Is it time for a 'Custom of Reasonable Silence'? Thoughts on Gen Houghtons comments about defence funding
The former
Chief of the Defence Staff, Baron Houghton of Richmond (more widely known to
many as General Sir Nick Houghton) has courted controversy in the media today
by suggesting that Defence is not properly funded, and was not properly funded
in 2015. In comments on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme he said:
“We have slightly deluded the public of late that we have
a defence programme that frankly we know is unaffordable… We are to an extent
living a lie” (LINK)
These comments caused a veritable storm
with some praising the General for his intervention, while others saw it as an
untimely and potentially hypocritical position to take.
Humphreys strictly personal view is that
interventions by retired very senior officers have become a depressingly
familiar theme in recent years. There appears to be a well-worn trend of Service
Chiefs staying relentlessly ‘on message’ at every opportunity while serving,
telling the men & women who look up to them for leadership, that all will
be well, that decisions make sense and that there is a plan to make it work. As
they come to the end of their time there is usually a slightly risqué interview
with a national newspaper where they’ll obliquely hint at concerns over funding
and issue a veiled threat that they’ll be watching with interest or concern.
There is then a period of silence, followed at some time later by an attack on
the Government of the day for failing to fund Defence properly. These
interventions have attracted increasing levels of cynicism from many
commentators, who note wryly that people only seem to develop an ability to tell
the truth once their pension is secure…
While the ‘secure pension’ line is in
itself a myth (anyone who has served long enough to be a 4* has already got a
secure and generous pension for life waiting for them the moment they retire), there
is perhaps more substance in the view that it is inconsistent to say one thing,
and then barely two years later say something completely different.
Most people in Defence will probably
harbour private concerns at one stage or another about the nature of their
organisation, the pace of cuts or structural changes and what they perceive to
be lack of investment in their area. This is entirely natural, particularly in
large organisations like the Armed Forces that regularly change their focus,
structures and roles, and where if you are in a small unit in a remote part of
the system, it is easy to feel that you’re not privy to the bigger picture.
The challenge for SNCO’s and Officers is
to motivate and lead their people at times like this, when there is relentless
negative coverage on the possible outlook for defence funding or reading in the
paper that your ship / regiment / squadron will be axed. They must persuade
people to keep the faith, that there is a plan and that things do make sense, and
not to lose hope. This is a real leadership challenge, taking a disaffected workforce
and keeping them engaged, particularly if they feel the system is letting them
down.
This leadership challenge is at its
hardest after big reviews like the 2015 SDSR, which will often have major
changes involving unit moves, disbandment’s, redundancies and other career
changing impacts. At times like this it is essential for the chain of command
to have faith that Senior Officers have signed up to something that works and
makes sense – uniformity of message from
the most senior 4* to the most junior Private is vital to keep people believing.
There are very few people in Defence who
actually take decisions, one of the great ironies of the system is that the
more network-centric, agile and enabled it becomes, the harder it gets to find
people actually empowered to make something happen. Therefore the Service Chiefs
carry considerable weight as the individuals who make the really tough
decisions on approving the force packages and structures, or looking at where
to make cuts to fund enhancements elsewhere. Other more junior personnel may
create and staff these proposals, but the buck will stop at 4* level.
Therefore it is disheartening to see a
recently retired CDS actively go on the offensive and claim that the most
recent review wasn’t fully funded and that we are living a lie. As recently as
2015 in the RUSI Christmas speech, General Houghton said publicly of the SDSR:
“I think
that the defence review has delivered a remarkably good outcome… So, as
I say, the outcome of the review itself was, I believe, a very good one…
In capability terms the review has allowed us to lift our level of equipment
investment to £178 billion over the next 10 years. This, in turn, will allow us
to plug many of the capability gaps that worried us, as well as investing in
new capabilities… “
“I want to offer you 5 themes which I
think better demonstrate the sophistication of the Review’s outcome and how we
envisage the character of the future force and the defence organisation that
generates it. They are: utility; agility; strategy; innovation and partnership…
Collectively they are at least part of the
response that I would make to the consistent and, I fear, sometimes
unimaginative criticism of those who can only judge the competence and
capability of armed forces through the input metric of platform and manpower
numbers” (LINK)
This
positivity sits at considerable odds with his intervention today, which is even
more surprising when you consider that he is essentially condemning the findings of the Review
that he was responsible for leading.
