Is There A Case for Defence Cuts?
There are multiple media reports this weekend talking about
what may, or may not, emerge in the Integrated Review (IR), due to be published
on 15 March. The general view seems to be that cuts lie ahead for the armed
forces, along with modernisation.
Naturally this has caused concerns in many areas, people do
not instinctively like defence cuts, or want to see military equipment taken
out of service ahead of its planned lifespan. But right now though, we don’t
know what will, or will not, happen as part of the IR. Anything circulating is a
leak or outright speculation or some valiant last ditch effort to protect vested
interests.
It is certain that there will be changes to equipment levels,
and it seems likely that some kit will be taken out of service. But at the risk of stating the obvious,
nothing is certain until it is officially announced – prior to this point it is
all speculation, guesses and rumours.
The bigger question that needs to be asked, and which perhaps people focus less on is ‘what is the benefit of these cuts and why do them’? In other words, rather than focus on the short term picture of equipment leaving service, what is the longer term goal and prize of making significant structural changes to the armed forces?
The point of an exercise like the Integrated Review is to understand how the world has changed, and how the UK needs to take steps to remain safe and secure. It is clear that over the last few years we have seen an acceleration of various themes, including significant advances in cyber warfare, the growth of AI, data and emerging technology as a way of fundamentally changing our lives.
We’ve also seen various changes to the global order, with
some powers rising, others falling and a variety of global issues and disputes
continuing. Throughout it all we’ve seen an increase in the importance of
international engagement, diplomatic alliance building and working jointly to
resolve issues. Looking ahead the next 10 years are likely to continue to
exacerbate this change, particularly in the field of military operations.
The challenge when working out how to respond to these
threats is judging the most likely force structure needed to counter them.
Historically, like most countries, the UK has relied on ‘heavy’ equipment like
tanks, fighter jets and major warships. This was the environment where most
operations occurred, and where it was possible to engage with and defeat your
enemy.
But in the last 20 years, this dominance has been challenged
by the growth of areas like cyber, enabling states to carry out espionage and
offensive cyber operations against others, or through the increased use of space
and the information domain to try to conduct operations. Increasingly we see
operations short of war occurring that require a far lower cost of entry than maintaining
an armoured division or carrier group, and which can be devastatingly effective
if successful.
This trend is likely to accelerate in the years to come,
seeing new technology emerge that could fundamentally change how military operations
are conducted enter service. The prize on offer is better capability that can
operate more effectively than previous generations of equipment and do things
previously not thought possible.
This is a prize worth trying to secure – but it takes time,
money and effort to deliver this and that isn’t always easy to do within the
confines of the current force structure. For example, running equipment on
means paying support costs, assigning personnel, and continuing to spend money
on something that may be increasingly less relevant.
In those circumstances, a decision to disinvest now,
stepping back from keeping a legacy unit going frees up cash, people and
resources that can instead be assigned to helping bring new equipment into service.
The best way to look at these decisions is to view them through
the prism of a 10-15 year lifespan. While it may sound depressing now to hear
that elderly equipment may leave service a little sooner than planned, it is
also important to look more long term. We are on the verge of significant
change, and we can either ride this through and gain a significant qualitative edge
on our peers, and continue to bring real leverage to our partners and friends,
or we can choose to not embrace this, and end up with increasingly less
relevant equipment and reduced influence.
Over the next decade or so, as new equipment emerges, and
new ways of operating, the UK has a chance to take a genuine lead in taking
this forward. This will reinforce the nation as a leading science power, able
to embrace new technology and find ways to use it on military operations. From
that perspective, a period of short term reductions, that give the headroom and
freedom to create the longer term conditions for success is essential.
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Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright |
This fits into a wider challenge of trying to balance off
the relative importance of the military in our future national security space. While
many people may respond to the news that (as seems likely) the British Army
will be reduced with a ‘well we can’t defend ourselves and technically as its
under 100k strong we no longer have an army anymore’ , or other such nonsense,
the better question is perhaps ‘what threats are emerging that the Army cannot
help us defend against’?
In those circumstances we see that there is a wide range of
changing threats, that sit outside the traditional area of military operations –
for example the cyber domain. In those circumstances, there is a very strong
argument for the idea of reducing spending on certain niche military
capabilities that are less likely to be used, in order to bolster spending on countering
threats that could be used against UK citizens daily.
What we need to understand is as the threat changes, where
do the spending priorities lie, and are the armed forces as important as they used
to be to solve this? A good reason for doing the Integrated Review is to take
stock on these threats, and work out who is best placed to fix them – in many
cases small investments in law enforcement, cyber capability, intelligence services
and so on could have a much bigger impact on long term national security than
continuing one or two major equipment projects.
The challenge too is to work out what role internationally
the armed forces play – for decades the
assumption has been that the British armed forces will operate in coalition
with others, and provide a leading role inside that coalition. The goal has essentially
been to be a ‘day one partner of choice’ – in other words the UK military contribution
is able to take part on the first day of any high intensity conflict alongside
the US and other peers, as a fully integrated partner, and not held back as a
possible liability.
