No The Royal Navy Has Not Been Humiliated By Norway...

 

 

This week it was announced that the first international partner for the Carrier Strike Group 25 deployment will be Norway, sending a frigate and tanker as part of the global operation led by HMS PRINCE OF WALES to the Indo-Pacific region.  Apparently, the Royal Navy is being humiliated because it is reliant on the Royal Norwegian Navy to deploy a frigate on the next Carrier Strike Group in 2025 for ‘protection’. This is the gist of a poorly written and appallingly researched article by someone called ‘David Axe’ who writes in the Telegraph on defence matters. Is this true, or is it more complicated than this?

The Carrier Strike Group concept is at the heart of Royal Navy planning and has been the centre of years of work to adjust how the surface fleet works, and in turn how it deploys. Historically the RN has not relied on ‘carrier battle groups’ as the USN uses the term, instead bringing together escort ships, support vessels and a carrier as required for deployments or operations. It has also globally deployed its escort force as singleton deployers, often for 6-9 months at a time, rather than in a larger force. The introduction of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class has significantly altered this dynamic.

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Instead of relying on individual deployments of escort ships, the RN has instead tried to carry out much of the maritime constabulary work through the near permanent presence of five RIVER Class OPV’s which are permanently based around the world on long term deployments. These ships carry out much of the joint exercise work, disaster relief and sovereignty protection patrols previously carried out by larger escorts, at a fraction of the cost. Given the low intensity nature of these operations, they are well armed for the task, despite endless (and very, very boring online debates) to give them more weaponry for no particularly understandable reason.

Meanwhile the main escort force has been brought closer to home and on paper now operates in the concept of a strike group, essentially holding a series of destroyers and frigates at readiness to deploy alongside the carrier and support vessels to provide a robust conventional deterrent. Able to embark jets, helicopters and troops as required, the carrier strike concept is about holding assets ready to go when needed, but not necessarily deploying them individually around the world. It was tested to significant effect in 2021 as part of the global carrier strike deployment, led by the QUEEN ELIZABETH.

Central to the concept of the CSG is that it is ‘international by design’. The UK recognises that it will not be operating in isolation  without allies as part of future conflicts. The idea that the UK will unilaterally go to war with Russia is to completely forget that the UK is part of NATO and would be triggering Article 5 in those circumstances. Given this, the UK sees the CSG capability as something that helps it provide genuine leadership within NATO and other international bodies. It does this in a number of ways – firstly, the platforms can be declared to NATO as command ships – in 2022 HMS PRINCE OF WALES embarked NATO staff to be available as a high readiness platform to support NATO operations if needed. The ships are designed to operate from the keel up as command vessels and embarking HQ staff, international IT and house working spaces for exercises and operations to be carried out.

Secondly the carriers are designed to embark and operate foreign jets. The Royal Navy is the only navy in the world which possesses an aircraft carrier capable of embarking a foreign airwing, not just for a ‘landing on’ exercise, but to embark them for many months, integrating crews and aircraft and working them as a single airwing. This concept was shown operationally in 2021 when the USMC embarked onboard the QE, forming a single air group and successfully operating for many months – something that has not been done before, or since.

While many ill-informed commentators incorrectly sneered about ‘the Royal Navy not having enough jets’, serious intelligence analysts in foreign powers will have noted, correctly, that the USMC now had access to operate and strike from two additional aircraft carriers, in a way that no other nation can do. Do not underestimate just how pivotal and significant the ability to embark foreign jets and helicopters is for the CSG concept – the UK has essentially built a carrier usable by NATO allies in a wide range of ways.

The final part of the CSG construct is the escort force around it. The Royal Navy has historically sought to provide 2 x destroyers and 2 x frigates for the CSG as a ‘main effort’ while also ensuring that frigates are available for ASW operations elsewhere. In a typical CSG deployment year, from a force of 15 escorts (6 destroyers, 9 frigates) the RN can generate four for the deployment, one out in the Middle East and one for TAPs (anti-submarine patrols) – so roughly 6 ships on deployment or available for operations, while others are in refit or lower states of readiness.

In addition to the RN escorts, foreign nations are invited to participate in the CSG as well, which is an excellent opportunity for them. The benefits of taking part in a CSG deployment include the ability for a smaller nations navy to gain practical experience of being part of a wider multi-national task group, operating in a carrier battle group role to practise a likely wartime function and helping extend the reach of a nations navy beyond where it would normally go. In the 2020s most NATO navies have small numbers of escort ships available, both due to reduced hull numbers and shortages of trained crew. The days of large squadrons sailing the high seas are long gone, so a CSG type deployment is often the only chance that these countries will get to practise operations at this incredibly complex level.

