Dress Like a Pirate - Submariners and their Sweaters...


The Sun has published a story today about a report into retention in the Submarine Service, focusing on a survey of Submarine personnel and what they feel is needed to improve morale and retention.
The headline focuses on the permitting people to wear their ‘submarine jumpers’ ashore, and the MOD has tried to deflect attention away entirely by claiming that the report was unauthorised, but the reality is that this is a good insight into the challenges facing retention in one of the most critical parts of the Royal Navy.

The context of the report is not entirely clear – it was, according to the FOI request written for a Rear Admiral Submarines (the effective ‘head’ of the Submarine Service), and was clearly formally written and staffed up through the chain. It is not clear if it is referring to one specific submarine, or the entire force as a whole though. Either way, although according to the MOD this was an “unofficial and unauthorised study conducted into life in the submarine service, and it would be inappropriate to comment further”, it does seem to be rather thorough and been seemingly distributed at a very high level within the Service about the challenges faced by Submariners..

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright



The Submarine Service is going through immense change and investment, operating 10 boats right now (4 x Vanguard class SSBN, 3 x Astute and 3 x Trafalgar) while building a further four ASTUTEs and building or designing another four DREADNOUGHT class. This considerable investment is occurring at the same time as the force is moving in its entirety to Faslane.

The force has been worked incredibly hard for years and has also suffered from a range of challenges. The combination of maintaining an effective Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD), which has now been sustained for 50 years, on an increasingly elderly and fragile platform, plus the wider issues of keeping the now very elderly remaining TRAFALGAR class vessels at sea, and introducing the new ASTUTE class has been a challenge.

The challenge is also in trying to meet multiple very demanding operations – from ensuring there is always an SSBN on patrol, to providing SSNs to provide cover and be ready to fulfil the wider TLAM strike and other ‘sneaky beaky’ work that plays upon the unique capability and characteristics of the SSN force. The sheer effort required by so many people, military, civil service and contractor to ensure continued operational delivery of these platforms is astounding.

The Submarine Service has always been a difficult and challenging organisation to recruit for. Its requirements are for the special combination of people who can meet the robust physical and psychological challenges associated with submarine life – months away from home in a confined space, working a very odd set of shifts and dealing with all manner of challenging issues deep under the water.  

Many submariners find themselves immersed in a career and culture that is demanding, dangerous and totally alien to the rest of the Naval Service. The wearers of the ‘dolphins’ are rightly proud of their skills and capabilities and see themselves as an elite group within the RN. But this does come at a cost – the force is busy, and people are often finding themselves away from home for far longer than they would wish to be. Retention is a real challenge; particularly given the length of time it takes to train new personnel and get them qualified for submarine service.


Solving this challenge then is to look at the question of how to create conditions where people want to stay in and not leave at an inopportune moment. To that end the RN seems to have conducted at least one study into attitudes among submariners about what would encourage them to stay, and what are the ‘little things’ that would make a difference.

Reading the actual (albeit very heavily redacted) survey is interesting as it shows that the fundamental concerns about how to improve things are not particularly surprising. There is a call for more pay, although there is probably not a single part of the armed forces that wouldn’t ask for more money! There is also a lot of focus on trying to improve the basic quality of life issues – such as the challenge associated with trying to sustain watchkeeping while alongside, or better support for accommodation and travel issues.

There is a focus on trying to better improve the recruiting visibility by getting more people into schools and 6th forms to drum up interest in a career within the service. There is also the intriguing observation that programmes such as ‘Navy School’ (a documentary about HMS RALEIGH) sat poorly with serving personnel, who felt the RN didn’t advertise itself brilliantly well in this regard. This is particularly interesting as Navy School may not have sat well with serving personnel but did reportedly cause a significant surge in interest by potential recruits, suggesting that if it was intended to aid recruitment, it succeeded even if it didn’t land well with those serving.

