Down Under, But Not Out - UK Defence in the Asia Pacific Region

HMS SUTHERLAND has arrived in Sydney, Australia on the latest leg of her Asia Pacific deployment. This trip marks the first time in a few years that a Royal Navy escort ship has ventured into the Asia Pacific region, although 2018 will see at least two separate deployments by RN escorts.

The visit led to observations by some on social media comparing the RN presence in the region unfavourably compared to the French Navy, and suggesting that the UK has somehow ‘lost influence’ as a result of a few years of no ship visits in the region. The aim of this article is to consider whether this is true, and whether in fact the UK remains perhaps more influential than we give it credit for, although this influence is built by other means.

The UK defence presence in the Asia Pacific region has for many years, arguably since the handover of Hong Kong, been built around a combination of limited physical presence and wider engagement and training. Today the permanent presence is limited to the dockyard in Singapore, which houses the 2^nd largest fuel depot in Asia after Pearl Harbour, and which still turns a handsome profit for the Treasury through its provision of fuel to allied vessels. There is a small RN wharf, with a stores facility and other assets too. The last major visit was by HMS ILLUSTRIOUS during OP PATWIN (disaster relief in the Philippines in 2012).

In Brunei a small garrison of approximately 1000 personnel, drawn mainly from the Gurkhas and paid for by the Sultan, serves as a visible reminder of UK support for the tiny nation. It also provides a jungle training school and houses various other units too. Beyond that, there are no permanent units or formations based in the region.

While there may have been fewer ship visits than usual, last year saw a Fleet Air Arm detachment deploy on a French training cruise to the region, an act which has been repeated this year too. Just because a hull with a White Ensign isn’t always in the region does not mean that the Royal Navy has abandoned it.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

 There is though a relatively substantial defence engagement presence, led by the British Defence Staff in Singapore, which co-ordinates engagement for the Asia Pacific region. Many of the nations in the region have a UK defence attaché presence, often at quite senior levels (Australia, Korea and China all have 1* officers plus other staff), and this has quietly grown in recent years – for instance the reopening of the defence section in Thailand.

This presence has also been reinforced by a significant rise in the number of staff talks (e.g. high level talks between armed forces), commitments to exercises (even just a token participant or two) and other opportunities to send UK personnel into the region to work with their international partners. It is very clear that there are a lot more UK personnel going into the Asia Pacific region now than a few years ago, but they are not doing it as a formed unit.

Some examples of these engagements have included the deployment of Typhoon aircraft to Korea and Japan last year (a significant event), and the current deployment by Royal Navy medical personnel onboard the USNS MERCY into the region, helping provide medical services and work with partner nations.

There has also been an increase in UK personnel attending exercises in Korea, providing clear support to a relationship that has been growing in importance in recent years. There is now a genuinely good bond between the two nations, perhaps neglected in recent decades due to US military dominance in the area.

Finally there are still loan personnel and other commitments, such as the ongoing intention to support the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), which dates back to the 1970s and provides a mechanism for the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia to consult in the event of an international crisis. Developed as a replacement for the UK presence after the withdrawal in the 1970s, it has stood the test of time and remains a cornerstone of UK engagement in the region to this day. The FPDA will almost certainly grow in importance over the next few years as the region tries to co-operate more effectively on defence matters, and the UKs continued commitment to it is of real significance.

Finally, in the wider region, the UK retains exceptionally close relationships with both Australia and New Zealand that underpin the deeper ‘Five Eyes’ treaty of intelligence co-operation. There are many UK personnel permanently on loan to, or exchange with, both nations armed forces, and there is an enormously effective and very deep relationship built over decades of shared operations. Do not underestimate the depth, strength and importance of the UK commitment to both nations as a means of the UK extending its interests and influence in the region.

It is worth noting that this defence footprint supports a much larger UK diplomatic and trade presence across the region, with large embassy presence and a growing recommitment to various international fora that occur. The UK is making an increasing commitment to not only the larger nations, but also the smaller island states too.  What is clear is that in the last few years there has been a sea change in the extent to which HMG has committed to the region, leading engagement in a range of ways and across a variety of issues. Just because the defence presence is reasonably small does not make the UK irrelevant.

What do we mean by influence?

The phrase influence is often kicked around in order to loftily pronounce that things are good/bad because the UK was unable to exert its influence in an area. Its easy to say, harder to quantify what it means, or why you’d need to deploy a warship on a port visit to have it.

In practical terms influence perhaps means ‘the ability to persuade others that it is in their interests to do you a favour’. In the field of international relations, there are always going to be limits to persuading others to do this – countries have to balance off many different obligations, interests and equities to decide on a foreign policy approach that suits their own needs.

The UK approach in the region seems to be built around low-level engagement in discrete areas that matter to the host nation. For instance, providing access to training courses, support defence sales to increase capability, or helping train with a nations armed forces against a common objective. This done over time helps build good working relationships, which in turn may make a nation more amenable to support the UK on other issues, such as voting on an issue at the UN or other international issue or supporting awards of trade deals to the UK and not another country.

For the UK engagement must be carefully calibrated to balance off a desire by countries to work with us, without overcommitting or giving an expectation of long term assistance that may not be forthcoming in every crisis. For instance, the occasional deployment of a destroyer or frigate helps provide a useful exercise participant, maintains working level relationships and is a useful backdrop to talks. But it doesn’t give off signals that the UK is prepared to support and come to military assistance in a crisis.