It is one
thing to make a carefully timed intervention many years, or decades, after leaving
the Service and comment with the benefit of wisdom and distance from serving
about your personal concerns about how the Government of the days defence
review may impact on the security of the nation. It is unlikely that anyone you
served directly with will still be serving, and while your words carry weight,
they do not come borne from direct exposure to the specific review.
It is frustrating to see so many retired
officers publicly state post retirement that they harboured doubts and concerns
about issues. But there comes a point where Humphrey feels like saying to the 4*’s
who are doing this – ‘You had the ear of the Prime Minister and the right of
access to them. You could have raised these concerns. You could have resigned
on principal. You could have used the democratic process appropriately and
stepped away with dignity rather than implement something you clearly don’t
fully believe in, and then spend time making statements to your people about
how good it is, only to openly contradict yourself once you no longer serve –
what message do you think this sends?’
Service life is a calling where people can
be expected to put their lives in the hands of others, and risk everything for
the Service. They take pride in the core values and ethos – for example, the so-called
C2DRIL (Courage Commitment Discipline Respect Integrity Loyalty) at the heart
of the Royal Navy ethos. How can a junior officer have confidence in their leadership
chain of command that they are doing something right and proper when they see
very senior officers openly misleading their people. Military personnel are
told to demonstrate moral courage, and arguably to say ‘all is well’ and then
later on say something different does not set the right example.
The commonly used riposte is that senior
officers shouldn’t try to intervene in the democratic process to make their
views clear. This is absolutely correct, it is not appropriate for a serving
officer to openly step up and engage in political games (although it wasn’t
that long ago in the early 20th Century that you could be both a serving
regular officer and MP). But there are ways and means to express your concerns
privately and if still not redressed, then resignation is always there as an option.
It is frustrating
to see someone who wasn’t prepared to resign on principal over his concerns about
the SDSR findings to now feel that they can criticise it publicly. To stage a
direct attack on the Government of the day, exposing your clear doubts over a
defence review findings and funding that was a result of a defence review occurring
barely 2 ½ years ago while you were CDS, and when many of your peer group are
still serving and worked on it is arguably inappropriate.
To publicly expose
private doubts, having spent so long telling the people that looked to you for
leadership that ‘all is well’ makes a mockery of the concept of honesty and
integrity. It calls into question too the trust that people will have in the
currently serving leadership, for they will know that the current Service Chiefs
worked directly with Gen Houghton. They will reasonably want to know whether
the current Chiefs shared (or still share) his private doubts. Frankly, this
intervention undermines the position of the existing Service chiefs for any
reasonable journalist will want to ask them (particularly those who served with
Gen Houghton) whether they share his views or not.
One of the
great strengths of the UK is that the lack of a written constitution has led to
the emergence of a great many conventions and practises that have become
custom. Perhaps it is time for a new one to emerge, namely ‘the custom of
reasonable silence’.
Such a
custom would ask that those retiring very senior officers undertake not to
publicly pronounce on Defence issues in a political manner until such point as
the next Strategic Defence Review has been completed (which should be every 5
years) or until all their 3 & 4* peers serving when they left have retired.
The aim would be to perhaps prevent the
next CDS or Service Chief from dealing with broadsides from recently retired
peers who made the decisions that they are now attacking the Government over.