Recognition is perhaps the most critical area mentioned here. People in a uniformed service are rightly proud of their work and status, particularly if they are part of a select group. Much like the parachute wings or aviator wings distinguishes those who can fly, and those who choose to jump out of perfectly serviceable aircraft for a living from other people, the Dolphin symbol serves as a visible sign of being part of ‘the club’.

The problem for submariners is that, until recently, they relatively rarely got to wear Dolphins except in formal No1 uniform. This has been relaxed somewhat though, and they can now be seen on more unform types. The suggestion that the submariners jersey, a unique item of clothing only issued to the Submarine Service be allowed to be worn ashore is actually a really good idea. It sends two messages – firstly it reinforces the theme that submariners are special – they are permitted to wear something that looks distinctive that others cannot. Secondly, it helps send a wider message that the Service wants its submariners to look the part. It may not sound like much, but it sends a wider signal of support and acceptance that will go a long way.


The issue of medallic recognition too is of paramount importance.  The Submarine Service is the part of the RN that operates in what are essentially wartime conditions daily. Their missions are secret and often exceptionally high risk – they are required to do tasks that they cannot speak of, or claim credit for publicly, and they will be expected to do so under conditions of extreme danger. A read of ‘The Silent Deep’ by Lord Hennessey will reveal the Cold War history of the force and some of the missions it carried out and the level of risk taken to do so. It is unlikely that much has changed since the end of the Cold War.

The problem for submariners though is that because their missions are so secret and compartmented, it is not possible for there to be public recognition of their work. Some may argue that the wearing of the Dolphin distinguishes them anyway, but there is something about the possession of a medal that makes people feel valued. In a military where many still have several for UN operations or short tours in Iraq or Afghanistan, there is perhaps an understandable resentment that for submariners, who fight a silent war daily, there is no similar recognition.

There are occasional suggestions online of issuing of what has been referred to as the ‘MT1.2 medal’ – an oblique reference to the work reportedly undertaken to better understand what other people may be up to. But, the issuing of this is probably to challenging as it would require explanation of just what people were up to. The Australian work around is apparently to issue a 'Special Operations' clasp to the Australian Service Medal, as a means of recognising activity without it forming part of a specific campaign. 


The SSBN force has tried to handle recognition by the issuing of a ‘bomber pin’ which is worn on the uniform to indicate that someone has completed a certain number of patrols. While not a medal, it is a useful visible sign of the commitment undertaken by someone to spending many months and years on patrol, far from home and in total radio silence. It is a helpful way of ensuring people can show that even if they have no visible medals, they have taken part in a very active operational career. There may be a logic in applying a similar pin for the SSN force, to reflect the levels of commitment involved.

The reason this sort of visible recognition matters is because it sends a message that people feel valued and appreciated. A great deal is asked of submariners and they lead a life which is not understood by the public, or often the Naval Service, at large.

There is one particularly cheeky suggestion that the RN should reconsider the introduction to service of a diesel submarine fleet. Whilst this report is unlikely by itself to create the conditions to bring the SSK force back, or magic up the extra personnel, industrial capacity and funding to make it happen, it does serve as a good reminder that nuclear submarines are complex beasts.

The Submarine Service is the only part of the RN that has nuclear engineers, meaning that their ability to draw on others to solve their manpower problems is highly limited. Keeping sufficient nuclear engineers trained and available to keep the force at sea is a real challenge, particularly when the private sector can offer very generous packages to people to leave. It is a good reminder that the real challenge is not the technology but the people. If you are unable to retain them, then it is much harder to keep vessels at sea. This is of particular importance when it comes to sustaining sufficient trained crew for the SSBN force.


Perhaps the biggest challenge of all though for the Submarine Service is ensuring that people understand the vital work they do and give them the recognition they deserve. To that end it is good to see that the RN is putting a focus on the role of the SSBN force as it celebrates 50 years of CASD.
The effort required to do this is significant, and represents 50 years of missed birthdays, family occasions and Christmas by crews sailing a long way from home in total isolation. The human story of the SSBN force and the sacrifices made to ensure the deterrent is always available is compelling and rightly worth telling.

