Tapping for Gold - Data, Submarine Cables and the Defence Review

The Defence Secretary has strongly hinted that the ongoing defence review will focus heavily on the sub sea threat. This covers the mysterious world beneath the oceans, and the critical strategic importance of cables to transfer data to power the global economy, and the lengths some states will go to interfere with this. This statement is covered in a lengthy article in the Daily Telegraph today, which explores in more detail the challenges and threats posed.

This is a fascinating area to look at, not just because of the threat, but also because of how it shows the changing nature of operations and the areas where the UK may need to prioritise defence spending in future.

The strategic importance of undersea cables is not a new phenomenon – at the outbreak of both WW1 and WW2, literally the first acts of the war were for the Royal Navy and associated Dominion Navies to cut German cables to cut them off from the world, isolating their communications, preventing orders reaching colonial outposts and disrupting the means to control global forces.

In the Cold War the presence of undersea cables was an extremely tempting intelligence target, and Western navies went to significant efforts to try to find and tap Soviet cables as a result. The book ‘Blind Mans Buff’ (albeit now rather dated) has good accounts of US Navy submarine missions involving tapping of cables and recovering them from deep inside Soviet territorial waters.

Today the world has become addicted to deep sea cable, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it is very much a global centre of gravity. Huge amounts of cable has been laid across the oceans, not just the classic phone line cables to enable calls, but now overwhelmingly data driven fibre optic cables.

The internet is driven by these cables, which link sites around the world and enable the world wide web, and also our global financial services to work in practically real time. Lose these cables and suddenly there is only a very limited amount of back up available, probably via satellites in space, which would have nowhere near the bandwidth or speed to cope with the data required.

If you wanted to cause significant strategic disruption to the UK today then arguably one easy way of doing it is to deny the cables, preventing data being transmitted. Almost immediately you will have caused enormous financial damage, the economic consequences of the City being cut off from other trading hubs could have serious repercussions for trades and stock markets.

The loss of data could potentially have a very serious impact on how global businesses work, if companies have major UK data hubs, or rely on data stored in data centres overseas, then the immediate inability to access this data could potentially have very serious impact on the viability of the company to survive.

At a governmental level the inability to speak easily to partner nations would make co-ordinating a response difficult, and could potentially disrupt the routine business of government, and helping build unity of resolve to solve the crisis – meaning the nation behind the disruption would enjoy significant strategic advantage.

Finally the impact of the loss of reliable day to day internet services could have an incredibly serious impact on the British population. Whether we like to admit it or not, we are a nation of internet addicts, and rely on the net for huge parts of our daily life, from updating our status on social media, to planning holidays or doing family chats via zoom, the internet drives much of the fabric of UK social life.

If it is suddenly taken out of action, potentially for a sustained period of time, then the impact on the UK population could be significant. Unrest and disruption are likely, possibly even rising panic if people are suddenly denied access to something that has become so central to the way we live our lives. This may sound overkill, but as this article from Vietnam notes, the temporary loss of subsea internet cables had an impact on the whole country.

It is not an exaggeration to say that for a modern liberal democracy subsea cables are potentially a genuine centre of gravity, the denial of which could cause strategic defeat. The challenge for the West though is that it is potentially possible to cause significant damage to these cables in operations short of war, making it hard to work out how to deter and defend against such provocations.

From a Russian perspective, the subsea cables offer an excellent opportunity to try to tap, monitor and map out to ensure that in the event of tensions they could be cut. The Russians excel at operations that blur the line between unconventional and conventional war – how difficult would it be to ‘accidentally’ break a cable, or to carry out an operation that could cause disruption, but be hard to prove – cable breaks have occurred in the past for all manner of reasons, and being able to identify and prove beyond reasonable doubt that Russia was responsible is likely to be extremely difficult.

This threat is real and works across a range of areas – for example, the Times reported in February about Russians investigating cable landings in Ireland as being a potential security risk.

Countering this requires investment in capabilities that increase our understanding of the Russian subsea threat, and also our ability in wartime to functionally defeat it before it can do real harm.

This means not just investing in platforms like the Type 26 frigate for ASW, but also looking more widely at our intelligence capabilities – how much do we know of Russian movements, do we understand their intentions, do we know what their likely range of capabilities are? Do we understand the deep sea domain in which they want to operate, and do we have the ability to monitor and track their activities in a way that allows us sufficient assurance that the cables have not been tampered with?

There is likely to be a case for investing in a wide range of capabilities which could include enhanced funding of hydrographic capability (not necessarily ships, but the deeply specialised equipment needed to understand the sub sea domain). It may mean increased investment in detection capabilities like sonar platforms, or possibly diving teams. It may involve better use of robotics, developing equipment that can go to great depths to check for cable tampering – maybe this is the time that uncrewed miniature submarines come of age for the Royal Navy?

It also requires investment in effective intelligence sharing and co-ordination with allies – not just the traditional ’5 Eyes’ grouping, but wider NATO and beyond relationships to understand wider threats, share information on Russian activity and co-ordinate responses where appropriate. This calls for heavy investment in ‘soft power’ and diplomatic punch, for there is little point in having military capabilities if you do not co-ordinate how best to employ them.

