Is the Royal Navy really growing for the first time in a generation?


During Defence Questions in the House of Commons on 5th March, the claim was made by a Minister that the Royal Navy was growing again for the first time in a generation. This is a strong statement to make, and one that has been used a lot over the last few years, but is it true?

The genesis for the ‘growing the Royal Navy’ claim seems to have come out of the 2015 SDSR, where the two main ‘good news’ announcements to underpin it were that there was to be a small growth in manpower (some 350 people) and that the intention of ordering what became known as the Type 31 light frigate was that the aspiration existed to grow the escort fleet beyond 19 hulls at some point in the 2030s.

These announcements were initially spun as news that the Royal Navy was expanding for the first time since the Second World War, but have since become rebranded as ‘first time in a generation’ (LINK), or alternatively the phrase used was ‘growing’ Royal Navy. These are bold claims to make, and aim to try and make a positive case that the RN is not in retreat, but instead focused on regeneration and renewal over the next few years.  

It is not the first time that the MOD has made such claims; during the early noughties a frequently heard line was ‘biggest shipbuilding programme for a generation’, which usually relied on citing various plans and orders for projects like CVF, Type 45, Type 26 and so on, many of which ended up being cancelled without ever being ordered.

Is there any merit to these claims though, or are they merely highly optimistic spinning? There seem to be three ways this could be considered – manpower, tonnage and hulls.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

Manpower
The RN is growing in manpower, with a firm commitment to increasing the regular service count by 350 people under the 2015 SDSR. These positions are reportedly but a fraction of the total requested, with rumours on some internet sites that the preferred figure was several thousand higher.

While this is a ‘growth’ it is only a partial reversal of cuts in 2010, when RN manpower dropped by 5000 from 35k to approximately 29,500. This increase merely buys back approximately 7% of the manpower lost under the 2010 SDSR, and does not reflect an increase in real terms.

It is also not the first time that the RN has tried to grow its manpower totals either. One of the key commitments from the 1998 SDR was a goal to grow the Royal Naval Reserve by approximately 1000 to take it up to well over 3000 people (again a reversal of the 1993 ‘Front cuts that took the RNR down from approximately 7000 to barely 3000).  Therefore the claim that the Royal Navy is growing for the first time is, in manpower terms, just about technically true, but is open to debate.

Tonnage
Since 2015 the RN has seen a significant increase in tonnage, with two new carriers, four tankers, one Type 26, five OPVs and several SSNs either entering service or beginning construction. Roughly 400,000 tonnes of shipping will have entered service or be under physical construction by the end of this year.

This is a very substantial construction programme, arguably outside of the US probably the most substantial and well-rounded naval construction programme in the world. There is no doubt that the RN is acquiring a significant increase in capability in terms of its platforms, which also add significantly to the overall fleet tonnage.

As a metric tonnage isn’t a bad metric to use when determining size of fleets. During the 1920s the Washington Naval Treaty (information HERE) was built on a variety of complicated metrics to determine the maximum permissible fleet tonnage in various classes of ships, while displacement limitations presented real challenges for Western ship designers in the late 1920s and 30s (such as the so-called ‘treaty cruisers – more information HERE).

Therefore it is not ridiculous to say that on pure tonnage terms the Royal Navy is growing, purely because the size of the new construction entering service is so large – we now see in the TIDE class, tankers as long as, and twice the displacement of, an INVINCIBLE class carrier. There is no doubt that the Royal Navy has more tonnage coming on line than it has for many years.

Does this justify the claim though? Many of the ships entering service have been planned or under construction for decades and formed part of much more ambitious (and long scaled back) construction programmes. What we are seeing arrive now is the delayed and reduced legacy of programmes dating back to the early 1990s, and not a coherent plan intended to grow the Royal Navy.

While the claim may technically be true, it is more by accident than design that the Royal Navy tonnage is growing, and the figure is still lower than if other programmes had not been cancelled, deferred or descoped over many years.



Hulls
Simply put, in terms of hull count the Royal Navy has been getting smaller and smaller, year on year, for decades.

While the rate of paying off has declined in recent years, it is worth noting that the MCMV fleet saw the loss of two hulls (both of which had many years life left in them), taking the force from 15 – 13, compared against a 1998 SDR goal of increasing the force from 19 – 22 hulls (which in itself was a reduction down from a planned 25).

10% of the escort fleet (one Destroyer and one Frigate) remain permanently alongside at very low readiness due to the lack of manpower to deploy them. HMS OCEAN is due to pay off as planned this month and the Batch 1 Rivers will be lost this year too. This is before you consider the potential loss of the LPDs and any other in year measures to balance the books as part of the Defence Review.

There are without doubt fewer ships in the Royal Navy now than over the last 20 years, and the planned construction programme is not going to deliver one for one replacements. It is often forgotten (for instance) that the long term future of the MCMV force is one of on shore technology and not hulls – meaning even further reductions are likely as new capability enters service. 