Likewise it is good to see the Submarine Service looking for other avenues to celebrate its people. This year sees four Submariners participate in the Tallisker Atlantic Challenge,  trying to row across the Atlantic and raise £100,000 for the RN&RM Charity (more information on HMS Oardacious and how you can support this very worthy cause can be found HERE). This sort of activity should be celebrated and lauded as a great example of the people spirit at the heart of the Submarine Service.

The sort of issues raised here may sound trivial to outside observers, but these are precisely the things that members of a uniformed disciplined service value. The ability to show off the slightly ‘pirate attitude’ by displaying a White Jersey, or the wearing of a medal to show that you have been to interesting waters. It sets you apart from the others – one of the great truths about uniformed service is that many people want to do anything but look uniform, they want tangible recognition that they are different and part of something special. Perhaps the time has come for the Submarine Service to be officially allowed to ‘be more pirate’?



Comments

  1. Is it time to look at the CASD mission again? Does it need to be 4 submarines and does it have to be continuous. The Russian Navy took a break from their deployments and no one doubted their commitment to a nuclear deterrent. I'm not aware if China even does CASD and again no one doubts their resolve to use nuclear weapons.
    I actually quite like the idea of diesel electric submarines, primarily to ease the burden of training commitments and allow a wider pool of engineers to help support the submarine service. The logistics would be a problem, but could a long lease of a proven design, with another navy leading the provision of the supply chain work?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Even if the Russians took a break from at sea deterrent they retained large numbers of land based ICBMs. UK doesn't have any, and the V Bomber force is long gone.

      Delete
    2. They did, but the reason we got rid of the air and land based systems was they weren't as assured to survive as the submarine based system.

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    3. @fruit
      If there wasn't a boomer at Sea, under what circumstances would you order the massive escalation of deploying one?

      Russian specisl forces abducting Estonian Generals? The partial annexation of Georgia or Ukraine?
      And for how llong after would you maintain them?

      Or would you wait till T72s were in Berlin? And if so, what happens if the boomer is destroyed in port as the fighting is around Warsaw?

      Delete
    4. Please read the comments below by me which explain what's proposed. It's not ending 365 days at sea as a target.

      Delete
  2. The Russian Navy took a break. You really believe this? That is why we need at least four.....

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I'll try to find the link. It was during the Yeltsin era. Granted they did have the silo land based missiles but the reason we got rid of those was they couldn't be guaranteed to be available, which is the prime driver of the submarine based system.

      Delete
    2. Russia is 17mn km2
      The UK is 243k km2

      Russia has vast amounts of space in which is can house land based nuclear weapons which are relatively safe from attack.
      The UK does not
      Any land based weapons in the UK would be relatively easy to destroy in a first strike.

      The only way to safely store UK nuclear weapons is to store them in a ssbn as we do currently.

      Delete
  3. It's not like we have other options. Russia and China still have land and air delivery iirc

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Yep, but we got rid of those because they weren't as assured of being available.

      Delete
  4. I do not believe that the UK should move away from CASD. Trident is our only nuclear delivery system and the cornerstone of UK defence. Abandoning 365 days a year deterrence would be the start of a slippery slope and the capability would be gradually downgraded to the point where it is of no value. SSKs are a nice idea but just not feasible in the current climate. Moving to 8 Astutes would have been the most realistic option in terms of incresing numbers but this is not going to happen now.

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    Replies
    1. I was more thinking of moving to 3 boats rather than removing 365 at sea, which will take us down from very, very likely to to have a boat on station to very likely to to have a boat on station. It's increasing the probability that a boat might not be available, not abandoning 365 at sea tasking.
      I wasn't suggesting increasing the number of boats for deployment, that seems to worsen the problem, I was suggesting that long term loan of a couple of SSK would allow non-nuclear engineers to support submarine training missions, widening the pool of resources.