 But, if the UK were to (for example) annually deploy a carrier group into the region to support specific exercises and increasingly integrate with other nations armed forces (such as bringing foreign ships into the Task Group), then it gives an impression of preparing for operations, and that in a crisis, that the UK was preparing to deploy that capability in support of the nation in question. This is an impression that may be entirely wrong, or the UK may not be able to provide that specific asset in a crisis. There is a danger that too high an exercise commitment without the underpinning certainty that it would be committed in a crisis could damage the UK standing in the region when there is a failure to deliver.

There is also a wider aspect of over committing to a region in that the regular presence of a ship quickly becomes taken for granted. If you have a destroyer permanently out there and offer it up for an exercise, it quickly becomes the benchmark against which co-operation is rated, and to take the relationship further you’d have to deploy more units or more capability – so the expectation may be that you’d have to send a Carrier Group or an SSN, as well as the destroyer.

Once a commitment is taken for granted, it becomes much harder to use as leverage for an exercise or operation. This is a problem some nations are finding in the Middle East, where permanently basing a small garrison causes more challenges than rewards. By contrast, occasional offers of an exercise participation actually generate more interest and access and can be used as a carrot/stick approach to help develop relationships. Countries that want to buy UK equipment may find it easier to secure a ship visit, access to training opportunities or other ‘rewards’, while countries less amenable will find the reverse. Small gestures can count for a great deal when trying to achieve results in foreign policy.

Is the Asia Pacific region the right place to build influence with Asia Pacific nations?

When trying to understand UK influence in the Asia Pacific region, it is wise to look beyond the Asia Pacific region itself. One of the locations where the UK is helping generate enormous influence, goodwill and working relationships with Asia Pacific nations is in fact the Middle East.

It is often forgotten that many nations in both Europe and the Asia Pacific region rely heavily on safe secure and stable sea lanes and nations to allow cargo vessels to travel across the world, and for fuel tankers to sail with their precious cargo from the Gulf. All parties have a strong vested interest in not seeing the Middle East, and the Gulf and Southern Red Sea collapse into chaos, as the impact on their economies would be enormous.

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In Bahrain the US Navy HQ also plays home to the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), an organisation of 31 like minded nations working together to deliver improved international security in the region. Through a combination of maritime patrol aircraft, surface ships and task groups, plus wider national MCMV capability, this region is a true meeting point to enable nations to work together to improve maritime security.

For the UK, CMF presents a real opportunity to exert influence to benefit wider goals. The Royal Navy provides many of the CMF staff, including a 1* officer as its Deputy Commander who all fill critical roles in developing operations. This brings RN personnel into daily contact with staff from across the globe, helping foster relationships that have potential to really blossom over time.

At an operational level the UK has provided support to navies coming to the region – for instance last year the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) took the lead in commanding a Task Force for the first time, as part of their wider efforts to grow their maritime reach. The UK provided many staff to act as integral members of this force, helping support the Japanese in successfully delivering operations and enhancing the RN/JMSDF relationship.

In a similar vein the CMF area of operations is the one place on earth where European and Asian navies operate alongside each other daily in a truly operational environment. The opportunities for the RN to work with partners from the region is enormous and of far more value than just doing random port visits. The Middle East is somewhere which has let the Royal Navy develop incredibly strong bonds with old friends from the Far East, operating alongside each other for a common cause.

This is often forgotten by commentators who assume that because the RN presence in the Asia Pacific region is limited, that the RN doesn’t matter. By contrast, the RN can maintain excellent relationships with many navies in the region precisely because it works with them daily in the Middle East. Operating in support of a common goal helps ease burdens too – all navies are overstretched and cannot in isolation provide sufficient ships to do all that is asked of them.

For the Asian navies, co-operation in the Middle East is an opportunity to contribute to wider security and protect their own national interest but reduces the number of their own ships and aircraft that need to be sent at any one time. This is coupled with the ability to develop joint exercises with many other nations, helping learn about just how difficult multi-national military operations are to execute, and the many challenges involved in keeping ships deployed a long way from home.

The wider benefit for many nations is that while most Asia Pacific nations have experience of working with the USA, often in their home waters, it is quite a different experience. The US military operates at a level of capability vastly beyond their own, and is not always the ideal exercise partner to work with to learn how to do multi-national operations.

By contrast the Royal Navy is a far closer sizer and match to their own aspirations and capability, and can provide a useful means of learning from a closer peer partner. The presence of the Royal Navy, with its broad capabilities in region and ability to provide strong logistical support and long experience of working in a coalition helps provide reassurance, support and positive outcomes for those countries keen to deploy, but unsure of where to begin.

A Bright Future

Looking ahead the future seems positive for the UK relationship with the Asia Pacific region, and

the presence of the Royal Navy in the region. A marked increase in deployments this year, coupled with the strong likelihood that the QUEEN ELIZABETH will visit the region early in her reign is a clear sign of continued UK defence interest. When coupled with the ongoing commitment to Japan and Korea, and maintenance of relationships on the FPDA, it is clear that the UK has a very positive approach to the region.

This matters partly because it helps support the UK’s own bilateral relationships with partners, but also because it sends a clear message to major allies like the USA that the UK is prepared to play a leading global role militarily, and not focus on being a purely regional power. Very very few countries can deploy, sustain and operate full spectrum armed forces on the other side of the planet, particularly while doing other operations too, so the UK capability matters and counts for a great deal.

When coupled with the deepening relationships in the Middle East where UK and allied nations are working together to build shared responsibility for the security challenges of the region, the message is clear – the UK is an influential partner with the Asia Pacific region, even if it is not necessarily operating in the region all the time.