There has also been a loss of ambition for the Type 26 programme, which has been descoped from 13 hulls to 8. This reduction is a common theme in UK naval planning, with the Type 22 and 23 planned buys originally planned to number well into the 20s, and the Type 45 was intended to be 12 strong.

As a general rule, the RN seems to reduce its overall aspiration for each new generation of ship by 30-50% between planned build and actual construction. Following this metric to its logical end point, the UK will cease to have a Navy in about 50-60 years time unless funding is assured. This is not hyperbole, merely an observation that every new class of escort ship for decades has not yet delivered a 1:1 replacement for its predecessors, and there will only be 6 destroyers and 13 frigates to replace.

The aspiration to grow the frigate force in the 2030s is doubtless made with the best of intentions, but reflects a commitment to enlarge a force in 15 years and likely 2-3 general elections time. Given the manner in which commitments of 15-20 years ago have been pared back or scrapped, it is perhaps difficult to envisage future governments feeling bound by the promises of this one to look at growing the fleet.  This means that while aspiration to grow the Royal Navy is there in powerpoint slides, the chances of it being successfully delivered is slim without long term funding improvements.  


Conclusions
The Minister did not lie, and he did not mislead the House. Technically speaking, the Royal Navy is growing in tonnage terms for the first time in many years. The reality though is that there are fewer ships now than last year, that further payoffs and reductions are likely and that unless more money is found, then this problem will only get worse.

The new ships under construction are phenomenally capable vessels, and the Royal Navy is rightly proud of its world class capabilities that are under construction right now. When you look to the potential forward programme on offer, of DREADNOUGHT, more  Type 26 & 31 and future support ships then it is clear that the programme out for another 15 years has potential to bring ever bigger, and ever more capable vessels into service.

But the phrase ‘growing the Royal Navy’ is perhaps slightly disingenuous. Without caveating, it implies more ships, not more tonnage. The public expect more hulls, not bigger ones. To not explain clearly what is meant by this phrase is unfortunate and could lead to the public not being accurately informed about the way in which their navy, that they pay for, is developing. It would perhaps be helpful in future to more carefully caveat such a statement to prevent the public thinking their navy is getting larger – for it emphatically is not.

Comments

  1. The RN is hardly growing and its not "slightly disingenuous" it is highly so. Tonnage is not a good measure, 1 large (heavy) vessel can still only be in 1 place at 1 time. Hull numbers is a better measure (IMHO) because it provides a better indicator of flexibility. So while we know that the T45 is far in advance of the T42 it replaced, this does not actually make up for 14 being reduced to 6. There are of course entire capabilities that have also been removed, i.e. RFA Diligence as a forward support and repair capability. So yeah, growing Royal Navy - my arse !

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    Replies
    1. IMHO hull numbers are also a flawed metric. The RN could have purchased some hulls to make up numbers, such as the Nakhoda Ragam class when they were available. Would that have lead to a better navy? No. It would have soaked up cash and manpower while not being able to compete in a high end shooting war. Better to spend the cash on a purposely lower capability ship and spend the money freed up on a highly capable class.

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    2. Then hull numbers is a crap metric if you buy crap useless hulls? Agreed! Lets buy some batch 2 Rivers because some MP's constituency needs the work....? Oh yeah, then advertise the fact that we are buying OPV's we don't really need as "growing" the RN :-(

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  2. Hulls / tonnage are pointless metrics invented by folks who don’t expect to be standing on a ship heading into fire. Military / technical credibility against the current threats is the only metric that defends lives at sea.

    Was fitting HMS queen Elizabeth with only phalanx sensible, viable, and credible to protect 1600 souls? Actually, HMS Queen Elizabeth could be defended against Zircon, but not with Phalanx. Hoping that an escort is going to be on the right side of HMS Queen Elizabeth to intercept hypersonic missiles is like asking for Murphy to give you the betting odds.

    Phalanx is obsolete; it cannot build up a sales-and-marketing wall of lead in front of a submarine launched manoeuvrable missile traveling faster than Sea Ceptor and faster than phalanx shells, a question of engineering and common sense. Three 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missiles traveling 4,600 miles per hour twice the speed of a phalanx shell, fired from submarine at anything from 20 to 250 miles away? Six LaWS lases would allow a minimum of two weapons to be brought to bear on a sea skimming manoeuvrable hypersonic missile.

    The cost of Retrofitting weapons is always higher than building them in during the manufacturing build (power cabling, command and control cabling, access for upgrading systems / maintenance).
    If the UK had built https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_aircraft_carrier_PA2 without CATOBAR (look at the Armament / defence capabilities) then the UK would have a platform that could be upgraded to mitigate against 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missiles at a cheaper end price.

    The watch words for a war ship should be redundancy, attrition, overlapping fields of fire. The Falkland’s re-taught us these basic lessons; did the SDR meeting forget these lessons, when the concepts and requirements for a ship of war was being brokered.

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