several strands of activity that brought together raise intriguing questions about the way that the UK and wider Western allies look to conduct operations, particularly those short of outright conflict.

This crisis has once again demonstrated the raw power and value of open source intelligence products that can be used to easily show and disseminate information to an audience. The widespread use of satellite imagery to show troop movements, and presence of Russian forces in different locations close to the border with Ukraine represents a capability that 20-30 years ago would almost certainly have been classified as Top Secret.

The emergence of highly capable commercially available platforms to share overhead imagery with people, and the wider ability to share geolocated information about troop movements (for example the regular film footage taken inside Russia of troop convoys moving) has been an intelligence boon. It is now possible for amateur organisations to act as essentially professional intelligence collection organisations, providing and analysing material to provide independent assessment on the situation.

We now find ourselves in a world where States are not the only possessors and users of intelligence material. Previously it would have been the case that a nation state would hold information, much like we are seeing in this open source products and regard it as the crown jewels of intelligence. Now it is freely available, enabling others to view and comment on it.

This makes for a fascinating debate about how intelligence use evolves – with intelligence no longer the sole preserve of the state, how can it be used to shape and inform public opinion? Given the deep and lingering suspicions of the misuse of intelligence products, dating back to 2003 and the so-called ‘dodgy dossier’, this crisis is notable by the way that there is a much wider acceptance that Russian activities are genuine – had this material solely come from a government, then there may be more doubt, or questions around the agenda of a NATO government in stating this – but with independent organisations providing corroboration, and the source material freely available, open source intelligence has become a credible way of confirming activity and removing doubts about whether it has occurred.

We now live in a world where policy makers, and influencers all have access to broadly the same intelligence picture – it is possible for Ministers and the media to be able to see broadly the same information about troops presence, their locations and their training in the same time frame. Intelligence has gone from being a tool of powerful control, limited to a select few with access to it, to a freely tradeable commodity that is far more accessible than it has ever been.

There is a fascinating debate to be had on how open source intelligence changes the policy makers perspective. Some Whitehall old-hands of a certain vintage still involuntarily shudder at the tale of a (now retired) very senior officer saying “I prefer to be my own intelligence analyst” – and this dates from the days before OSINT became so accessible. Today the growth in accessibility means that literally every policy maker, strategic communications analyst and political advisor can see, and reach their own conclusions on the raw material in front of them.

The wider growth too in analysis of this material, with a wide range of highly credible and well regarded intelligence analytical sites in existence means that it is possible to get a ‘second opinion’ too. For the intelligence community and analysts, the challenge is how to ensure that opinion formers and decision makers in government use your material, treat its content with seriousness it deserves, and reach their policy making conclusions on your assessments.

This is not as easy as it may sound – if access to intelligence is slow, or the desire to provide properly assessed ‘all source’ product means producing intelligence updates takes time – or even if the concept of ‘need to know’ means people who can influence decision makers don’t get told, then unlike in previous years where there would be an information vacuum, the same customer base will now go elsewhere for their raw information update.

A big challenge in the world of easily available intelligence material is going to be ensuring that decision makers have timely access to properly assessed and usable product. If something cannot be shared, or is too highly classified to widely disseminate, does it suddenly cease to be of value in an era where a SPAD can just go on the internet and find the answer to their Ministers question?

We have emerged into a world where fundamentally the same raw intelligence product is, broadly speaking, available via a variety of channels and producers. The challenge for the Government intelligence community will be to ensure that its message, content and assessment are seen as the gold standard, and not ‘too difficult to bother with’ by decision makers.

The next intriguing lesson in this crisis is the use of rapidly downgraded intelligence to shape the information space. This perhaps marks the first time that intelligence has been so quickly provided in a usable format to decision makers in a way that enables it to shape messaging and information.

Rather than being hidden behind the closed doors of windowless rooms, where intelligence officials know Russian intent, but are unable to discuss it, we instead see a strong and assertive messaging campaign from Western leaders to highlight Russian actions as they happen.

The fusing of intelligence with media briefings, to essentially ‘show and tell’ Russian acts, predicting the provocations, showing that ‘false flag’ operations are underway and helping rapidly rebut film footage that is a lie is powerful and effective. The West appears to have essentially laid out the Russian plan and is pointing to it in a way that shows clearly Russian actions and intent.