All of this is eminently achievable – a key strength of the UK is its industrial and research base which can quickly rise to new challenges and invest in different areas. A decision in the defence review to focus resources on deterring this sort of threat, and in being able to counter the Russian presence would be deliverable and achievable – but at what price?

This is perhaps the biggest problem facing the authors of the review. There is a clearly understood threat here, and one that could pose a real challenge to our way of life if not adequately contained. But the price tag to resolve it may be significant, and there are many other issues in the defence review that need considering too.

For example, if UK policy is to adopt an approach that reflects a return to a world of great power competition and state on state conflict, then this perhaps calls for using NATO and other alliances as a vehicle to deter and contain Russian aggression.

But UK credibility in NATO relies equally heavily on the commitment of land and air forces in Eastern Europe to provide a forward battlegroup to protect the Baltic nations. This comes at a price, and its fair to say the equipment is aging (particularly for the Army) and is relatively small in scale.

If the UK wanted to thicken its deterrent capability against Russia, does it do so by investing in the sub sea domain, by taking resources away from Land capabilities in order to offer something to NATO that others cannot do. Does the UK offer to NATO look like ‘we won’t do that much on land beyond provide a thin red line wearing Union Flags to die valiantly if required, but we will keep the Alliance members safe at sea’?

How would this decision to disinvest in land-based presence and capability sit at a time when the UK wants to retain a leading role in NATO? Alternatively does the UK accept on risk that there is a credible threat from the Russian undersea reconnaissance programme, but that the risk is reduced while NATO remains credible as a deterrent on land, and that our interests are best served by thickening our presence in Eastern Europe?

The problem is that in an idea world the answer would be that both demand equal resourcing, but in a financially stretched review, where there is almost certainly going to need to be painful choices around where to invest and disinvest, something is likely to have to give.

A final option is to ask whether the scale of the threat from Russia is so great that the UK needs to rein back in its more global aspirations. Instead it would focus on delivering an enhanced presence in the North Atlantic and Europe, and fund this by withdrawing from other commitments, and relying more heavily on soft power and diplomacy.

These sorts of choices get to the heart of why it is so difficult to work out the role of defence in the 21^st century. The big challenging threats are the ones that require a lot of time, investment and people to adequately counter, but to do this means taking a lot of risk elsewhere.

There is a wider problem too of selling to a sceptical public that less platforms means their security is enhanced. The public like the image of traditional warships, tanks and planes – there is a certain sense of security that comes from seeing rows of military equipment arrayed to defend oneself, and a sense of pride too in a national capability.

But these platforms are not necessarily the right ones for the next generation of conflict – what may be needed is as much investment in safeguarding data, investing in robotics and uncrewed technology to operate in the depths of the oceans, and resources to keep our digital way of life safe from a physical threat.

We need to do this in a world where it is increasingly difficult to draw a line between peace and conflict. The Russian State has proven itself willing to act in a manner that suggests it sees no qualms about using force abroad, or in using WMD on foreign soil (see for example the Skripal incident). To them, the ability to cause disruption or chaos be it under the seas or in space is just part of the reality of great power brinksmanship and policy making, and not something to be concerned about.

How the UK responds in a coherent manner to address this sort of threat is critical – it requires more than just armoured divisions or fleets of ships. It needs a truly co-ordinated approach of hard and soft power, and a willingness to examine the lines drawn – are we now in a point where engaging in morally ambiguous ‘grey conflict’, for example using our robotic undersea submarines to protect and if needs be robustly challenge Russian submarines tapping our cables, is a serious proposition? Or are we in a world where we maintain the niceties of distinguishing between peace and war?

Finally we need to consider how the British public can be sold the reality that Data is as much a valid national security issue as safeguarding a line on the map is. Our lives rely on data, so is it something we need to take steps to fund and defend, even if that means spending less on conventional defence in the process?

The question on data is something that is gaining increased Parliamentary attention, and is likely to feature heavily in Commons debates. There is now an All Party Parliamentary Group on Technology and National Security which is researching the role of data for the review – they currently have a call out for contributions and thoughts on why data is key to the integrated review, which is likely to prove fascinating reading.

The challenge is going to be though striking a balance. The public want to feel safe, they want to feel reassured that they have coherent military power protecting them, but they also want threats countered. How the MOD and others can do this to ensure data is adequately protected while also countering other threats will be extremely difficult.

Planners will need to decide what matters more – mass or technology, and what domain requires the most protection? Will this review be remembered as one that attempted to step away from trying to do a little of everything into one much more focused set of roles, or will it be more of the same? How do you protect data in a physical manner, and how do you strike a balance between physical and virtual protection, and who funds and delivers this?

One thing is clear though, whatever happens, Defence is going to have to think ever more about the importance of data as central to the security of the realm, even if it means having less soldiers, sailors and airmen as a result.