A Bleak or Bright Future? Analysis on Reported Sale of RFA tanker to Brazil.

SUMMARY

·         UK reported to be selling one WAVE class tanker to Brazil, before Defence Review findings publicly announced.

·         Highlights possible long term strategy change in RN to less globally capable force, but potentially medium term hopes in form of new Auxiliary Oiler project to restore tanker numbers over the  next 5-7 years.

A Brazilian naval website has put up a report on 1 June claiming that the UK MOD has twice offered to sell one of the WAVE class tankers to them next year (Article is HERE). The report specifically states that

“The British Royal Navy has informed the Brazilian Navy (MB) that it is preparing to make available one of its two "Wave" (RFA Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler) tankers next year… It was the second warning that the British military gave to their Brazilian colleagues on the subject - which in Brasilia has been understood as a survey about the possible interest of MB in this type of vessel. “

This report if true represents a previously unexpected cut to the WAVE class, which most commentators had assumed would be run on into the late 2020s – early 2030s. Is this a genuine cut, or is something else going on?

The first issue to consider is whether the report is accurate, or if it is perhaps as misinterpretation of conversations between the UK and the Brazilian Navy. It may be the case that there is some subtle games being played here, with Brazil ‘flying a kite’ to try and smoke out RN interest in selling the ships – such a move being common in the world of defence exports. This could possibly be the case here – a planted story to see if a tanker can be acquired quickly to support the Brazilian acquisition of HMS OCEAN.

Secondly, it must be asked if this is an official contact, sent through formal Naval channels such as the disposals team or the Naval Staff to the Brazilians making them aware of the ships availability – for instance via Staff Talks or other formal engagement as part of the agenda. Or was it informal engagement via naval attaches or policy officials, perhaps speaking discretely in the margins of another conversation and sounding out interest?

Regardless, if true then it appears to be the case that the RFA will find itself a tanker down very quickly. This represents yet another cut in capability for the Royal Navy and once more makes an utter mockery of the ‘growing Royal Navy’ statement trotted out with depressing regularity in press releases.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

A Bleak Future?

No matter how positive a view one takes on the future potential opportunities afforded to an RFA with four TIDE class and two/three FSS platforms, the current situation is dire. Right now there are two RFA BAY class deployed, one in the Caribbean and one in the Gulf. A single AEFS (FORT ROSALIE) is returning from a deployment in the Middle East for a refit. RFA ARGUS is in refit and the remainder of the ships are either alongside, in mothballs or refit or being prepared for service and deployment.

By Humphreys reckoning, based on publicly available information, right now there is not a single RFA tanker or store ship operationally deployed outside of the UK. This is, for a Navy that takes great pride in its blue water heritage, an utterly desperate state of affairs

The quiet temporary death of the RN tanker fleet has been a long time coming – since the about 2005 when the WAVE class entered service, the force has gone from approximately two WAVES, three ROVERS and four LEAF class tankers (plus two FORT VICTORIA class with tanking ability), making a total of 11 ships. The loss of the LEAF and ROVER class over the last 9 years, coupled with the deletion of the refuelling ability of the FORT class means that even in a best case scenario the RN has been cut to just 6 tankers.

In reality, since last year there have been only two (and at times probably zero) operational tankers in the RFA. The TIDE class will be exceptionally capable vessels and will be a huge step up in capability, but they are still being kitted out. Since then the RN has had to rely purely on the WAVE class for its tanking requirements.

The question needs to be asked as to whether the RN needs 6 tankers moving forward though – for many years the WAVE class were used as Guardships in the West Indies to do sovereignty patrols and counter drugs work – important tasks for sure, and one that a flexible platform with a large hangar is good for, but arguably not the best use of a large tanker. Given the now likely lack of permanent frigate presence in both the Falklands and West Indies (standfast occasional visits), the need for an RFA tanker on either station has probably gone.

It could be the case that this cut highlights the growing evolution of the Royal Navy into a very French model – something this blog has discussed before. A cut to the tanker force reduces the ability to sustain long deployments, but if the aspiration of the RN is merely to deploy a carrier group, with some amphibious and other platforms as a single body, and then send stand alone vessels like the Type 31 or River class out on guardship duties, then reduced tanker numbers does make sense.

An RN that is less focused on task group deployments, and which is prepared to rely on local base facilities (such as the Naval Support Facility in Bahrain), or think innovatively about working through partners (such as the use of Japanese bases for the current Asia Pacific deployments) has less need of a tanker to stay at sea.

