Living in Tempestuous Times - The RAF and Tempest

Its been an interesting week for the British Armed Forces, with a variety of stories emerging that when brought together highlight several of the challenges facing Defence. To start with, early in the week a story was published in the Mail, talking about how the RAF had a large number of Typhoon aircraft out of service and being stripped for spares.

The practise of stripping aircraft for parts is not remotely uncommon. In fact its done by every air force on the planet, and has been done since the beginning of aviation history. This happens for two main reasons usually. Either the airframe is potentially needing further deep repairs or replacements, and has spare parts located onboard that can be used to keep another operational, or it has reached the end of its operational life.

Taking parts off one jet and placing them on another is entirely common practise. If an airframe isn’t likely to fly for some reason, and its quicker to take the part off it and get another airborne, then why not do it?

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

Aircraft do not have a monopoly on the parts they are fitted with – they are rather like very large and expensive Lego kits, with interchangeable pieces that can be swapped between frames as required. Sometimes it is easier to swap a spare out than it is to wait for the supply chain to deliver a new part, and instead see that the new part is sent to an already out of commission jet.

There is another practise too of stripping jets at the end of their serviceable lives of all relevant parts to ensure that they can be recycled into service as required. When an airframe reaches the end of its life, it will have every component that can still have further use removed from it in order to build up stockpiles of spares and components, helping build a bit of ‘fat’ in the system for when its required.

The news that the RAF has withdrawn some Tranche 1 Typhoons and stripped them for parts did come as a surprise to some, who thought they would remain in service for longer. In fact this move was entirely predictable and makes a good deal of sense. It was actually announced in an FOI a couple of years ago, and reported at the time that the Tranche 1 trainers would be cannibalised for spares.

The Typhoon fleet is not a homogenous block of identical aircraft, all of which look and operate in the same way. From a total order of some 160 airframes, the RAF force comprises three distinct ‘tranches’.

The Tranche 1 Typhoon buy was some 48 aircraft, split between the single seat and twin seat trainer aircraft variants. The latter was used to help get pilots familiar with the aircraft during conversion training. The original plan was always the for Tranche 1 airframes to go out of service by 2019, after a total service life of around 15 years.

The bulk of the RAF Typhoon force was always intended to be the Tranche 2 & 3 forces, which are significantly different aircraft. Although superficially visually similar, under the skin there are major differences in how the aircraft works, the software used and the package of capabilities that can be used.

For example the Tranche 1 is primarily an air defender, and had very little air to ground capability – as other Tranches entered service, they had a much better ability to carry out this sort of work. There is surprisingly little commonality between the Tranche 1 and other fleets, and it isn’t suitable for upgrades to the latest standard as the cost would be very high due to the changes required to make them compatible.

The 2015 SDSR agreed that there was a need to retain some ofthe Tranche 1 fleet in service to provide additional air defence support, assistance to the joint RAF & Qatari squadron of Typhoons (No12 Sqn) and carry out some so-called ‘Aggressor’ training.

This was done to relieve pressure on the very busy Tranche 2 & 3 force which will make up the bulk of the future combat force. The decision was taken to retain two squadrons in service, but dispose of the ‘twin seat’ variant (some 24 strong), with the current plan being to maintain them until 2035.

What is likely to have been reported then in the Mail is the news that the Tranche 1 trainers, a small force with no operational future or requirement, have been taken out of service and stripped for parts to help support other Tranche 1 aircraft for many years to come.

There are two key parts to this story that are important to remember. Firstly, all air forces strip airframes – this is not new, and its entirely routine business. There is nothing outrageous about taking an airframe no longer in service, and for which there is no longer any military requirement for, and ensuring that usable parts are taken off it.

Secondly, it is helpful to remember that when you look at a total ‘order of battle’, the number of aircraft planned or in service will very rarely actually equate to a combat force of the same size. On paper the RAF has 160 Typhoons in service or on order, yet it will never operate all of them at once.

The length of time it can take to see an aircraft programme deliver can be measured in decades now – the Typhoon project can trace back to the early 1980s, some 40yrs ago, and is likely to be in service for 20-30 more years. Even if a country states it wants hundreds of aircraft, the time for delivery and spacing out of orders means that it will be many decades between the first and last arriving.

For example the first few Tranche 1 Typhoons entered service back in the early 2000s, yet nearly twenty years later, the RAF has yet to receive the last of the Batch 3s. This is a long term programme.

