The Importance of Being Doctrinally Earnest...

 

The Chief of the Defence Staff has given a speech setting out his vision of what the future operating concept for the British Armed Forces is. This talk, perhaps politely best described as being long on buzzwords, short on evidenced examples, was an attempt to set out how the Integrated Review will try to shape the way that the armed forces will operate for the next few years.

Speeches on operating concepts and doctrinal development rarely get much interest or attention in the defence social media space. Far easier perhaps to focus on easily definable tangibles like ‘how many ships do we need’ or ‘if we scrap this unit, we could fund that enhancement’. But while focusing in on the tactical minutiae is perhaps rewarding, what is equally powerful is understanding the policy that underpins how the military will be used.

The speech therefore matters because it sets out the circumstances as to how the British Government is likely to see the world evolve, and the way that military units are likely to be employed. This means that it warrants further examination to understand what the IR is likely to mean for the armed forces.

Image by Ministry of Defence; © Crown copyright

The challenge with handling speeches on doctrine and thinking though is that it can be quite hard to set out what it all means in a way that is easily understandable by a layperson. That’s particularly the case in a speech that seems to have been written in an intent to squeeze every last ounce of buzzword related jargon in, in a manner that doesn’t always feel accessible.

Humphrey has spent the last few days puzzling over how to comment on what was a significant intervention, in a way that doesn’t instantly send the readership to sleep. Thankfully help has come in the form of an immensely powerful set of images showing the QUEEN ELIZABETH carrier battle group at sea, coming together briefly for a Photographic exercise ahead of moving into exercise Joint Warrior.

The photos show the QE steaming in a force surrounded by escorts and support ships and with multiple aircraft embarked, heading towards a major international exercise. By itself the images help demonstrate UK naval power, but they also speak to so much more than this.

In the speech CDS referred to the way in which the UK has to adapt to a world where our opponents are fundamentally seeking to achieve success through means short of outright war. He rightly notes that few countries want or are prepared for war, but the spectrum where we can expect challenges to occur has grown exponentially.

In the modern world everyone has an information voice, and can use the combination of propaganda, information operations and the internet to message effectively. This photo is effective as a classic example of this – the shots taken of a Royal Navy task force steaming in rough seas send a clear message to potential foes of capability and credibility, while sending a message of reassurance to both the domestic public and allies too (note the presence of two foreign escorts in the group).

The photo is proof of itself that information operations are central to how states get their messaging done and achieve their aims. A well judged photo can be as powerful in shaping opinions as an actual deployment if done in the right way. 

It is also a reminder that the information domain needs to be considered properly when carrying out military operations. Every opportunity needs to be taken to put the information plan front and centre, and seize opportunities to show what is being done – while, as has rightly been noted, the CSG would never operate in a manner that remotely resembles this picture for real, it is a good way of visually telling a story to explain what carrier strike looks like when brought together in one image.

Another area CDS explored was the concept of introducing the Integrated Operating Concept (the theory which should, in practise, underpin how the armed forces work and deploy). This will be the model under which the armed forces are going to look to the future and their ways of working.

The concept is interesting to examine because in part it really doesn’t commit the UK to doing anything new that it hasn’t done in one form or another for decades, but it does formalise much of what has gone on.

For example, the concept looks at the idea of introducing ‘competition’ – namely the way that the armed forces can be used in increasingly escalatory manner that stops short of general war with a peer rival.

This ability to dial up or deescalate is something that the carrier strike group will excel at. By being able to move to a position of interest, its mere presence can be used as a message to other powers of UK interest or concern on a position.

The capabilities held within the force can be used in a variety of ways, from training and assistance through to directly mentoring or supporting foreign powers – for instance the ships helicopters could be used to carry out maritime surveillance work in support of a country.

Alternatively, the embarked Royal Marine force could send experienced trainers and mentors onto ground operations, embedding with friendly local forces to lead patrols which may come into contact with hostile forces that are being mentored by our rivals.

This level of competition is not new-  one of the often forgotten conflicts in UK history was ‘Confrontation’ which was in effect a proxy war in the Far East fought between the UK and allies against Indonesian forces (heavily supported by Russia) in the 1960s in a battle for influence and control.

This campaign saw extensive use of maritime power, local clashes and operations short of outright war in an effort to ensure that Western interests prevailed. Arguably the concepts being proposed here are not necessarily new, merely a reiteration of the work of previous decades.

The speech also referred to the fact that the armed forces would be much more forward deployed in future, rather than being held back for contingent operations. This too relates to this image. There have been media rumours that the Royal Navy is looking to base a carrier in Japan, and it isn’t difficult to imagine the RN being keen to embrace the concept of forward deployed forces.

The specific text of the speech is telling:

This posture will be engaged and forward deployed – armed forces much more in use rather than dedicated solely for contingency - with training and exercising being delivered as operations. It will involve capacity building and engagement in support of countries that need our support. This could include partnered operations against common threats – particularly violent extremism. And this may involve combat operations’

The shift to forward deployed and working with partners will lead the UK into conflict with other countries, working as integrated members of a coalition and not as a singleton nation. This shift in emphasis, recognising that the work the military will do is going to be international by design and potentially involve combat operations is captured by the image in a simple way.

The presence in the task group of two foreign escorts, a destroyer from the Royal Netherlands Navy, and a US Navy destroyer reflects the ability of the UK to step up and lead complex forces on operations. The fact that the carrier is operating an integrated Anglo/US airwing is another reminder too of the importance of working with international partners in our operations.

The picture captures a force that could, if required, quickly switch to conducting military operations, but also which is able to train effectively together now. The Exercise Joint Warrior, which is about to begin off Scotland is a good reminder of the importance of NATO forces working together to be able to operate at the very highest levels of complexity, and be able to conduct very challenging military operations as part of a multi-national force.