To keep this coveted position means investing in technology now
to ensure that when it hits widespread use, the UK is ahead of the game and
able to operate with the US and other partners. A failure to invest, and a failure
to keep up means ceding this position and losing influence – to that end
cutting older capabilities now to ensure that the UK remains fit to fight makes
a lot of sense.
It also bolsters credibility on a wider diplomatic scale – its
much easier to build an alliance with nations if you offer to turn up with
relevant equipment able to match the likely threat and also enhance the
capabilities of the force. This sits far more comfortably with other nations
than the offer of older equipment less able to deploy, less able to fight and
survive and which in turn puts their own assets and troops at risk. To that
end, investing in future technology makes a great deal of sense to keep the
military able to enhance our diplomatic leverage.
There will be dismay at the loss of capabilities in the IR –
it is always sad to see equipment taken out of service. But it is worth remembering
that whatever package is agreed, is agreed for good reasons. Decisions will be
taken based on an understanding not just of the costs of the force now, but
also in the future, and what material state assets are in, and what likely
further costs are coming up.
Decisions to not replace other capabilities may be taken due
to analysis on what missions are likely to no longer be required, or where
reduced troop levels mean other requirements are reduced. The whole point is
that these packages are drawn up using a lot of analysis and effort to be as
coherent as possible and ensure that the future military structures make sense
for the tasks that the nation requires of it.
A final thought is that for all the talk of reductions,
there are almost certainly going to be enhancements or changes too that ensure
capabilities are met in different ways. It would be unwise to assume that just
because something is leaving service means that the UK will no longer do
something, it could just be that it will be done differently in future.
The future nature of conflict will be very different, and
the UK (like all nations) has to make difficult decisions about how it wants to
operate and fight. It faces a binary choice – either invest in new technology at
the expense of short term cuts, and remain a leading global military power, or
alternatively retain similar force structures at the expense of modernisation
and find itself left behind by others and likely outmatched on the battlefield.
There is without doubt a case for intelligent defence cuts,
provided they are done in a coherent and structured way. The prize is enormous but
costly, but it is a price worth paying if the UK is serious about remaining a
top tier military power.
A very well written article Sir! Thanks for that, always good to get a debate going :)
ReplyDeleteI don't know if I accept that cyber, AI ect has greatly changed since the last review, as I'm sure people with a lot more knowledge & intellect than me would have been able to predict the continued rise of those particular elements long long ago. In the same way, I don't seriously believe that the withdrawal of Nimrod without replacement in 2010 was a cut in a coherent structed way, as hey presto, the next review suddenly ordered new aircraft to perform the exact same job. We had to just cross our fingers that allies could pick up the tab in the mean time. I think the main problem with UK defence has been money & a coherent long term plan (or lack of both). We shall see what happens in the IR, & I would agree that done in a structed way, some cuts could be justified. Above all, I just hope we are treated like adults & are told the real rational for the changes, rather than be pushed off with spin & buzz words, which have happened all before & have made many people very skeptical about having confidence that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing. We can't afford to do everything as the saying goes, & some honesty from our political masters in that regard would be welcomed. Best wishes.
Do you get Wednesday afternoons off for being a Main Building shill?
ReplyDeleteDear Sir Humphrey,
ReplyDeletesince you are talking about the changes in security trends and about new challenges ahead, I would be interested in your position on so called "hybrid threats/interference". What is the role of army in countering these threats, if there is any?
From my point of view, this topic is becoming more and more part of (not just) public discussion, although there is still not common understanding of it...
Thank you for your comments!
I agree with the overall argument in this post. Given the scalability of technology, a "minor" technological advantage one party over the other has serious cascading impacts in a conflict. The recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrates that no matter the "elan" of one side or the other, if you integrate modern technology and adapt your strategy accordingly, you can defeat an opponent in the most humiliating way possible.
ReplyDeleteThe threats the UK faces include state/non-state cyber operations which can disrupt an entire nation. It must face the reality that if the US focuses attention towards China then the challenge Russia poses must be increasingly borne by Europe. It faces an assertive Iran who has the desire to dominate the Persian Gulf region disrupting oil supplies if they so wish, and Turkey who wants to dominate the newly discovered natural gas fields in the eastern Med, thereby causing additional problems for European-wide stability... in short, as the US is no longer the global hegemon, regional powers begin to act up in their own self-interest and this is something Europeans have not had to deal with in a while (I expand this point beyond just the UK to include European NATO partners as well).
Whilst it is difficult to spend like the Americans or the Chinese, the UK Government can learn from other countries and militaries how to become more effective and remain at the cutting edge. Whether that means a Talpiot-like programme targeting UK youth, integrating civilians with critical cyber/engineering (i.e. autonomous robotics) skills more closely to the security/defence establishment or whatever, flexibility and adaptability are absolutely critical for the UK to maintain peace and security.