On the one hand such logic makes complete sense – surely it is better to rely on shore facilities if you have guaranteed access to them, and no need to stay at sea on station for long periods of time. But, there is something depressing about the willingness of the RN, which has long proudly and aloofly seen itself as a ‘real’ navy due to its Bluewater ability to stay at sea through the RFA, to so quickly and readily reduce its tanker force. Such a move is arguably incoherent with the ‘global Britain’ narrative, as by making it harder for UK forces to deploy independently by sea across the world, such a cut actively diminishes UK reach, capability and credibility.

In a coalition setting, these cuts will be viewed with dismay. To allies one of the reasons the UK matters as a key coalition partner is its ability to bring a full range of logistic enablers like tankers, stores ships, repair ships and medical facilities like RFA ARGUS to support operations. The presence of RFA’s in the Gulf played a critical part in keeping US and allied warships at sea conducting counter piracy patrols and supporting counter terrorism work for longer – rather than constantly having to return to port. The loss of an RFA tanker which could sustain this work will be keenly felt, and will in the eyes of partner confirm the view that the UK is now a less credible military ally as it isn’t prepared to provide the capabilities that it used to.

We must also fast be approaching the point where the long-term sustainability of the RFA as it is currently structured must be actively questioned. The continued manpower crisis resulting in highly expensive and capable platforms being mothballed pending refit, often for years at a time is enormously damaging to the UK.

The inability of the RFA to get sufficient manpower at sea as needed, coupled with large numbers of retirements of very experienced personnel points to a real problem ahead. Unless something is done soon, possibly as radical as ending the model of RFA being civil servants and instead turning them into RN warships to draw on more manpower, then the RN is at real risk of losing its decisive edge for global deployments. One must ask how much longer the RFA can remain a purely civilian force in an age when increasingly elderly UK merchant seaman are few and far between.

Finally this news points to a wider picture that potentially implies that the RN must know that it no longer requires 6 tankers to support its planned force. The question is what other planned activities are being reduced, and what ships are being scrapped too? If the assumption is that 6 tankers are needed to support the current force, then 5 tankers leads to the reasonable assumption that the RN is facing significant cuts. This may well lend yet further credibility to the ongoing rumours that the LPD force faces scrapping soon, or it could imply that more escort frigates face being scrapped.

There are clear benefits to the UK of selling a ship to Brazil – their navy is extremely professional, hugely competent and the possessor of the most balanced South American navy. It has proven a good home to many former RN vessels, and purchaser of many UK designs. The hope must be that Brazil looks to the Type 31e design as a credible start point for its future force – potentially a good long term export deal that could support UK shipbuilding.

A Bright Future?

The final thought though is whether there is a wider plan afoot here that hasn’t been brilliantly communicated to the public. A review of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (LINK HERE) has a graph on Page 22 (shown below) that looks at future RN shipbuilding plans for the next twenty years.

Within this mention is made of a new ‘Auxiliary Oiler’ project, that is separate to the TIDE class and which sees a decision point on future capability being reached over the next few years, with a view to an entirely new capability entering service from 2023.

It is not clear what this programme is, what its requirements are, or how many hulls it will deliver. But it could be the case that the RN is intending to build replacements for the WAVE class shortly, but has been extremely poor about communicating this programmes existence publicly. It may be the case that an early sale and paying off of the WAVE class will be required to free up funds to commence building replacements soon – potentially good news for the wider UK shipbuilding community.

In this scenario, there is less risk as the RFA has shown it can support deployments with two tankers, so a temporary ‘decrease/increase’ to four, pending new AO’s entering service in the next 5-6 years is probably sustainable, assuming of course that such ships are not cut under the current defence review.

One has to hope that renewed public scrutiny on this reported sale will help get more clarity about the future shipbuilding plans for the RFA and also shed more light on what the MOD plans to do for the future of the RN’s tanker capability over the next few years.

It is perhaps mildly frustrating though for an observer of UK defence policy to discover via a Brazilian website that the MOD appears to be preparing to scrap a critical part of the RN’s global capability, without announcing it to the public first. Given that the public is repeatedly told that no decisions have yet been taken on the current defence review, why is the MOD telling a foreign power about the scrapping of a ship nearly 15-20 years early without telling Parliament and the Public first?