Integrated Review - Initial Thoughts and Impressions.

 

The Integrated Review has been published, and it sets a compelling vision for the next 10 years of UK national security strategy. The document was intended to act as the top level paper, setting out the overall strategy and vision, and further Departmental papers will follow. This means that the MOD will not announce until next Monday (22 Mar) the likely force structures arising as a result of the IR.

An initial read of the paper shows a document that is determined to reshape how we think about defence and security, and this is to be welcomed. For too long the phrase ‘defence review’ has become synonymous with decisions on tank or warship numbers, and not the deeper discussion about what it is that the UK wants to do in the world, and how it wants to do it.

The paper eloquently captures that the reason the UK is such an influential country is due to a very wide range of factors, not just our armed forces. The emphasis for example on soft power, multilateral diplomacy and looking to use all manner of different enablers to pursue goals is welcome.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The UK can, and does, operate very effectively as a ‘soft superpower’, and is particularly good at leveraging these assets. One of the hidden strengths of the UK system is that the Civil Service and military can, and do, work very effectively together as a joint manner – that may sound dull, but actually is a real force multiplier. To have a government that practises joined up government really makes the UK far more potent in diplomatic and other areas as a result – because it speaks with a coherent voice.

Much of the paper focuses on issues seemingly of little relevance to those interested in ‘hard’ defence, but which are crucial. If you want the UK to be an influential power, you need to engage in trade alliances, work in multi-lateral bodies and help shape the regulatory frameworks that matter and shape the world.

Engagement in places like shaping how the internet is governed may sound dull, but is core to ensuring that what emerges is a dimension that is run and governed and acts in a manner amenable to our longer term interests. The more that the UK engages in these debates, and takes the lead, the more it is possible to quietly shape the world in a vision that matches our own positive look.

It is pleasing then to see so much emphasis on this softer engagement side, the focus on use of diplomatic talks, international bodies and working in collaboration with allies to shape the world order. If the UK can take the lead on shaping these areas, it becomes far more influential as a power as a result.

The wider focus too on science is equally refreshing. As we have seen over the last year, possessing a world leading science capability matters because it lets you solve problems to make the world a better place. In the 21^st Century the ability to rapidly develop vaccines or find innovative science based answers to knotty problems will be as important as possession of armoured divisions or aircraft carriers.

We’ve seen in the form of ‘vaccine diplomacy’ that the effective deployment of safe and usable vaccines can pay dividends in the third world. Just look at the speed by which China and Russia have sought to get their vaccines in general use around the world. For the UK, acting as a sovereign nation with control over an effective scientific industry and the ability to protect it from being disrupted will be crucial moving forward.

To that end it is absolutely right to focus on the place of the UK as a leading science superpower – this is where future battles will be fought. Protection of science, creating the conditions for research and for encouraging investment is crucial now, because if not, then the UK becomes reliant on others for support and help when it is needed most.

Likewise the emphasis on cyber defence also makes a great deal of sense. Cyber has revolutionised our lives and changed the way we approach and engage with the world. It can be hard to quantify ‘cyber’ as a capability in the same way as a picture of tanks lined up – after all, who thinks that an image of a server room full of Royal Signals types with their belts over their jumpers is a marker of military power?

But a failure to invest properly in this space, to understand it, to defend it and to if needs be go on the offensive in it, could have damaging consequences for our way of life as a nation. The loss of internet banking, the theft of commercial secrets leading to IP theft, the compromise of personal data – all of this can have grave consequences. In a nation that is digitally engaged at all times, the loss of the internet, or parts of thereof, to hostile cyber activity could have profound economic, military and diplomatic consequences.

To that end it makes a great deal of sense to invest in proper cyber defences – they may not be high profile, but without them, it will be hard to maintain our way of life as a nation.

The wider emphasis in the paper covering the changing nature of security threats gained a lot of attention too. The fact that Russia remains a clear threat is perhaps unsurprising, there is little doubt that Russian activity against the UK under the Putin regime remains hostile, aggressive and in complete breach of international laws and norms. Sadly this has become depressingly par for the course for a nation that shows abject contempt for its neighbours and their borders.  That NATO will remain the cornerstone of our security is sensible, as is the UK’s ongoing commitment to it.

The references to China though highlight the real dilemma facing policy makers on the balance between security and co-operation. On the one hand, it is clear that China poses a significant threat to UK national security interests- for example through its aggressive acts in the South China Sea, its flagrant disregard for other nations borders and maritime boundaries, and its aggressive campaign of intellectual property theft and cyber crime. The paper is clear that steps need to be taken to safeguard UK industry and capabilities against aggressive Chinese activity which could threaten us – for example the 5G challenge.

At the same time though, China represents an economic prize that is significant. An audience of over a billion people, many of whom are rapidly growing richer and keen to invest in middle class activities and pursuits. UK industry excels at producing ‘soft’ offerings like luxury products, education and other things that generate trade and jobs. There are potentially enormous economic prizes on offer with trade that would help improve the economic situation no end.

The challenge for policy makers is to balance this off against China as a security threat to our wider way of life. To outright cease trading would, particularly at the moment, cause real difficulties for the UK economy, so striking the balance, working out how to encourage China to act as a responsible global power, and still trading warily is going to be key here.