It would
provide a gentle air gap too, much like public servants are not theoretically
permitted to take up employment for a period after leaving government, perhaps
too it is appropriate to not let influential retired officers be in a position
where they can try to sway the debate on Defence until they are no longer
current on, or directly linked to, the issues of the day. A reasonable silence
would give the current Service Chiefs the ability to lead and take difficult decisions
without concern that their predecessors will publicly stage an intervention
that could cause them immense difficulties.
Defence will
always remain an emotive subject, but it is vital that people have confidence
that very senior officers can deliver difficult decisions in an objective
manner. The men and women of our armed forces deserve better than the sight of
their former CDS until less than two years ago openly undermine the work he had
done and imply that he’d helped perpetuate a lie on the British public, and by
extension the people who would go in harms way on his command. A custom of reasonable silence would be very
helpful indeed…
Excellent.
ReplyDeletethank you!
DeleteHumph, I responded to fruit man's comment on the Tier One article. Just in case you find a use for me. Apologies.
DeleteWell no one else is prepared to tell us the truth, someone's got to do it.
ReplyDeletePlanning a tier 1 structure that you can't afford inevitably ends up unable to do anything properly.
The carrier programme is an immense folly.
Your evidence for the UK carrier policy being an immense folly is?
DeleteYour evidence for the vast USN carrier policy being an immense folly is?
Your evidence for the French, Indian and Chinese carrier policies all being immense follies is?
Your alternative policy proposal with political, strategic, tactical and financial evidence for it being superior to a carrier policy is?
That would be a very,very long reply. However in the case of the French its very easy, their carrier is currently in middle of a long and expensive refit which will be followed by a work up.Attack now in the unlikely case that all that was stopping you was this complex and vulnerable drain on their resources.Our only carrier is currently no use to us either and according to the rule of three we will have the same problem.I don't think the Indians and Chinese have anything viable at the moment despite massive expenditure.We have nothing like enough escorts to support a carrier battle group and absorb losses or enough manpower for the ships that we have.
DeleteThe alternative is not having a large fleet carriers.
How about you coming up with a viable mission that would be worth risking?
Grubbie, whilst we live in a democracy with freedom of speech, it seems to come, in this day and age, with freedom of ignorance. Whilst most rational people accept that major military decisions are taken by military and engineering teams with the relevant qualifications and experience. There are those who posses neither who do not. Whilst most rational observers, would give to those who devout there lives to the service of the nation and in service of engineering excellence, the presumption that they carry out their duties with honesty and integrity. Many of those without either do not.
DeleteOne assumes that a rational analysis of the carrier force projection package has been carried out by qualified and experienced professionals from many countries and found to be logical and efficient. However, we live in an age of Trump and therefore logic or rationality are not a requirement for decisions or opinions.
As to the article in question. I would agree with the gist of the thing, either he was lying then or he is lying now. Obviously Humphrey is too polite to put it in these terms. However, if we subject these things to "rational" analysis, compared to other nations of similar "heft" are armed services budget is bigger than most and in line with our peers (or peer i.e. France), so this eternal winging is neither rational or honest. Not even China gets as much bang for the buck with a budget which is 5x bigger.
So,you are unable to explain what the carrier's are meant to do ,although apparently there might be a handful of experts with huge brains somewhere who know,but it's far too complicated for them to explain to everyone else?
DeleteThe "vast USN carrier policy"is bankrupting the US,but at least achieves the nessicary critical mass to make it viable.
Not an 'immense folly' at all. SDR1998 emphasised the global role of UK forces and that requires aircraft carriers. Ditto any navy that needs to be able to project force out of area, e.g. the U.S., Russia and France. If someone had suggested abandoning the carriers and just building frigates and attack submarines they would have been laughed out of the room given that the Cold War was over and we had spent the previous decade scrapping them.
DeleteThe RN has been hobbled for decades by mini-carriers that were far too small to be effective and offered poor value for money. It made far more sense to build full-size ones than go round in circles reinventing the square wheel. Even a STOVL light fleet carrier would need to be 30-40,000 tons to be credible today, 50-60,000 tons for a mid-size carrier. Put simply, big carriers are far more useful and represent much better value.