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    2. I think the issue with going from 4 boats to 3 is that the reduction in capability would not lead to worthwhile savings. A lot of the costs are fixed and when this was being debated a decade ago it was suggested that a 25% reduction in the number of boats would only translate to a 10% reduction in capital costs. Axing Ark Royal and the Harriers 5 years early to save a few bob is one thing, but decisions concerning Trident are of a completely different order of magnitude.

      Also, if we only built 3 boats and the security situation then deteriorated, with guaranteed CASD again being required, the RN would not be able to deliver it. We could not just build a one-off 4th boat. If there were only 3 built we would be stuck with that for 3 decades. It might be possible to get away with 'near CASD' now but we do not know what the threats to national security will be 20 years from now.

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    3. The previous proposals were about saving money, but in this case reducing to 3 boats is about freeing up resources to crew other submarines.
      The proposal is to run the CASD mission closer to the margin, accepting the increased risk of not having a boat at sea when needed. The aim is still 365 days at sea for the length of the mission.
      It's true we don't know what the threat will be in 20 years but that statement doesn't provide guidance as to what we should do today.

      Delete
  5. Medals for service are all well and good but I think you need to be wary of creating an elite. By creating a singled out 1st class you have by default created a second class. Tell one group they are special you have automatically told the rest they are not. For example the "Hat" culture in the army is not exactly healthy.

    I think there must be better ways to aid retention than being given a lovely jumper, a pat on the head and being told your special.

    They really are very nice jumpers though!!!

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  6. Subamriners should certainly be encouraged to show off their (correctly) elite skills in public - a small bit of appreciation goes a long way. However, it is too hopeful to think that this alone would sort the retention problem. That problem is at core on of overwork, not underappreciation. Which in turn is a problem of too few boats. Which is partly a problem of budget, but also a problem of created by the (mad) idea of having a 100% nuclear powered capability. A careful analysis of MoD's published accounts shows that reactor fuel and processing costs in the region of £1m per operational boat-sea-day (yes, amazing, carefully concealed in plain sight, but true). Which makes all the low-intensity submarine tasks incredibly expensive (Perisher, Clockwork mouse, OST, etc).

    Sweden has today ordered two SSKs with AIP from Saab - 20-day dived endurance, crew 30 (ish) cost about £300m, fuel cost per operational sea-day about £3k.

    A report into that bizarre RN decision would be welcome.

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    Replies
    1. Exactly what I was thinking of. Even better if we could get Sweden's Försvarets materielverk to provide the lead on their ongoing support.

      Delete
    2. OMG, we agree! That is a pleasant surprise FM.
      Page C10 of the "report" also agrees.
      But, like the Irishman asked for directions said, "if you want to get [there], you shouldn't be starting from [here]"

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    3. But the Swedish submarine force only needs to patrol close to Sweden, protecting territorial waters.

      RN submarines need to be Nuclear because British operations stretch the entire globe, not to mention they will soon need to keep up with a carrier group, doing 3x the miles of the surface ships as they range around the group providing protection. Good luck doing that with AIP where you can either go fast underwater OR stay underwater for a long time, not both.

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  7. To quote the urban dictionary,
    "craphat
    Military slang used by members of the parachute regiment to denote what they class as lesser regiments.
    Taken from the fact that they wear the coveted Maroon beret that no-one else wears.
    what the f*ck does he know hes a f*cking craphat"

    A fairly good definition though it extends beyond the Parachute regiment. Unit rivalry, ethos and pride are to be supported. But their are many who believe it (lesser regiments) a little too much.
    Massive link to the original quote below!

    https://www-urbandictionary-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?amp_js_v=a2&amp_gsa=1&term=craphat&amp=true&usqp=mq331AQCCAE%3D#referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.urbandictionary.com%2Fdefine.php%3Fterm%3Dcraphat

    ReplyDelete

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