When coupled with independent OSINT organisations providing corroboration of this movement, we are seeing an extremely effective use of intelligence to drive the narrative. The ability to launch a surprise attack is diminished, or to claim that the Russian forces are providing aid at rebel request looks ever more laughable by the hour.

Russian efforts, often lauded in some academic quarters for their thinking on such concepts as ‘grey zone warfare’ or the ‘Gerasimov doctrine’ have gone from looking sharp, to, frankly, looking pretty amateur.

To find themselves and their plans so openly called out by NATO, and yet to persist with such blatant and unsubtle provocations demonstrates a lack of agile thinking in Russian military circles – it suggests a plan is underway, and that the pattern of fake attacks, staged bombs and other such nonsense cannot be stopped, modified or amended – the Russians seem to lack the capability to adopt subtle measures, and are instead blundering on with their original plan with all the subtlety and nuance of the D-Day naval gunfire support missions.

Whether they particularly care or not is another question. Russian activity seems set on building internal domestic public support for what may be a long and bloody war. By creating circumstances where the population blame the West and others for their woes, it seems as if Russian policy makers care little for how their actions are perceived – they are in many ways the Millwall of international relations (“no one likes us, we don’t care”) – but at the same time, there seems to be a lack of nuance or subtlety to their communications, compared to the Soviet Union days.

The use of open source intelligence in this way, and the Russian reaction to it does raise two questions – firstly, is the use of strategic deception or gaining surprise even possible any more, and secondly, does it matter?

We now live in a world where large troop movements and build ups are impossible to conceal credibly. No nation can hope to deploy or amass large ground forces near anothers border without it quickly leaking onto social media. From an intelligence perspective this is an interesting opportunity – it is possible to call out and show troop build ups without necessarily blowing the existence of dedicated and specialist intelligence sources – in turn this enables policy makers to more assertively call out activity before it becomes an issue.

In practical terms, if the element of strategic surprise has been lost, and the only tactical surprise possible is perhaps the question of when the attack will specifically occur, or its initial objectives, then can nation states still rely on the concept of surprise attack anymore as a tool of policy? Similarly, given the plethora of open source media in existence, and the ability to rapidly and firmly rebut and react to deception or disinformation operations, is it still possible for nation states to use these as an external policy tool?

Assuming that the sort of nations that rely on these tactics are likely to be dictatorships with internally controlled and repressed state media, and limited external access to information, we have to work on the view that these nations care little for domestic views on a crisis. It is the external audience whose opinion they may need to shape or deceive.

In the NATO response to this crisis, we’ve seen a surprisingly assertive and effective response to Russian tactics – essentially denying them the element of surprise, and ensuring that their intentions are clearly telegraphed to the wider world. Is this likely to be the textbook of future operations, where nations are no longer able to use surprise as a strategic tool, or rely on deception to be effective?

We find ourselves in a world where intelligence is freely available to anyone at any time who has access to the internet or a smart phone. The days of the public waiting to hear the Prime Minister speak on the wireless to update the nation as to whether we are at war or not has gone forever. Instead it is possible for people globally to learn in seconds about very tactical developments in an operational theatre.

What is emerging is a fascinating competition between the West, which uses this information as an assertive way of calling out behaviour and activity, and Russia and other totalitarian states, where the leadership lack either the will, or interest to fight a meaningful information war. There seems to be an assumption in these states that their domestic audience will not care, and they invest little imagination or effort in pushing credible coherent narratives to undermine Western perspectives.

There is a sharp contrast between the unity of purpose and clear messaging resolve displayed by the West, and the way in which Russian government messaging appears both dysfunctional and shambolic in its approach.

Whether this matters though remains to be seen – if the Russian leadership decide to commit a strategic error and commit to an invasion of Ukraine, then they seem to have accepted the West will neither accept, nor endorse, their narrative of events. Given this, what really matters is perhaps how effective their armed forces will be, and how they can sustain domestic public support as sanctions bite, economies shrink and the body bags of loved ones return home in ever greater numbers.

Will a primitive and internally focused messaging appeal to the public be enough, or will a wily population, now aware of the West, and a youth who are increasingly unhappy with Putins regime turn on the leadership in protest at a bloody war that they will be expected to fight and die in?

Whatever happens in the coming days, it is clear that there is much to be discussed on messaging, intelligence and the means by which some nations prepare to go to war, and democracies try to prevent one.