No, the QE class are not perfect but they are the best design the RN could get without spending significantly more. Just over £6 billion for 2 ships represents something of a bargain by today's standards and the final bill would have been less had Labour not foolishly slowed down the build to make short-term savings. We would have bought the F35 in some form anyway with or without the carriers so all-in-all a successful project.
The carriers are clearly an easy target for 'bee in the bonnet' detractors who have no understanding of the Navy's requirements and what the carriers offer across the full spectrum of operations, whether working alone or with allies. Typically, they appear to be blissfully unaware of far more wasteful projects in defence and indeed elsewhere in government - presumably because they have not been hyped-up ad nausem by the tabloid press and/or do not agitate the bee for some inexplicable reason.
What are you actually going to use them for?6 billion is just the bare shell.We don't have enough escorts, crows nest isn't really adequate and we can't keep them in continuous service because 2 is not enough and we don't have the manpower.Its just not viable.
DeleteLots of logical refutation above, with which I agree. I note that Grubbie has not yet explained a policy to achieve what carriers achieve without using carriers but has demanded to know what carriers are for. There are endless possible scenarios not to mention dozens of examples of carrier power from history. But what about this scenario:
DeleteIt is 2025 and the NHS has made huge advances using diagnostic artificial intelligence but it can only operate on open architectures and all firewalls have weaknesses. A rogue Middle East state is harbouring terrorist groups that are carrying out cyber attacks on the NHS and people are being killed. As fast as one loophole is plugged the cyber attackers find another and the deaths go on.
The locations of the cyber attackers are identified by GCHQ and strikes are launched from Cyprus and the UK which temporarily slow down the attacks. However, the cyber attackers move into a heavily populated city and set up operations from hospitals and schools so air strikes cannot be used without causing massive collateral damage.
HMS Prince of Wales is configured in the helicopter platform role and Special Forces and Royal Marines embarked to raid and destroy the cyber attackers locations without causing collateral damage. The raiding force is lightly equipped and would be overwhelmed by the rogue state's army. Providing protective air cover from Cyprus and the UK is difficult - the required sortie rate and time on task simply cannot be achieved at that distance. HMS Queen Elizabeth operating in the carrier strike role embarks 30 F35B stealth fighters. Operating off the coast, F35Bs provide the necessary air support and the raid is successful.
Is this a fanciful scenario? We know there are rogue states that hate us. We know there are terrorist groups who wish our people harm. We know cyber warfare is a burgeoning threat. We know the NHS has already been subjected to cyber attacks. We know there are terrorist groups that will deliberately site their weapons close to schools and hospitals. So the scenario could come to pass if sufficient malice and ingenuity is brought to bear. So how are you going to deal with this scenario. Remember that the majority of the world's population live close to the sea so can be impacted by sea power. Remember that the key to success will be aircraft sortie rate and time over target. How will you achieve this without an aircraft carrier close to the area of operations?
Or you could just let the deaths go on in the NHS, after all this is only an artificial scenario. For now.
First law of the 21st Century; don't feed the troll.
DeleteJunior staff have been let down by their peers too often in the recent past. Trust has been lost. The MOD 'gagging order' on all MOD workers prevents criticism/ telling truth when in uniform. The MOD remains the only department of state whose professional workforce are prevented from contact with the public unlike police, doctors,teachers and local government. The true material state of the Armed Forces is a disgrace. At present the public are only given the politicians interpretation of capacity & capability. Spare a thought for those who serve without the resources needed to perform.
ReplyDeleteI find his comments reasonable.
ReplyDeleteBut a tad late...
DeleteHumph, I responded to fruit man's comment on the Tier One article. Just in case you find a use for me. Apologies.
ReplyDeleteOften ignored in this debate is the enormous flock of chickens coming home to roost in the form of the very high interest PFI credit card repayments that have been allowed to build up.Wonga is next.
ReplyDelete