Close and Constant Allies - Why the UK/US Relationship Still Matters...

 

Commentators in the UK have begun their 4-yearly ritual of worrying about their relationship status with the USA. Despite no reason for there to be any change from ‘in a relationship’, some in the UK seem to think that it may be time to change things to ‘its complicated’ – this is entirely normal and happens every four years.

The cause of this angst is linked to the arrival of President Biden, which in turn has led to lots of articles about how the UK doesn’t matter, or how the UK can be a great friend, or how the special relationship is doomed and so on. It’s a curiously British obsession with trying to work out just how into them the US President actually is.

Lots of airtime is given to focusing on the first phone call, the first visit, the first talks (but hopefully not the first kiss), and perhaps less attention is given to asking whether the relationship between President and Prime Ministers actually matters all that much?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The UK and US enjoy an extremely close and very effective relationship covering defence, national security and intelligence co-operation. Both nations share a core set of mutual values, and have a broad commitment to open markets, democratic traditions and standing up for the importance of international law (except in very specific and limited ways). This is a relationship built on the foundation of decades of close co-operation.

The heart of the relationship is two distinct things-  firstly it is the shared values, which as noted cover many areas of mutual interest. This makes it naturally easier to co-operate when you both see the world through the same lens.

The second distinct thing is that there is a genuinely close and effective working relationship at staff level between the civil servants and military personnel who operate together around the world. This isn’t just an occasional stilted ‘staff talks’ where there is polite small talk, nice pictures and little progress. This is a relationship built with UK and US staff sitting together in shared offices working on solving some of the biggest problems out there.

We too often focus on the leadership dynamic, and ask whether this drives the relationship. To be honest, no it doesn’t. While Presidents and Prime Ministers can, and do, take decisions or shape how their Governments work, they rarely have time to focus on in depth bilateral issues – a Prime Minister who has time to dive deeply into the depths of the Anglo-US relationship is a Prime Minister whose Private Office isn’t keeping him busy on other equally pressing priorities.

What it is better to do is to think of the leadership as that of custodians of the story of the relationship. They will shape how it continues, through their words and deeds, but they will in turn leave the day to day machinery of its operation to the officials, officers and others who keep it working in rude health.

The UK does seem to have a regular and ongoing sense of existential angst about whether it is a favourite or not, which is not replicated by those who actually have to work on these issues. There is a sense of understanding that the UK brings a very solid set of credentials and credibility to policy makers in Washington DC who are looking for credible allies.

The UK ‘offer’ is built around the principles of having a global focus, shared mutual interests in foreign policy, armed forces capable of deploying and holding their own globally, and the offer of both bases and interoperability with the US as near peers.

There are no other nations out there which can bring the same package of benefits to the table. Other nations have close links to the US in historical terms (for example, it is common to refer to France as America’s oldest ally, which is entirely true), or to look to work closely with other nations on a regional footing – for example in the Middle East or Asia Pacific.

What differentiates the UK is both the closeness of the relationship, but also the wider value it brings. A good set of diplomatic links, permanent memberships of a wide range of global organisations, and also highly capable intelligence services that can work with the US.

This is paired with a very capable defence industry, home to companies not only capable of building world leading defence and security products, but also who have heavily invested in the US as well. Most of the major UK defence companies also now have significant stakes in the US, and provide equipment to the US military as well.

When brought together the result is a genuinely close link that runs well at working level. It doesn’t need high level intervention from Presidents and Prime Ministers to make it work. It doesn’t need lots of effort and panic to prioritise it and make it special, because it already works well without needing attention.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

This is the key point – some relationships need input, steering and top level leadership to work. But if the maintenance of a diplomatic relationship requires your head of government to lead, then its probably not in a very healthy position.

The really effective relationships, the ones where things are truly close, they function at working level. For example the Franco-German links, or the Australia-NZ relationship. This is where the dynamics are so close, the views so aligned, and the understanding that the other partner brings so much value, that there is no need to do anything other than take it for granted.

The UK-US relationship is strong in the areas that matter. Of course the US will have a different focus at times. It is a continental sized superpower that has a global focus and resourcing that other countries can only dream of. To compare UK and US spending or power is pointless, because they are on totally different levels.

What is far more sensible is to look and focus not on this, but on where the UK and US staff are. Look at the exchange officer roles, look at the information sharing, look at the presence of joint offices, or diplomats working together in Chanceries around the world. Try to look at the web of interconnection between the two governmental systems and you realise that the links are strong and enduring.

This does not mean that the UK can take its access for granted. It is a privilege hard won, and one that exists because the UK has shown a willingness to spend and invest in a big way. To pare back, take risk or carry out some activity that implies a reduction in willingness to shoulder the burden of global leadership would probably have consequences. To step away from responsibility means a reduction in rewards too.

The challenge for the UK is to ensure that for as long as our strategic interests align with the US, to make sure that the UK demonstrates its worth and value as a partner. This may mean having to make decisions about strategic posture, deployments and commitments that factor in both the UK self interest, but also the wider dynamic of the impact on the bilateral relationship.

If the UK were to step back from this, there are plenty of nations that would happily try to steal from the UK’s position and step in. Once positions are ceded, they are rarely open to being filled again – for example, in a Joint environment, if the UK were to gap high profile, high value, high access posts like those in the J3/J5 environment, then it would find it much harder to get similar slots in the future.

It also means that the UK needs to think carefully about how it sends its people to posts – some of the most critical posts in the relationship are carried out at working level – the wrong SO1 or OF5 in post could have damaging consequences for information sharing and relationship maintenance on a longer term basis. Likewise, is it better to send a very good Officer to deploy into a liaison or exchange role abroad, or keep them back in the UK and grow them for a future talent role inside the single service or national ‘purple’ environment?

This may grow in importance as time passes on from the HERRICK/TELIC era. With fewer opportunities at present for UK and US troops to work together in an operational environment, there needs to be more focus on finding the right opportunities to keep links together at working level, starting with young platoon and company commanders, and building the deeper links and friendships that matter. Without this investment of opportunities now, then there will be weaker links at more senior levels in 10-15 years time, which will miss the bonds forged in exercises, operations and battle.

This too poses challenges – how does the UK balance off the need for putting people into joint exercises in the US, working in joint environments and ensuring there is a steady throughflow of UK personnel into the US environment, and reminding people that the UK is present. One constant reality of dealing with the US is that if you aren’t there in their military system, then it will quickly close up again and be as if you were never there –the price of influence is the demand for persistent presence.

When all is said and done, there will always be a desire to be wanted. Secretly the fact that the UK is able to enjoy such good links to the US is both a source of national pride to many, and frustration to other nations, who would dearly love their own similar access.

What is a fairly pointless exercise though is to write articles suggesting that because there is a regular change at the top, that this changes the dynamic of a relationship built over three quarters of a century. The relationship will change, evolve and maybe in years to come wither if circumstances make it so – but right now it remains in robust health, driven by those who make it so. It doesn’t matter who is in No10 or the White House, what matters is who is in the offices, the ops rooms and the front line, working together constantly as genuinely close and constant allies in an uncertain world, now and in the future.