Be wary then of assuming that an order of ‘X’ hundred airframes means a nation can actually field those aircraft in one go. In reality a combination of crashes, servicing, maintenance issues and other challenges means most fleets usually only operate half to two thirds their actual size, with the remainder out of active use.

The challenge is less ‘how to get as many aircraft in the air as possible’ but far more one of ‘how to guarantee a consistent level of availability, often for many years. This may result in what seems like a smaller available force, but is often a feat of considerable effort to do – the RAF in particular is very good at maintaining high availability rates over a sustained period from its fleets.

To that end, there is nothing of particular concern about the news then that RAF jets are being stripped for parts. Its all part of the cycle of life, and not something either unusual or scandalous of itself.

The bigger question though is what does this mean for the future of the RAF in the next 20 years as the next generation of aircraft is designed? Already work is warming up to deliver the so-called ‘Tempest’ project, which will be the new RAF airframe, likely to enter service in the late 2030s and 40s.

This project has potential to provide a replacement for the Typhoon force, and is seen as the future of the UK aviation industry. The challenge though is how to bring it into service in a way which ensures it is affordable, capable and in enough numbers to meet current commitments.

This is where the Government faces a range of dilemmas – the order for Tempest is not just one about pure military capability. It is a much deeper question about the future of the UK aerospace industry and how it evolves and remains credible well into the 21^st century.

The most cost effective option may indeed not be to develop a new UK jet, but instead buy into a wider replacement programme – for example doing as with JSF and seeing if there is a US programme the UK could support. But would this be the right outcome for industry, and if not, how does the UK retain an element of sovereign control on its aircraft projects in future?

The Tempest programme will be crucial to maintaining tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs in the UK, which would otherwise be lost when the Typhoon project comes to an end. It would not be possible to resurrect them easily if a pause in construction occurs, as was seen in shipbuilding, when a pause in orders led to major loss of knowledge and experience.

But this investment comes at a cost – and its unlikely to be cheap. Here the UK faces difficult decisions – is the priority to protect the UK aerospace sector, come what may and invest in Tempest regardless of cost? Or is it to buy some Tempest, but not enough to keep it economically viable in order to free up cash to buy enough airframes of other types to fill the gaps caused by lack of Tempest forces?

The RAF will need a high capability aircraft in the years to come, as will other nations, but getting it to the point where it is affordable may mean compromises over workshare agreements that could make it less beneficial to the UK to order than planned.

These are all difficult questions that don’t have easy answers to hand, and which will require balancing off. But it highlights how Defence is having to grapple with really big problems – unlike in the early years of the Jet Age, there is no way of developing competing products quickly, or bringing multiple variants into service as a way of hedging bets. The days of ordering three variants of ‘V’ bombers are gone forever. Whatever course the RAF goes down will see it committed for decades to come, so it has to get this right, otherwise the consequences could be enormous.

When brought together the question for Defence is a simple one – in a defence budget that is already stretched, what may have to be sacrificed to pay for it elsewhere? Is this about ordering for the sake of Defence, or for the continuation of the UK aerospace industry?

The hint seems to be that the future is likely to be one of robots and automation rather than people. Reports suggest that the British Army is likely to try to lose soldiers (potentially as many as 7000 headcount) in a drive to automate and use robots instead to fill gaps.

The RAF is likely to look to automation and robotics where possible to reduce headcount and associated infrastructure. But it still needs to recruit and retain good people, who will have high expectations – the more high tech your force, the better your benefits package needs to be to attract talent. Will the people cost rise exponentially the smaller the RAF gets to attract those it needs?

These challenges are being addressed in part now by the so-called ‘Astra’ programme (which is in the eyes of some either a huge change management programme or a borderline cult). But this needs to address not just equipment, but also make the RAF fundamentally fit for purpose for its people – with an aging legacy estate in very poor condition (e.g. multiple reports of sites without hot water for long periods of time), is the RAF going to find that its efforts to fund Tempest deny it the funds to make its estate livable, and in doing so cause a retention crisis as people leave?

The future ahead is both exciting and challenging for the RAF – it has huge opportunities with Tempest, but it needs to be prepared to make and see through the execution of tough choices to get there, which will be either very expensive, or politically very unpalatable to deliver.  It is likely to be a tempestuous few years ahead…