One of the most widely discussed aspects of the paper is the so-called ‘Indo Pacific Tilt’ shifting UK attention into the region in a more coherent way. This does not mean that the UK is suddenly about to reopen the Far East Fleet, but rather that it will focus more diplomatic effort in region.

The paper is clear that this tilt is about low cost high gain participation in trade talks, diplomatic outreach and pushing on multilateral engagement in order to ensure that UK views are represented in region. By participating, expressing views and seeking to offer support, the UK will be seen as an active participant in a way it perhaps isn’t at the moment.

Very much as a secondary aspect of this, its likely that there will be increased defence interest in the region, but it should be clear that this is not going to be some massive upscaling of presence or commitment. This is also a long term goal – the path to deeper commitment begins here, but will take many years to take forward, it is not something that will see the UK jump in and be received with welcome arms and rewards from the outset.

Of perhaps the most interest though was not the widely trailed ‘tilt’ but instead the more subtle refocusing of effort elsewhere. Significant mention was made of the importance of Africa to UK security and thinking, very much from the long-term perspective. This ties into the wider concerns raised in the paper on climate change, decreasing poverty and the growth of medium power alliances – the world is moving away from monolithic blocs, and there are a rise in nations of power and influence who will work together on a case by case basis.

The emphasis on Africa points to the recognition that in decades to come, the UK will need to build links with African nations as peers and partners, and work with them on bilateral and multilateral issues of concern. By thickening links now, and focusing on cooperation across a range of areas, not just security, the UK is taking the best possible steps to build a strong position for years to come.

Also of interest was the near total absence of references to Gulf security. For a region that has absorbed so much attention and policy making interest for decades, the Gulf section felt relatively light, suggesting that it is of marked declining value to UK policy makers compared to even a few years ago.  It is interesting too,  to see how little policy interest is focused in Central and South America.

The overall result seems to show a UK focused on three primary and three secondary areas of security interest – European, African and Indo-Pacific security are all seen as primary drivers, while the Gulf, Americas and the ‘rest of the world’ feel less directly important.

However you chose to interpret it though, it is clear that this is a paper long on ambition and on making clear that security is about more than just guns and bombs. There is a role for the armed forces, but the paper sets out a vision that shows a world where state on state conflict is just one part of many security challenges, and where the military is far more likely to be needed to operate in the ‘grey zone’ than it is for conventional wars.

The future of security is as much about protecting our critical national infrastructure,  investing in science and supporting efforts to regulate and set the global agenda as it is about deploying troops on the front line.

There will always be a role for this military capability, but its going to be less than we perhaps have previously assumed. Instead other areas will come to the fore, equally demanding of resources and attention. This poses difficult spending decisions for politicians – do you invest in areas like the armed forces, as much to protect industrial supply chains as to keep military capability, or do you focus on areas like cyber and the intelligence community?

One of the most interesting parts of the Defence paper that will follow is to see what the vision for the armed forces is. Is it to do more of the same, and keep a fairly traditional fighting military, or to radically change and more closely integrate the armed forces with other security providers? Is the future of the armed forces to be but one arm of a multi-disciplinary security function?

The area of the paper that has gotten the most media attention is the commitment to raise the nuclear warhead stockpile from 180 to 260 warheads. This represents a not insignificant shift to UK nuclear policy, reversing years of drawing numbers down and keeping the SSBNs relatively lightly armed.

What is known about the SSBN force is that it has submarines at sea with 8 missiles embarked, carrying a maximum of 40 warheads per submarine. To change this would require putting either additional missiles onboard, or amending the payloads of the missiles significantly – both of which are decisions that take time to do.

The question that won’t be answered is whether this is a move to permit the UK to introduce a new generation of warheads, while phasing the old ones out, permitting a temporary overall increase in numbers, or if it is about fundamentally changing how the UK sees its nuclear deterrence posture.

If the former then this is unlikely to have much effect on day to day operations as it won’t really change the number of warheads at sea. If the latter, then it sends a clear message that the UK continues to evaluate its criteria needed for the deterrent to be effective, and that it will not hesitate from changing upwards if that is required – e.g. if the so-called ‘Moscow Criteria’ has changed (the number of warheads needed to functionally destroy Moscow and other Russian cities as a deterrence against a Russian attack), then this sends a strong message to Russia that the UK is determined to remain a credible nuclear power for the long term.

It is likely that this subject will remain the most contentious part of the paper, but it is also a helpful debate to have. If strengthening the nuclear deterrent is a key decision in order to preserve the credibility of NATO as a nuclear alliance, then this helps reinforce the position of the UK as a leading NATO power, and helps justify the continued retention of certain key roles and positions.

Overall though this paper is to be warmly welcomed. It is refreshing to read a national security paper that focuses so widely and on the myriad of ways that UK security can be impacted by different threats. Rather than focus on tanks, guns and boats, with a small little bit on ‘other stuff’, this is a good realistic assessment of the world of 2021.

It recognises that the threats we face are real, and both the same as, and also very different from the world of 2010 or 1990. There is still a role for the armed forces and Defence, but this is a paper that rightly recognises that national security is the responsibility of practically every part of Government, and not exclusively the MOD.

Fundamentally it is a positive and challenging read that should be studied in detail to understand how different the world will become, and sets out a very positive vision of the UK remaining in a leading role in this world. It is well worth taking the time to read and study in detail.