The speech noted too the importance of having the credibility to be able to ‘war fight’ and again this is captured wonderfully in the image. It is vital that UK forces are able to remain credible and send a clear message of deterrence to potential foes – conducting exercises like the bringing together of the task group and holding of Joint Warrior reinforce this message.

It sends a clear signal that NATO underpins UK operational planning, and that NATO forces are competent and capable. It also reminds nations that even if we don’t want to go to war with them, training is conducted at a sufficient level of realism to ensure that if needs be, the force could slip from ‘peace’ to ‘war’ with very little notice. This image is a powerful shot of UK conventional deterrence policy in action.

That the UK can do this in an integrated manner with allies helps build the point made by CDS that future operations cannot be done in silos. There needs to be a plan for joint working, be it done as a UK ‘purple’ operation involving all the services, or by working with allies.

In the image, as noted not only is there multiple UK and allied vessels, but also true jointery in the form of having both RN and RAF forces embarked on the carrier. Only the British Army is missing from the picture…

It is perhaps on that point that it is timely to discuss the points made by CDS around the idea of ‘industrial’ capabilities and ‘sunset’. The speech talks about the move from industrial to information warfare, and how some capabilities must face their ‘sunset’ in order that others can have ‘sunrise’, as well as discussing how to operate through the night.

On one level this sort of language is rather patronising and seems to shy away from genuinely difficult decisions. Saying ‘sunset’ is a more polite way of saying ‘scrap’ and ‘sunrise’ is a way of saying ‘buy’. Surely part of being able to communicate a good case for defence is that of making the public understand the trade off between capabilities and the difficult choices faced.

Bluntly, while the operating concept looks extremely exciting, it is being done against a backdrop of insufficient resourcing on current figures to make the whole force affordable. There is nothing wrong with saying ‘we cannot afford everything, something has to give’ as long as you can make a cogent case for it.

On a more emotional level, there is something quite insulting about the phrase ‘sunset’ – can you imagine if a soldier was killed on operations due to the lack of a capability that was removed from service (sorry, had its sunset). Trying to explain to a grieving family that their relative was killed because we’d found that a certain capability had ‘had its sunset’ is insulting.

If we want to give a speech and push an operating  concept that will actively commit UK troops to combat operations, lets be mature enough as a country to accept we have to take decisions to scrap things that may save their lives, rather than talk about ‘sunset and sunrise’ as if its all a theoretical game of fantasy fleets.

The image though helps illustrate this debate rather wonderfully – for it shows a naval task force which has seen a huge amount of public money invested over the last 20 years to deliver. Billions of pounds have been spent to generate that force, and decisions taken to prioritise funding that project and not other ones.

It reflects that certain other projects will not get the same funding – for instance reduced funding for army projects. The photo perhaps illustrates the tensions which exist in the heart of UK defence aspiration – for each great shot of an RN / RAF carrier strike group deployed working up on operations, there are probably a dozen or more powerpoint images of long cancelled or unaffordable concept projects to revitalise the British Army’s fleet of tanks and APCs – the shot shows the outcome of taking tough funding decisions.

The last area of interest was the way that CDS spoke about taking risk and being more willing to embrace technology. In a paragraph that sounds like a Dalek doing an MBA course, he said the following:

“We will have to take risk, accept some failure and place emphasis on experimentation by allocating resources, force structure, training and exercise activity to stimulate innovation in all lines of development, with a responsive commercial function at the leading edge. This will enable adaptive exploitation as opportunities become clear and allow better financial control.”

While one is minded of the response to Fred Mulley, the Secretary of State for Defence by the Hon Member for Salford East in the 1976 Defence White Paper debate (namely ‘what the hell does that mean’) it seems to essentially suggest that a greater emphasis on risk taking will lie at the heart of defence operations.

This will be challenging to deliver unless significant change is made to how careers are managed – it is easy as CDS to say ‘accept some failure’ but far harder to deliver if you are a young thrusting SO2 keen to promote – why take risk on failure if you think it is career ending.  Talk of accepting failure is fine, but until promotion boards treat failure, as long as it was done in a manner intended to further technological development, as a success, then few are likely to risk it.

Similarly, the discussion on experimentation is fine, but selling the idea of the MOD, always under financial pressure, buying equipment that may or may not work as part of ‘taking risk’ will almost certainly enrage many – why take risk with public money and in turn put our people at risk?

It is also unlikely given the way careers are run that people will have the ability at the moment to see a project through to delivery and spot where to take risks, or step back and switch off.  One has to ask if a risk taking mentality will only be fostered when the career structure is changed to actively reward risk and failure, not push a culture of holding back?

In the image itself, we can see where risk may be taken to advance the cause of technology. The carrier will almost certainly be used to host trials of drones and the airwing of the 2040s and 50s will probably see an ever greater proportion of these platforms embarked instead of crewed jets.

Also, the Type 45 destroyers in the picture may yet embark some form of BMD capability – but the ability to make it work is likely to be costly, and is not guaranteed to work – yet. Is this something that we should embrace, even if it costs scarce resources, and takes ships off other tasks, or should we not embrace this risk and invest the money elsewhere?

Summing up, the speech is well worth a read – it is very full of buzzword bingo, and to be honest it’s a bit of a hard slog in places. The insights it offers are not necessarily new – as part of the prep for this article, Humphrey read through a lot of archive material on previous defence reviews and many common themes emerged around deterrence, technology, risk taking, international operations and so on. If anything, the speech is a reaffirmation of old principles rather than a stunning leap forward into new ones.

But it is worth reading and digesting. If you want to understand why force structures are likely to change, or operational deployments occur in new places, then this speech is setting out the underpinning doctrine and concepts that explain why. It should be essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the serious business of defence.