In 2021 both the Royal Netherlands Navy and the US Navy participated in the CSG deployment, while so far we know that the Royal Norwegian Navy will join in. It is entirely likely that other NATO partners may choose to send ships too, although at this stage that depends on budgets, hull availability and the wider operational plot. The fact these nations are going to deploy does not mean that the UK is somehow ‘failing’ despite what the media would have you think. It is arguably a huge compliment to the UK and its influence that other countries want to send their own scarce military assets to participate in exercises as part of a wider British task force, and helps demonstrate the UK’s role as a leader, not a follower, in NATO.

It is also not unusual for nations to send ships to participate in other nations carrier battle groups – the French Navy has regularly worked with the Royal Navy and other European nations, incorporating them into their carrier groups for escort duties and anti-air warfare work. Meanwhile the US Navy has often seen Canadian and Danish vessels integrated into entire carrier battle group deployments, with their escorts an integral part of the force for the entire deployment. For some strange reason, you don’t see hyperbolic articles full of breathless nonsense in the Telegraph suggesting that the US Navy has been humiliated because it is deploying with foreign vessels in its forces – why is that?  What matters here is that the UK can, and will, be deploying a carrier strike capability to the other side of the planet in 2025. Very few countries can do this, let alone on a routine basis as ‘normal business’ The UK is one of those nations.

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Are there reasons for concerns here that do matter? Of course people share concerns about the state of the RN escort fleet at the moment and it’s a really challenging place to be. There is no doubt that the RN would prefer to have Type 26 and Type 31 now, but that isn’t happening yet. Instead it is being forced to run on increasingly ancient frigates that are well past their life expiry date, while waiting for the cavalry to arrive to replace them. This is a legacy of systemic underfunding and deprioritising investment in RN shipbuilding for many years, and repeated delays in getting the Type 26 onto contract. Its fair to say that there is light at the end of the tunnel, particularly with the 2^nd Type 26 about to be ‘floated out’ and the first Type 31 very close to launch. We’re not far away from seeing complete recapitalisation of the frigate force, which will make a massive difference here – but it takes time to do this.

The interesting question will be, given that the RN (and wider MOD) faces horrific in year budget challenges as a result of chronic underfunding in recent years, whether a decision is taken to step back completely from the Type 23 force and stop being a frigate navy at all for a few years. Given the enormously fragile state of the force, the costs being sunk in ships with very limited life left, and the people tied up in them, would it make more sense to pay the bulk of the Type 23s off, accelerate the Type 26 programme with the funding and people saved and take a 5 year view that a capability ‘holiday’ makes for a vastly more capable and lethal RN in the 2030s, rather than breaking the force with ancient ships and tired people?

To those who say that the RN needs more ships, yes it does and it recognises this fact. There was historically a long term goal of getting growth past the target of 19 escorts into the mid 20s, but this requires people. Until the RN can solve its horrific personnel challenges, where each year it is losing more people than it recruits and is carrying gaps all over the place, there is little point having more ships because there aren’t enough people to safely sail, operate and fight them. What matters far more than hulls is people and there are not enough of them at the moment (a problem familiar to most Western navies to be fair for many different reasons).

The more interesting point about the Norwegian announcement was that the tanker MAUD will be joining the deployment. Its not clear whether she will be joined by an RFA or not, and given the utterly dire state of affairs in the RFA right now, where the bulk of its force is laid up in reserve, unlikely to sail again, and with sailors going on strike, its hard to see how an RFA could be generated for this trip. If we want to worry about anything, lets worry about the RFA which if you believe social media is really not in a good place right now, with most of its brand new tankers in reserve (of 6 tankers  and 1 store ship on paper, only 1, possibly 2 are active, the rest are laid up),

The real worry point should not be that an escort is joining the deployment, but that there is an incredibly real possibility that there will not be a UK store ship available in the form of RFA FORT VICTORIA (the other three RFA solid stores ships having been scrapped or sold between 2010 and 2022). The ‘Fort Vic’ is ancient, well into her 30s and in increasingly poor material condition – it is hard to see her being able to make the trip out to the far east, while the TIDE class can only carry incredibly limited numbers of solid stores (and not ammunition for jets). Due to repeated decisions to delay ordering replacements in previous years, it will be the best part of a decade before her replacement is available for duties. This is the equivalent of using a WW2 built store ship in the Falklands War due to a failure to build replacements in time.

However, lets park these concerns for the time being and focus instead on what really matters here. The UK is clear that a carrier strike group is deploying next year and it will once again function as a global show of strength for UK capability. It will be joined by one of our closest military partners, Norway, which has a long and proud history of jointoperations with the UK and which may yet join the Type 26 family too. We should focus on the very positive story to be told of this deployment, the fact that it is ‘international by design’ and ignore the risible nonsense being published in the Telegraph as inaccurate scaremongering. There is a bright future next year, and beyond for the Royal Navy and its frigate force, regardless of what some may have you think.